State of Policing –
The Annual Assessment of Policing in England and Wales 2019

Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary

Presented to Parliament pursuant to section 54 of the Police Act 1996

This is a revised version of a report which was presented to Parliament on 2 July 2020 during the 2019-21 parliamentary session.

The revision takes out an error in an explanation of the relationship between two sources of police funding for the recruitment of police officers.
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Foreword

This is my report to the Secretary of State under section 54 of the Police Act 1996.

It contains my assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of policing in England and Wales, based on the inspections we carried out between May 2019 and March 2020.

This report’s structure and purpose

Part 1 contains my assessment of the state of policing in England and Wales. In making my assessment, I have drawn on the inspections we carried out over the past year, as well as the findings and reports of other organisations, and other information and analysis available to me.

Part 2 gives an overview of the findings of the inspections we carried out between 3 May 2019 and 30 March 2020, including a summary of our police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy (PEEL) inspections.

Part 3 sets out a full list of our inspections and other work in the year in question.

The results of our individual inspections enable an assessment of the performance of individual forces, or a more general assessment of performance in specific aspects of policing. I hope that people, including the
public, who hold policing to account will draw on the overall conclusions in this report just as much as they draw on the specific conclusions we have reached for each force.

**Coronavirus (COVID-19)**

After it emerged in China in December 2019, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (the virus that causes COVID-19) spread rapidly to other parts of the world. This included the United Kingdom, where the first reported cases were in January 2020.

On 30 January 2020, the World Health Organization declared an international public health emergency. In common with most other developed countries, the United Kingdom entered a period of great uncertainty and disruption to everyone’s home and working lives, on a scale not seen since the Second World War. It has profound implications for policing and the public, now and for the future.

Most of the commentary in this report relates to policing in 2019, before COVID-19 began to affect the United Kingdom. However, because this report also covers the period between January 2020 and March 2020, I have included some commentary on COVID-19. This covers three specific issues:

- first, my initial observations on the quality of the police response to the emergency (up to May 2020);
- second, COVID-19’s longer-term impact on policing, which can reasonably be anticipated to be
considerable, including the implications for much-needed police reform; and

- third, COVID-19’s impact on our organisation and our inspection programme.

I explore the first two issues later in this report. I will deal with the third now.

**Suspension of the inspection programme**

Police force inspections are important, but they are usually not urgent. In March 2020, in consultation with the Home Office, the HMICFRS Board made a series of decisions designed to support the Government’s efforts to implement the national [coronavirus action plan](https://www.gov.uk/coronavirus-action-plan). These included providing support to police forces.

All inspections create administrative work for forces. We always do everything we reasonably can to minimise this, but it can’t be eliminated. Because of the extraordinary demands on forces created by COVID-19, we decided to suspend indefinitely all inspection work needing appreciable input from police forces. There were isolated exceptions, where forces asked us to proceed with an urgent inspection visit. We agreed to these while following the social distancing guidelines.
Staff redeployments

Effective inspections require police experience in the teams carrying them out, so our workforce always includes a cohort of experienced police officers. These officers come to us on temporary secondment from their home forces. While working with us, they inspect police forces other than their home forces.

Because of the urgent need for the police to assemble and deploy extra capacity during the emergency, we offered to support any requests from forces for their seconded police officers to return temporarily. As we anticipated, many such requests followed. Most of our seconded officers returned to their home forces, where their skills and experience were in particularly high demand.

We made a similar decision to support the temporary redeployment of civil servants who work at HMICFRS. Many were temporarily redeployed to other parts of the Government, to support vital work in managing the emergency response. At the request of the Home Office and the National Police Chiefs’ Council, we also temporarily redeployed staff to work in the National Police Coordination Centre.¹

¹ The National Police Coordination Centre is responsible for co-ordinating the deployment of police officers and staff from across UK policing to support forces during large-scale events, operations and in times of national crisis – for example, large-scale flooding and civil emergencies.
Office closure

As many other organisations did, we temporarily closed our offices. We asked the rest of our staff to carry out their normal duties while working from home. Many did so while looking after their children during school closures, or while caring for vulnerable friends, neighbours or relatives who needed to self-isolate.

With a temporarily depleted and remote workforce, we used the period of suspension as an opportunity to carry out some other vitally important inspection-related tasks. These included the design work for our future PEEL inspections and preparing for our inspection programme to resume.

I would like to place on record my very great thanks to all HMICFRS staff, whether they returned to their home police forces, supported the National Police Coordination Centre, supported the fire and rescue sector or other parts of government, or stayed at the inspectorate. In these extremely difficult and unusual circumstances, they have continued to work hard, support each other and display our values in everything they do.

Changes to our PEEL programme

Since its introduction in 2015, our PEEL programme has continued to evolve. In 2019, we completed the round of integrated PEEL assessments that we started in 2018. Looking ahead, for our PEEL inspections in
2020 and beyond, we intend to adopt an intelligence-led continuous assessment approach. This will involve making greater use of evidence collected throughout the year.

Part 2 of this report describes in more detail the results of the 2018–20 integrated PEEL assessments and our plans for PEEL 2020 (subject to the inspection programme starting again).

HMI Phil Gormley

In March 2020, HMI Phil Gormley tendered his resignation. I pay warm tribute to Mr Gormley for his achievements as HMI with responsibility for inspecting the forces of northern England.

Mr Gormley brought to HMICFRS his substantial experience in policing and put it to very good use here, to the considerable advantage of our organisation, policing and the public.

I wish Mr Gormley every success in his new role as chief executive of East Anglia Children’s Hospices, a charity that I know is very close to his heart.

Contributions to my assessment

My assessment is enriched substantially by the contributions of others.

As in previous years, when compiling my assessment, I wrote to chief constables, local policing bodies (police
and crime commissioners and their equivalents\(^2\) and other interested parties. I asked them to set out their views. As ever, I am indebted to them for the large number of very helpful responses I received.

Another major contribution to my assessment comes from HMICFRS staff, whose unique, highly valuable perspective comes from their day-to-day work inspecting police forces.

A substantial proportion of our inspection work is carried out jointly with the other criminal justice inspectorates: Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons; Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation; and Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate. Their expertise adds considerable value to our work.

For all these contributions, I offer my warm thanks. I have been struck by the broad consensus across all these groups, particularly on the immense demands faced by the police and other parts of the criminal justice system.

**Sir Thomas P Winsor**
Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary

\(^2\) Local policing bodies are charged with securing the efficient and effective policing of police areas. Of these, 40 are elected as police and crime commissioners. The rest are: the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (which covers the Metropolitan Police Service); the City of London Corporation’s Court of Common Council (which covers the City of London Police); and the Mayor of Greater Manchester (who covers Greater Manchester Police).
Part 1: Overview

Overview

This year’s assessment starts with my initial observations on the quality of the police response to the public health emergency created by COVID-19, and the wider demands the police faced during 2019.

A series of principal points follows. They are all connected to a central theme: the need for reform in policing. This is in terms of the police service’s structure and the arrangements for:

• making good use of an additional 20,000 officers;
• funding the service;
• selecting and developing chief officers;
• collaboration and integration between police forces and other public services; and
• designing and using evidence-based, sustainable approaches to solve policing problems.

I explore how considerable reform is needed for the police to meet public expectations consistently.
The police are overcoming major problems and responding to COVID-19

The policing of the public health emergency is one of the biggest challenges the police have faced in recent years. It is highly unusual in its scale, complexity and duration. It comes at a time when the numbers of police officers and staff are among their lowest since 2010, when the number of full-time equivalent police workers peaked at 244,497.¹ Since 2010, there has been a downward trend, although we saw two small consecutive annual increases in police workers in 2018 and 2019. As at the end of March 2019, there were 20,564 fewer police officers and 15,185 fewer police staff than there were at the same point in 2010.² In terms of the total police workforce, this was 17 percent below 2010 levels.

As police numbers fell, the size of the general population grew. The relationship isn’t linear, but the more people there are, the more offenders and victims there are likely to be. Between 2010 and 2019, the population of England and Wales grew from 55.7 million to 59.4 million, an increase of 7 percent.³

¹ On 30 September 2019, the total workforce (officers, staff, police community support officers, designated officers and traffic wardens) was 204,815, of which 124,784 were police officers. Source: Police workforce, England and Wales, as at 30 September 2019, Home Office, 30 January 2020.
³ Estimates of the population for the UK, England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, Office for National Statistics.
More recently, police numbers have begun to rise – and they can be expected to rise much further. Later in my report, I will comment on how the Government plans to return police numbers to 2009 levels by March 2023. But the police workforce is facing this unprecedented crisis at its current, not future, capacity.

**Plans were put into action**

A significant and abiding strength of the police service is its ability to respond quickly and effectively to civil emergencies, even with limited resources. In recent months, COVID-19 has tested this strength in individual police forces and across the whole police service. To its credit, the service has responded well.

Police forces routinely plan for civil emergencies, usually as part of multi-agency arrangements involving local resilience forums. At the start of 2020, they had to put their plans into action, adapting rapidly to overcome a series of challenges created by COVID-19. Among the first was the repatriation and quarantine of infected people returning from abroad. Merseyside Police, for example, policed Arrowe Park Hospital, which housed many people who needed to be quarantined on their return from China in January 2020.
Police tried to enforce lockdown restrictions sensitively

A major challenge for the police was how to interpret and enforce regulations the Government urgently introduced on 26 March 2020 to slow the transmission of the disease. Generally, these regulations severely restricted the public’s freedom of movement and required many businesses and services to be suspended.

The third of the ‘Peelian principles’, all of which were created in 1829, reminds the police:

“to recognise always that to secure and maintain the respect and approval of the public means also the securing of the willing co-operation of the public in the task of securing observance of laws.”

As quickly as the public had to adapt to life under the regulations, the police had to learn how to enforce them. And they had to do so while trying to maintain the public’s approval and consent, at a time of considerable anxiety and uncertainty.

When encountering people in public places during the lockdown, police officers had to determine whether they had a reasonable excuse for leaving their homes. In this respect, the regulations were open to some

interpretation and, on 22 April 2020, they had to be amended. The amendment established that people needed a reasonable excuse not just for leaving their homes but for remaining outside their homes.6

In a relatively small number of cases, officers misinterpreted or misapplied the regulations. Separate legislation,7 designed to deal with people who may be infectious, was more problematic. In May 2020, a Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) review revealed that all 44 cases under the Coronavirus Act 2020 were found to have been incorrectly charged. They had to be withdrawn or returned to court.8

There were also indications of an inconsistent approach between police forces. Over the first weekend that the regulations were in place, 27–29 March 2020, some forces issued over a hundred fixed penalty notices for breaches of the regulations; others issued none.9

However, these concerns are balanced by numerous indications of a sensitive, careful approach, for which the police’s efforts should be recognised. Working closely together, the National Police Chiefs’ Council and the College of Policing rapidly developed and published joint guidance on how to police the

7 The Coronavirus Act 2020.
lockdown. Officers were guided to use a four-stage approach of: “engage; explain; encourage; and, only if necessary, enforce”. The guidance was crystal clear that enforcement should be a last resort.¹⁰

**Enforcement was at times firm**

In early spring 2020, many will have seen the extensive media coverage of near-deserted streets across England and Wales. And in the early days of the lockdown, the whole police service issued relatively few fixed penalty notices for breaches of the coronavirus regulations. In the cases where offences were tried at court, convictions usually followed.¹¹

Later, the police had to take a slightly firmer line, particularly during the sunny Easter weekend (10–13 April 2020) when more people sought to venture out without reasonable excuse. And in the weeks that followed, the number of fixed penalty notices continued to rise. Police issued a total of 9,176 notices during the period 27 March 2020 to 27 April 2020.¹²

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¹¹ Oral evidence from the Police Federation’s ‘operational lead’, the Police Superintendents’ Association president, and four chief constables (from Derbyshire, Bedfordshire, North Yorkshire, South Yorkshire) to the Home Affairs Committee, conducted remotely by video-conferencing on 6 April 2020.

During the COVID-19 emergency, the extent to which the police need to resort to their enforcement powers will be defined by the limit of public forbearance. By May 2020, that limit hadn’t been reached. However, on 1 June 2020 (as this assessment went to print and as lockdown restrictions were beginning to be eased) the public’s willingness to observe the remaining restrictions was increasingly being called into question. Some police leaders voiced concerns about the service’s ability to enforce lockdown effectively in the event of strong public resistance.

**Problems with personal protective equipment created risks to health and safety**

Of course, the public’s attention has rightly focused on the bravery of those working in the National Health Service, who take sustained and exceptional personal risks every day when caring for patients with the virus. Some National Health Service personnel have made the ultimate sacrifice while saving the lives of others. Such high levels of public service motivation – even to the detriment of individual wellbeing – are in the police’s DNA too.

During the COVID-19 emergency, one of the challenges facing the police was to make sure personal protective equipment was available to all officers who needed it. Particularly during the early stages of the emergency, it wasn’t always available: officers had to work without it, often placing themselves in harm’s way. Another challenge was providing officers with
reliable and consistent advice on how and when to use this equipment. Some of the advice was confusing and contradictory.\textsuperscript{13}

Some officers lost their lives to COVID-19. The police’s bravery, and the personal sacrifices of many officers, should not go unrecognised.

**Demand changed during the COVID-19 emergency**

The police have also had to adapt quickly to changes in demand during the emergency. In some welcome respects, demands on the police fell. Chief constables reported reductions in the volume of phone calls (both 999 emergency calls and 101 non-emergency calls), fewer arrests, and less crime, particularly acquisitive crime, such as burglary. Based on provisional figures, reported crime went down by 28 percent in the four weeks to 12 April 2020, compared with the same period last year.\textsuperscript{14} There was an increase in the proportion of crime reported online, rather than in person or over the phone.

But in other respects, demand increased. The charity Refuge reported that, during the week commencing 30 March 2020, calls to its domestic abuse helpline increased by an average of 25 percent.\textsuperscript{15} The charity

\textsuperscript{13} Home Office preparedness for Covid-19 (Coronavirus): Policing, Home Affairs Committee, 17 April 2020, paragraph 40.

\textsuperscript{14} Data provided by the National Police Chiefs’ Council. Available at: Update: Covid-19 FPN data, and chiefs urge public to keep reporting crime, National Police Chiefs’ Council, 15 April 2020.

\textsuperscript{15} See: 25% increase in calls to National Domestic Abuse Helpline since lockdown measures began, Refuge, 6 April 2020.
also saw a 150 percent increase in the number of online visits to its website\textsuperscript{16} during the initial stages of the lockdown. The relevant National Police Chiefs’ Council lead officer issued a statement, reaffirming that tackling domestic abuse remained a police priority.\textsuperscript{17} Chief constables also reported concerns about increases in child sexual abuse, including online abuse, and other forms of online crime generally, including fraud.

Some criminals even used COVID-19 as an opportunity to defraud people. By mid-April, Google reported that it was blocking 18 million scam emails related to COVID-19 each day. During the first month of lockdown, the National Crime Agency (NCA), working with the National Cyber Security Centre and the City of London Police, took down more than 2,000 illicit websites relating to COVID-19. These included fake online shops, malware distribution sites and phishing sites seeking personal information such as passwords or credit card details.\textsuperscript{18}

Some forces raised concerns about road safety during the lockdown, with some people speeding while the roads were quieter.

\textsuperscript{16} See: National Domestic Abuse Helpline.
\textsuperscript{17} See: Domestic Abuse victims urged to keep seeking help during Coronavirus outbreak, National Police Chiefs’ Council, 4 April 2020.
COVID-19 will affect the future of policing and the criminal justice system

There will undoubtedly be many more lessons for the police service, other public services, and local and central government to learn from COVID-19. We are already supporting the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s work to evaluate emerging crime trends, and we anticipate the scope of our support to expand. When our inspection programme resumes in due course, we will play an even bigger part in helping the police learn the lessons.

Other public services have been affected too. For example, the criminal justice system – already struggling in many respects – will face displaced demands that it will find hard to meet. On 23 March 2020, it was announced that no new jury trial should start in the Crown Court.\textsuperscript{19} Trials already under way were concluded and, by 24 April 2020, no trials were under way.\textsuperscript{20} As this assessment was being finalised, plans were being made to resume jury trials, but only in a few courts.\textsuperscript{21} There was already a considerable backlog of cases awaiting Crown Court trial.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{21} See: Jury trials to resume this month, Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, 11 May 2020.
\textsuperscript{22} Criminal court statistics quarterly, England and Wales, October to December 2019, Ministry of Justice, 26 March 2020.
Unavoidably, the disruption will add to the backlog, and it raises serious questions about the viability of the system; justice delayed is justice denied.

But this is just one aspect of a much bigger problem.

In last year’s assessment, I described the criminal justice system as dysfunctional and defective. Since then, there has been little substantial improvement in its condition. Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunal Service is part way through a programme of reform, but it has made less progress than expected and its ambition has been scaled back.\(^{23}\) In England, the proposed Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, announced in late 2019, is not yet under way. In Wales, there has been more progress: the report of the Commission on Justice in Wales proposes comprehensive reforms.\(^{24}\)

Arguably, the imperative has never been greater for these (and other) reforms in the interests of efficiency. COVID-19 is already having a far-reaching and long-lasting effect on public finances. It is reasonable to expect that funding for public services will soon be in much shorter supply than envisaged a matter of months ago.

I have devoted the rest of my assessment to the state of policing that prevailed in 2019, before

\(^{23}\) *Transforming courts and tribunals – a progress update*, National Audit Office, 6 September 2019, HC 2638, pages 6 and 7.

\(^{24}\) *Justice in Wales for the People of Wales*, Commission on Justice in Wales, 24 October 2019.
COVID-19 emerged. It includes my observations on the reforms that will be necessary for the police service to gain, and keep, acceptable levels of effectiveness and efficiency in the years to come. To a considerable extent, the police service’s success will be defined by the urgency and resolve with which these reforms can be made.

However, before turning to the reforms, I will comment on the other demands the police have had to deal with during 2019. These placed the police service under considerable pressure.25

There are considerable pressures on the police

Following a long-term reduction, levels of crime have stayed broadly stable in recent years. The latest available national statistics (for the year ending December 2019) estimate a 5 percent reduction in overall levels of crime for the year. But it is too early to say whether this is a change in the recent trend.26

This insight, which comes from the Office for National Statistics, is important and helps to put into context any discussion about demands on the police. But, behind the headline statistics, there is a more complex picture.

Vulnerable and mentally ill people present major demands

Many forces report increases in demand, particularly in responding to the needs of vulnerable people. This is usually because other public services have been withdrawn or scaled back. Generally, incidents involving vulnerable or mentally ill people are complex and time-consuming for the police to deal with.

There remain high levels of mental illness, and drug and alcohol dependency, among those taken into police custody. Many of the problems I reported in *State of Policing 2018* are still of concern. In particular, serious weaknesses in the provision of mental health services place more demands on the police.

For example, Greater Manchester Police told us its officers and staff are dealing with more people with mental illness than ever before. Avon and Somerset Constabulary told us it experienced an 8 percent annual increase in mental health-related calls in 2019. The force also said that, in 2018, 70 percent of the 1,228 people it detained under section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 had been detained before.

Dyfed-Powys Police and Hywel Dda Health Board operate a joint mental health triage team. Services of this nature may be effective; arguably, their necessity is heightened because mental health provision alone is inadequate. This raises wider questions about the role of the police. If they are expected to concentrate on crime and disorder, the Government may need to
consider specifying to what extent the police should be dealing with mental health-related incidents. Next year, with the other criminal justice inspectorates and the Care Quality Commission, we intend to carry out a joint inspection to assess how offenders with mental ill-health are treated in the criminal justice system.

Other demands on the police are increasing too. South Wales Police told us it had a 65 percent increase in missing person cases over the past year; and Northamptonshire Police forecasts a 43 percent increase by 2022. It isn’t a crime to go missing from home but, whenever people are reported missing, the police must establish their whereabouts and whether any crime has been committed. And, as far as they can, the police must protect the person who has gone missing from becoming a victim of crime. Children missing from care homes are at particular risk of criminal exploitation, which can result in them becoming victims, offenders, or both. Cambridgeshire Constabulary told us that, in the 12 months to November 2019, it had received 657 missing from home reports for children in care.

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Serious organised crime and terrorism are major threats

The NCA estimates there to be more than 350,000 people involved in serious and organised crime in the UK. For the police, this presents major challenges. Offences such as organised fraud; money laundering; cybercrime; drug, firearm and human trafficking; and modern slavery are particularly complex to investigate. They often need months – and sometimes years – of painstaking work.

These offences also require high levels of specialist expertise, in dealing with extremely vulnerable people and in areas such as digital forensics, especially when mobile phones and other devices have been encrypted to frustrate law enforcement. Encryption is increasingly available to less-sophisticated offenders. There were nearly half a million reports of suspicious financial activity in 2019, another record number. Some investigations involve lines of enquiry into the use of crypto-currencies.

Terrorism remains a major threat. In November 2019, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre revised its assessment of the threat to the United Kingdom from terrorism. After a lengthy period at ‘severe’, the threat

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level was reduced to ‘substantial’.³⁰ This means that an attack is deemed to be likely, but not highly likely.

On 29 November 2019, a recently released terrorism prisoner carried out an attack on London Bridge, during which he stabbed five people, two of whom died. On 2 February 2020, another recently released terrorism prisoner carried out a separate attack in which he stabbed two people in Streatham, London. In both cases, police very quickly shot the attacker dead (in the second case, the attacker was under police surveillance at the time). This undoubtedly saved the lives of innocent people. But, even in our cities, providing such rapid police response times creates substantial demands on forces.

**Demonstrations and flooding created additional demands**

There have also been many public order demands on the police during 2019, often related to Brexit demonstrations and far right-wing activism. The police also had to prepare to deal with any civil unrest in the event of a ‘no deal’ Brexit.

In summer 2019, Extinction Rebellion caused major disruption in cities, creating extra demands on forces such as the Metropolitan Police, South Wales Police, Avon and Somerset Constabulary and West Yorkshire Police. Elsewhere, Warwickshire Police reported larger

³⁰ See: Threat levels, MI5.
and more frequent protests against the new HS2 rail link’s construction. And in June 2019, Surrey Police and Sussex Police co-ordinated a road safety and public order operation to deal with a large-scale international Hells Angels gathering. It resulted in 34 arrests.  

Flooding has been a particular problem for the police this year. In August 2019, when part of a dam collapsed after very heavy rain, it created a complex and demanding incident for Derbyshire Constabulary, with a nearby village having to be evacuated. In February 2020, floods attributable to storms Ciara and Dennis created very substantial demands on several police forces, including West Mercia Police, South Yorkshire Police, South Wales Police and – again – Derbyshire Constabulary.  

The demands on the police are complex, many and varied, and forces regularly struggle to meet them. So a recent Government announcement to increase resources was welcome.

32 At least one force declared a major incident. See: Storm Dennis: Major Incident Update, South Wales Police, 16 February 2020.
Planned increases in resources need careful handling

In October 2019, the Home Office announced an uplift programme with more funding for the police service. This involved plans to increase police officer numbers by 20,000 over the next three years, including 6,000 by the end of 2020/21. In response, forces have begun to increase the size of their recruitment intakes.34

An increase in officer numbers on this scale will have a tangible and beneficial effect on the service. The significance of this should not be underestimated. Put simply, the police service will be able to meet more of the demands it faces. In every sense, these benefits are welcome.

However, in the interest of managing public and political expectations, wider observations need to be made about the programme. There also needs to be a debate about the disadvantages of viewing police effectiveness solely by the number of officers in the service, or by percentage changes in the volume of recorded or detected crime.

33 See: Home Office announces first wave of 20,000 police officer uplift, Home Office, 9 October 2019.
34 Provisional figures released by the Home Office show that the first 3,005 additional officers were recruited by 31 March 2020. Source: Police officer uplift, England and Wales, quarterly update to 31 March 2020, Home Office, 30 April 2020.
Success must be measured more intelligently

In purely numerical terms, the effect of the uplift programme will broadly be to reverse the reductions in police numbers. As the numbers went down, some elements of police demand went up. But, in any case, policing isn’t just about the number of officers, and it would be wrong to measure its effectiveness in this way. For example, in schools and colleges, the quality of education isn’t best defined by the number of teachers: it’s best defined by the results of the process – progress, attainment and exam results.

In policing, the desired ‘results of the process’ are straightforward to define but more complex to assess. The first Peelian principle – the prevention of crime and disorder – offers a valid starting point. It is certainly legitimate to expect the police to focus on preventing crime and disorder. But specifically what crimes, why, to what extent, and by what means should they be prevented or detected? Put simply, forces have to prioritise.

The risk is that targets based on crudely drawn percentage measures will lead to perverse outcomes. They have repeatedly done so in the past, to an unacceptable extent and with disastrous results.

For example, during the 1990s and early 2000s, in numerous towns and cities across England and Wales, the widespread and systematic physical, sexual and emotional abuse of vulnerable children was, to a considerable extent, ignored or tolerated. At the time,
police forces tended to focus on other priorities such as burglary, street robbery, criminal damage, anti-social behaviour and car crime. As a result, in too many respects, child abuse went unchecked. The full extent of police and other public service failings are now being laid bare through the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse.

Recruitment in very high numbers will be difficult

It will be a major undertaking for forces to recruit and train student officers in such large numbers. Over the past five years, an average of 6 percent of police officers have left the service each year. This is usually through normal retirement, with smaller numbers resigning before retirement, leaving through medical retirement or, in a few cases, being dismissed. So forces have to recruit in significant numbers simply to keep the workforce at its present level. There will also be a need to recruit more police staff to support the newly recruited officers.

Taking these factors into account, the police service will need to recruit and train a total of 54,000 people over the three-year period. The police may be given the funding to recruit in such large numbers, but this is no guarantee that it will be possible in practice. The recruitment process will need considerable effort and resources.

The inexperience of new recruits will be a concern

The recruitment process will result in a disproportionately high number of inexperienced student officers in response policing, where new police officers usually start their careers. In some forces, inexperience at the front line is already a concern.\(^{36}\) Inexperienced officers may also need to tutor, mentor and supervise student officers. When fully recruited, it will take time for this 20,000-strong cohort to develop the skills and experience it will need to become fully effective. Similarly, it will take time for the uplift programme’s effect to be felt on the previously reported national shortage of detectives, which police leaders are working hard to address.\(^{37}\)

On a positive note, the uplift presents a good opportunity for the police leadership to improve diversity in the police workforce. Currently, no more than a third of police officers are women, and fewer than one in ten officers are from an ethnic minority.\(^{38}\)

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\(^{36}\) Metropolitan Police Service: An inspection of the Metropolitan Police Service’s response to a review of its investigations into allegations of non-recent sexual abuse by prominent people (the Henriques report), HMICFRS, 13 March 2020, page 54.


\(^{38}\) Leading Lights: An inspection of the police service’s arrangements for the selection and development of chief officers, HMICFRS, 3 September 2019, pages 63 and 64.
Police funding arrangements carry limitations

There are other limitations associated with the uplift funding. These include its relatively short-term nature and the wider police funding arrangements, the formula for which continues to attract considerable criticism. There are deep-rooted problems with the funding formula, which the uplift money doesn’t address. The Home Office should review the funding formula.

I have said before that short-term funding is problematic for the police. Forces must balance new, longer-term capital investment (for example, in technological capability) with shorter-term funding for frontline services. Leaders must often make difficult choices. This can mean critical or mandatory services having to be prioritised at the expense of other, less urgent ones.

An unwanted effect of short-term funding arrangements is the way they often impede new and longer-term investment. As a result, in some respects, particularly technology, policing is gradually falling further behind some other aspects of society. A good example of this is the Police National Database, to which a few forces’ information systems still aren’t properly connected. This is despite the police service treating the matter as a critical incident during 2019.

Short-term funding also hampers organisational development in other areas, such as force-level violent crime reduction units and regional-level
organised crime units. Units of this nature often rely on dedicated annual funding that is made available for specific projects.

Also, a significant percentage of the NCA’s funding comes in this way. The NCA’s inability to hold financial reserves from year to year makes this funding arrangement particularly problematic.

More sustainable funding arrangements are undoubtedly needed. They could be implemented in the form of, say, rolling three-year programmes, adjusted each year. This would be an enormous aid to strategic planning.

Forces also face uncertainty over the costs of delays in providing the new Emergency Services Network. This £9.3 billion programme is to replace and upgrade the police and other emergency services’ mobile communication systems, but it is delayed by three years.39 Until December 2022, the police service won’t be able to make the expected efficiency gains from the new system. And, in the interim, at least one force reports having to replace worn-out radio hardware with new but outdated hardware, to continue working on the current system. These are major financial and operational risks.

Chief officer selection needs an overhaul

In 2019, we inspected the police service’s arrangements for selecting and developing chief officers.\textsuperscript{40} The inspection revealed major weaknesses, which, if not properly addressed, will have a profoundly adverse effect on the police service. The police service needs the right leadership capability and capacity to modernise and restructure effectively. The main findings and recommendations from the inspection appear later, in Part 2 of my assessment. The College of Policing has already done a considerable amount of work to address them, but there is more to do.

The service needs to become much better at maximising the potential of its people. The current arrangements are leading to parochialism and a significant drop in applicants for the most senior roles. This raises questions about whether and how future chief constables are being identified and provided with the extensive range of experiences and development they need to become fully equipped for the role.

It also highlights the effect of changes to the role of HMICFRS. Before 2011, Inspectors of Constabulary played an active role in advising police authorities as

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Leading Lights: An inspection of the police service’s arrangements for the selection and development of chief officers}, HMICFRS, 3 September 2019.
they recruited new chief officers. This advisory role required Inspectors to have an in-depth understanding of the merits of each candidate. Inspectors often sat on recruitment panels. They gave a professional view on the quality of evidence each candidate offered, while not taking part in the panel’s decision making. Generally, the system worked well. However, it was discontinued when police and crime commissioners were introduced, and it wasn’t replaced with anything more suitable. As a result, we, local policing bodies and chief officers all report weaknesses with the current selection and development arrangements.

**The 43-force structure needs reform**

In some important respects, the current 43-force structure is no longer fit for purpose. It hasn’t been for many years, and its shortcomings shouldn’t be considered less important than other policing matters. As I have said before, in too many respects, the lines on the map that delineate force boundaries act as barriers to the exchange of intelligence, to co-operation, and to true effectiveness and efficiency.

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41 Extensive reforms to police governance arrangements, including the role of the inspectorate, were a feature of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011.
A 1960s structure can’t cope well with modern criminality

The origins of the 43-force structure go back to the 1960s. So, by decades, they pre-date many things that society now takes for granted in modern life: for example, the internet and mobile phones, mass access to affordable vehicle ownership, and rail and air travel (although these have been interrupted by COVID-19).

These things have in many respects enriched human life, increasing our mobility and making us better connected than ever before. But they have also enabled criminality, the types and scales of which were wholly unimaginable in the 1960s. Online fraud and other forms of cybercrime are now among the greatest crime threats to the public. Rural police forces may face bigger challenges from cross-border drug dealing along ‘county lines’ than from domestic burglary. Many organised crime groups transport drugs by train, taking advantage of the ‘cover’ provided by the considerable increases in rail passenger volumes of recent years.

Since the 1960s, in many respects, policing has been modernised at various times, but not to the degree it needs. The establishment of regional organised crime units, and the creation, in October 2013, of the NCA have both helped the police to tackle serious and

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organised crime, much of which is online and crosses regional, national and international borders. And there are many examples of innovative, creative and determined efforts by dedicated police leaders. But, with its current structure, the service still isn’t configured to deal with these crimes – and some other modern forms of criminality – as well as the public has the right to expect.43

**Online and cross-border crime demand more co-ordination and co-operation**

The service’s current structure provides a sensible blueprint for tackling ‘local’ crimes – those where the crime scene, offender, victim and witnesses are all conveniently located in one force area. But the inescapable fact is that an increasing proportion of crime isn’t local.

To tackle it more successfully, there needs to be more systematic co-ordination and co-operation between police forces, and between the police and the NCA. This co-ordination and co-operation should be on a greater scale. There is an increasingly pressing need to develop an effective and efficient single system of law enforcement, with clear local, regional and national components. In this respect, the findings of a serious

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43 *Fraud: Time to Choose – An inspection of the police response to fraud*, HMICFRS, 2 April 2019. See also: *Cyber: Keep the light on – An inspection of the police response to cyber-dependent crime*, HMICFRS, 24 October 2019.
and organised crime review commissioned by the Home Office in October 2019 will be welcome.  

**A redesign should lead to further modernisation**

Put simply, this should involve going back to first principles, whereby the police service works out what capabilities and capacity it needs to tackle crime effectively and efficiently. It should then reorganise accordingly, defining what should be done locally, regionally and nationally. The process should involve comprehensively mapping out the real patterns of demand and offending. This should be not just on a geographical basis but in public, private and virtual environments too.

To some extent, forces already try to do this, through force- and regional-level strategic threat and risk assessments. And the NCA produces the [National Strategic Assessment of serious and organised crime](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-strategic-assessment-2020-national-strategic-assessment-2020), the current version of which describes “a rapidly evolving threat that is becoming increasingly complex as criminals exploit the fast expansion of technology”. These processes are valuable and worthwhile, but they tend to be used for decision making within current organisational structures. They don’t guide the service towards redesigning or modifying its structure to the degree it needs.

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Until the structure of policing in England and Wales has been substantially modernised in this way, the service’s efficiency will continue to be compromised. And it will remain unable to cope well with the local, regional, national and international patterns of crime we now commonly experience.

In some respects, the police have made progress. For example, most forces have signed up to the ‘single online home’, which is designed to give the public a consistent means of interacting online with police forces. But generally, the police’s information and communications technology (ICT) arrangements are unnecessarily expensive and don’t work together well enough. There is ample room for improvement.

**Leaders should seize the options for change**

There are various options open to leaders – among both police leaders and elected representatives – to develop better-connected and integrated structures, systems and processes. These improvements would make the service more fit for its 21st-century purpose.

**The Home Office should take a stronger leadership role**

First, there is an important role for the Home Office to play, particularly in making regional and national functions work more efficiently and effectively – with each other and with local police forces.
I welcome the establishment of the National Policing Board. The Home Secretary chairs this group, which includes other ministers and is attended by the leaders of all the principal policing institutions. It too has an important role to play.

In last year’s assessment, I described how there may need to be compulsory, rather than voluntary, reform. For example, there would be considerable advantage in a national prescription of capabilities and resourcing levels of regional organised crime units. Under the current arrangements, chief constables and local policing bodies must only “have regard” to the Strategic Policing Requirement.45

When contemplating these sorts of reforms, there is clearly a balance to strike between the central and the local. Both are necessary, if the service is to tackle its structural problems while maintaining local accountability.

Also, as I said earlier, the unequal nature of the police funding formula needs attention. This also needs the Home Office’s leadership. Until the formula is improved, we can expect to see more examples of police forces applying for Home Office special grant funding (usually reserved for unexpected and exceptional policing demands), simply to make ends meet.46

The College of Policing should play a more prominent role

Second, there is the College of Policing’s role in establishing common procedures and practices. Policing isn’t regulated in any way resembling the economic or safety regulatory regimes in other safety-critical essential public services such as nuclear energy, transport, telecommunications and broadcasting. HMICFRS is not a regulator; regulators have powers of intervention, direction and enforcement. Because of the special powers invested in police officers, British policing has never been – and should never be – under that degree of control.

But that doesn’t mean forces shouldn’t have to adhere to regional and national procedures and practices when they are established fairly and are clearly in the public interest. Establishing these procedures and practices is properly the responsibility of the Home Office with the approval of the College of Policing; better still, their introduction should be prompted by the College, with the Home Office facilitating the process.

With some exceptions – such as discipline arrangements and police officer ranks – forces are largely free to operate in the way they consider most suitable for their local demands.\(^{47}\) This arrangement gives police forces considerable freedom, which

\(^{47}\) The regulations include: Police Regulations 2003/527; Police (Conduct) Regulations 2012; Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012; and Police (Performance) Regulations 2012.
is generally welcome. But it can come at a cost. For example, differing procedures and practices between forces can cause operating standards and performance to become unacceptably inconsistent. Or procedures can vary so much that forces find it hard to work together when they need to, such as during major incidents and civil emergencies.

Since May 2014, legislation has been in place that requires the Home Secretary, under certain conditions, to make regulations if asked to by the College of Policing. Such regulations would require one or more police forces to “adopt particular procedures or practices; or to adopt procedures or practices of a particular description”.\(^{48}\)

Arguments in favour of the College making use of this legislation are becoming increasingly strong. For example, this year we recommended its use to improve the way chief constables select candidates for assessment and development into chief officer roles.\(^{49}\) When our inspections expose unacceptable weaknesses in policing practice, we may recommend more regulation.


\(^{49}\) Leading Lights: An inspection of the police service’s arrangements for the selection and development of chief officers, HMICFRS, 3 September 2019, recommendation 1, page 14.
Chief constables and local policing bodies should overcome parochialism

Third, there are the roles of chief constables and local policing bodies, who are responsible for making local decisions on policing. There is an inherent tension between decisions that benefit an individual police force or local community and decisions that benefit other police forces (usually the others in the region) or the police service in general. We often see this tension arise when forces look to enter, or withdraw from, collaboration agreements. We are increasingly seeing the latter, which raises major concerns; I will comment on this later.

Of course, local, regional and national policing interests aren’t mutually exclusive. But it can be difficult for chief constables and local policing bodies to reconcile them. To an unacceptable degree, major decisions can be influenced by parochialism.

More needs to be done to remedy the disadvantages of the current structure, while protecting its advantages. If the 43-force structure is to survive in its current or a somewhat modified form, there will remain a need for far more efficient and effective arrangements – which apply to all Home Office forces and the NCA – for making decisions about things that must be done the same way everywhere. That is not to say that local accountability should be abandoned; it is and will remain very important and must be protected. But it needs to be balanced with much better assurances that
forces will act in the regional and national policing interest when there is a case to do so.

The network code concept, which I have commented on before, is such a case.\textsuperscript{50} A network code is a collective decision-making mechanism for establishing and securing adherence to principles, practices and procedures that need to be common on a regional or national basis, using a system of voting. The United Kingdom has already introduced such mechanisms in several essential public services. The legal technology already exists: it is tried and tested, and it works. Since 2016, I have been calling for chief constables and local policing bodies to pool their sovereignty by signing up to a network code.

Some may be reluctant to do so. One of the obstacles is the very diverse nature of the 43 forces, in terms of the size of the forces and the geographical areas they cover. For example, the demands facing the Metropolitan Police Service are extraordinarily different from those facing Cumbria Constabulary. Replicated 43 times over, this can make collective decision making at best problematic and at worst impossible.

But many aspects of policing are common to all forces. And in respect of many systems and procedures, there are strong arguments in favour of making collective rather than individual decisions, to prompt closer alignment.

Police ICT is a powerful example. Closer alignment and commonality in this and many other aspects of policing would lead to considerable improvements in effectiveness and efficiency. With measures such as weighted voting, minority protections and different voting thresholds for different decisions, a well-conceived network code would successfully guide the service to a better balance between local, regional and national policing interests.

In other words, it would help to overcome parochialism. Police leaders – and, in some cases, leaders of other parts of the criminal justice system too – should adopt a network code.

**Policing and other public services need greater integration**

My assessment describes the state of policing, not the state of other public services. But, of course, policing doesn’t operate in a vacuum. Policing and some other public services are closely linked; the level of investment in one service will have an effect – good or bad – on another. For example, gaps in youth services can mean that young people aren’t diverted from crime.
They can go on to offend, placing demands on the police and the criminal justice system.\(^{51}\)

Policing is most closely linked with education; health (particularly mental health), drug and alcohol dependency support; housing; and social services. But it isn’t only these services that can pass demand onto the police. For example, Dyfed-Powys Police told us its officers are increasingly administering first aid or transporting casualties to hospital. This is because ambulances aren’t always available to attend the scenes of incidents quickly enough.

There are good examples of the police and fire and rescue services working well together. Generally, demands on the police and health services are going up, whereas demands on fire and rescue services are going down. In South Yorkshire, for example, if people needing urgent medical attention are found in locked buildings, the fire and rescue service now forces entry for the ambulance service. This was previously carried out by the police. Some fire and rescue services are using spare capacity to carry out community safety work, which also benefits the police. Some local policing bodies have taken responsibility for the local fire and rescue service as well as the local police force, but none has integrated them in a comprehensive way.

\(^{51}\) *Both sides of the coin: The police and National Crime Agency’s response to vulnerable people in ‘county lines’ drug offending*, HMICFRS, 10 January 2020, page 25.
Poor service integration perpetuates the circularity of offending

There are many good examples of the police and other public services working well together. But, generally, at the local level there needs to be better integration between the police and other services. Without this, there can only be an unco-ordinated response, particularly to the needs of vulnerable people. This can make local services less efficient than they could be.

The police service, the wider criminal justice system and other public services are too fragmented in many respects. This perpetuates the circularity of offending. Many people whose life experience leads them to the fringes of society become offenders. Some become repeat offenders. This happens for many reasons – for example, unstable home and family environments; poverty; ineffective parenting; unsuitable housing; adverse childhood experiences; long-term absence from school; drug and alcohol addiction; mental illness; criminal exploitation; exposure to prison environments; ineffective rehabilitation; and weak or absent support and supervision on release from prison. Whatever the reasons, the shortcomings of one public service will often transfer demand to another.
In a joint inspection report,\textsuperscript{52} published in February 2020, we and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation found that integrated offender management arrangements have lost their way since 2015. This joint police and probation service approach holds great potential for managing the most prolific offenders, but it badly needs new national leadership to reinvigorate it.

The prison population of England and Wales quadrupled in size between 1900 and 2018, with around half of this increase taking place since 1990.\textsuperscript{53} Although the prison population isn’t quite as high as it was around a decade ago, some prisons are still overcrowded.\textsuperscript{54}

For policymakers, this raises dilemmas about where to concentrate finite public money and resources. For example, the Government could stop school exclusions, improve mental health provision, spend more on probation services, or build more prisons. To break the cycle of offending, there needs to be a radical rethink, with a new plan to make these interrelated public services function together in a more integrated way.

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{A joint thematic inspection of Integrated Offender Management}, HMICFRS and HM Inspectorate of Probation, 28 February 2020.


\textsuperscript{54} As before, page 12, paragraph 1.5.
Collaboration agreements need stronger foundations

In 2009 and 2011, legislation was passed to enable and encourage more collaboration between police forces. It gave forces a duty to collaborate “where it is in the interests of the efficiency or effectiveness of their own and other police force areas”. Then and more recently, police forces were under considerable pressure to reduce their spending (as a result of the financial crisis and the period of austerity that followed). Many forces did so by entering into collaboration agreements with each other.

Now, the scope and complexity of these collaborations vary a great deal. Some collaboration agreements are broad. Others are much narrower, covering one or more specific functions. There are service-wide collaboration agreements, such as the agreement that created the National Police Air Service. There are also agreements between neighbouring forces. These include the agreement between the Surrey and Sussex forces that created their joint major crime investigation team, and the agreement between the Welsh forces that created an all-Wales police recruitment system. Firearms teams, marine

56 As before, page 13, paragraph 32.
and underwater search units, police dog units, mounted branches and motorway policing teams are among the features of policing commonly seen in collaboration agreements.

Some collaboration agreements are particularly mature and evidently successful. Arguably, one of the best examples of this is the East Midlands Police Collaboration Programme. Through this collaboration, the Leicestershire, Derbyshire, Lincolnshire, Nottinghamshire and Northamptonshire forces collaborate on a wide range of operational and administrative functions.

However, even in that example, the chief constables and police and crime commissioners don’t always find it easy to reach agreement on how best to develop the arrangements. Taking the full range of collaborations into account, the state of collaboration across the police service raises two causes for concern.

The first is that collaboration arrangements are largely piecemeal and patchy. And, with one exception – counter-terrorism policing – the arrangements don’t reflect a well-conceived strategic plan for the police service as a whole.

The second is that collaboration agreements have often proved to be deeply problematic. Some have already been torn up. Examples include a tri-force collaboration between the Avon and Somerset, Gloucestershire and Wiltshire forces, which ended in 2018, and the strategic
alliance between Warwickshire Police and West Mercia Police, which broke down in 2019.

Among those that continue, some face considerable difficulties. This can be particularly evident in cases where the forces are significantly different in size, such as the Warwickshire and West Mercia example. In cases involving more than two forces, gaining and keeping consensus about priorities and appropriate levels of resourcing can be especially difficult. The more forces involved, the more will be the chief constables and local policing bodies whose views need to be heard and reconciled.

The police’s experience has shown that successful collaborations need particularly strong leadership and a shared conviction among participants that the collaboration should be supported. When chief constables retire or new police and crime commissioners are elected, even the strongest agreements are vulnerable to changes of personality.

**Easing financial pressures may make collaboration a less-favoured option**

This year, forces have faced less financial pressure. And if the Government continues to prioritise the funding for the 20,000-officer uplift programme, financial pressure on forces will continue to ease. So, arguably, collaboration is now a less-favoured option for the police. In the short term, it would be deeply regrettable if forces treated the 20,000-officer
uplift programme as an opportunity to neglect their duty to collaborate.

In the longer term, it is too early to predict the exact effect of COVID-19 on public – and therefore police – finances, but it will undoubtedly be considerable. When implemented well, collaboration offers the police a route to greater efficiency. This is likely to become even more important as the country deals with the economic and social costs of COVID-19. The police will almost certainly have to provide evidence of improved efficiency and productivity. And more than ever, as this assessment highlights, the regional, national and international nature of crime means police forces must work more closely together. If they don’t improve in this respect, the service’s effectiveness will continue to suffer.

This raises a major question about the future of police collaborations. The current arrangements, including the statutory framework and the duty to collaborate, haven’t resulted in sufficiently strong, stable, service-wide collaboration agreements. If collaboration is to be an enduring part of the solution to policing’s problems, chief constables and local policing bodies will need to be more actively incentivised – and possibly compelled – to enter into collaborations and make them work.
Evidence-based, sustainable approaches are needed to solve policing problems

In another respect, policing is improving. Forces increasingly recognise the importance of evidence-based practice and are keen to adopt it. We are seeing more of a recognition of the important role that data and technology, particularly machine learning, have to play. This is a theme that began to emerge in recent years.

For example, Avon and Somerset Constabulary has established a Data Science and Innovation Centre, through which it develops data-driven services in collaboration with local authorities. West Midlands Police operates a data-driven insights programme. South Yorkshire Police is in the early stages of a project with Sheffield Hallam University. It is developing an artificial intelligence-based algorithm to identify children at heightened risk of exploitation. And, in late 2019, Greater Manchester Police set up an evidence-based practice hub to carry out research into relevant areas, such as current and predicted social norms, which will have an effect on policing.

At a national level, the College of Policing continues to develop its ‘What Works Centre for Crime Reduction’. This valuable initiative gives the police accessible,
evidence-based examples of effective crime reduction techniques.\textsuperscript{57}

These initiatives are promising, but there is a note of caution. As the service becomes increasingly data-driven in its adoption of predictive policing, it will be important to make sure the police preserve their legitimacy. This needs appropriate measures to guard against bias towards any particular group of people.\textsuperscript{58}

**The service should follow the trail of data**

Also, the service as a whole lacks the infrastructure and consistency of approach necessary to exploit fully the data it holds. This is because many of its information systems are unconnected. There needs to be a more systematic way of analysing all this data, along a trail that begins with the events and circumstances that lead people to commit crime. The trail needs to flow through the initial police response, custody, follow-up investigations, criminal justice processes and longer-term outcomes for individuals and communities. Without being able to analyse data comprehensively and systematically, policing won’t be as efficient as it can be.

And without such analysis, there are still some important aspects of policing that aren’t as evidence-based as they could be. A good example of this is the policing of knife crime, which is now 49

\textsuperscript{57} See: About College What Works, College of Policing.
\textsuperscript{58} See: Policing by Machine, Liberty, 1 February 2019.
percent higher than it was when comparable recording began (the year ending March 2011) and the highest on record.⁵⁹

When confronted by an increase in knife crime, some police forces tend to carry out more stop and search.⁶⁰ Undeniably, every time a police officer takes a knife from someone unlawfully carrying it in public, they may well have prevented another stabbing. And it would seem logical to conclude that the increased use of stop and search may deter potential offenders.

However, the causes of knife crime are complex, needing a multi-agency response. The true efficacy of stop and search as a means of reducing knife crime is a matter of some difference among expert bodies. For example, an independent study published in 2019 suggested that stop and search’s overall effect on crime (not just knife crime) is likely to be at best marginal.⁶¹

There may not be a strong evidence base for the efficacy of stop and search, but there is plenty of evidence of disproportionality in how the police use it. In the year ending March 2019, people who identify as black were nearly ten times more likely to be stopped

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⁶⁰ See: Greater powers for police to use stop and search to tackle violent crime, Home Office, 31 March 2019.
⁶¹ Does stop and search reduce crime?, Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, 28 February 2019, page 1.
than people who identify as white. This raises the prospect of an unintended consequence that shouldn’t be ignored.

One of the stated aims of the 20,000-officer uplift programme is to improve diversity in policing. But disproportionality in stop and search risks alienating some sections of society, particularly young black men. Many people who are stopped and searched have committed no crime. So efforts to improve diversity may be at risk of being thwarted by a well-intentioned but potentially misguided approach.

Levels of service don’t always meet public expectations

Against the most serious criminality, and especially terrorism, policing can be particularly effective. The life-saving interventions of police officers on London Bridge and in Streatham I referred to earlier are cases in point. And police forces increasingly recognise and deal effectively with vulnerable people, such as children and older people.

However, focusing on dealing well with the most serious offences and safeguarding the most vulnerable in society may come at the expense of wider public confidence and satisfaction in policing. The factors I have described in this assessment have a worrying

consequence: across the gamut of crime, the police service can’t provide the consistently high levels of service the public would hope to receive.

In the words of one chief constable: “victims of ‘less serious’ crimes receive a limited service, if any service at all”. Some of our inspections bear out this downbeat observation. And it applies to many forces – even those that perform comparatively well. For example, in 2018/19, Durham Constabulary, a force with an outstanding HMICFRS grade for effectiveness,\textsuperscript{63} assigned a positive outcome\textsuperscript{64} to only 13 percent of burglaries and 14 percent of vehicle crimes recorded in 2018/19, compared to 23 percent of violent crimes.\textsuperscript{65} While positive outcome rates were higher in Durham than in England and Wales as a whole (6 percent, 3 percent and 13 percent respectively), it still supports the suggestion that victims of ‘less serious’ crimes are unlikely to see their offenders brought to justice.

With the policing of fraud, performance across England and Wales is particularly poor. There are an estimated 3.7 million frauds each year, most of which aren’t recorded, let alone investigated.\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{64} A positive outcome refers to charged/ summoned, taken into consideration, out-of-court (formal) or out-of-court (informal).
\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Police recorded crime and outcomes open data tables: Outcomes open data year ending March 2019}, Home Office, 23 April 2020.
Even with more serious crimes that are recorded, there are problems. Reports of rape have trebled over the past decade, with over 55,000 recorded in 2019. But there has been a clear fall in the volume of police referrals to the CPS and a decrease in the number of charges of, and prosecutions and convictions for, rape.

There are other areas of concern too. For example, some crime investigation processes have been reduced to little more than a telephone conversation with the victim, in which just the basic facts of the allegation are recorded. Also, for those trying to contact the police using the 101 non-emergency number, call waiting times can be unacceptably long.

At its core, the problem is that the demand for policing considerably outstrips supply. The extra capacity provided by the 20,000-officer uplift programme will narrow the gap, but it won’t close it. And it will create higher public expectations, particularly in relation to police visibility – for example, calls for a greater deterrent police presence in cities, towns and villages.

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67 Crime in England and Wales: Appendix tables, Office for National Statistics, 23 April 2020, Summary Table 3 (excludes rapes recorded by Greater Manchester Police).
69 Understanding the Public’s Priorities for Policing, Police Foundation (Andy Higgins), November 2019, page 4.
Many people would favour the return of the old-fashioned village bobby. But the old ways of doing things are no match for the increased complexity and volume of modern crime. For example, effective investigations into child sexual exploitation (including allegations of non-recent offences), modern slavery, human trafficking, cybercrime and many other crime types demand specialist police capabilities, training and resources.

Even the most basic investigations very often need specialist expertise for examining digital devices. These are often delayed and time-consuming. And, when they are carried out, they often involve vast amounts of material, creating substantial investigative and disclosure demands. Analysis by the College of Policing shows that, every year, each digital investigator receives over 300 exhibits to examine.

This isn’t just about mobile phones and memory sticks. Investigations can involve satnavs and car computers, wi-fi routers, speech recognition devices (such as Amazon Alexa), laptops, tablets and home PCs, and CCTV recordings. Some investigations also involve analysing social media, or other databases, networks and cloud-based storage.

In very many respects, the police are struggling to adapt to the challenges associated with the scale and complexity of modern criminality. For the public, this often means lengthy delays in investigations, and therefore delays in justice. With the number of
internet-enabled devices in the average household set to increase, this aspect of policing will only become more demanding.

**Conclusion**

As this assessment shows, there is much to be proud of in policing in England and Wales. The police service’s response to COVID-19 opens another chapter in a long history of commitment to dealing with civil emergencies well.

As the UK adapts to a ‘new normal’ involving social distancing in some form or another, for the foreseeable future, the police will face more demands. This isn’t just about COVID-19, for which the public’s resolve to comply with the restrictions on movement may increasingly be tested. Demands of the kinds I described earlier can be expected in future years, and there will be new ones too. The uplift programme provides some confidence that the service will have more capacity to meet them, but the planned increases in resourcing need careful handling. The number of new recruits required is very substantial indeed and of course they can’t all become experienced police officers overnight.

And, as welcome as it is, the uplift isn’t the sole answer to the question of how to improve effectiveness and efficiency in policing. An examination of police funding arrangements is long overdue. Its outcome should be a fairer distribution of funds between forces, and
longer-term settlements that enable police leaders to make longer-term investments.

The state of policing I have described has fundamental strengths, but it has weaknesses too. To build on the strengths and overcome the weaknesses, the service needs highly capable chief officers. For this, it must get better at identifying its most talented future leaders, nurturing their development and helping them rise to the top. The service needs leaders with the determination to reshape the 1960s structure into a 21st-century structure. It needs leaders with the service-wide influence to design more coherent collaboration arrangements and put them onto stronger foundations. It needs leaders who will exploit the capabilities of technology, to build sustainable, evidence-based solutions to policing problems.

In all these respects, there is a great deal more that the Home Office, the College of Policing and HMICFRS can do to help chief constables and local policing bodies secure improvements in police effectiveness, efficiency and service levels. These improvements would help the service to carry the weight of public expectations more comfortably.

But there is an even greater prize: a highly efficient and effective police service functioning with other safety-critical essential public services in a more integrated way, systematically breaking the cycle of offending. It would be to the considerable advantage of society. It would save vast sums of public money.
Most importantly, it would save lives. And it would improve the quality of exponentially more, by sparing people the experience of being a victim of crime, or of becoming an offender.

If leaders in policing, other public services and Government all work together, that prize can be won.
Part 2: Our inspections

Our PEEL inspections

In 2018/19, we made our fourth PEEL (police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy) assessment of the 43 police forces in England and Wales. As part of the PEEL programme, we assess and make graded judgments about how well each police force keeps people safe and reduces crime.

The PEEL programme consists of three pillars: effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy.

Effectiveness

Effectiveness assesses whether each police force is providing the right services and how well those services work. It considers the range of the force’s responsibilities, such as preventing crime and anti-social behaviour; investigating crime and catching criminals; protecting vulnerable people and supporting victims; tackling serious organised crime; and providing specialist capabilities, such as an armed response.

Efficiency

Efficiency assesses whether the way each force provides its services represents value for money. It also considers how well the force understands and matches its resources and assets to the demands for its
services, both in the present and in planning for the future.

**Legitimacy**

Legitimacy assesses whether each force operates fairly, ethically and within the law. This includes how the force treats both the people it serves and its workforce.

**Integrated PEEL assessments**

In 2018/19, we adopted an integrated PEEL assessment (IPA) approach. This combined the effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy pillars into a single inspection.

The main features of IPAs were:

- a single set of questions covering all three PEEL pillars;
- just one period of inspection fieldwork for each force in the IPA inspection cycle;
- for most forces (unless high risk), fewer days of inspection than with the split approach we used before;
- extra evidence from force management statements (FMSs), which we used in our risk assessments and final judgments;
- three groups of fieldwork (with 14 to 15 forces in each group);
single rather than multiple reports for each force (with reports published in batches after each group of inspections);

alongside our force reports, published PEEL spotlight reports that draw out emerging or recurring national themes;

monitoring of each force’s performance between each group of inspections, drawing on all the available evidence; and

risk assessments for each force, minimising the fieldwork we need to do.

**Force management statements**

We can make an even better assessment of forces thanks to the information they give us in their FMSs. This information gives us a wider view of how well prepared forces are to meet future demands.

**Risk-based assessment**

As part of the IPA approach, we looked for ways to reduce the intensity of inspection on forces. Based on our analysis of previous inspections and other information, we used a risk-based approach. This meant that well-performing forces were inspected on fewer areas.

We carried out pre-inspection work to inform our risk-based approach. This included examining the quality of investigation files, assessing arrangements to tackle serious and organised crime, and reviewing stop
and search records. This means that we now hold information about all forces in many areas of their work. We also inspected some areas in all forces.

Because we inspect forces using a risk-based approach, it is a realistic possibility that a small minority of results may be more positive than they would otherwise be.

**PEEL spotlight reports**

We also publish PEEL spotlight reports. These bring out the themes we have identified during our PEEL inspections. We draw on the evidence we gather from all 43 England and Wales forces. This means we can give a clearer picture of how these areas of policing are performing.

**The operating context**

The challenge of providing services throughout an entire police force area is affected by many things. These include the area’s size, geography, road network, financial condition, levels of affluence and deprivation, industries and employment patterns and, most importantly, the people who live, work and spend time there. Police and crime plans – established by local policing bodies – contain priorities of special importance to which chief constables must have regard. Taken together, these and other factors are often called the operating context.
We take account of the operating context for each force and recognise that different contexts create different needs for policing. Information about each force’s local context is included in the ‘Force in context’ section of our PEEL reports.

**Understanding our graded judgments**

It is important to emphasise that police forces aren’t in competition with each other. Inevitably, some people will want to re-order our graded judgments into a form of league table. But representing the breadth and complexity of police performance, while taking account of the operating context, needs a more sophisticated approach.

Similarly, it is important to read beyond the headlines and consider why some forces have been graded higher than others. The nuances are in the individual force reports on our website.

On the following pages, you can see our most recent graded judgments for all 43 forces in England and Wales. We split these into the effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy pillars. We show whether the current graded judgment is based on inspection fieldwork from 2018/19, or whether our risk-based approach means that the grade from 2017 or 2016 has been carried over. For the three pillar-level judgments, we indicate whether a force has improved, declined or not changed since our previous inspection of that force.
A change to how we run PEEL inspections from 2020

We are evolving our PEEL inspection and monitoring of police forces from 2020. This builds on our integrated framework and risk-based approach in IPA 2018/19 to move towards an intelligence-led, continuous assessment model.

We are changing the structure of our inspection framework. It will better match the way forces are organised, the demands they face and what the public expect of them. Our questions will be more closely aligned with FMSs. We will then be able to make the fullest use of the data and analysis that forces are providing to us.

We will regularly assess forces using all the information we have about them. There will be less reliance on an intense annual inspection of a force. Instead, we will take an intelligence-led approach to the evidence we need to collect. This will mean we will be more dynamic and better able to help forces improve their performance.

We will publish our reports more quickly. We will do this by publishing them as soon as they are ready, rather than in three tranches as before. We already provide feedback to forces after an inspection so that they can start improving swiftly. We will now be able to inform the public of our findings sooner. This will help local policing bodies hold their chief constables to account and, in
turn, will help the public hold their local policing bodies to account.

PEEL judgments

Effectiveness

- Avon and Somerset: Good (unchanged)
- Bedfordshire: Good (improved)
- Cambridgeshire: Good (improved)
- Cheshire: Good (unchanged)
- City of London: Good (unchanged)
- Cleveland: Inadequate (declined)
- Cumbria: Good (unchanged)
- Derbyshire: Requires improvement (declined)
- Devon and Cornwall: Good (improved)
- Dorset: Good (unchanged)
- Durham: Outstanding (unchanged)
- Dyfed-Powys: Good (unchanged)
- Essex: Good (unchanged)
- Gloucestershire: Good (improved)
- Greater Manchester: Requires improvement (unchanged)
- Gwent: Good (improved)
- Hampshire: Good (unchanged)
- Hertfordshire: Good (unchanged)
- Humberside: Good (improved)
• Kent: Good (unchanged)
• Lancashire: Good (unchanged)
• Leicestershire: Good (unchanged)
• Lincolnshire: Good (unchanged)
• Merseyside: Good (unchanged)
• Metropolitan Police: Requires improvement (unchanged)
• Norfolk: Good (unchanged)
• North Wales: Good (unchanged)
• North Yorkshire: Good (unchanged)
• Northamptonshire: Requires improvement (unchanged)
• Northumbria: Requires improvement (declined)
• Nottinghamshire: Good (unchanged)
• South Wales: Good (unchanged)
• South Yorkshire: Good (unchanged)
• Staffordshire: Good (unchanged)
• Suffolk: Good (unchanged)
• Surrey: Good (unchanged)
• Sussex: Good (unchanged)
• Thames Valley: Good (unchanged)
• Warwickshire: Good (improved)
• West Mercia: Requires improvement (unchanged)
• West Midlands: Good (improved)
• West Yorkshire: Good (unchanged)
• Wiltshire: Good (unchanged)

Totals:
• 1 Outstanding
• 35 Good
• 6 Requires improvement
• 1 Inadequate

How effective is the force at preventing crime, tackling anti-social behaviour and keeping people safe?
• Avon and Somerset: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• Bedfordshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Cambridgeshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Cheshire: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• City of London: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Cleveland: Inadequate (last inspected 2018/19)
• Cumbria: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• Derbyshire: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• Devon and Cornwall: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Dorset: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• Durham: Outstanding (last inspected 2016/17)
• Dyfed-Powys: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Essex: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Gloucestershire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Greater Manchester: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Gwent: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• Hampshire: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• Hertfordshire: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• Humberside: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Kent: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• Lancashire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Leicestershire: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• Lincolnshire: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Merseyside: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• Metropolitan Police: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Norfolk: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• North Wales: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• North Yorkshire: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• Northamptonshire: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Northumbria: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Nottinghamshire: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• South Wales: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• South Yorkshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Staffordshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Suffolk: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• Surrey: Outstanding (last inspected 2018/19)
• Sussex: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Thames Valley: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Warwickshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• West Mercia: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• West Midlands: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• West Yorkshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Wiltshire: Good (last inspected 2016/17)

Totals:
• 2 Outstanding
• 34 Good
• 6 Requires improvement
• 1 Inadequate

How effective is the force at investigating crime and reducing re-offending?
• Avon and Somerset: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Bedfordshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Cambridgeshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Cheshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• City of London: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Cleveland: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Cumbria: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Derbyshire: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Devon and Cornwall: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Dorset: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Durham: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Dyfed-Powys: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Essex: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Gloucestershire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Greater Manchester: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Gwent: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Hampshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Hertfordshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Humberside: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Kent: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Lancashire: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Leicestershire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Lincolnshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Merseyside: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Metropolitan Police: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Norfolk: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• North Wales: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• North Yorkshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Northamptonshire: Inadequate (last inspected 2018/19)
• Northumbria: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Nottinghamshire: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• South Wales: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• South Yorkshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Staffordshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Suffolk: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Surrey: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Sussex: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Thames Valley: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Warwickshire: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• West Mercia: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• West Midlands: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• West Yorkshire: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Wiltshire: Good (last inspected 2016/17)

Totals:
• 0 Outstanding
• 30 Good
• 12 Requires improvement
• 1 Inadequate
How effective is the force at protecting those who are vulnerable from harm, and supporting victims?

- Avon and Somerset: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Bedfordshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Cambridgeshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Cheshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- City of London: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Cleveland: Inadequate (last inspected 2018/19)
- Cumbria: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Derbyshire: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
- Devon and Cornwall: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Dorset: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Durham: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Dyfed-Powys: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
- Essex: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Gloucestershire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Greater Manchester: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
- Gwent: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Hampshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Hertfordshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Humberside: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Kent: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Lancashire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Leicestershire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Lincolnshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Merseyside: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Metropolitan Police: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Norfolk: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• North Wales: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• North Yorkshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Northamptonshire: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Northumbria: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Nottinghamshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• South Wales: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• South Yorkshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Staffordshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Suffolk: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Surrey: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Sussex: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Thames Valley: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Warwickshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• West Mercia: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• West Midlands: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• West Yorkshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Wiltshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)

Totals:
• 0 Outstanding
• 33 Good
• 9 Requires improvement
• 1 Inadequate

How effective is the force at tackling serious and organised crime?
• Avon and Somerset: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Bedfordshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Cambridgeshire: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• Cheshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• City of London: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Cleveland: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Cumbria: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Derbyshire: Outstanding (last inspected 2016/17)
• Devon and Cornwall: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• Dorset: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• Durham: Outstanding (last inspected 2016/17)
• Dyfed-Powys: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• Essex: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• Gloucestershire: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Greater Manchester: Outstanding (last inspected 2016/17)
• Gwent: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Hampshire: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• Hertfordshire: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• Humberside: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• Kent: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• Lancashire: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• Leicestershire: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• Lincolnshire: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• Merseyside: Outstanding (last inspected 2016/17)
• Metropolitan Police: Outstanding (last inspected 2018/19)
• Norfolk: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• North Wales: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• North Yorkshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Northamptonshire: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Northumbria: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• Nottinghamshire: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• South Wales: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• South Yorkshire: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• Staffordshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Suffolk: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• Surrey: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Sussex: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Thames Valley: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
• Warwickshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• West Mercia: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• West Midlands: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• West Yorkshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Wiltshire: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)

Totals:
• 5 Outstanding
• 35 Good
• 3 Requires improvement
• 0 Inadequate

Efficiency
• Avon and Somerset: Outstanding (improved)
• Bedfordshire: Good (improved)
• Cambridgeshire: Good (unchanged)
• Cheshire: Good (unchanged)
• City of London: Good (unchanged)
• Cleveland: Inadequate (declined)
• Cumbria: Good (unchanged)
• Derbyshire: Requires improvement (declined)
- Devon and Cornwall: Good (unchanged)
- Dorset: Good (unchanged)
- Durham: Outstanding (unchanged)
- Dyfed-Powys: Requires improvement (unchanged)
- Essex: Good (unchanged)
- Gloucestershire: Good (unchanged)
- Greater Manchester: Requires improvement (declined)
- Gwent: Good (unchanged)
- Hampshire: Good (unchanged)
- Hertfordshire: Good (unchanged)
- Humberside: Good (improved)
- Kent: Outstanding (improved)
- Lancashire: Outstanding (improved)
- Leicestershire: Good (improved)
- Lincolnshire: Requires improvement (unchanged)
- Merseyside: Good (unchanged)
- Metropolitan Police: Good (improved)
- Norfolk: Outstanding (improved)
- North Wales: Good (improved)
- North Yorkshire: Good (improved)
- Northamptonshire: Inadequate (declined)
- Northumbria: Requires improvement (declined)
- Nottinghamshire: Requires improvement (unchanged)
- South Wales: Good (unchanged)
• South Yorkshire: Good (improved)
• Staffordshire: Good (unchanged)
• Suffolk: Good (unchanged)
• Surrey: Requires improvement (declined)
• Sussex: Requires improvement (declined)
• Thames Valley: Good (declined)
• Warwickshire: Requires improvement (declined)
• West Mercia: Requires improvement (declined)
• West Midlands: Good (unchanged)
• West Yorkshire: Outstanding (improved)
• Wiltshire: Good (unchanged)

Totals:
• 6 Outstanding
• 25 Good
• 10 Requires improvement
• 2 Inadequate

How well does the force use its resources to meet the demand it faces?
• Avon and Somerset: Outstanding (last inspected 2017/18)
• Bedfordshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Cambridgeshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Cheshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• City of London: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Cleveland: Inadequate (last inspected 2018/19)
Cumbria: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
Derbyshire: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
Devon and Cornwall: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
Dorset: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
Durham: Outstanding (last inspected 2017/18)
Dyfed-Powys: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
Essex: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
Gloucestershire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
Greater Manchester: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
Gwent: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
Hampshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
Hertfordshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
Humberside: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
Kent: Outstanding (last inspected 2017/18)
Lancashire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
Leicestershire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
Lincolnshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
Merseyside: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
Metropolitan Police: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
Norfolk: Outstanding (last inspected 2017/18)
North Wales: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
North Yorkshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Northamptonshire: Inadequate (last inspected 2018/19)
- Northumbria: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
- Nottinghamshire: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
- South Wales: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- South Yorkshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Staffordshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Suffolk: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Surrey: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
- Sussex: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
- Thames Valley: Outstanding (last inspected 2017/18)
- Warwickshire: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
- West Mercia: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
- West Midlands: Requires improvement (last inspected 2017/18)
- West Yorkshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Wiltshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)

Totals:
- 5 Outstanding
- 26 Good
10 Requires improvement
2 Inadequate

How well does the force plan for the future?

- Avon and Somerset: Outstanding (last inspected 2018/19)
- Bedfordshire: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
- Cambridgeshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Cheshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- City of London: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
- Cleveland: Inadequate (last inspected 2018/19)
- Cumbria: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Derbyshire: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
- Devon and Cornwall: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Dorset: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Durham: Outstanding (last inspected 2018/19)
- Dyfed-Powys: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
- Essex: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Gloucestershire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Greater Manchester: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
- Gwent: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Hampshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Hertfordshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Humberside: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Kent: Outstanding (last inspected 2018/19)
- Lancashire: Outstanding (last inspected 2018/19)
- Leicestershire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Lincolnshire: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
- Merseyside: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Metropolitan Police: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Norfolk: Outstanding (last inspected 2018/19)
- North Wales: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- North Yorkshire: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
- Northamptonshire: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
- Northumbria: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
- Nottinghamshire: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
- South Wales: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- South Yorkshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Staffordshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Suffolk: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Surrey: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
- Sussex: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Thames Valley: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Warwickshire: Inadequate (last inspected 2018/19)
• West Mercia: Inadequate (last inspected 2018/19)
• West Midlands: Outstanding (last inspected 2018/19)
• West Yorkshire: Outstanding (last inspected 2018/19)
• Wiltshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)

Totals:
• 7 Outstanding
• 22 Good
• 11 Requires improvement
• 3 Inadequate

Legitimacy
• Avon and Somerset: Good (unchanged)
• Bedfordshire: Good (unchanged)
• Cambridgeshire: Good (unchanged)
• Cheshire: Good (unchanged)
• City of London: Requires improvement (unchanged)
• Cleveland: Inadequate (declined)
• Cumbria: Good (unchanged)
• Derbyshire: Good (unchanged)
• Devon and Cornwall: Good (unchanged)
• Dorset: Good (unchanged)
• Durham: Good (unchanged)
• Dyfed-Powys: Requires improvement (declined)
- Essex: Good (unchanged)
- Gloucestershire: Good (unchanged)
- Greater Manchester: Good (unchanged)
- Gwent: Requires improvement (declined)
- Hampshire: Good (unchanged)
- Hertfordshire: Good (unchanged)
- Humberside: Good (unchanged)
- Kent: Outstanding (unchanged)
- Lancashire: Good (unchanged)
- Leicestershire: Good (unchanged)
- Lincolnshire: Good (unchanged)
- Merseyside: Good (unchanged)
- Metropolitan Police: Good (unchanged)
- Norfolk: Good (unchanged)
- North Wales: Good (unchanged)
- North Yorkshire: Requires improvement (declined)
- Northamptonshire: Requires improvement (unchanged)
- Northumbria: Good (unchanged)
- Nottinghamshire: Good (unchanged)
- South Wales: Good (unchanged)
- South Yorkshire: Good (unchanged)
- Staffordshire: Good (unchanged)
- Suffolk: Good (unchanged)
- Surrey: Good (unchanged)
• Sussex: Good (unchanged)
• Thames Valley: Good (unchanged)
• Warwickshire: Good (improved)
• West Mercia: Requires improvement (unchanged)
• West Midlands: Good (improved)
• West Yorkshire: Good (unchanged)
• Wiltshire: Good (unchanged)

Totals:
• 1 Outstanding
• 35 Good
• 6 Requires improvement
• 1 Inadequate

How well does the force treat the people it serves with fairness and respect?
• Avon and Somerset: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Bedfordshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Cambridgeshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Cheshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• City of London: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Cleveland: Inadequate (last inspected 2018/19)
• Cumbria: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Derbyshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Devon and Cornwall: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Dorset: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Durham: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Dyfed-Powys: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Essex: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Gloucestershire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Greater Manchester: Good (last inspected 2016/17)
- Gwent: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
- Hampshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Hertfordshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Humberside: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Kent: Outstanding (last inspected 2017/18)
- Lancashire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Leicestershire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Lincolnshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Merseyside: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Metropolitan Police: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Norfolk: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
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- Northumbria: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
- Nottinghamshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• South Wales: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
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• Suffolk: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Surrey: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Sussex: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Thames Valley: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Warwickshire: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• West Mercia: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• West Midlands: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• West Yorkshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Wiltshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)

Totals:
• 1 Outstanding
• 33 Good
• 8 Requires improvement
• 1 Inadequate

How well does the force ensure that its workforce behaves ethically and lawfully?

• Avon and Somerset: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Bedfordshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Cambridgeshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Cheshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• City of London: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Cleveland: Inadequate (last inspected 2018/19)
• Cumbria: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Derbyshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Devon and Cornwall: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Dorset: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Durham: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Dyfed-Powys: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Essex: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Gloucestershire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Greater Manchester: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Gwent: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Hampshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Hertfordshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Humberside: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Kent: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Lancashire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Leicestershire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Lincolnshire: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Merseyside: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Metropolitan Police: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Norfolk: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• North Wales: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• North Yorkshire: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Northamptonshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Northumbria: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Nottinghamshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• South Wales: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• South Yorkshire: Outstanding (last inspected 2018/19)
• Staffordshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Suffolk: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Surrey: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Sussex: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• Thames Valley: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Warwickshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• West Mercia: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• West Midlands: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• West Yorkshire: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• Wiltshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
Totals:
- 1 Outstanding
- 31 Good
- 10 Requires improvement
- 1 Inadequate

How well does the force treat its workforce with fairness and respect?
- Avon and Somerset: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Bedfordshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Cambridgeshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Cheshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- City of London: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Cleveland: Inadequate (last inspected 2018/19)
- Cumbria: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Derbyshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Devon and Cornwall: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Dorset: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Durham: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Dyfed-Powys: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
- Essex: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Gloucestershire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Greater Manchester: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Gwent: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Hampshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Hertfordshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Humberside: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Kent: Outstanding (last inspected 2017/18)
- Lancashire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Leicestershire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Lincolnshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Merseyside: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Metropolitan Police: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Norfolk: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- North Wales: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- North Yorkshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Northamptonshire: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
- Northumbria: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Nottinghamshire: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
- South Wales: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- South Yorkshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Staffordshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Suffolk: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Surrey: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Sussex: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
- Thames Valley: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
- Warwickshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• West Mercia: Requires improvement (last inspected 2018/19)
• West Midlands: Good (last inspected 2018/19)
• West Yorkshire: Good (last inspected 2017/18)
• Wiltshire: Good (last inspected 2018/19)

Totals:
• 1 Outstanding
• 37 Good
• 4 Requires improvement
• 1 Inadequate

Our 2018/19 PEEL inspections

We published our PEEL reports in three groups, in May 2019, September 2019 and February 2020.

Because we inspect forces using a risk-based approach, it is a realistic possibility that a small minority of these results may be more positive than they would otherwise have been.

After the terrorist attack in Manchester on 22 May 2017, we agreed with Greater Manchester Police that we wouldn’t make a graded judgment for the efficiency and legitimacy pillars in 2017. The changes in Greater Manchester Police’s grades are measured from its 2016 graded judgments for efficiency and legitimacy.
Summary of grades

On **effectiveness**, we graded one force as outstanding, 35 as good, six as requiring improvement and one as inadequate.

Compared with our 2017 effectiveness inspection, the grades for 32 forces stayed the same, eight got better and three got worse.

On **efficiency**, we graded six forces as outstanding, 25 forces as good, 10 as requiring improvement and two as inadequate.

Compared with our 2017 efficiency inspection, the grades for 21 forces stayed the same, 12 forces got better and 10 got worse.

On **legitimacy**, we graded one force as outstanding, 35 forces as good, six as requiring improvement and one as inadequate.

Compared with our 2017 legitimacy inspection, the grades for 37 forces stayed the same, two got better and four got worse.

Our findings

Our inspections show that policing across England and Wales is generally good. Most forces are:

- keeping people safe and reducing crime;
- using their resources efficiently; and
- treating their communities and their workforces fairly and with respect.
But there are still significant difficulties for policing. Forces are providing services under the joint pressures of rising demand and falling resources, and these pressures haven’t fallen equally across police forces. Some forces have risen exceptionally well to the challenge; others are struggling.

**Effectiveness**

We have seen sustained improvement in forces’ ability to protect vulnerable people and support victims. And forces continue to improve how effectively they tackle serious and organised crime.

We are pleased to see that forces are increasingly protecting their neighbourhood officers’ time. This means they are dealing with problems in their communities rather than being diverted from their main role to support colleagues in responding to other incidents.

But too many forces are having difficulties investigating crime. And there are rising numbers of investigations that are closed because the victim no longer supports any police action. There is a real risk that the inability of forces to investigate high-volume crimes successfully is causing a loss of public confidence in policing.
Forces have greatly improved their ability to protect vulnerable people and support victims

Almost all the frontline staff we spoke to have a good understanding of vulnerability and its importance. This area has seen the greatest improvement in grades since our previous inspection in 2017.

But too many forces still have problems assessing the risk posed to vulnerable people quickly enough. This includes assessing risk in the control room, in responding to domestic abuse victims, and in managing registered sex offenders. These problems mean that many vulnerable people still aren’t getting the protection and support they need.

Forces continue to improve how effectively they tackle serious and organised crime

Most forces are getting better at identifying the threats to their communities from serious and organised crime. They are using intelligence to prioritise their response to those they believe to be causing greatest harm. And, generally, they are accessing regional and national support when they need to.

But many forces don’t fully understand the impact they are having on organised crime. There isn’t enough longer-term analysis of the effect of police action on future threats to the community, and there is little evidence that forces are drawing enough on community intelligence to inform this.
More neighbourhood officers are spending their time solving problems in their communities

In our early IPA 2018/19 inspections, we saw that forces were often moving neighbourhood officers to other duties. This was damaging their crime prevention work and limiting their community engagement. We are pleased that this was not the case with our later inspections. We saw that most forces were protecting their neighbourhood officers’ time in their communities, even though, in some cases, those teams had been reduced in size.

But we continue to find a lack of capacity in neighbourhood policing to analyse and use intelligence. And a lack of analysis and exchanging of good practice between neighbourhood teams within a force reduces how effective this type of policing is at keeping people safe.

Crime investigation is failing too many victims

Most forces are prioritising their investigation of the most serious crimes, such as child abuse, rape and serious violence. These investigations are usually conducted to a high standard. But there remains a national shortage of trained investigators, and forces are less able to meet the demands of other high-volume crimes such as burglary, assault and theft.

Some forces are having problems allocating new incidents to people with the right skills to
investigate them. And there are some very long delays in recovering evidence from digital devices.

We continue to see investigations suffering because of a lack of supervision. Direction and support are needed, particularly for less experienced investigators. We have seen too many examples of unmanageable workloads and lengthy waits for victims.

The likelihood of the police bringing someone to justice following a criminal investigation is falling. The proportion of crimes closed because the victim doesn’t support a prosecution is rising. And there is limited understanding as to why so many victims seem to be losing faith in the criminal justice system.

**Efficiency**

Forces are generally good at using their resources to meet the demand they face and planning for the future. They understand their demand and use best practice to manage those demands. In doing this, most forces are allocating their resources in the most efficient way. But some forces are experiencing serious problems. These forces don’t fully understand the demand they are currently facing so they are having difficulty managing it.

Many forces have a good understanding of how demand might be different in future. But few have sustainable plans in place to meet their predictions. Our analysis of FMSs showed that forces need to be
able to analyse these predictions so that they can anticipate any future difficulties in meeting demand.

**Investment is needed in preventing crime and reducing the need for policing services in the future**

The demand for policing services is increasing, but there are opportunities to reduce this demand. Putting effort into preventing crime and building community relationships can lead to falling demand for policing services.

Some forces continue to do this well, despite pressures to divert resources from prevention work. Other forces need to improve their focus on this area.

**We still have concerns about the development and use of information and communications technology**

There are examples of forces making significant investment in computer systems that aren’t providing the benefits they should. Worse, in a few cases, these poor systems – or difficulties in implementing new ones – have reduced forces’ effectiveness.

There has been some progress in forces working together to share systems. But too many systems are still procured separately, don’t work together properly, and have varying benefits not only for the forces themselves but also for the communities they are serving. There needs to be more openness about how forces are spending their investments in information and communications technology (ICT) and the benefits they are achieving.
All forces need to understand what skills their workforces have, and what skills they need in future

Most forces understand the operational policing skills they hold within their workforces. But we did find examples of out-of-date workforce plans, and skills audits that were too simplistic. And most forces don’t gather enough information on the wider skills their workforces have.

Forces will be more effective and efficient if they can make use of all the skills they currently have, and plan to replace them in future. Forces will then be in a better position to determine their needs. This will help them appoint the right people to the right places to provide the best service to the public.

Forces will still need to make savings, even with an increase in police officers

Most forces have plans in place to make further savings. But, in some cases, it isn’t clear that their plans are fully achievable. High costs of long-running operations, and the breakdown of established collaborations, are already negatively affecting some of these plans.

Forces now need to plan to meet additional employer pension costs. In 2019/20, a central government grant covered these costs. Forces assume the Government will repeat this in future years, but it isn't yet certain.
Legitimacy

We have graded most forces as good for legitimacy. This means that most are treating the public they serve with fairness and respect. They are also treating their workforces fairly, while making sure that they behave ethically and lawfully.

Where forces have focused their attention, they have made improvements. Most forces are doing more to engage with the communities they serve, and to recruit a more diverse workforce. They are building ethical cultures and taking more action to improve wellbeing.

However, legitimacy is the pillar with the least movement in grades since our 2017 inspections. It takes effort to maintain performance against a backdrop of reduced resources and rising crime. But this also suggests that there is less determination to improve and less innovation in this area.

There have been limited improvements in the retention and promotion of black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) officers. Some forces have serious difficulties maintaining the vetting of their workforces. And all forces still need to act to make sure they are using their stop and search powers consistently, fairly and reasonably.
Forces are slowly becoming more representative of the communities they serve

To build trust, forces need to reflect the communities they are serving. Most forces are having some success in recruiting more officers and staff from a range of ethnic backgrounds. But there is still more to do before they truly reflect the communities they are policing. And forces need to consider how to attract recruits from other groups with protected characteristics, which are currently under-represented.

A force needs a broad range of methods if it is to retain and develop a workforce that reflects the diversity of the community. Many forces are working to improve their promotion processes to make sure they are fair and effective. But more work needs to be done so that specialist roles and higher ranks reflect not only the whole workforce but also the communities the force serves.

Forces need to do more to address the disproportionate use of police powers

No force has fully met our 2017 legitimacy recommendation to address the disproportionate use of stop and search involving BAME people. It is important that forces understand the causes of this disproportionality and explain it to the public.

Independent scrutiny of the use of police powers is the best way to make sure people are being treated fairly. It makes it possible for people to see how and why the
police are using these powers, and to assess what effect their use may be having. Many forces are monitoring a wide range of data about stop and search, inviting independent scrutiny and reviewing body-worn video footage as part of these arrangements. All forces should be doing this.

**Some forces don’t dedicate enough resources to tackling corruption**

Many forces have shown the necessary leadership to promote a more ethical and lawful workforce. Other forces need to be more proactive in looking for signs of corruption and having the resources available to tackle it.

Making sure all officers and staff are vetted to the correct standard is the first line of defence against corruption. Yet it is a serious problem for some forces. Forces also need to consider how their vetting processes may disproportionately affect people from BAME backgrounds. All forces need to make sure their vetting units are fit for purpose to meet the demands of increasing recruitment without neglecting the vetting of their existing workforce.

**Supervisors need more time to provide support for officers and staff**

Officers and staff need to be well supervised. This helps their development, gives them direction and supports their wellbeing. But some forces are struggling to give
members of their workforces the supervision they need to provide their best service to the public.

Forces are increasingly good at supporting officers and staff after traumatic incidents. But supervisors need to have regular discussions with their staff, on a one-to-one basis, to review workloads and explore their wellbeing needs. Without this time, supervisors may struggle to spot early signs that someone is having difficulties.

Wellbeing training for supervisors is becoming more widespread. But supervisors need time to provide support and make sure officers and staff are coping with the pressures they are facing.

**Abuse of position for a sexual purpose**

The National Police Chiefs’ Council defines abuse of position for a sexual purpose as:

“Any behaviour by a police officer or police staff member, whether on or off duty, that takes advantage of their position as a member of the police service to misuse their position, authority or powers in order to pursue a sexual or improper emotional relationship with any member of the public.”

Police officers and staff who abuse their positions for a sexual purpose are committing serious corruption. All forces need to fully understand this type of offending, take all opportunities to identify warning signs, and stop it from happening.
We have previously inspected forces on their response to this matter and in 2016 we made some national recommendations. Through our 2019 PEEL inspections, we assessed the extent to which forces have met these recommendations.

**Our findings**

Many forces have listened and acted on this matter, or are making changes. But others have been far too slow. Many forces aren’t complying fully with their vetting requirements. And some don’t have enough resources in their counter-corruption units to proactively seek out this type of corruption.

We reported our findings in four areas:
- Prevention
- Understanding the threat
- Uncovering corruption
- Taking action.

**Prevention**

Forces are taking the right steps to set standards of behaviour. Generally, officers and staff understand what this type of corruption is, and the professional boundaries the public expect of them when they interact with the police.

Vetting is the first line of defence against this kind of corruption. Some forces are very good at vetting their workforces. But others are so poor that we have identified it as a cause of concern.
Understanding the threat

This form of corruption can be hard to detect, so forces need all the information they can gather to fight it. More than half were either not collecting or not classifying their information correctly. And more than half either didn’t have a current corruption threat assessment or had one we judged to be unsatisfactory. As the national threat assessment is built from force assessments, this means the national picture isn’t good enough.

Uncovering corruption

To uncover corruption, forces need information from a wide range of places. All forces have a confidential reporting system, and in all but two the workforce was aware of and trusted this system.

Some forces have built good relationships with organisations that support vulnerable people. They have received intelligence and caught officers and staff abusing their position as a result. But almost a third of forces still haven’t built the right links.

Forces have significant databases of information about people, and these should be kept safe and only used for a policing purpose. Many of those who abuse their position use police systems to find vulnerable people or information about them. But two-thirds of forces can’t fully monitor their systems.
Taking action

It is important to have enough people working in counter-corruption units, and for them to have the right blend of skills to do this difficult work. We judged two-thirds of forces as not having enough capacity to proactively obtain intelligence. In too many respects, they were just reacting to information they were given. This isn’t good enough.

We conducted a review of all 43 England and Wales police force websites. Almost all forces had some information about corruption. But in too many cases it was hard to find, very recent, and required knowledge of police terminology to carry out an appropriate search. Publicising cases sends a strong message, to the public and to the workforce, about unacceptable behaviour. It can also encourage people to report it.

Our recommendations

All officers and staff should have the suitable vetting status for their roles. We recommended that forces that haven’t yet done so should vet all their personnel to the appropriate standard for the roles they hold. There should be a standardised list of information provided when someone transfers from one force to another.

All forces need the tools and commitment to uncover corruption. We recommended that all forces record information using established categories and produce a comprehensive annual assessment of risk. Forces that
haven’t yet done so should establish regular links with organisations that support vulnerable people. And the police should work with the Home Office and software suppliers to provide a solution so that all forces can proactively monitor use of their ICT systems.

Forces need to have enough resources dedicated to acting against corruption. Those that haven’t yet done so should make sure they have enough people with the right skills to look proactively for intelligence, and to complete their investigations successfully.

**Next steps**

We will inspect this area again in our next programme of PEEL inspections.

**Force management statements**

As part of our inspection process, we require forces to send us information they use in their planning processes in the form of a force management statement (FMS).

FMSs are self-assessments that chief constables (and their London equivalents) prepare and send to us each year. It is their statement and explanation of:

- the demand (crime and non-crime, latent and patent) that their force expects to face in the next four years;
- how their force will develop and improve its workforce and other assets to cope with that demand;
• how their force will improve its efficiency to make sure the gap between future demand and future capability is as small as it can reasonably be made to be; and
• the money the force expects to have to do all this.

Of the 43 Home Office forces, 42 sent us an FMS in 2019. We also received an FMS from the British Transport Police.

We have used information from the FMSs in our risk-based approach to IPA fieldwork. As a result, for some forces, the breadth and intensity of inspection were reduced. We expect this reduction to be more pronounced as our IPA questions change to match the structure of FMSs. This will mean that, as forces become more accustomed to producing FMSs, we can make better use of the information and link it with our inspection work.

**Why FMSs are important**

To police communities effectively and efficiently, forces need to manage their assets proactively and competently.

An FMS can help a force make better decisions about changing to meet future demand. But this is only if a force comprehensively assesses the demands it expects to face in the future, and the condition of its workforce and assets. This knowledge can help make sure funds, resources and effort are properly allocated, and that the force can deal effectively and efficiently with those demands that pose the highest risk.
Observations from the 2019 FMSs

We used FMSs to establish common themes and make observations about the pressures on policing in England and Wales.

Maintaining the workforce

The second generation of FMSs highlighted the effects of long-term austerity on police forces. Some forces described strain in supporting functions such as training, human resources and analysis. If this isn’t remedied, it may have worrying implications for the national increase in police officers and forces’ capacity to recruit new people.

Forces told us about how much time their specialised workforces, such as forensic investigators and firearms officers, spend on accreditation. They also described how an ageing population affects policing demand, as well as the capability and capacity of the police workforce. For example, some forces told us that their officers and staff increasingly had care duties for family members that the force needed to plan for.

Many forces also said they were increasingly using screening processes to prioritise incidents for officers to attend or investigate. Many continue to report reduced prevention and problem-solving work in neighbourhood teams. Instead, other functions such as safeguarding, investigations or offender management come first.
Current and future demand

Forces were generally able to show evidence of their current demand, such as the number of incidents they attend or the number of crimes they deal with. But we would have liked to have seen more analysis of the types of demand that tend to remain hidden.

Forces should have a good relationship with organisations such as community safety partnerships, safeguarding boards and those involved in multi-agency public protection arrangements, as well as local businesses and the voluntary sector. These organisations will often be aware of crime, anti-social behaviour or other problems not reported to the police. Forces need this information to assess fully the true level of risk.

Workforce and other assets

In their FMSs, forces generally described the capacity and capability of their workforces well, including where they need training. They told us about the wellbeing of their staff and what they are doing to improve it. Most forces told us about performance in each unit. We would have liked to have seen more analysis and assessment of these topics. Too often, FMSs give numerical or descriptive data without enough of an analysis of how forces will meet current or future demand.

Clearly, people are the most important asset to any police force. But workforces need the right premises,
vehicles and equipment for their work. Some forces didn’t tell us about, or make any assessment of, the assets their workforce needs, or how their needs may change. Forces need to assess the condition, capacity, capability, serviceability, performance and security of supply of other assets, as well as their workforces.

**Changing to meet expected demand**

When forces don’t analyse the status of their workforces and other assets, it isn’t surprising that they struggle to explain how they need to change to meet expected demand. Generally, forces described to us the actions they were taking. But the decision making behind these actions wasn’t always clear.

For example, one force told us about an increase in capacity when there was no expected increase in demand and the unit already had capacity to meet the expected demand. Some forces didn’t explain how their actions could affect their response or help them meet future demand. There was little assessment of the costs or disadvantages of change, either in financial terms or the effect on staff, victims or the wider public.

**Demand forces don’t expect to meet**

Very few forces were able to identify the demand they expect to be unable to meet in the future. Some forces claimed in their FMSs that they would be able to meet future demand, but the supporting information was weak. Some highlighted the difficulties they faced
and the actions they were taking without identifying future unmet demand.

Forces should analyse the demand they respond to and use the FMS to tell us about their analysis. They should say what resources they have and how they plan to change. Without this, the FMSs don’t yet show that forces can effectively assess their future demand.

The FMS process has shown that generally police forces don’t have a comprehensive understanding of the demand they face, or of their own assets. This means they don’t always know how they need to change to meet future demand or how to make sure their workforces are operating at their best. This can lead to higher costs or reduced performance, because forces can’t effectively plan how they need to change.

**Developing FMSs**

The FMS steering group co-ordinates the development of FMSs. It brings together representatives from HMICFRS, the National Police Chiefs’ Council, local policing bodies, the Home Office, the Police Federation of England and Wales and the Police Superintendents’ Association of England and Wales. We continue to work with the steering group to develop the FMS process.

Steering group members are actively involved in shaping the 2020 version of the FMS. In 2020, the group will help the police service, local policing bodies,
the Home Office and HMICFRS to make best use of the information in FMSs. It will:

- record evidence of how FMSs are changing to improve both planning and our inspection programme;
- provide support to forces to improve their FMSs; and
- continue to work with leaders in different organisations to see how FMSs should evolve to meet the future needs of policing.

**Our child protection inspections**

**National child protection**

We started the national child protection inspection programme in April 2014. By the end of March 2020, we had published reports on 30 police forces. We had also gone back to 25 of those forces to assess their progress against our recommendations.

**Helping forces to improve**

In last year’s *State of Policing* report, we said we felt we could do more to help forces improve. We described how we had changed the way we carry out child protection inspections. Since we made these changes, each force has received support from us.

We also continue to develop our relationships with national police leaders, the Government and other child protection and safeguarding bodies. We now routinely tell these organisations what we have learned
from our inspections. This means that our findings inform best practice and national policy.

We have been pleased with the response to – and enthusiasm for – this more collaborative way of working. We will continue to work closely with other interested parties to promote improvements in the experiences of children in need of help and protection.

**How we carry out our national child protection inspections**

In these inspections, we put the experiences of children at the centre of our analysis. We use that analysis to support learning and development. We assess decision making, leadership, training and forces’ awareness of their safeguarding responsibilities.

Our reports give forces a detailed blueprint for recommended effective practice. We describe the strengths they should build on and where they can improve. We are pleased that, in every follow-up inspection, we have found clear (and in some cases significant) improvements.

**Our findings**

In February 2020, we published our second child protection thematic report.¹ It summarises the findings of more than 80 child protection inspections that we have carried out since our 2015 thematic report on our

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early inspection findings. Some inspections we carried out alone and some with other agencies. The report considers how the police service, its safeguarding partners and the Government need to adapt and respond to the challenges they face.

The role of leaders and leadership

Nationally, the police’s senior leaders and staff are clearly committed to protecting children better. Our return visits to forces showed that every force was achieving better results for children at risk of harm. But, too often, the priority placed on protecting those who are vulnerable isn’t translating into better decisions being made when children need help and protection.

Children who are deemed vulnerable might be those who, for example, live with physical or mental illness; go hungry; are homeless or excluded from school; are at risk of neglect; or live with parents with health problems.

We have found many examples of good, innovative work to protect vulnerable children, and police leaders are getting better at recognising the benefits of tackling the root causes of vulnerability. But the police cannot – and should not – do this alone. New approaches are needed to make sure that vulnerable children are better protected. We want children to be safeguarded as early as possible, so they aren’t subjected to abuse. Society shouldn’t wait until they have already suffered.

Our report recommended that the Government should develop a national early intervention and prevention
strategy. This would make sure agencies work together to give early support to vulnerable children. Research shows that there are clear benefits to intervening early because trauma can have a cumulative effect on children over time.

**Recognising risk and vulnerability**

Greater police focus on safeguarding and protecting vulnerable people means that officers understand vulnerability more and have a better sense of responsibility. But, despite this, the police still don’t routinely recognise or evaluate risks to children well enough. Forces usually deal with cases of child abuse and neglect promptly and efficiently. But more complex cases (for example, those with multiple victims or perpetrators, or those that take place over a long period) are often badly handled and investigations can suffer delays.

Sometimes, officers and staff haven’t had extra training before they carry out complex investigations. They don’t always have the skills and experience they need to investigate effectively, or to make appropriate plans to protect a child. Officers do show better understanding of the increased risk of exploitation when children go missing, but this isn’t always evident in their decision making.

When a child goes missing, decisions still tend to focus on what has just happened, and on finding the child and returning them to their home. Officers don’t always seek
to understand the wider circumstances or risks children face, which often contribute to them going missing.

Too often, the focus is on the incident, missing the bigger picture. Incidents are dealt with in isolation. Cumulative and escalating risk isn’t identified as soon as it could be. This can cause delays in developing an appropriate protective plan.

**Responding to risk and vulnerability**

The police work hard with their colleagues in social care, health and other agencies, such as youth offending teams and probation services, to protect victims. But too little is done to prevent risk becoming acute or to repair the damage it causes. The new statutory local safeguarding framework will allow the police to develop more effective ways of exchanging information about risk, and to make joint decisions in developing protective plans.

**Criminal exploitation**

We found that police forces are now better at recognising children at risk of criminal exploitation. They understand that organised criminals move children across the country and coerce them into committing crime. These offences are often referred to as ‘county lines’.

But the police aren’t yet using all the tools available to them to protect children who are forced to commit crime. In too many areas, children are still likely to be prosecuted despite clear evidence of coercion. As a
result, too many children are being criminalised when they shouldn’t be.

Often, when deciding on the right response, too little consideration is given to the reasons why children commit crime. Recognising the root causes of criminality (whether it be exploitation or another vulnerability) would allow for more suitable responses to crime.

The response to those who pose a risk to children

The way the police deal with people who pose a risk to children is inconsistent. Examining seized electronic devices often causes delays. Some forces have equipment that can quickly identify which devices may have indecent images on them. But not all forces use this. As a result, images and other evidence of abuse can only be found by costly and time-consuming digital forensic examinations. Often, the police take no action to safeguard children until devices have been examined. We found that this can lead to delays in children getting the support and protection they need.

The sheer number of complex cases means that some are investigated by officers who don’t have the right training, skills or experience. The outcomes of these cases are almost always worse than they would have been otherwise. Prosecutions are often discontinued because officers can’t obtain the right evidence, so devices that may contain indecent images of children are returned to potential perpetrators. All this is entirely avoidable.
Detaining children in police custody

Police forces now know they shouldn’t hold children in police stations unless this is necessary to investigate serious crime. They ask for accommodation from local authorities more often to accommodate children who have been charged with an offence and denied bail. Local authorities should accommodate children in these circumstances. The 2017 Home Office Concordat on children in custody reinforced this, but it hasn't led to more accommodation being made available.

We found some evidence of forces using alternatives such as bail more effectively. But, in most cases where suitable accommodation isn’t available, children are still detained until they go to court. This is often for a long time.

The national concordat needs to be reviewed and replaced with arrangements that reduce, and ultimately end, the unnecessary detention of children.

Improving how we inspect the protection of children

We are proud of our support for the police in improving their service to children in need of help and protection. But we also wanted to find out how we might further improve the work we do through our child protection inspections. We commissioned NatCen Social Research to independently evaluate our national child protection inspections and to make recommendations for how we might improve.
NatCen conducted a wide-ranging and detailed analysis of the programme since it began in 2014. They reviewed our data and spoke to police leaders and practitioners from across England and Wales. We were pleased to hear that our approach since the programme started has been described as considered, engaging and comprehensive.

NatCen also found evidence of positive changes to how forces approach child protection. These changes have been in force leadership, management and governance, and the child’s experience of a force. Since senior leaders have become more engaged with the programme, there has been greater investment in resources designed to safeguard children.

However, NatCen also found that we could communicate the aims and benefits of the programme more effectively. Communicating best practice more consistently would also encourage forces to learn from one another. We will use the results of this evaluation and its recommendations to develop and improve our inspections.

**Joint targeted child protection inspections**

In 2016, we started a programme of joint child protection inspections. We carry them out with Ofsted, the Care Quality Commission and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation (HMI Probation). The programme is continuing.
In these inspections, we consider how well police, education, health and social services work together to help children in need of protection.

By the end of March 2020, we had carried out joint in-depth inspections in 35 local authority areas. These focused on child sexual exploitation; children living with domestic or sexual abuse within the family; children at risk of neglect or criminal exploitation; and those living with mental health problems.

We continue to find examples of good joint working, but agencies can do more. All children and young people, in all areas, should get consistently good support. We still find examples of poor practice by some professionals and agencies. Some children who are at risk or vulnerable don’t get the response they need as quickly as they should.

**Children who are at risk of sexual abuse in the family environment**

In February 2020, we published a report covering six inspections of the multi-agency response to children who are at risk of sexual abuse in the family environment.

We found that child sexual abuse in the family environment needs to be a greater priority for government departments and local areas. Important lessons learned from dealing with child sexual exploitation aren’t being applied enough to
abuse in families. Professionals don’t always know enough about perpetrators, how to identify them or how to stop them from abusing children. Better training and support for frontline workers are vital. Too often, responses leave children repeatedly victimised and not supported well enough. Perpetrators go unidentified, and therefore remain a risk to children.

We saw some good examples of children being supported effectively through good-quality police investigations led by experienced and well-trained police officers. In too many cases, though, we saw delays and not enough focus on the child.

**Joint inspection of child protection arrangements in Wales**

In Wales, child protection and safeguarding responsibilities are devolved to the Welsh government. The All Wales Child Protection Procedures set out what is expected of all organisations involved in child protection in Wales, including the police. This means that the joint inspections of child protection we conduct with Ofsted, the Care Quality Commission and HMI Probation don’t take place in Wales.

Throughout 2019, we worked with the Care Inspectorate Wales, Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, Eystn (the education and training inspectorate for Wales) and HMI Probation. Together, we developed a joint inspection programme to test the effectiveness of partnership working to protect children. A pilot
inspection took place in December 2019 and a formal evaluation is under way. Early feedback from the inspectorates suggests that there will be a full programme of further inspections over the next 12 months.

Youth Offending Services

We carry out joint inspections of Youth Offending Services (YOSs) with HMI Probation and other inspectorates, including the Care Quality Commission. YOSs are multi-agency teams, co-ordinated by local authorities, that aim to reduce offending by young people. Police forces have a statutory responsibility to support YOSs, and to share information with them.

YOSs deal with some of the most vulnerable young people in society. Effective partnership working can help keep these young people safe and stop them committing further offences. We inspected six force areas to assess how well the police were carrying out their responsibilities within this partnership approach.

Our findings

We found that the police remain committed to the YOS partnership approach. We also found that the police play an active and valuable part in the process of deciding whether a young person should receive an out-of-court disposal.
However, the police need to be aware of all young people being managed by YOSs to make sure information sharing is as effective as possible.

**Our specialist inspections**

**County lines drug offending**

‘County lines’ is a term used to describe crimes involving gangs and organised criminal networks moving illegal drugs around the UK. Typically, this will involve moving drugs out from large cities and urban areas to sell in rural communities.

Gangs and networks involved in county lines are likely to target and exploit children and vulnerable adults to move and store drugs and money involved in these deals. Often gangs use coercion, intimidation and violence (including sexual violence) to force these vulnerable people to carry out criminal acts.

As a result of the increase in these types of crime, we inspected police forces’ understanding of, and approach to, county lines. We focused on whether the vulnerability and exploitation of individuals are understood and prioritised by the police.

To tackle county lines effectively, each police force must work well across force borders. Forces must work with each other, with the British Transport Police and with the National Crime Agency (NCA) as a single system – locally, regionally and nationally – to both understand and respond to the threat.
The police need to work with other agencies to safeguard vulnerable people, to increase awareness of county lines within other organisations, and to help build resilient communities. Police leaders also need to make sure their staff make good use of the legislative tools available to disrupt and deter this criminality, and to protect people vulnerable to exploitation.

When doing all this, the police must strike a careful balance between safeguarding victims, disrupting criminal operations and prosecuting offenders. This is about recognising that the children and vulnerable adults involved in county lines offending can be victims as well as offenders.

**Our findings**

**Police intelligence, prioritisation and response**

We found that the intelligence picture is improving. Forces and the NCA have made efforts to develop the national intelligence picture of county lines offending. But there are shortcomings in the intelligence processes.

The way forces identify how some people involved in county lines are vulnerable to exploitation is improving, but inconsistent.

The 43-force structure in England and Wales acts as a barrier to personnel being deployed efficiently, co-ordinating efforts, and to forces exchanging intelligence over police borders. The NCA is making good use of its powers to direct national policing activity.
for county lines purposes. But there is a need for a more coherent and integrated system of allocating work nationally.

**Joint working with other public services**

Joint working is effective but doesn’t always happen. Funding for, and availability of, support services vary hugely from area to area.

Also, there are often problems when forces arrest vulnerable people outside their local areas. The force covering the area where the offence has been committed will generally be responsible for the investigation. But, for other public services, the responsible organisation is usually the one covering the area where the offender lives. This means that, when they are released from police custody, children and other vulnerable people often don’t have ready access to the support services they may need.

We heard how children excluded from school face heightened risks of exploitation, and how those at school can be at risk too. There were similar concerns about children who go missing from home, albeit with some good examples of joint working to minimise the risks.

In some ways, joint work to protect vulnerable people involved in county lines is improving. But barriers to exchanging information undermine effective joint working and need to be addressed. There also needs to
be a common, statutory definition of child criminal exploitation.

**Powers and legislation**

We found little police support for the use of telecommunications restriction orders. This is mainly because drug dealers can get hold of replacement phones and numbers quickly and anonymously.

Forces should pursue modern slavery offences whenever possible in county lines cases, because these better reflect how vulnerable people are being exploited. We found examples of successful prosecutions of county lines leaders for these offences.

There is a statutory defence for victims of slavery and exploitation who commit offences on behalf of their abusers, such as county lines drug dealing. But there are signs that this defence may increase the risk of exploitation: some offenders coach their recruits to say they have been trafficked if they are arrested. Also, police and prosecutors reported practical difficulties disproving the defence, even when it is false.

We found evidence of good practice relating to bail conditions. By making effective use of their powers to impose bail conditions on vulnerable suspects when released from police custody, some forces were safeguarding people vulnerable to exploitation by criminals.
Our recommendations

We made some recommendations aimed at improving the consistency and co-ordination of police forces and the NCA. These include guidance on submitting intelligence and conducting risk assessments, as well as developing a more coherent and integrated system for allocating work nationally.

To improve joint working, we recommended a review of the quality and extent of information exchange by public bodies for law enforcement purposes. The definition of child criminal exploitation should be placed on a statutory footing. There should also be formal arrangements for notifying police forces when local authorities move children at high risk of criminal exploitation to their areas.

There should be a dedicated central team to co-ordinate the use of telecommunications restriction orders relating to drug dealing. There should also be a review of the criminal abuse of mobile telecommunications services, including whether anonymous access to devices and services should continue, and a detailed review of cases involving the statutory defence for victims of slavery and exploitation.
Crimes against older people

The age structure of UK society is shifting as people live longer. In 2017, almost 12 million people were aged 65 years and older – 2.2 million more people than 10 years earlier.

Old age shouldn’t necessarily be associated with vulnerability. But older people experience higher rates of ill health than younger people. It is this, rather than age itself, that can make older people vulnerable. Older people may also feel the effects of crime differently from other age groups.

In 2017, the then Home Secretary commissioned an inspection to establish the nature and extent of problems affecting older people in the criminal justice system. The inspection concentrated on crimes of abuse and exploitation, including financial exploitation.

We conducted this thematic inspection with Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate. The police and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) must work effectively together to deal with crimes against older people, so it is beneficial to consider all the factors that might affect the criminal justice response to such crimes.

Our findings

No national focus on older people

There is no national police focus on older victims of crime, many of whom are vulnerable.
The police don’t generally treat crimes against older people (those over 60) as a specific category of offending. By contrast, the CPS has a policy on crimes against this age group that have certain other features. But beyond the need to flag such cases, we found little evidence that prosecutors consider and apply the policy.

We don’t believe that these different national approaches allow the police and the CPS to work effectively together. As a starting point, there needs to be a simple, joint definition of what constitutes a crime against an older person. It is critical that the police have consistent and effective arrangements to make sure people are kept safe.

**Safeguarding older people**

In their work, the police must be effective at identifying anyone they come across who needs safeguarding, and they must tell other organisations about what they have found. We identified significant shortfalls relating to these processes for older people.

We found that the police are usually good in their initial dealings with older victims. Their response is appropriate, and most victims are seen promptly and in person. We also found that initial police decisions about whether a victim is vulnerable were mainly accurate. But crime allocation policies often weren’t sophisticated enough and subsequent investigations not good enough.
Supporting older victims

We found little evidence in our inspection that the police have a consistent approach to assessing victims’ needs. There is no standard way for victim needs assessments to take place, so forces have developed these piecemeal or not at all. Some victims aren’t referred to victim support services when they should be.

We found that errors and omissions in assessing a victim’s needs could have implications throughout the criminal justice system. For example, some vulnerable victims may not be given help to provide their account to the police or give their evidence in court. If a victim needs assessment doesn’t take place at the start of the police process, police don’t always know what they need to do to help the victim. This could include video interviews, interpreters, intermediaries and (later in the process) an assessment of whether special measures are needed in court.

Even when victims’ needs were identified, we found that the police and the CPS were often poor at dealing with complex needs. Special measures weren’t always considered to help victims give evidence – for example, from behind a screen in court or by video link.

Our report identified causes of concern and areas for improvement. We made 13 recommendations to several agencies, organisations and government departments.
Cyber-dependent crime

There are few aspects of everyday life that haven’t been affected by the development of digital technology. In many ways, we rely on technology to function, both as individuals and as a wider society. This provides an opportunity for criminals who seek to attack our devices.

Cyber-dependent crime is crime that can only be committed using ICT, where devices are both the tools for committing the crime and the targets of the crime. It is greatly under-reported and, as a result, the true scale of it is unknown. This is a significant problem for law enforcement agencies.

This inspection followed on from our 2019 report *Fraud: Time to Choose*. Between April and June 2019, we inspected ten police forces in England and Wales, all nine regional organised crime units, the NCA, Action Fraud and the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau.

**Our findings**

In general, we found a positive picture, with a good national approach to tackling cyber-dependent crime. But we also found that, as local cyber-dependent crime units have developed, they have become a potential source of inefficiencies. These include:

- variation in how nationally agreed structures and processes are applied;
• little understanding of demand among forces, leading to duplication of effort or, in some cases, a lack of capability in some roles, such as analysis; and
• the potential for regional and local cyber-dependent crime resources to be diverted to deal with other types of crime.

We separated our inspection into six areas:
• the strategic approach to fraud;
• how policing is structured to respond to cyber-dependent crime;
• how the public is protected from cyber-dependent crime;
• how cyber-dependent crime is investigated;
• how victims of cyber-dependent crime are treated; and
• the training given to officers and staff.

The strategic approach to fraud

We found that the law enforcement response to cyber-dependent crime is good but could be better. For example, the national strategy for tackling cyber-dependent crime is well established but the extent to which police forces have adopted it varies. Often, police forces don’t fully understand the threat from cyber-dependent crime and rarely see it as a priority. As a result, there is too much variation in local responses to a national threat.
Dataset 1: Number of forces that specifically feature cyber-dependent (or cybercrime more generally) in their strategic priorities

Ten forces feature cybercrime as a specific strategic priority, which includes mention of cyber-dependent crime. Seventeen forces have cybercrime as a specific strategic priority. One force has cyber-dependent crime as a specific strategic priority. Twelve forces have neither cybercrime nor cyber-dependent crime as specific strategic priorities.

Source: HMICFRS inspection data

How policing is structured to respond to cyber-dependent crime

We found that having 43 forces operating independently didn’t provide an effective response to cyber-dependent crime. Although central government funding had encouraged police forces to develop their ability to respond to cyber-dependent crime, we found that the levels of capability and capacity were often based on the available budget rather than an understanding of the demand.

Ultimately, not enough forces had a clear plan to maintain these resources beyond the short term. Also, not all forces have allowed their specialist cyber-dependent resources to be managed regionally, which would provide a more consistent response nationally.
How the public is protected from cyber-dependent crime

National organisations do good work in identifying emerging threats. Regionally, there is a well-established network to make sure that initiatives promoting protection against cyber-dependent threats are implemented. Forces are also increasingly proactive in communicating to the public about how to protect themselves from cyber-dependent crime. But these messages aren’t being consistently co-ordinated and more needs to be done to avoid both duplicating and leaving out information.

How cyber-dependent crime is investigated

We found that the response to cyber-dependent crime was improving. For example, a national allocation process and regional co-ordinators for investigations provide some consistency in when, how, and to what level cyber-dependent crime is investigated by regional and local teams.

National performance indicators have also provided some way of measuring performance. However, each of these developments has limitations, and there is still too much variation in the approach to cases.

How victims of cyber-dependent crime are treated

Victims who report cyber-dependent crime are generally satisfied with the service they receive, but there is still confusion among the public about who to report it to. Whether victims are given good advice on protecting themselves from further cyber-dependent attacks varies
depending on who they contact. They are often given confusing and misleading advice about how (or whether) their cases will be investigated and, if they are, how they are progressing.

The training given to officers and staff

The approach to learning for staff varies. A national training plan is in place, which includes recommended training providers. However, there is wide variation in the extent to which forces follow this. There is little evidence that forces are carrying out any adequate analysis of the training their staff need, and for some roles the training isn’t good enough. The level of training or resources forces provide to help non-investigative staff recognise cyber-dependent crime is inconsistent.

Our recommendations

Several of the 16 recommendations and five areas for improvement in *Fraud: Time to Choose* applied equally to cyber-dependent crime. As a result, we reproduced them in our cyber-dependent crime report.²

We also made one further recommendation: that the Home Office and other interested parties should revise the current police structure for the response to cyber-dependent crime. In doing so, they should consider creating a national police cyber-dependent crime network.

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² *Cyber: Keep the Light On – An inspection of the police response to cyber-dependent crime*, HMICFRS, 24 October 2019.
They should also consider how such a network would engage with other law enforcement agencies and how best to co-ordinate responsibilities to make sure it is effective.

The police service’s arrangements for the selection and development of chief officers

In policing, chief officers are those at the highest ranks. They set the police service’s direction and have a profound effect on the forces they lead.

This inspection was prompted by concerns raised in the police service about a reduced number of applications for chief officer posts, the wellbeing of postholders and the length of their appointments. The purpose of our inspection was to answer the question: how well does the police service select and develop candidates for chief officer roles?

Our findings

We found that the police service is not doing this as well as it should. This is despite valiant efforts by the College of Policing to help the police professionalise the selection arrangements and adopt a stronger culture of continuing professional development.

Getting to the assessment centre

Those who aspire to become chief officers must first pass the Senior Police National Assessment Centre. To get a place at the centre, they need their chief constable’s endorsement. We found a lack of
consistency, fairness and transparency in the endorsement process. Potential candidates’ relationships with chief constables can matter more than their abilities.

Some candidates get effective coaching, paid for by their forces, to help them succeed at the assessment centre; others don’t get this, or it isn’t paid for. This makes the playing field unequal and unfair. These and other things put people off applying for promotion.

The Senior Police National Assessment Centre

We found conflicting evidence about the value of the assessment centre. Some chief officers were confident that it is a sound basis for selection and development; others considered it unhelpful and unnecessary. There was criticism that not all tests are relevant to all police forces. The tests can put candidates from other policing organisations – for example, the NCA – at a disadvantage.

The evidence points to a need for a national assessment to make sure there is a high standard of skills and experience in all those eligible for chief officer roles, but the assessment centre needs a fresh look. There is a professional reference group that advises the College of Policing on the assessment centre, but its members are exclusively from policing. We consider that the College of Policing should extend the group’s membership to include people with a wider range of backgrounds.
The Strategic Command Course

After passing the assessment centre, development for aspiring chief officers includes completing the College of Policing’s Strategic Command Course. There were mixed opinions of the course’s value, relating to what is taught and how. But there was a consistently positive view that the course gave students the chance to build lifelong, supportive professional networks.

We have some concerns about the course’s content. But these can’t be fully addressed until the police (as opposed to the College of Policing) take the concept of continuous professional development more seriously.

We concluded that a newly constituted professional reference group should lead a process of reflection and change. This should be supported by a professional, independent and possibly international evaluation of the Strategic Command Course. The evaluation should lead to a course that meets the needs of policing. And the course should be a feature of a wider framework of continuous professional development.

Selection processes for chief officer appointments

This area wasn’t within the scope of this inspection. However, we gathered information that we consider important and so report it here in the public interest.

We found that selection processes are inconsistent, with a lack of impartial guidance for those seeking promotion. The inconsistency, together with concern
that appointments have already been decided in favour of local candidates, is putting potential applicants off.

There is a clear case for greater consistency and professionalism in the processes used to select chief officers. The College of Policing offers valuable support and guidance that we found only a few forces had taken up. We urge more to do so.

**Mobility and relocation**

There has never been a greater need for the police service to function as part of a single law enforcement system, yet an increasing number of officers have only ever served in one force. The police service needs chief officers with a breadth of skills, experience and vision to lead effective local, regional and national policing arrangements.

The barriers to mobility also include finance and the cost of moving home; having a partner with a career; and caring responsibilities.

Before changes to police regulations in 2012, officers couldn’t be promoted to chief constable without having served in another force or policing organisation for at least two years. We explored options for reinstating such a regulation, but one that takes account of the needs of those with caring responsibilities. We concluded that such a regulation should be made.
Wellbeing and tenure

One of the concerns that prompted this inspection was a decrease in the average period of tenure for chief constables. Our evidence indicated that very short tenures create unsettling turnover within forces.

According to a wellbeing survey conducted by the Chief Police Officers’ Staff Association, 10 percent of chief officers registered high anxiety scores, with bullying and peer pressure cited as factors. We found an absence of appropriate support for them in their own forces.

At the time of the inspection, the Chief Police Officers’ Staff Association was developing a peer support framework and the College of Policing was also doing some work in this area. We welcome these initiatives but recognise that more should be done to meet the apparent demand for welfare support.

Diversity in the workforce

The percentage of BAME officers across the police service is low. At chief officer level, the percentage is even lower.

Non-warranted officers and staff improve overall representation rates. However, targeted initiatives to increase diversity aren’t having enough of a positive effect. They also attract resentment, with some interviewees maintaining that they feel at a disadvantage when it comes to promotion.
Our recommendations

We made nine recommendations, covering three main areas:

- promoting greater consistency, openness and fairness in selection;
- establishing a framework of continuous professional development; and
- encouraging mobility among chief officers.

The police’s contribution to the Government’s Prevent programme

The purpose of this inspection was to assess how effective the police are in contributing to Prevent, one of the strands of the Government’s counter-terrorism strategy. Local policing bodies and chief constables are required to consider the need to identify and divert those involved in, or vulnerable to, radicalisation.

The main areas of this inspection were:

- what capability is in place in police forces to support Prevent;
- whether there is consistency in how police forces operate in this area; and
- whether there is effective information sharing.

We found that, in general, forces were meeting their Prevent duties. There are many positive aspects of the Prevent work police forces do, including working effectively with other organisations. Our inspection
showed that there are effective processes in place to protect people from being radicalised. But there is room for improvement in some aspects of training, ICT, communication and safeguarding.

**Capability**

We established that most forces have staff dedicated to this role and they have received appropriate training. Some forces have designed training packages for frontline staff, but there is no training tailored to the role of each force’s strategic lead on Prevent.

Most forces had a good and improving capability to support the multi-agency approach to Prevent. Many of the people we interviewed during our inspection were confident in the police’s ability to manage the risk from radicalisation.

We found that, in general, the ICT systems were satisfactory. However, some important roles didn’t have direct access to the Prevent ICT system.

**Consistency**

Forces are well supported by the National Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters’ (NCTPHQ’s) policy. NCTPHQ provides advice and guidance to forces and co-ordinates their activities, making their approach to Prevent more consistent.

The Government’s Channel programme is designed to make sure that a range of organisations, including the police, work together to deter and prevent people from
becoming radicalised. In Channel programme meetings we observed, there were strong links between forces and the organisations they were working with.

However, police forces don’t always recognise potential for radicalisation as a vulnerability issue, and we found inconsistencies in the links between safeguarding teams and Prevent officers.

**Communication and disseminating learning**

There was a wide range of approaches to Prevent communication strategies. These were specific to the individual circumstances of each region and each case. They were generally effective.

However, we found an unstructured approach to disseminating lessons learned from Prevent. We found some good examples of learning from incidents, and the experience of others, being passed on through formal processes or at peer-to-peer events. But, in general and in too many respects, forces aren’t sufficiently identifying and disseminating lessons learned or incorporating them into action plans.

**Our recommendations**

We have made eight recommendations for improving the police approach to meeting their Prevent duty. These are mainly for the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for Prevent but also include the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism and the College of Policing. They include recommendations on training, governance and performance measures. We also recommend that
vulnerability to radicalisation should be included as one of the disciplines of public protection within the National Policing Curriculum.

These recommendations should have been implemented by June 2020. We will work with NCTPHQ to assess progress.

**TACT custody suites**

In early 2019, we and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons (HMI Prisons) conducted the first inspection of Terrorism Act (TACT) custody facilities. The inspection assessed outcomes for detainees at the five TACT custody suites in England. It also examined how well the national framework, provided and overseen by the National Counter Terrorism Policing Network, supported TACT detention.

We found good treatment and high levels of care for detainees held under TACT. The inspection also highlighted some good healthcare practices that improved the medical care arrangements for these detainees. But governance arrangements for TACT detention were often limited, including poor performance monitoring of custody services. In a report published in August 2019, we made recommendations to both counter-terrorism policing and the forces hosting TACT suites to address these concerns and several other areas that needed improvement.

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3 Report on an Announced Inspection Visit to TACT Custody Suites in England and Wales, HMI Prisons and HMICFRS, 1 August 2019.
The National Crime Agency warrants inspection

In 2015, the NCA launched an internal inquiry into its use of warrants and production orders after the collapse of three major trials. It conducted a review of all warrants and orders obtained from the courts in live pre-conviction criminal cases. The review, overseen by an independent panel, started in the summer of 2015 and took six months.

The NCA published a report on the review, which recommended several improvements to training, supervision and management, as well as procedures for warrant applications. The report also recommended that HMICFRS and Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate should carry out a joint inspection to assess whether the NCA had made these improvements.

A main focus of our joint inspection was to establish whether the NCA had improved how it dealt with applications to search premises and obtain production orders.

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4 Court orders that compel the holder of documents to hand them to the police, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the NCA, the Serious Fraud Office or another authority.
Overall findings

Our inspection found that the NCA had been working hard to tackle the areas of concern highlighted in the 2015 review. Our inspection of search authorities, search warrants and production orders found some problems, but overall the standard was good. We were also impressed by the NCA’s efforts to train officers and give them guidance to make sure that the organisation’s approach is consistent.

We concluded that the NCA had achieved the improvements that were recommended in the 2015 review. We made six recommendations in our inspection report. These are focused on reviewing and improving procedures, and updating guidance.

The National Crime Agency’s Anti-Kidnap and Extortion Unit

We carried out an inspection of the NCA’s Anti-Kidnap and Extortion Unit (AKEU). The AKEU is a small unit of 14 officers, who provide a centre of expertise for the law enforcement response to kidnap, extortion, blackmail and other crimes. These are known in law enforcement circles as ‘crimes in action’.

Our findings

Most forces make good use of the AKEU’s advice and help in accessing the NCA’s specialist capabilities. The AKEU also provides a deconfliction service to make sure that, in instances involving multiple victims,
investigations are properly co-ordinated. We found the service to work well.

The nature of the AKEU’s work means that the expertise of its officers is particularly important. At the time of the inspection, there was plenty of expertise within the unit, but no succession plan.

The AKEU spends a great deal of time providing training to police forces in how to investigate kidnappings. We found that this training was fit for purpose. However, it wasn’t clear that senior leaders in the NCA understood exactly how much time the team was spending on training. We recommended that the NCA should pay closer attention to this aspect of the AKEU’s work.

The AKEU plays another important role when dealing with extortion incidents involving product contamination. We found that it provides a very good service to police forces and has established good lines of communication with Public Health England, scientific advisers and retailers.

In non-terrorism cases, the AKEU usually takes a co-ordination role, briefing and deploying the relevant NCA international liaison officer and other relevant law enforcement personnel local to the incident. Police forces assured us that the AKEU performs this role well.
Our recommendations

We made three recommendations, including:

• implementing a succession and career plan for the AKEU;

• a review of the AKEU’s training provision; and

• a review of the role and scope of the AKEU, to make sure it can fulfil its operational responsibilities.

Domestic abuse evidence-led prosecutions

We helped Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate carry out an inspection into domestic abuse evidence-led prosecutions. These are domestic abuse cases where the victim withdraws support for the prosecution, but there is still evidence which could lead to a successful case against the offender. Police and prosecutors should make sure that, at the outset of a complaint of domestic abuse, they consider how they could prosecute the case if the victim refuses or later withdraws their support.

The inspection focused on whether police officers and CPS lawyers understand what needs to be done to build viable evidence-led prosecutions. We also assessed whether staff dealing with domestic abuse cases within the police and the CPS appreciate the importance of evidence-led prosecutions, and have a good enough understanding of the relevant guidance and policy.
Our findings

At all levels in the police and the CPS, we found both a clear recognition that domestic abuse is an important area of work and a desire to achieve the best possible outcomes for victims. Operational police officers and CPS prosecutors have a good understanding of evidence-led prosecutions and are aware that cases can proceed even when victims don’t support them.

However, the handling of evidence-led domestic abuse prosecutions requires improvement. The police and the CPS need to do more to make sure they focus on these prosecutions and consider them a priority.

We also found that, in too many respects, neither the police nor the CPS have adequate systems in place to distinguish cases where an evidence-led approach may be more effective. Although training for cases involving domestic abuse was in place across both services, there were limited training packages or material available with a specific focus on evidence-led domestic abuse prosecutions. These cases should be given the same weight and training as those offered to staff dealing with general domestic abuse.

In most of the cases we analysed, police officers dealing with domestic abuse had completed a risk assessment of the level of risk to the victim and family. But often the quality of these assessments needed to improve. Despite these shortcomings, in many cases where victims don’t support a prosecution, frontline
police officers refer victims of domestic abuse to agencies offering support.

**Our recommendations**

Our joint report recommended that evidence-led domestic abuse cases receive the same scrutiny and focus as cases where the victim does support prosecution.

**Integrated offender management**

We worked with HMI Probation on a joint thematic inspection of integrated offender management (IOM).

IOM was originally established in 2009, with the aim of bringing multiple organisations together to respond to the threat of crime and reoffending faced by local communities. The most persistent and problematic offenders were to be identified and managed by different agencies, such as police and probation, working together. These agencies would provide services to offenders, such as support with alcohol or substance abuse or mental ill-health, and help with housing and employment.

We last inspected IOM in 2014, when we found the programme had the potential to achieve its aim. Since then, there have been some major changes. In June 2014, as part of the Government’s Transforming Rehabilitation programme, 35 probation trusts were replaced by a new public sector National Probation Service and 21 Community
Rehabilitation Companies. Subsequently, the Ministry of Justice and Home Office relaunched their approach to IOM in 2015 and updated its main principles.

This inspection examined how IOM has been operating since the implementation of the Transforming Rehabilitation programme and in a climate of reduced police numbers. Our joint inspection team visited seven different IOM schemes in England and Wales.

**Our findings**

Overall, our findings in this 2019 inspection are disappointing. There has been little development of IOM since 2015. In many areas, IOM has lost its way and has a much lower profile than before.

**Schemes are less focused than before and service provision is patchy**

In many schemes, the scope has broadened to cover those who have a high risk of harming the public, as well as prolific offender cases. This has made the focus of these schemes less clear. In too many cases, staff aren’t being given the necessary training to deal with the different challenges presented by this type of offender.

The provision of services to offenders in IOM schemes is also patchy. In only a third of the IOM cases we reviewed did plans set out exactly what was required of service users as a result of their being included in the IOM scheme. Less than half were getting the drug or alcohol misuse services they needed.
In many cases, police, probation and support services had previously been located on the same site. This appears to have become a thing of the past, with only one of the seven sites we visited having this arrangement. This could be making joint working less effective. In some areas, the roles of police and probation have blurred, and the police are more actively engaged in rehabilitation work than the probation service. The separation of probation under Transforming Rehabilitation, reductions in police numbers and funding cuts to most services have hindered IOM work.

Some encouraging signs

This is not to say that our findings during this inspection were all negative. There are still some encouraging signs of the potential for IOM to provide good-quality services to those who most need it. We found some effective practice continuing at some of the sites we visited.

This inspection resulted in several recommendations to a range of government departments and other organisations. These recommendations focused on refreshing the IOM strategy; better recording, measuring and analysing of IOM work; and improving training and guidance. We also recommended that the IOM leaders in the National Police Chiefs’ Council and National Probation Service establish a joint national group to guide and oversee improvements to IOM.
Our specialist rolling inspections

Joint custody inspections

We inspect police custody suites jointly with HMI Prisons. We do this as a member of the UK’s National Preventive Mechanism (NPM). NPM members monitor and inspect places of detention, in line with the UK’s obligations under the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT).

Our inspections take place on a rolling programme so that all police custody suites are visited regularly.

Between April 2019 and the end of March 2020, we published seven reports after unannounced inspections of police custody suites across England and Wales. These included the custody suites used to detain people arrested on suspicion of terrorism offences.

Follow-up visits to forces

One year after we have inspected them, we carry out follow-up visits to forces. We use these visits to assess the progress each force has made in response to our findings. Between April 2019 and the end of March 2020, we carried out eight of these visits.

As last year, most forces had begun to improve their custody services and were monitoring their progress. But when forces were dependent on other organisations, such as courts, medical and children’s services, progress was slow in achieving better
outcomes for detainees. This was despite the best efforts of many forces to work proactively with others.

**Our findings**

As in previous years, we found that custody officers treat detainees respectfully and meet their health needs. They usually identify risks and manage them well.

**Children and young people in custody**

Diverting vulnerable people and children away from custody is still an important strategic aim for forces. Children aren’t usually kept in custody for longer than needed while offences are being investigated. Overall, the numbers of children charged and refused bail are low. But children charged and denied bail are rarely moved to accommodation arranged by the local authority as they should be. This year, we also started to see some improvements in care for detainees, with custody officers paying better attention to their welfare. For example, some forces have started using foam footballs in cells to keep detainees, especially children, occupied.

**Meeting changing PACE requirements**

Our inspections also assessed how well forces are implementing the changes to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) codes of practice in 2019. These included the support available to women and the need to offer all detainees the chance to speak to a
custody officer in private. Not all forces were consistently implementing these changes but generally we saw an improving picture. However, some other aspects of custody showed little improvement.

Most forces weren’t good enough at collating and monitoring important custody performance data. There were gaps in important information. Data wasn’t always accurate or reliable. This included data showing that any force used against detainees in custody was appropriate and proportionate. Without this information, forces can’t have good oversight of their custody services. This means that outcomes for detainees aren’t always regularly assessed and improved on.

**Reviewing detention**

Many of the forces we inspected still didn’t consistently meet the requirements of the PACE codes of practice for arrest and detention. This often related to reviewing a person’s detention. For example, too many forces didn’t always tell detainees that their detention had been further authorised while they were asleep.

**Support for vulnerable detainees**

Vulnerable detainees didn’t always get the support they should have had from an appropriate adult, or had to wait too long for it. All children had this support, which is a statutory requirement, but again not always early enough.

The liaison and diversion services we saw working in custody were providing some good support for
vulnerable detainees. Custody staff welcomed this. But mental health assessments weren’t always done quickly enough. Detainees often had to wait too long if they needed to be moved to a mental health bed in a health-based place of safety.

We have also started to see forces detaining people under section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 while in custody. In too many cases, these detainees hadn’t been fully assessed while in custody but their detention time under PACE had nearly run out. Officers were using mental health powers to detain them so they could be transferred to health-based places of safety. This is an area we will continue to focus on in our inspections.

**Crime data integrity**

In 2014, we published the results of our thematic inspection into the crime data integrity (CDI) of police forces: *Crime Recording: Making the Victim Count*. This found that, at a national level, the police failed to record 19 percent of the crimes reported to them. We found the problem to be worst for victims of violence against the person and sexual offences, where the under-recording rates were 33 percent and 26 percent respectively.

Accurate crime recording helps forces prioritise investigations using suitably skilled staff. It also helps them manage their resources, plan effectively for the
future, and give victims and the community the service they deserve.

This data affects every area of policing, from call handling to investigations, and from crime prevention to how forces work with other organisations. It also helps forces monitor whether they are treating people fairly, as set out in the Public Sector Equality Duty. As such, it is very important that the data is accurate.

In April 2016, we started a new programme to inspect all 43 forces in England and Wales on how well they record reported crime. This programme builds on our 2014 thematic inspection, which found that 800,000 reported crimes (19 percent) went unrecorded nationally.

Our inspections cover several areas:

- how accurately the police record reports of crime in general;
- how accurately the police record reports of violent and sexual crimes;
- how accurately the police record reports of rape;
- how well victims of domestic abuse are treated; and
- how well the police record reports of modern slavery crimes.

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5 The public sector equality duty is a duty on public authorities to consider how their policies or decisions affect people who are protected under the Equality Act 2010.
We examine reports made by the public and by organisations, such as social services, to specialist police departments dealing with vulnerable victims. We assess these reports to see whether crimes have been appropriately recorded. We also examine cases in which the police have amended crime reports to show that no crime has been committed.

**Our findings**

In my *2018 State of Policing report*, I described the three factors that contribute to a high standard of crime data integrity: strong leadership, effective oversight arrangements, and systems and processes that work well – all of which contribute to a healthy, victim-focused culture. This is still the case.

**The big picture**

We have now completed our rolling programme into all 43 territorial police forces in England and Wales, 14 of which we have re-inspected. We reviewed more than 66,900 reports of crime across these 57 inspections.

The combined recording accuracy for all reported crime in England and Wales\(^6\) was 90.3 percent. For violent offences it was 88.3 percent, and for sexual offences it was 94.0 percent.\(^7\)

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\(^6\) To produce the figures for England and Wales, we applied simple weighting to the individual recording accuracies for each force.

\(^7\) These figures have confidence intervals of +/- 0.3 percent for all reported crime; +/- 0.4 percent for violent offences; and +/- 0.4 percent for sexual offences. A confidence interval gives an estimated range within which the figures are likely to fall. For example, if an audit found that 85 percent +/- 1
Dataset 2: Overall crime recording accuracy by force

The overall crime recording accuracy of all 43 forces in England and Wales is 90.3 percent. We revisited 12 forces to check for improvement, and 11 of them showed a statistically significant increase in accuracy. Derbyshire had the largest increase (from 65.3 percent to 90.9 percent), followed by Kent (from 83.6 percent to 96.6 percent). Of the latest estimates into each force, Devon and Cornwall has the lowest accuracy with 81.5 percent. Gloucestershire has the second lowest, with 81.6 percent. All accuracy numbers are central estimates and could deviate within a confidence interval.

Source: HMICFRS crime data integrity data

This is the first time we have been able to compare our findings from the full rolling programme with those from our 2014 thematic inspection. The recording accuracy from our rolling programme is substantially better than that from the 2014 thematic, which shows the value of our inspection work. But there is still room for further improvement.

percent of reported crimes were correctly recorded, we would be confident that between 84 percent and 86 percent of reported crimes were correctly recorded.
Dataset 3: Crime recording accuracy by type of crime and crime data integrity (CDI) programme

Crime recording accuracy has increased between the 2014 CDI inspection and the 2016–2020 rolling programme. The accuracy for all crime (excluding fraud) increased from 80.5 percent to 90.3 percent, which means 570,000 more crimes were recorded in 2019 due to improved recording standards. For violent offences, accuracy increased from 66.9 percent to 88.3 percent, which means 421,000 more crimes were recorded. For sexual offences, accuracy increased from 74.2 percent to 94.0 percent, which means 34,000 more crimes were recorded.

Source: HMICFRS CDI data

We estimate that, because of better recording standards, and compared with the findings of our 2014 inspection, forces recorded around 570,000 more crimes during 2019, including 421,000 violent offences and 34,000 sexual offences.

This means that many more victims now receive the service they would potentially have been denied if standards hadn’t improved. Also, forces have a much clearer understanding of crime and criminality, so they can better manage their response and make sure they are using their resources as efficiently as they can. However, we estimate that around 561,000 crimes reported to the police in 2019 still went unrecorded. This shows that there is still much to do.
**Next steps**

This rolling programme of inspections has now finished. However, there is a real need for further improvement and for continuous assessment of CDI. So inspection of CDI has now become part of our integrated PEEL assessment process, within a broader victim service assessment.\(^8\)

We will assess victims’ experiences of the service they receive from the point of contact, through the police response, crime recording, crime allocation, investigation and outcome. This will allow for a much broader assessment of the service victims receive when engaging with the police, and through their own eyes. It is intended to give the public confidence in crime recording arrangements, as well as the service they receive at all stages of their involvement with the police.

**Our inspections of non-Home Office forces**

**Sovereign Bases Area Police, Cyprus**

We carried out an inspection of Sovereign Bases Area Police in Cyprus. The inspection was classified, so we didn’t publish the findings.

\(^8\) All forces will be subject to a victim service assessment. The intention is that CDI will be included in this assessment once every three years.
States of Jersey Police

In 2018, the Jersey Police Authority invited us to inspect the States of Jersey Police (SOJP). We examined most aspects of SOJP’s operations and its governance arrangements.

Our findings

Overall, the force serves the Bailiwick of Jersey’s population well in terms of attending crime scenes and investigating most crime, including financial crime.

Crime scenes

SOJP’s criminal investigators get good forensic support. Accredited crime scene investigators (CSIs) attend incidents promptly and are quick to update crime files and return results to investigating officers. In more serious crime investigations, the CSIs discuss forensics strategy with investigators to agree what action to take.

The force has an agreement with the South West Regional Organised Crime Unit, which can provide more CSI resources if needed. The force also has a contract with a commercial provider that examines forensic samples. These examinations are usually done on time, and fingerprint checks take place consistently within the 24-hour deadline.
Investigation

The public protection unit (PPU) conducts effective investigations. Our review of a small number of PPU case files showed that all lines of enquiry had been followed in each. The standard of investigations was high and focused on the victims’ needs. But, as with investigations conducted by uniformed officers and the serious crime unit, the supervision of PPU cases was inconsistent.

We saw investigation plans in most of the electronic case files we reviewed. But some files didn’t include plans or objectives. And while some case files showed evidence of regular, though unscheduled, supervisory reviews, in others the direction of the investigation hadn’t been reviewed at all.

Financial investigations

SOJP operates to City of London Police standards. Investigators are well trained and dedicated to their roles. Intelligence used in investigations focuses on complex money laundering crimes. All these features were identified as areas for improvement in the Moneyval report of 2016\(^9\) and have since improved. We assessed similar themes to those identified in that report.

\(^9\) Moneyval is a permanent monitoring body of the Council of Europe. It assesses compliance with the principal international standards to counter money laundering and the financing of terrorism, and how effectively they are implemented. It also makes recommendations to national authorities about improvements to their systems.
The financial crime unit assesses over 3,500 suspicious activity reports each year, provided by financial institutions; these are the basis of its investigations.

We identified some areas for improvement and, in some cases, we made specific recommendations. These included the following:

- All response officers should have had basic investigation training.
- Investigations should be directed and supervised effectively.
- There should be set standards for victim care based on those in the Ministry of Justice’s Code of Practice for Victims of Crime.

**Trinidad and Tobago Police Service**

In January 2019, the commissioner of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS) invited us to review its homicide prevention and investigation procedures. This invitation was prompted by the high number of homicides involving firearms in recent years.

Policing in Trinidad and Tobago is very different from that in England and Wales. We commissioned a rapid evidence assessment from the University of South Wales to establish what research there had been about homicides in the country. The findings from this project helped us design our review of TTPS.

In May 2019, we conducted a detailed review of homicide procedures in TTPS. The findings of this
review were set out in a letter to the commissioner. This letter won’t be published because it contains details of tactics and procedures that it is not in the public interest to disclose.

The Police Service of Northern Ireland

In 2018, the Department of Justice commissioned us to inspect the efficiency and effectiveness of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). The suspension of the elected Assembly in Northern Ireland meant that there was no Minister of Justice; our 2018 commission came from the Department of Justice’s permanent secretary.

We applied the inspection methodology we use in England and Wales, focusing on the following questions:

Efficiency – how efficient is the service at keeping people safe and reducing crime? Specifically, how well does it understand the demand it faces? How well does it use its resources? And how well does it plan for the future?

Effectiveness – how effective is the service at reducing crime, tackling anti-social behaviour and keeping people safe? Specifically, how well does the service protect vulnerable people and support victims?
Our findings

Efficiency

We assessed the PSNI as being good in terms of efficiency.

The service has a thorough understanding of the demand it faces now and is likely to face in the future. It knows about the capability and skills of its workforce and has thought about how those may change over time. It also has a well-developed process of priority-based resourcing, which helps it to allocate resources and supports the change management team.

We didn’t identify any causes of concern about efficiency, but we did find some areas where the service could improve. For example, it should develop plans to meet its future need for investigative staff. This is particularly relevant given that the service has identified that many of its detectives are close to retirement.

We also recommended that the service enables officers to complete DASH\(^\text{10}\) assessments on their mobile data devices.

\(^{10}\) DASH stands for domestic abuse, stalking, harassment and honour-based violence. It is an assessment to help practitioners working with domestic abuse victims to identify those at high risk of harm.
Effectiveness

We assessed the PSNI as being good in terms of effectiveness.

The service is effective at keeping people safe and reducing crime. Since our last inspection, it has developed a training programme in problem-solving policing and is training sergeants in investigation quality and file standards. We found that investigating officers have access to a good range of support, including forensic crime scene investigation and a cybercrime centre.

The PSNI has good strategies for protecting vulnerable people and supporting victims. The service has a thorough understanding of the nature and scale of vulnerability in Northern Ireland. Officers and staff recognise it as a priority. Call handlers now identify vulnerability at the first point of contact, through effective use of the THRIVE\(^\text{11}\) model in the control room.

The service continues to develop its understanding of mental health. It works well with a wide range of other organisations, including health trusts, social services and voluntary sector bodies, to tackle vulnerability, although partnerships are at different stages of maturity across Northern Ireland.

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\(^{11}\) THRIVE is a risk assessment tool used by forces. It stands for threat, harm, risk, investigation opportunities, vulnerability of the victim and the engagement level needed to resolve the problem. THRIVE is used to assign a priority level to an incident. It may also be used to reach and justify an operational decision.
We identified a few areas where the service could be more effective. These include:

• introducing a single, standard form to refer vulnerable people to support agencies;
• providing preventative health screening for officers in high-risk roles; and
• issuing clear guidance on when officers should use body-worn video devices.

There were clear improvements since our last inspection in 2017. The service had responded well to budgetary constraints and has been able to make savings, while continuing to improve its ability to keep people safe.

It has been difficult for the service to plan for long-term investment during the absence of an elected Assembly and because funding settlements are currently annual. We encourage the restored elected Assembly to recognise the need for a longer-term approach to police funding.

**Other work**

**Super-complaints**

Super-complaints are complaints about a feature, or combination of features, of policing in England and Wales by one or more than one police force, which is, or appears to be, significantly harming the interests of the public.
The police super-complaints system started on 1 November 2018 and brings together the three policing oversight bodies: HMICFRS, the College of Policing and the Independent Office for Police Conduct. Each body contributes its relevant expertise and experience, and has joint responsibility for taking decisions about super-complaints.

The system isn’t designed for individual complaints and doesn’t replace existing police complaints systems, nor is it a way to escalate complaints from those systems. It instead focuses on systemic problems of local, regional or national significance that may not be addressed elsewhere.

Super-complaints can be made about:
- any one or more of the 43 police forces in England and Wales;
- the NCA;
- the Ministry of Defence Police;
- the Civil Nuclear Constabulary; and
- the British Transport Police.

Only bodies designated by the Home Secretary can make a super-complaint. In June 2018, 16 bodies, covering a range of issues, were designated.

Super-complaint investigations usually include information gathering from a variety of sources: fieldwork in forces; policy reviews; data analysis; and seeking the views of experts. Each super-complaint is
different, and how best to investigate them needs individual consideration. Throughout every investigation, we maintain regular contact with the designated body that submitted the super-complaint.

**Current super-complaint investigations**

We received the first-ever police super-complaint on 18 December 2018. It was made jointly by Liberty and Southall Black Sisters. It is about the policies and practices of all police forces in England and Wales in how they treat victims of crime and witnesses with insecure immigration status. In particular, it focuses on the practice of passing people’s data to the Home Office for immigration enforcement.

We received the second super-complaint on 19 March 2019. It came from the Centre for Women’s Justice and is about police use of protective measures in cases of violence against women and girls. The Centre for Women’s Justice is concerned about the police’s use of bail conditions; their treatment of breach of non-molestation orders; and their use of domestic violence protection notices and orders, and restraining orders.

We received the third super-complaint on 25 March 2019. It came from Hestia and focuses on how police treat victims and survivors of modern slavery and human trafficking.

We received the fourth super-complaint on 6 March 2020. It was made by the Centre for Women’s
Justice and sets out concerns about forces’ response to alleged domestic abuse perpetrated by police officers or staff.

**Next steps**

The system is still relatively new. We are using the experience we have gained so far to inform current and future work, and we are continually evaluating the process.

We expect to receive further super-complaints during 2020 and 2021. We will work with the Independent Office for Police Conduct and College of Policing to decide whether any other super-complaints submitted are eligible and, if so, to allocate responsibility for any future investigations.

There is up-to-date information about super-complaints on GOV.UK.¹²

**The Rape Monitoring Group**

The Rape Monitoring Group (RMG) is a multi-agency group in England and Wales. It was established to promote improvements in the response to rape across all the agencies that make up the criminal justice system.

We publish criminal justice system data on rape on the group’s behalf. This shows the number of rapes reported, arrests made, prosecutions brought and

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¹² Available at: Police super-complaints, College of Policing, HMICFRS and Independent Office for Police Conduct, 25 June 2018.
successful convictions for each force, as well as other relevant data. We want those who are involved in preventing rape and supporting victims to use this data to understand better what improvements they should focus on within their local areas.

**Our interactive dashboard**

In May 2018, we introduced a new interactive dashboard to show this data. This was updated in August 2019 (see Dataset 4). It allows for a better analysis of how rape is dealt with across the criminal justice system.

The publication of the 2017/18 dashboard in August 2019 received a significant amount of media interest. Multiple news outlets reported the headline finding that, despite an increase in the number of reports of rape, the overall charge rate for England and Wales had decreased from 6.8 percent in the previous year to 4.2 percent.

**Dataset 4: Percentage of charge/summonsed outcomes assigned to police recorded rape offences recorded in 2015/16 to 2017/18**

The percentage of police recorded rape crimes that had a charged / summoned outcome was 10.83 percent in 2015/16. It fell to 6.78 percent in 2016/17, and to 4.15 percent in 2017/18.

**Source:** [Rape Monitoring Group digestes](#)
In all, over 130 local and national media outlets reported on this story. Many prominent interested parties, including Victims’ Commissioner Dame Vera Baird QC, commented on our findings. These comments increased the amount of media interest. Ultimately, more than 130 national and local media outlets covered this story.

In response to this media coverage, the Government released a statement saying that it was “taking action to restore public confidence in the justice system”.\(^{13}\) We are in the process of planning a joint inspection of rape work as a result.

**Special grants**

Forces should include reasonable contingencies in their policing and budget plans for unexpected events in their areas. But there may be exceptional events that can threaten a force’s financial stability. In these cases, local policing bodies can apply to the Home Office for special grant funding to ease the financial burden.

The Home Office may refer applications to us to assess. We are normally asked to consider whether the resources deployed were reasonable and proportionate to the aims of the operation or investigation and its associated risks. Our reports aren’t published but, based on our findings, Home Office

\(^{13}\) See: [Home Office in the media: Thursday 29 August](https://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/media/2019/08/home-office-in-the-media-thursday-29-august), Home Office news team, 29 August 2019.
officials advise ministers, who then make the final decisions about funding.

**Special grants work in 2019**

In 2019, we produced six reports on applications for funding from six forces. The applications related to 12 police operations. They involved major or critical incidents and serious criminal offences, such as the criminal use of firearms, child sexual exploitation and the re-investigation of deaths at Gosport War Memorial Hospital.
Part 3: Our reports

Our reports

Between 3 May 2019 and 30 March 2020, we published 183 reports, which are all available on our website.

As well as our work with the 43 Home Office forces, and the other inspectorates, we carried out various other inspections. These are part of our statutory duties to inspect non-Home Office police forces and certain other law enforcement agencies. We gave our reports for these inspections to the relevant Secretaries of State. Except where national security considerations precluded it, these were then published on our website.

Over the next few pages, we have listed our reports, along with:

- a short description of the inspection’s focus;
- the names of the other inspectorates, if it was a joint inspection;
- the publication date; and
- the name(s) of Her Majesty’s Inspector(s) (HMI) responsible for the inspection.
Reports published
3 May 2019 to 30 March 2020

PEEL inspections

PEEL: Police Efficiency and Effectiveness 2018 – Police Service of Northern Ireland

Published: 10 June 2019

Inspection of the effectiveness and efficiency of the Police Service of Northern Ireland.

Lead HMI: Matt Parr

Police Effectiveness, Efficiency and Legitimacy 2018/19 (Tranche 2)

Published: 26 September 2019

The second group of Integrated PEEL Assessment inspections, combining the effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy areas of PEEL into a single inspection. We assessed 15 forces.

Lead HMI: Matt Parr/Zoë Billingham

Shining a Light on Betrayal: Abuse of Position for a Sexual Purpose

Published: 26 September 2019

A national overview of abuse of position for a sexual purpose, drawing on finalised findings from the first two groups of Integrated PEEL Assessments and early findings from the third and final group.
Lead HMI: Zoë Billingham

Police Effectiveness, Efficiency and Legitimacy 2018/19 (Tranche 3)

Published: 6 February 2020

The third group of Integrated PEEL Assessment inspections, combining the effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy areas of PEEL into a single inspection. We assessed 14 forces.

Lead HMI: Matt Parr

Child protection inspections

Joint Targeted Area Inspection of the Multi-Agency Response to Abuse and Neglect in Derby City

Published: 8 May 2019

Inspection of the multi-agency response to sexual abuse in the family in Derby City, including a focus on the response to child sexual abuse in the family environment.

Joint inspection with Ofsted, the Care Quality Commission and HMI Probation.

Lead HMI: Wendy Williams

Inspections of Youth Offending Services

Published: 14 June 2019 – 19 March 2020

Inspections of youth offending services (YOSs). We inspected YOSs in five force areas.
Joint inspection with HMI Probation.

**Lead HMI:** Wendy Williams

**National Child Protection Inspections**

**Published:** 27 June 2019 – 18 March 2020

Inspections, re-visit inspections and post-inspection reviews of how the police protect children, in nine forces.

**Lead HMI:** Wendy Williams

**Joint Targeted Area Inspections of the Multi-Agency Response to Child Exploitation**

**Published:** 2 August 2019 – 23 August 2019

Inspections of the multi-agency response to children experiencing or at risk of sexual exploitation, and those experiencing or at risk of criminal exploitation, in two local authority areas.

Joint inspection with Ofsted, the Care Quality Commission and HMI Probation.

**Lead HMI:** Wendy Williams

**Joint Targeted Area Inspections of the Multi-Agency Response to Children’s Mental Health**

**Published:** 18 December 2019 – 14 April 2020

Inspections of the multi-agency response to children’s mental health in six local authority areas.
Joint inspection with Ofsted, the Care Quality Commission and HMI Probation.

**Lead HMI:** Wendy Williams

The Multi-Agency Response to Child Sexual Abuse in the Family Environment: Prevention, Identification, Protection and Support

**Published:** 4 February 2020

Overview of six joint targeted area inspections of the multi-agency response to sexual abuse in the family.

Joint inspection with Ofsted, the Care Quality Commission and HMI Probation.

**Lead HMI:** Wendy Williams

National Child Protection Inspections: 2019 Thematic Report

**Published:** 27 February 2020

Summary of the findings to date from our national programme of child protection inspections, examining the police’s decisions at each stage of their interactions with children.

**Lead HMI:** Wendy Williams

**Specialist inspections**

Crime Data Integrity Inspections

**Published:** 16 May 2019 – 21 February 2020
Inspections of forces’ progress against recommendations we made in our 2014 Crime Data Integrity inspections. We inspected 14 forces.

**Lead HMI:** Matt Parr

**The Poor Relation: The Police and Crown Prosecution Service’s Response to Crimes Against Older People**

**Published:** 17 July 2019

Inspection of how the police and the Crown Prosecution Service respond to crimes against older people.

Joint inspection with HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate.

**Lead HMI:** Wendy Williams

**Report on an Announced Inspection Visit to TACT Custody Suites in England and Wales**

**Published:** 1 August 2019

Inspection of Terrorism Act (TACT) custody facilities, which hold people detained for terrorism or terrorism-related offences.

Joint inspection with HMI Prisons.

**Lead HMI:** Wendy Williams

**Leading Lights: An Inspection of the Police Service’s Arrangements for the Selection and Development of Chief Officers**

**Published:** 3 September 2019
Inspection of how effectively police forces select and train candidates for chief officer roles.

Joint inspection with HM Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland.

**Lead HMI:** Matt Parr

**Unannounced Inspections of Police Custody Suites**

**Published:** 11 September 2019 – 21 April 2020

Inspections of police custody, to evaluate strategy, treatment and conditions, individual rights and healthcare of people in custody. We inspected six force areas and the British Transport Police.

Joint inspection with HMI Prisons.

**Lead HMI:** Wendy Williams

**An Inspection of the States of Jersey Police**

**Published:** 30 September 2019

Inspection of the efficiency and effectiveness of the States of Jersey Police.

**Lead HMI:** Matt Parr

**Cyber: Keep the Light on – An Inspection of the Police Response to Cyber-Dependent Crime**

**Published:** 24 October 2019

Inspection of the effectiveness and efficiency of the police and National Crime Agency’s response to cyber-dependent crime.
Lead HMI: Matt Parr

Both Sides of the Coin: An Inspection of how the Police and National Crime Agency Consider Vulnerable People who are both Victims and Offenders in ‘County Lines’ Drug Offending

Published: 10 January 2020

Inspection of how the police and National Crime Agency identify and treat children and other vulnerable people involved in county lines drug trafficking.

Lead HMI: Phil Gormley

Evidence-led Domestic Abuse Prosecutions

Published: 23 January 2020

Inspection of how police and prosecutors handle ‘evidence-led’ domestic abuse prosecutions, where prosecutions are brought without the support of the victim.

Joint inspection with HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate.

Lead HMI: Wendy Williams

A Joint Thematic Inspection of Integrated Offender Management

Published: 28 February 2020

Inspection examining integrated offender management, a multi-agency structure for partner agencies to identify
and jointly manage those offenders most likely to reoffend.

Joint inspection with HMI Probation.

**Lead HMI:** Wendy Williams

**Greater Manchester Police Integrated Operational Policing System (iOPS)**

**Published:** 3 March 2020

Inspection to review Greater Manchester Police’s action plan to reduce backlogs arising from the implementation of a new computer system.

**Lead HMI:** Phil Gormley

**Counter-Terrorism Policing: An Inspection of the Police’s Contribution to the Government’s Prevent Programme**

**Published:** 9 March 2020

Inspection of how effective the police are in contributing to Prevent, one of four strands of the Government’s CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy.

**Lead HMI:** Matt Parr

**The Metropolitan Police: An Inspection of the Metropolitan Police Service’s Response to a Review of its Investigations into Allegations of Non-Recent Sexual Abuse by Prominent People (the Henricques Report)**

**Published:** 13 March 2020
Inspection of the Metropolitan Police Service’s progress in learning from its Operation Midland investigation. We reviewed its response to the findings and recommendations of the Henriques and Kentia reports.

**Lead HMI**: Matt Parr

**Non-inspection publications**

**State of Policing – the Annual Assessment of Policing in England and Wales 2018**

**Published**: 4 July 2019


**Lead HMI**: Sir Thomas Winsor

**Policing Inspection Programme and Framework 2019/20**

**Published**: 24 July 2019

HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary’s 2019/20 inspection programme and framework, prepared under Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996.

**Lead HMI**: Sir Thomas Winsor

**Rape Monitoring Group Digests**

**Published**: 29 August 2019

Interactive data dashboard showing how rape is dealt with locally at each stage of the criminal justice system.
The dashboard includes data from the 43 English and Welsh forces and British Transport Police.

**Lead HMI:** Wendy Williams

**Gang-Related Homicide and Police Corruption in Trinidad and Tobago: A Rapid Evidence Assessment**

**Published:** 18 October 2019

Examination of the current state of research on gang-related homicide and police corruption in Trinidad and Tobago, carried out by the University of South Wales.

**Lead HMI:** Matt Parr

**HMICFRS Value for Money Profiles 2019**

**Published:** 31 October 2019

Full profiles of each England and Wales force, giving a comparative analysis of policing activities, and highlighting differences in expenditure and performance.

**Lead HMI:** Matt Parr

**Observations on the Second Force Management Statement Submissions**

**Published:** 17 January 2020

Observations of the force management statement (FMS) steering group on the second round of FMSs.

**Lead HMI:** Sir Thomas Winsor
National Child Protection Inspection Programme Evaluation

Published: 27 February 2020

Independent evaluation of the impact of the national child protection inspection programme on policing activity, carried out by NatCen Social Research.

Lead HMI: Wendy Williams
Annexes

Annex A: Police force areas

The 43 territorial police forces of England and Wales are:

- Avon and Somerset
- Bedfordshire
- Cambridgeshire
- Cheshire
- City of London
- Cleveland
- Cumbria
- Derbyshire
- Devon and Cornwall
- Dorset
- Durham
- Dyfed-Powys
- Essex
- Gloucestershire
- Greater Manchester
- Gwent
- Hampshire
- Hertfordshire
- Humberside
• Kent
• Lancashire
• Leicestershire
• Lincolnshire
• Merseyside
• Metropolitan
• Norfolk
• North Wales
• North Yorkshire
• Northamptonshire
• Northumbria
• Nottinghamshire
• South Wales
• South Yorkshire
• Staffordshire
• Suffolk
• Surrey
• Sussex
• Thames Valley
• Warwickshire
• West Mercia
• West Midlands
• West Yorkshire
• Wiltshire.
Annex B: About us

Our history

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary was established in 1856, under the same statute that required every county and borough that hadn’t already done so to set up and maintain a permanent salaried police force (the County and Borough Police Act 1856).

Under the 1856 Act, three Inspectors of Constabulary in England and Wales were appointed. It was their duty to “inquire into the state and efficiency of the police” (section 15). The Act also introduced the concept of annual inspection.

The first Chief Inspector of Constabulary (HMCIC) was appointed in 1962, as part of a major package of reforms to improve police governance and expand the role of the Inspectorate.

Our role and influence have evolved over the last century and a half. Most of our current functions are set out in the Police Act 1996 (as amended by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 and the Policing and Crime Act 2017).

We are independent of both the police service and the Government. Both our independence and inspection rights are vested in Her Majesty’s Inspectors, who are Crown appointees (section 54(1), Police Act 1996).
Our statutory responsibilities

Inspecting territorial police forces in England and Wales

We must inspect and report on the efficiency and effectiveness of every police force maintained for a police area (section 54(2), Police Act 1996).

The Secretary of State may at any time direct us to carry out an inspection of a police force in any police area (section 54(2B), Police Act 1996).

From time to time, the Home Secretary may also direct us to carry out other duties to help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the police (section 54(3), Police Act 1996).

The local policing body for a police area may at any time ask us to carry out an inspection of a police force in that area (section 54(2BA), Police Act 1996).

Inspecting other police forces and agencies

We also have statutory duties to inspect other police forces and agencies, whose remits are not limited to a particular territorial area. Instead, they police specific areas of infrastructure or particular types of crime. In these cases, we give our report to whichever government body is responsible for what the force or agency does.
We have a duty to inspect:

- Armed Forces Police – Royal Navy, Royal Military and Royal Air Force Police (section 321A, Armed Forces Act 2006);
- British Transport Police (section 63, Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003);
- Civil Nuclear Constabulary (section 62, Energy Act 2004);
- HM Revenue & Customs (section 27, Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005, and the Revenue and Customs (Inspections) Regulations 2005 (SI 2005/1133));
- Ministry of Defence Police (section 4B, Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987);
- Police Service of Northern Ireland (section 41, Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998, subject to appointment by the Department of Justice, Northern Ireland);
- National Crime Agency (section 11, Crime and Courts Act 2013); and
- Customs functions (section 29, Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, and the Customs (Inspections by Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Constabulary and the Scottish Inspectors) Regulations 2012 (SI 2012/2840)).

In summer 2017, we took on inspections of England’s fire and rescue services, assessing and reporting on their efficiency, effectiveness and people. To reflect this new role, our name changed to Her Majesty’s
Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS).

Collaborative working

The long history of collaborative working between the criminal justice inspectorates – of Constabulary, the Crown Prosecution Service, Prisons and the National Probation Service – was enshrined in law through the Police Act 1996.

Schedule 4A to the 1996 Act says that the Inspectors of Constabulary:

- must co-operate with other inspectorates, where appropriate, so they can operate efficiently and effectively (paragraph 4);
- must draw up a joint inspection programme with other inspectorates (paragraph 5); and
- may tell certain other inspectorates not to carry out an inspection, or not to do so in a particular way, if HMCIC believes the inspection would impose an unreasonable burden (paragraph 3).

Publishing reports

We must publish the reports we prepare under section 54 of the Police Act 1996 (section 55(1), Police Act 1996).

We must not publish anything the Inspectors believe would be against the interests of national security or might put anyone in danger (section 55(2), Police Act 1996).
We must send a copy of every published report to the Secretary of State, the local policing body maintaining the police force the report is about, the chief officer for that police force and the police and crime panel for that police area (section 55(3), Police Act 1996).

HMCIC must each year give the Secretary of State a report on our inspections. HMCIC must lay a copy of this report before Parliament (section 54(4), Police Act 1996). The report must include his assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of policing in England and Wales for that year (section 54(4A), Police Act 1996). This is our State of Policing report.

**Producing the HMICFRS inspection programme and framework**

HMCIC must prepare, consult on and publish an inspection programme and framework (paragraph 2 of Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996). He must gain the Home Secretary’s approval of the inspection programme and framework. He must then lay the inspection programme and framework before Parliament (paragraphs 2(2A)–(2B) of Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996).

**Complaints and misconduct**

HM Inspectors (HMIs) inspecting a police force must make sure they stay informed about all complaints and misconduct matters relating to that force (section 15(1), Police Reform Act 2002).
Super-complaints

The Policing and Crime Act 2017 established a new system of police super-complaints. The system considers complaints that “a feature, or combination of features, of policing in England and Wales by one or more than one police force is, or appears to be, significantly harming the interests of the public”.

Only bodies designated by the Home Secretary can make a super-complaint. In June 2018, 16 bodies were designated.

Super-complaints must be made in writing to Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary. They are considered by HMICFRS, the College of Policing and the Independent Office for Police Conduct, who together decide what (if anything) needs to happen as a result of the super-complaint.

Participating in misconduct proceedings

In misconduct proceedings for chief constables and other senior officers above the rank of chief superintendent, HMCIC, or an HMI he nominates, will sit on the panel for misconduct meetings and misconduct hearings (Police (Conduct) Regulations 2012 (SI 2012/2632), regulation 26). For all chief officer ranks (including chief constables), HMCIC, or an HMI he nominates, will sit on any police appeals tribunal (Police Act 1996, Schedule 6, paragraph 1).
Acting as a check on the removal of senior officers

If a police and crime commissioner is proposing to call on a chief constable or other senior officer to retire or resign, they must invite HMCIC to give his written views on the proposed removal. HMCIC must then give his views and the police and crime commissioner must consider them (Police Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/527), regulations 11A and 11B).

The police and crime panel may consult HMCIC before making a recommendation to the police and crime commissioner on dismissing a chief constable (Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, Schedule 8, paragraph 15).

Our powers

Amendments made by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 to the Police Act 1996 have strengthened our role as a policing body independent of both the Government and the police. This makes us more fully accountable to the public and to Parliament.

Access to documents and premises

The chief officer of police must give Inspectors information, documents, evidence or other things the Inspector needs to carry out the inspection (paragraph 6A of Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996). The chief officer must also give Inspectors access to the force’s premises, and to documents and other things on those
premises that we need to carry out the inspection (paragraph 6B of Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996).

**Power to delegate functions**

An Inspector has the power to delegate any of his or her functions to another public authority (paragraph 1 of Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996).

**Power to act jointly with another public body**

We can act jointly with another public body where appropriate, to work efficiently and effectively (paragraph 5(1) of Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996).

**Power to provide assistance to any other public authority**

HMCIC may, if he thinks it is appropriate, help any other public authority carry out its role. HMCIC can do this on reasonable terms, including payment terms (paragraph 6 of Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996).

**Who we are**

Biographies for each of the Inspectors of Constabulary are on our website.

**Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary**

**Sir Thomas Winsor**

In October 2012, Sir Thomas was appointed as Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary. He is the first holder of that office to come from a non-policing background.
Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Constabulary

Zoë Billingham

Zoë Billingham is Her Majesty’s Inspector for the Eastern Region.

Phil Gormley

Phil Gormley QPM is Her Majesty’s Inspector for the Northern Region.

Matt Parr

Matt Parr CB is Her Majesty’s Inspector for the National and London Regions. He is also Her Majesty’s Inspector for Bedfordshire Police.

Dru Sharpling

Dru Sharpling CBE is Her Majesty’s Inspector and also sits on the panel of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse.

Wendy Williams

Wendy Williams is Her Majesty’s Inspector for the Wales and Western Region.

How we are accountable

The first Inspectors of Constabulary were appointed under the County and Borough Police Act 1856. The Act required them to inspect and report on the efficiency and effectiveness of most of the police forces in England and Wales.
Our main role hasn’t changed materially since then, except that our remit now covers the 43 forces in England and Wales, and several other forces and agencies. Our main empowering statute is now the Police Act 1996.

There are six Inspectors of Constabulary. They are neither civil servants nor police officers, and are appointed by the Crown for a fixed term of up to five years. That means we are independent of the police, Government, police and crime commissioners (and their equivalents), other agencies in the criminal justice system and all outside parties.

However, independence doesn’t mean a lack of accountability. We are accountable in these ways:

- our statutory duties, enforceable through judicial review or by action for breach of statutory duty;
- our obligation to submit an annual report to the Home Secretary under section 54 of the Police Act 1996; each report must be published and laid before Parliament: section 54(4), Police Act 1996;
- our obligation to lay before Parliament a copy of each inspection programme and inspection framework: Police Act 1996, schedule 4A, paragraph 2(2A)(a);
- written Parliamentary questions;
- our obligation to give written and oral evidence to Committees of Parliament, including the Home Affairs Select Committee, the Public Accounts Committee
and any other select committee which may call on us to give evidence;

- our obligation to carry out other duties the Home Secretary directs us to: section 54(3), Police Act 1996; and

- our obligation to comply with the rules of administrative law and the rules of good public administration, enforceable in the High Court by judicial review.

As a public body, we are also subject to the legal obligations imposed on public authorities, including:

- Official Secrets Acts 1911 and 1989;
- Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974;
- Data Protection Act 2018 and the General Data Protection Regulation (2016/679/EU);
- Human Rights Act 1998;
- Freedom of Information Act 2000; and

**How we work with other organisations**

We are mostly funded by the Home Office and are accountable to the Home Office for our spending, even though we are neither a subsidiary nor a part of the Home Office.
We have three concordats with others which set out the relationship or working arrangements between us. These are:

- a concordat with the Home Office which explains the material parts of the relationship between our two organisations. The concordat sets out our respective roles, and the responsibilities of the main people involved in running, sponsoring and overseeing our affairs. The concordat is published on our website;

- a concordat with the College of Policing. As we have complementary purposes and different powers by which we aim to achieve those purposes, the concordat sets out our respective roles and responsibilities, and how we work with each other;

- a concordat with the College of Policing and the Independent Office for Police Conduct. The concordat sets out our respective roles and responsibilities, and how we work with each other.

We also have a statutory duty to co-operate with the other criminal justice inspectorates, namely those concerned with the Crown Prosecution Service and the probation and prisons services, and the other named inspectorates set out in paragraph 4, Schedule 4A, Police Act 1996. Our obligations relating to joint inspections are set out in paragraphs 2–5 of that Schedule and we cover those inspections in this report.
Our regions

Our four geographic regions are the Northern, Eastern, National and London, and Wales and Western regions.

The National and London regions’ responsibilities include:

- Metropolitan Police Service
- City of London Police
- National Crime Agency
- British Transport Police
- Civil Nuclear Constabulary
- Ministry of Defence Police
- Armed Forces Police
- Guernsey Police
- Royal Gibraltar Police
- States of Jersey Police
- Isle of Man Constabulary
- HM Revenue & Customs
- others by invitation.
Our purpose, values and objectives

Our purpose is to promote improvements in policing and fire and rescue services to make everyone safer.

Our values of respect, honesty, independence, integrity and fairness are at the heart of how we work. They act as a touchstone to help us make decisions – both as individuals and as an organisation.

Our objectives are to:

• demonstrate our values in everything we do;
• conduct informed, independent and evidence-based inspections;
• provide value for money;
• work with others to promote improvements in policing and fire and rescue services;
• report our inspection findings/analysis in a clear and compelling way; and
• ensure that our staff have the skills, knowledge and support to do their jobs.
Annex C: Peelian principles

Sir Robert Peel became Home Secretary in 1822. In 1829, he established the first full-time, professional and centrally-organised police force in England and Wales, for the Greater London area.

His police reforms were based on a philosophy that the power of the police comes from the common consent of the public, as opposed to the power of the state. This philosophy is underpinned by nine principles which have shaped our approach when assessing forces.

1. The basic mission for which the police exist is to prevent crime and disorder.
2. The ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval of police actions.
3. Police must secure the willing co-operation of the public in voluntary observance of the law to be able to secure and maintain the respect of the public.
4. The degree of co-operation of the public that can be secured diminishes proportionately to the necessity of the use of physical force.
5. Police seek and preserve public favour not by pandering to public opinion but by constantly demonstrating absolute impartial service to the law.
6. Police use physical force to the extent necessary to secure observance of the law or to restore order only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient.
7. Police, at all times, should maintain a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and the public are the police; the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.

8. Police should always direct their actions strictly towards their functions and never appear to usurp the powers of the judiciary.

9. The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with it.
Annex D: Our finances and our workforce

Our finances

We are funded mainly by the Home Office. We also receive funding for inspections commissioned by others (such as the National Crime Agency).

We spend just over 80 percent of our funding on our workforce, with the rest spent on travel, subsistence, accommodation and other expenses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure breakdown 2018/19 (£)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20.8 million (83% of our funding) on staffing costs including associates</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.4 million (10%) on travel and subsistence</td>
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<td>0.7 million (3%) on IT and telephony</td>
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<tr>
<td>0.6 million (2%) on office expenditure and other costs</td>
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<td>0.5 million (2%) on surveys and inspection services</td>
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<tr>
<td>0.2 million (1%) on accommodation</td>
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Note: numbers may not add up to 100% due to rounding
Our workforce

Our workforce comprises the Inspectors of Constabulary, civil servants, seconded police officers and staff, and secondees from fire and rescue services. We also have a register of associate inspectors.

**Staffing breakdown 2018/19**

181 permanent staff (67% of our workforce)
44 police secondees (16% of our workforce)
19 fire and rescue secondees (7% of our workforce)
15 fixed-term appointments (6% of our workforce)
5 people from other government departments or on loan (2% of our workforce)
4 fast streamers, agency staff and sandwich students (1% of our workforce)
3 fire staff (1% of our workforce)
1 police staff (0.4% of our workforce)

*Note: numbers may not add up to 100% due to rounding*
Annex E: Our inspections by force
1 April 2018 to 2 May 2019

The 43 territorial police forces of England and Wales are:

- Avon and Somerset
- Bedfordshire
- Cambridgeshire
- Cheshire
- City of London
- Cleveland
- Cumbria
- Derbyshire
- Devon and Cornwall
- Dorset
- Durham
- Dyfed-Powys
- Essex
- Gloucestershire
- Greater Manchester
- Gwent
- Hampshire
- Hertfordshire
- Humberside
- Kent
- Lancashire
- Leicestershire
- Lincolnshire
- Merseyside
- Metropolitan
- Norfolk
- North Wales
- North Yorkshire
- Northamptonshire
- Northumbria
- Nottinghamshire
- South Wales
- South Yorkshire
- Staffordshire
- Suffolk
- Surrey
- Sussex
- Thames Valley
- Warwickshire
- West Mercia
- West Midlands
- West Yorkshire
- Wiltshire.
PEEL inspections

PEEL: Police Efficiency and Effectiveness 2018 – Police Service of Northern Ireland

Inspected force: Police Service of Northern Ireland

Police Effectiveness, Efficiency and Legitimacy 2018/19

Inspected forces: Avon and Somerset, Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Cheshire, Cleveland, Derbyshire, Devon and Cornwall, Dorset, Gwent, Hampshire, Hertfordshire, Lancashire, Lincolnshire, Merseyside, Metropolitan, North Wales, North Yorkshire, Northamptonshire, Northumbria, South Wales, South Yorkshire, Suffolk, Staffordshire, Surrey, Sussex, Thames Valley, Warwickshire, West Mercia and West Yorkshire

Shining a Light on Betrayal: Abuse of Position for a Sexual Purpose

Inspected forces: All 43 territorial police forces of England and Wales
Child protection inspections

Joint Targeted Area Inspection of the Multi-Agency Response to Abuse and Neglect in Derby City

Inspected force: Derbyshire

Inspections of Youth Offending Services

Inspected forces: Lancashire, Merseyside, Metropolitan, Nottinghamshire and West Yorkshire

National Child Protection Inspections

Inspected forces: Durham, Gwent, Hertfordshire, Kent, Lincolnshire, Merseyside, North Wales, Northamptonshire and Sussex

Joint Targeted Area Inspections of the Multi-Agency Response to Child Exploitation

Inspected forces: Cheshire and Northumbria

Joint Targeted Area Inspections of the Multi-Agency Response to Children’s Mental Health

Inspected forces: Devon and Cornwall, Hampshire, Merseyside, Metropolitan, Sussex and Thames Valley

The Multi-Agency Response to Child Sexual Abuse in the Family Environment: Prevention, Identification, Protection and Support

Inspected forces: Derbyshire, Devon and Cornwall, Metropolitan, North Yorkshire, Thames Valley and West Mercia
National Child Protection Inspections: 2019 Thematic Report

Inspected forces: All 43 territorial police forces of England and Wales

**Specialist inspections**

Crime Data Integrity Inspections

Inspected forces: City of London, Cumbria, Derbyshire, Essex, Gloucestershire, Lancashire, Lincolnshire, Norfolk, North Yorkshire, Suffolk, Thames Valley, Warwickshire, West Mercia and West Yorkshire

The Poor Relation: the Police and Crown Prosecution Service’s Response to Crimes Against Older People

Inspected forces: All 43 territorial police forces of England and Wales

Announced Inspection Visit to TACT Custody Suites in England and Wales

Inspected forces: All 43 territorial police forces of England and Wales

Leading Lights: the Police Service’s Arrangements for the Selection and Development of Chief Officers

Inspected forces: All 43 territorial police forces of England and Wales
Unannounced Inspections of Police Custody Suites
Inspected forces: Bedfordshire, Devon and Cornwall, Durham, Northumbria, South Yorkshire, Sussex and British Transport Police

An Inspection of the States of Jersey Police
Inspected force: States of Jersey Police

Keep the Light on – an Inspection of the Police Response to Cyber-Dependent Crime
Inspected forces: All 43 territorial police forces of England and Wales and the National Crime Agency

Both Sides of the Coin: an Inspection of How the Police and NCA Consider Vulnerable People Who Are Both Victims and Offenders in ‘County Lines’ Drug Offending
Inspected forces: All 43 territorial police forces of England and Wales and the National Crime Agency

Evidence-Led Domestic Abuse Prosecutions
Inspected forces: All 43 territorial police forces of England and Wales

A Joint Thematic Inspection of Integrated Offender Management
Inspected forces: All 43 territorial police forces of England and Wales

Greater Manchester Police Integrated Operational Policing System (iOPS)
Inspected force: Greater Manchester
Counter-Terrorism Policing: an Inspection of the Police’s Contribution to the Government’s Prevent Programme

Inspected forces: All 43 territorial police forces of England and Wales, British Transport Police, Civil Nuclear Constabulary and the Ministry of Defence Police

An Inspection of the Metropolitan Police Service’s Response to a Review of its Investigations into Allegations of Non-Recent Sexual Abuse by Prominent People (the Henriques Report)

Inspected force: Metropolitan
Promoting improvements in policing and fire and rescue services to make everyone safer

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) independently assesses the effectiveness and efficiency of police forces and fire and rescue services – in the public interest.

In preparing our reports, we ask the questions that citizens would ask, and publish the answers in accessible form, using our expertise to interpret the evidence and make recommendations for improvement.

We provide authoritative information to allow the public to compare the performance of their police force or fire and rescue service against others. Our evidence is used to bring about improvements in the services they provide to the public.