State of Policing – The Annual Assessment of Policing in England and Wales 2018

Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary

Presented to Parliament pursuant to section 54 of the Police Act 1996
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Foreword

This is my report to the Secretary of State under section 54 of the Police Act 1996.

It contains my assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of policing in England and Wales, based on the inspections we carried out between April 2018 and May 2019.

My report on the effectiveness and efficiency of fire and rescue services in England will be published separately.

This report’s structure and purpose

Part 1 contains my assessment of the state of policing in England and Wales. In making my assessment, I have drawn on the inspections we carried out over the past year, as well as the findings and reports of other organisations, and other information and analysis available to me.

Part 2 gives an overview of the findings of the inspections we carried out between 1 April 2018 and 2 May 2019, including a summary of our police efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy (PEEL) inspections.

Part 3 sets out the full list of our inspections and other work in the year in question.

The results of our individual inspections enable an assessment of the performance of individual forces, or a more general assessment of performance in specific aspects of policing. I hope that people, including the public, who hold policing to account will draw on the overall conclusions in this report just as much as they draw on the specific conclusions we have reached for each force.

Changes to our PEEL programme

Inspection is a continuous process of design, monitoring and reporting; it isn’t just when we have ‘boots on the ground’. This continuous process enables us to adopt an integrated, risk-based approach.

For this year’s PEEL programme, we reduced by a third the number of questions we sought to answer in the inspections, and we carried out integrated, single inspections in each force rather than separate inspections. Because of this, half the inspections took one week rather than two. We hope that police forces will have welcomed this.

We have also changed the way we report the findings from our PEEL inspections – from 43 forces in one go to three separate tranches (covered in detail in Part 2).
HMI Phil Gormley
This year, we have been pleased to welcome HMI Phil Gormley to the inspectorate. Mr Gormley was appointed as Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary in October 2018. A former chief constable of two police forces and deputy director general of the National Crime Agency, he brings with him his very considerable experience of leadership in policing and law enforcement.

Since joining Thames Valley Police in 1985, Mr Gormley’s highly creditable achievements include developing the national blueprint for counter-terrorism policing; designing and implementing the national arrangements for dealing with serious and organised crime; and leading the largest-ever UK law enforcement operation targeting the online abuse of children.

With considerable advantage to the public, HMI Gormley is already putting his experience to very good use at the inspectorate. I look forward to working closely and constructively with him in the years to come.

Contributions to my assessment
When compiling this assessment, I wrote to chief constables, police and crime commissioners and their equivalents and other interested parties, inviting them to contribute their views on the state of policing in England and Wales. I received a substantial number of very thoughtful and insightful responses. Much of what they said resonated with my views, those of my fellow HMIs, and our inspection findings in general. I would like to place on record my warmest thanks to all those who responded, for their very helpful contributions.

Of course, a major contribution to my assessment comes from HMICFRS staff. It is they who devote their efforts to carrying out the full range of our day-to-day activities and inspections. They do so conscientiously, thoroughly and diligently, always observing our values of honesty, integrity, fairness, independence and respect. They too have my very great thanks for all they do.

The Peelian principles
Some 190 years after their appointment, we remain indebted to the first Commissioners of Police of the Metropolis, Sir Charles Rowan and Sir Richard Mayne. They are credited with devising nine enduring principles of policing, commonly known as ‘the Peelian principles’, after the then Home Secretary Sir Robert Peel. These principles are as relevant today as the day, in 1829, when they were first introduced to every new police officer.

In compiling this year’s assessment, I have highlighted several of the Peelian principles and their particular relevance to contemporary matters. As ever, there are lessons to be learned from history.

Sir Thomas P Winsor
Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary
Part 1: Overview
Overview

This year’s assessment contains four principal points.

The first is that most forces are performing well, despite many new policing challenges. Our police show integrity and – often – considerable bravery as they deal with the many demands they face, some of which are increasing in scale and complexity.

The second is that, in some important respects, the wider criminal justice system is dysfunctional and defective. In particular, the system lets down children and other vulnerable people. As well as often being victims of crime, they may become trapped in a cycle of offending, conviction, punishment, release and re-offending. The police are getting better at identifying and protecting some vulnerable victims. But, generally, there is not enough emphasis on prevention and early intervention to break the cycle.

The third is that there is a mismatch between police funding and public expectations. The police funding arrangements are flawed in two respects: they do not take enough account of the unique circumstances of each force; and funding is provided on too short-term a basis. But, above all, there is a widening gap between the needs of the public and the police’s capacity and capability to meet them. Our work on force management statements, which does much to reveal the extent of the problem, will help policymakers as they make difficult decisions about where to allocate public funds.

The fourth is that there needs to be reform of national, regional and local arrangements. In too many respects, the lines on the map created by the current 43 force structure act as barriers to the exchange of intelligence, to co-operation, and to true efficiency and effectiveness. There is a pressing need to develop an effective and efficient single system of law enforcement, with clear local, regional and national components. For the police to develop such a system, there are options for voluntary or compulsory reform; the case for the latter is becoming increasingly strong.
Most forces are performing well, despite many new policing challenges

We continue to have generally high standards of policing. The 43 police forces of England and Wales are unerringly dedicated to serving the public. Most are performing well, keeping people safe, using their resources efficiently and treating their workforces and the communities they serve fairly and with respect.

And the integrity and bravery of our police, which I have commented on many times before, remain abundantly evident. There are again countless examples of police officers putting themselves in harm’s way to protect us. This year, none is better than the awarding, in July 2018, of the George Medal to constables Charlie Guenigault of the Metropolitan Police Service and Wayne Marques of British Transport Police, and the Queen’s Gallantry Medal to Constable Leon McLeod of British Transport Police. These officers, all unarmed and one off duty at the time, confronted terrorists at London Bridge as they inflicted deadly violence on defenceless people. These officers are a credit to their forces and to the whole police service.

The police usually respond well to our inspection reports and the recommendations we make. This year was no exception. There were distinguished examples set by the Cheshire and Lancashire forces, both of which made notable improvements in their crime recording accuracy. These forces have exemplified the willingness and ability of the police to continue to improve.

Major demands from extraordinary events

But policing had much to contend with in the past year. Crime rates are no longer falling and some of the most demanding and complex crimes the police have to deal with are on the rise.

Many forces were preparing to meet the policing demands associated with the UK leaving the European Union. For all forces, there remain significant questions over the future arrangements for law enforcement co-operation with European police forces. The heated political climate, with high-profile protests and threats of serious violence to elected representatives, has created its own policing challenges. And forces with an international air or sea port in their area may also have had to make contingency plans to deal with possible disruption. For example, in Kent, through which so many internationally-bound lorries pass each day, there is the ever-present risk of major disruption to the motorway network deep into the county, if problems arise at Dover or the Channel Tunnel.

But we have also seen extraordinary events placing major demands on other forces. Wiltshire Police, one of the smallest forces in England and Wales, had to deal with previously unimaginable public safety concerns after the unlawful use of a nerve agent, and the highly complex criminal investigation that followed.

In Sussex, there was the Gatwick Airport drone incident. This went on for three days, causing disruption for many thousands of people hoping to travel just before Christmas. It raised important questions about the police’s ability to adapt to new types of crime and threat.
In London, we saw the effects of organised environmental protests, bringing extensive disruption to parts of the capital. This prompted the Metropolitan Police Service – the largest force in the UK – to ask for help from its neighbouring forces.

In the past 12 months, several forces have experienced high demand due to knife crime. Regrettably, 20 years after the publication of the Macpherson report, levels of street violence are rising, and this is disproportionately affecting young black men. It is only with an imaginative, co-ordinated approach, based on what really works, that communities will be able to stem and then reverse the rise of these appalling, brutal crimes and keep vulnerable young people safer on our streets.

Most, if not all, forces in England and Wales can offer examples of extraordinary policing challenges. Cases of this nature usually attract plenty of coverage in the media. But, behind the headlines, there is a different story about policing that needs to be told.

This story is about what the police must, should and could do for the public; how they have to do it as part of a wider system that isn’t working properly; dilemmas facing the Government over police funding; and how the policing landscape must change, if the service is to meet the demands of now and the future.

In some important respects, the criminal justice system is dysfunctional and defective

The criminal justice system exists to prevent crime and disorder, detect offences, acquit the innocent and convict the guilty, bringing offenders to justice, and – very importantly – rehabilitating them.

The demands on the police and the police’s success in tackling crime depend, in no small part, on the success of the other criminal justice bodies and public sector entities concerned with the orderly functioning of civil society. It also requires the smooth functioning of the system as a whole.

But, in some important respects, the system is dysfunctional and defective. And unless things improve, crime and disorder will continue to rise. Some people will be both offenders and victims. Many will become trapped in a cycle of offending, conviction, punishment, release and re-offending. All this will place more burdens on the police, and the other parts of the criminal justice system and civil society.
Many children who end up in gangs have been excluded from school. They are not being educated in school, so they are educated in something much worse. This is increasingly happening to younger children: there are eight-year-olds carrying weapons and hiding drugs. By the time they are 14, they are hardened.

Another example of vulnerable people entering the criminal justice system is those experiencing mental illness. There are well-documented, chronic and unremedied weaknesses in adult and children’s mental health provision, and a high percentage of prisoners have mental health problems.

Some vulnerable people may end up committing crimes through no fault of their own. For example, if victims of modern slavery or human trafficking are forced to commit crimes closely linked with their predicament, the law recognises that they may not necessarily be responsible. As a 14-year-old victim of child grooming and sexual exploitation, Sammy Woodhouse was forced by her abusers in Rotherham to commit crimes, giving her a criminal record which she now has to carry through adult life. The campaign for ‘Sammy’s law’, which would provide a statutory defence to those unfortunate enough to find themselves in a similar situation, has my full support.

When people go to prison, they are likely to encounter violence, drugs, squalor, self-harm and suicide. In prisons, assaults and self-harm incidents both reached record highs during 2018. Too many prisoners live in an environment of fear while serving their sentences. There are high levels of illiteracy and innumeracy among prisoners. And their access to basic education, and their opportunities to be trained for some useful occupation, may be poor, or even close to non-existent. Instead, some inevitably learn more effective criminal ways from their fellow inmates.

For people released from prison, there is no guarantee of proper support in dealing with benefits and finance, and finding accommodation or work. So it should come as no surprise that many will struggle to make a success of their lives after prison and return to their old lives of crime.
The importance of prevention and early intervention

The consequences of the dysfunctional and defective system are evident to all who care to see. In society as a whole, the homicide rate is at its highest in ten years. The 20-year downward trend in violent crime has come to an end. Over recent decades, there have been continued falls in overall levels of crime. But in the past year there has been no significant change, and robbery, fraud, vehicle crime and knife crime are all on the increase.

Virtually all the costs of the criminal justice system are incurred after a crime has been committed. In policing and criminal justice, prevention is far cheaper than cure. But it’s not just about the money. Naturally, the public would expect offenders to be punished, but they want crime to be prevented too. Two-thirds of respondents to our public perception survey said that they are interested in what the police are doing to prevent crime. And responding to emergencies and preventing crime are the public’s top priorities for policing.

Fewer victims of homicide or stabbings will always be preferable to just throwing people in jail. Early intervention is not just about reducing offending: it is about making the lives of often vulnerable people better overall.

In a joint inspection of child protection arrangements in Southend-on-Sea, we learned of a 14-year-old boy who had repeatedly gone missing. He had previously been the victim of criminal exploitation and was at risk of sexual exploitation. A ‘team around the teen’, made up of four professionals from his school, the police and the local authority, created a tight network around him, responding flexibly and creatively to reduce risks before he suffered further harm.

The boy had already been charged with carrying a knife. When it was discovered that he had been concealing a knife in his bedroom, it was recovered by a police officer he was familiar with, during a well-co-ordinated joint visit with the children’s social care team worker.

Since 2010, the proportion of offenders with a long criminal career (more than 15 previous cautions or convictions) has increased. In 2018, nearly two-fifths (37 percent) of the offending population fitted this description, an increase of 10 percent since 2008. Repeat offenders place tremendous demands on the police and cause harm to victims. Their almost inevitably circular journey through the system is a cycle that must be permanently broken.

I welcome the reversal of the ill-conceived and deeply flawed privatisation of the probation service. This policy put public safety at risk and saw the average number of re-offences per offender rise by 22 percent, at a cost of hundreds of millions to the taxpayer.

Virtually all the costs of the criminal justice system are incurred after a crime has been committed.
The risk, not only to him but also to the wider public, was therefore tackled effectively. That’s immediate prevention. The boy has also built a relationship of trust with the team, providing the basis for further progress. That’s the long-term prevention.

An excellent example of this approach is the Early Action Together work in Wales.¹³ This sees all four Welsh forces collaborating with Public Health Wales on early intervention and prevention work with children who have suffered adverse childhood experiences. Giving these children early support will have longer-term benefits, not only for the police, but for health, education and other public services.

Peel’s first principle (see Annex C) says that “the basic mission for which the police exist is to prevent crime and disorder”. It is extremely important that this obligation is given the attention and resources it needs. But the obligations on government and society extend beyond this. For example, parental responsibility, housing, education, health and social conditions generally, all need to be taken more seriously if crime is to be reduced. Early intervention to prevent offending, and rehabilitating offenders, are important not just for the police and other public services, but for the whole community. Until society takes these things more seriously, demands on the criminal justice system will not reduce.

It is more than 20 years since legislation was enacted to prompt police and other public bodies to exchange more information and work together more closely.¹⁴ Yet the degree to which these agencies co-operate remains below that which the public have a right to expect. The public, through their local and national politicians, have a choice to make about how best to allocate money between dealing with the causes of crime and its consequences. Prevention is always cheaper, not only in financial terms, but in lives damaged or lost, and the strain on emergency and public services.

**Identifying and protecting vulnerable victims**

Forces are becoming better at identifying some vulnerable groups and allocating the right specialist resources to investigating crime against them. But this is inconsistent among different groups of vulnerable people. Forces need to be aware of the specific types of vulnerability in their own communities, and understand that most vulnerable people are vulnerable in more than one way.

Some of the most vulnerable in society are those who are victims of domestic abuse. Since 2014,¹⁵ we have published a series of reports on the police response to this often hidden crime which blights the lives of many and destroys some. Encouragingly, the police response continues to improve. We have seen good work being carried out by most police forces including investment in training; multi-agency safeguarding hubs; increased use of body-worn video; and schemes involving the police and schools working together to support children.¹⁶

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There are welcome developments in the Government’s Bill for tackling domestic abuse. If enacted, victims should have a less traumatic time in court when giving evidence to bring their abusers to justice, and the police will have greater powers to tackle abuse.

Vulnerable people can also be at risk online. As I said in last year’s State of Policing report: “The raw power of the worldwide web can be an agency of fear as well as freedom. Technology enhances much of our daily lives. It also intensifies severe threats to the most vulnerable people in society, including children.” Online offenders can very easily reach distant and vulnerable victims.

Most children are now more at risk in their own bedrooms than they are on the streets. This type of offending is not just about child sexual abuse and fraud, but radicalisation, harassment and stalking too.

Parents have a responsibility to teach their children how to navigate the online world safely. But the onus cannot rest completely on them. So I warmly welcome the proposed reforms the Government announced in April 2019, in its Online Harms White Paper.

Regulation of these aspects of the internet cannot come quickly enough. Some of the corporations in question now own and operate what, to many people, have become significant pieces of public infrastructure. Their stewardship of these networks and systems should now be subject to appropriately stringent public interest regulation.

But merely fining some of the world’s richest companies for tolerating the presence of harmful material on their websites will not be enough. The option the Government is exploring — to create criminal liability for senior managers — should be at the heart of the scheme of regulation. That regulation should provide for both significant fines and severe personal criminal penalties. Long experience in the US shows that, for the directors at the very top of large companies, being faced with losing both their fortunes and their liberty concentrates their minds on their responsibilities like nothing else.

There is a mismatch between police funding and public expectations

There has been a real-terms reduction in police funding of 19 percent since 2010/11. Police funding for the 2018/19 financial year amounted to £12.3 billion. This provided for a workforce of approximately 190,000 (122,000 police officers and 68,000 police staff); in other words, approximately one police officer for every 480 people.

But it is not just about police numbers. The money also has to pay for the buildings, vehicles and other things the police need to do their jobs. Increasingly, some also needs to go towards investment in new capabilities to tackle the changing face of crime: for example, technology to analyse the dark web, or to overcome the use of encrypted communications by organised crime groups.

Police spending in England and Wales represented only around 2 percent of public expenditure. Yet policing is among the most essential public services of all; without it, society cannot function. Without public safety and security, the other institutions of society will be in jeopardy. Their ability to operate will be compromised and may even be extinguished.
Multi-year settlements

Annual funding settlements are the norm for the police. But such short-term settlements are incompatible with efficient and effective long-term planning. When it comes to funding, forces need certainty, stability and predictability. So there is a clear need for multi-year settlements.

This is not just about recruiting police officers and staff with the right skills. In many respects, the police need to invest for the longer term, particularly in technology, to become more efficient. It is essential that the police are given the means to do this. For example, body-worn video, fully-functional hand-held mobile devices, facial recognition and artificial intelligence, and the connected systems and infrastructure to support them, are all things in which police forces must invest for the long term. If they don’t, they are left playing catch-up as offenders intensify and increase their abuse of modern technology to cause harm.
The mismatch between public expectations and the police’s priorities

However, even if the funding formula were to be revised, and multi-year settlements became the norm, neither would solve a bigger problem faced by the police: the widening gap between the needs of the public and the police’s capacity and capability to meet them. To some degree, the gap is created by cuts in other public services, which have shifted demands onto the police and other parts of the criminal justice system. For example, recent research by the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Knife Crime suggests a growing link between cuts to youth services and the country’s knife crime epidemic.

There is a particular tension between the clamour for ‘old-style’ policing and the reality of modern crime, most of which takes place outside the public’s view. Being mugged, or having your handbag snatched outside the post office, is traumatic. But so is having your life savings taken out of your bank account by a fraudster. Adults in England and Wales are more likely to fall victim to fraud than any other crime type. Just because a crime isn’t so visible doesn’t mean it isn’t serious or doesn’t need police attention.

Public expectations of the police tend to focus on reassurance, visibility and protection. Some voices insist that the public place very great weight on local issues such as speeding in villages or illegal parking on market days. But the reality is that, in many communities, people are more concerned about violent crime, drugs and gangs. Citizens who are concerned about low-level, yet highly visible, crimes and irritations can be vocal. But they would be just as vocal and concerned – if not significantly more so – if they knew that their next-door neighbour was being beaten by her partner; or the child across the road was being sexually abused, in person or online; or their teenage son’s classmate was being supplied with drugs by an organised crime group.

The integration of police systems with other parts of the criminal justice system also needs long-term investment. Lack of integration currently makes it harder for the police quickly to pass vital evidence, such as camera footage, to the Crown Prosecution Service. This, and other problems with the system, can result in delays, causing victims and witnesses to become disillusioned and withdraw from proceedings.

There is no reason why some forces should not be able to make these investment decisions with more confidence that they will have the money they need. Forces that we judge as being efficient have provided evidence that they use public money appropriately. So they should be able to benefit from multi-year settlements now.
There is strong evidence that police officers try hard to meet the demands made of them.

The police recorded nearly 600,000 domestic abuse-related crimes last year, an increase of 23 percent year on year.\(^{25}\) In recent years, there has been a very significant increase in referrals of online child abuse images from industry to the National Crime Agency (NCA). According to the NCA, there are 2.88 million accounts globally on the most harmful child sexual abuse and exploitation dark-web sites. The NCA believes at least 5 percent of these (144,000) emanate from the UK.

For the police, these matters cannot be ignored. Nor can other serious threats to public safety and national security, such as organised crime and terrorism. As recently as 2017, there were five terrorist attacks on British soil. Since then, the UK has faced the persistent, serious threat of more.\(^{26}\)

The police have an obligation to protect everyone, not just those for whom certain problems are of concern. This can take police officers off the street, making the service less visible to the public. Police visibility has its place in preventing some crimes and reassuring the public. But it is not the best, or the only, answer to all crime and disorder problems. Peel’s ninth principle says that the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them.

For police leaders, there is a balance to strike between providing a visible service and one that also deals effectively with the less visible forms of crime and disorder. Striking this balance creates the potential for an uninformed public to wonder where the police officers are, and to lose faith in the service.

So there is an increasingly pressing need for an open, honest debate about what the public should expect from the police. In certain circumstances (for example, involving a vulnerable or elderly victim), should people be guaranteed a particular level of service from the police? In a perfect world, some would prefer to have police officers on every street corner. But this is not practical, efficient or affordable.

**Meeting growing, complex demand**

There is strong evidence that police officers try hard to meet the demands made of them. Sometimes, they do so at considerable risk to their personal safety, or to the detriment of their physical or mental health.\(^ {27}\) A 2019 study indicates that one in five serving police officers and staff have a form of post-traumatic stress disorder.\(^ {28}\)

As Peel’s fifth principle reminds us, the police preserve public favour by the “ready offering of individual sacrifice in protecting and preserving life”. It is to the police service's very great credit that, so often, many officers do just that. The police tend to cope well with the demands associated with the most serious of events, such as terrorism, major crimes, civil emergencies and critical incidents. And they often have to do so under the most intense media and public scrutiny.
But, as far as more routine policing matters are concerned, things are different. There are indications that some forces are straining under significant pressure as they try to meet growing complex and high-risk demand with weakened resources.29 This pressure appears to have grown since our inspections last year. The 2010 financial settlement compelled the police to find efficiencies, and to an appreciable extent it was successful. However, resources are now so constrained that some forces are struggling to cope. At the same time, investigating and prosecuting more complex and harmful offences create especially intensive demands on the police and the wider criminal justice system.

**Demand from digital devices**

There is a huge growth in demand from the widespread use of digital devices. This makes investigations more complex due to the sheer volume of evidence stored in, for example, mobile phones.

Not surprisingly, but worryingly nevertheless, a recent review by the Attorney General found that the police often did not comply with their legal obligation to record, retain and review material collected during the course of investigations.30 This has profound consequences for the integrity of the criminal justice system, and especially the lives of those who are accused, and those who are victims or witnesses.

One solution to this particular problem undoubtedly lies in the use of artificial intelligence to identify, from bulk material, only that which is relevant to the case. But its availability in policing is far from widespread, and its use raises important ethical questions about its intrusiveness, reliability, fairness and safety.31 Nevertheless, it will be impossible for the police and prosecutors to achieve prompt and true justice without highly effective technological methods to acquire and analyse the large quantities of data now available in criminal cases. As long as the police persist in using 20th-century methods to try to cope with 21st-century technology and ways of life, they will continue to fall further and further behind, and the quality of justice will exponentially diminish.

Justice delayed is justice denied; the denials of justice in the modern day may be reaching unprecedented and alarming levels.

Extra demand on the police also comes from increases in reporting rates for certain types of crime, some of which are complex or need special care to investigate. For example, analysis by the College of Policing shows that rape allegations have increased more than threefold since 2007/8. This increase is not necessarily a bad thing: it could indicate that people have more confidence in reporting rape. But, at the same time, the number of successful convictions has reduced. It is vital that investigations are properly resourced to increase the number of sound convictions, support victims and prevent re-offending.
Incidents involving mental ill-health still take up a significant and unjustified amount of police resources.

Demand from mental health incidents
Another major component of increased demand on the police comes from incidents involving people with mental health problems. There is good evidence of some forces working more and more closely with health and social care agencies. But the fact is that incidents involving mental ill-health still take up a significant and unjustified amount of police resources.

Officers responding to mental health-related calls often have to spend a significant amount of time with the person involved to understand what they need. Analysis by the Welsh forces shows that on average this takes about three hours. They may need more officers to help, and the person might end up being detained under section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 and taken to a place of safety.

Recent changes in working practices and legislation make it far less likely that police station cells will be used as places of safety. Nevertheless, in a significant proportion of cases, it is the police service, and not the ambulance service, that transports people elsewhere. When they arrive, the handover can take a few hours, depending on the availability of health agencies and specialist hospital beds. Or – worse – it may result in a very long wait in accident and emergency for the person in crisis and the police officers accompanying them.

In our 2018 report on policing and mental health, we expressed grave concerns about whether the police should be involved in responding to mental health problems to the degree they are. In dealing with people with mental health problems, police officers and staff must do complex and high-risk work. They often don’t have the skills they need to support people with mental health problems. And, too often, they find themselves responsible for the safety and welfare of people whom other professionals would be better placed to deal with.

Demand suppression
The police, in common with all public services, have to make difficult decisions about where, when and how to ration services. In many cases, to do so, they find ways of suppressing demand. We first reported on this in 2017, when we found large numbers of unallocated incidents in control rooms and evidence that the initial risk assessments had been downgraded, because no one was available to respond. We also found occasions when gangs of violent and dangerous criminals were not formally classified as organised crime groups, because this would further stretch the resources available to deal with them.

More recently, we have seen demand suppression manifest itself in other ways: for example, in some forces’ failure to record a significant proportion of the crimes which are reported: and with some crime types – fraud being a good example – the often wholesale failure to carry out investigations.

All this demand suppression, in these and various other forms, has two very likely consequences: public dissatisfaction with the police will rise and confidence in policing will fall.

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Force management statements

Working closely with chief constables and police and crime commissioners (PCCs) and their equivalents, we have been developing a system for regularly collecting and analysing vital information about police forces. This comes in the form of force management statements (FMSs). FMSs ask a straightforward question: how well are the police preparing for the future?

A similar system has been in use in several other safety-critical essential public services for many years. While it is a more recent innovation in policing, it doesn’t require forces to provide information that any well-managed force wouldn’t already have.

We have received and analysed the first year’s FMSs from all 44 forces. Some forces have already published theirs. Most forces put a great deal of work into their FMSs, and we benefited from strong support from chief constables and most PCCs.

Future FMSs will enable increasingly detailed comparisons and analysis. The police and the public will be able to see, on a force, regional and national basis, the projected aggregate demand on policing, and much more. FMSs will explore the characteristics of the demand and the state of the assets – people, money and other resources – including their condition, capability and capacity. When this is done, it will flush out the fact of the matter: there is a range of demands the police just cannot meet.
There is a substantial and increasing amount of crime that transcends local, regional and national borders.

FMSs will reveal three essential truths. First, they will show all the demand the police face, crime and non-crime, latent and patent. Second, they will show the state of the assets, workforce, hardware and software, their condition, capacity and capability, performance and efficiency, and how they will be improved. Third, they will show how much money the police are going to have.

FMSs will also provide the answer to a critical question: do the police have what they need to meet the legitimate, rational and informed expectations of the public? The answer to the critical question will, in most cases, be no. And so the public, through their elected representatives, will have to decide what they want to do: spend more or expect less, or a blend of the two.

The inescapable fact is that no public service can meet 100 percent of projected demand for, say, 70 percent of its efficient cost.

There needs to be reform of national, regional and local arrangements

Much of the crime and disorder the police deal with has a significant local character. It requires the police response to be concentrated in one place – usually where a crime scene, victim, offender, witnesses and evidence can all be found.

However, there is a substantial and increasing amount of crime that transcends local, regional and national borders. Online fraud, online child sexual abuse, other forms of cybercrime, human trafficking, regional and national drug dealing – often along ‘county lines’ – are all examples of crimes which, inconveniently for policing, are not neatly arranged in local areas. The reality is that police force boundaries have a diminishing significance in the face of these crimes.

The 43-force model

For many years, there has been controversy about the 43-force structure of policing in England and Wales.41

In our highly connected world, the need has never been greater for the police service to function, with the NCA, as a single law enforcement system. But the police service does not do this well. This is usually because it is inhibited by the competing pressures of the needs for operational efficiency on the one hand and respect for local governance and accountability arrangements on the other. They may also be held back by a lack of a coherent mechanism for regional and national decision making. In too many respects, the lines on the map act as barriers to the exchange of intelligence, to co-operation, and to true efficiency and effectiveness.

Each of the 43 police forces in England and Wales has a locally elected PCC. PCCs are likely to be judged by the public primarily on their success in tackling ‘local’ crime and disorder. In asserting the operational independence of the police, Peel’s fifth principle states that, ultimately, the police should “seek and preserve public favour, not by pandering to public opinion, but by constantly demonstrating absolutely impartial service to law, in complete independence of policy”.

In the context of policing policy in the 21st century, there is a tension – deliberately created by Parliament – between the duty of the chief constable to maintain order and enforce the criminal law, and to have regard to local priorities.
A rebalancing of effort, attention and resources across local, regional and national functions is overdue.

established by PCCs. With the greater demands for regional and national co-operation and co-ordination, that tension becomes more acute, but it is not irreconcilable. It is important that the relationships between local, regional and national demands and priorities are understood, respected and accommodated, to ensure public safety.

The present and future nature of crime and disorder means that policing will need greater co-ordination at regional and national levels to make sure local factors do not inhibit improvement in policing. This is not to say that the aspects of policing which are inherently local in character should be eroded; of course they should not. A rebalancing of effort, attention and resources across local, regional and national functions is overdue.

In its evidence to a Home Affairs Committee inquiry into the future of policing, the Home Office stated that it “does not run policing but is supporting the sector to become self-reforming”.

In many respects, this policy has been effective; to a certain degree, the police have been successful in self-reforming. But, to establish and operate the regional and national structures necessary for every police force to function as part of an effective and efficient single system, change is essential.

There is ample evidence of what has not worked well. For example:

- IT is still fragmented and inconsistent, without a comprehensive set of national data standards, not fully joined up across all forces and without a clear plan to make it so.
- Certain functions which are obviously suited to being carried out on a regional or national basis, such as payroll, procurement and fleet management, often are not.
- Certain specialist capabilities are replicated unnecessarily between police forces, regional organised crime units and the NCA.
- Some money-saving collaboration agreements, such as the alliance between the Warwickshire and West Mercia forces, are collapsing.
- Other collaboration agreements, such as the one that established the National Police Air Service, continue, but with well-documented shortcomings and deep dissatisfaction voiced by many chief constables and PCCs.

In the light of these and other observations, the increasingly urgent need for further police reform is clear. The time has come for the police service to realise the pressing need for single-system operation in many, if not all, activities which are not purely local.

The options for voluntary or compulsory reform

There are still options open to the service (for voluntary reform) and to the Home Secretary (for compulsory reform). Based on this assessment of the state of policing, the latter will be necessary if the service is to achieve the levels of efficiency and effectiveness it needs to, with pace, urgency and resolve.

In either case, a new national system of police co-ordination should be established to make sure the police are as effective and efficient as they can be. The police service needs to improve its analytical capability significantly, and establish a better mechanism for making sure skills, people and other resources are available wherever they are needed.
Making standards, guidance and collaborations mandatory

Using the findings from our inspections, the College of Policing has determined the most prevalent causes of inefficiency and ineffectiveness in policing.

There is currently no obligation on individual police forces to adopt standards in the forms currently established by the College. And it is a reasonable assumption that the extent to which forces adopt them, and how quickly, will vary from force to force, which is to the detriment of the public. Therefore, the Home Office should consider using its existing legal powers to make these standards mandatory.

The Home Office should also intensify its encouragement of collaborations and, in appropriate cases, be prepared to mandate them. That means specifying which functions must be the subjects of collaboration agreements and which forces must enter into them. It should also become willing to require forces to use standard-form collaboration agreements. These should be tailored to meet the needs of the various parties making the agreement. The College should support the development of these agreements to make sure they are consistent.

It is also regrettable that the Forensic Science Regulator Bill still has not been passed, even though Parliamentary time is in plentiful supply.

Targeted support and intervention

The Home Office could also establish a regime under which forces that need help must (not may) accept it from the College and another nominated force or forces. This regime would apply when a force’s performance falls below a predetermined threshold in the national police performance monitoring and oversight system. Cases of this nature should be few and far between, but the facility should exist.

Conclusion

I have set out in this assessment my view of the state of policing in England and Wales. I believe that some profound and far-reaching aspects of police reform are called for. For these reforms to take place, leaders in central government, PCCs and chief constables will all need to make bold, long-term decisions.

If they don’t, the windspeed of police reform will fall to a flutter, leaving the police service increasingly unable to meet the demands it faces. The inevitable legacy of such an approach would be unacceptable compromises in both the quality of service the police can offer the public and the level of public safety and security the police can uphold.

But if the reforms I have set out in my assessment are carried out, competently, comprehensively and with resolve, they will secure major improvements in police effectiveness and efficiency. The widening gap I spoke of earlier – between the public’s needs and the police’s capacity and capability – will begin to narrow. And the police service will be better able to adapt to face the demands of today and tomorrow, to the great benefit of all of us.
Part 2: Our inspections

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Our PEEL inspections

In 2018/19, we are making our fourth complete PEEL assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of the 43 police forces in England and Wales. As part of the PEEL programme, we assess and make graded judgments about how well each police force keeps people safe and reduces crime.

The PEEL programme consists of three pillars: effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy.

Effectiveness

Effectiveness assesses whether each police force is providing the right services and how well those services work. It considers the range of the force’s responsibilities, such as preventing crime and anti-social behaviour; investigating crime and catching criminals; protecting the vulnerable and supporting victims; tackling serious organised crime; and providing specialist capabilities, such as an armed response.

Efficiency

Efficiency assesses whether the way each force provides its services represents value for money. It also considers how well the force understands and matches its resources and assets to the demands for its services, both in the present and in planning for the future.

Legitimacy

Legitimacy assesses whether each force operates fairly, ethically and within the law. This includes how the force treats both the people it serves and its workforce.

Our PEEL assessment also examines how well each of the 43 English and Welsh forces understands, develops and shows leadership.
Integrated PEEL assessments

In 2018/19, we adopted an integrated PEEL assessment (IPA) approach. This combines the effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy pillars into a single inspection. We assess forces against every pillar every year.

As part of the IPA approach, we have looked for ways to reduce the intensity of inspection on forces. Based on our analysis of previous inspections and other information, we used a risk-based approach, which means well-performing forces are inspected on fewer areas.

We can make an even better assessment of forces thanks to the information they give us in their force management statements (FMSs). This information gives us a wider view of how well prepared forces are to meet future demands.

We now also update our evidence more often through monitoring, to help forces improve their service. We are further developing an online register that will enable us and others to track forces’ progress in acting on our recommendations. It will also enable police and crime commissioners (PCCs) to record their comments on inspection reports, including their responses to our recommendations.

The main features of IPAs are:

- a single set of questions that covers all three PEEL pillars;
- just one period of inspection fieldwork for each force in the IPA inspection cycle (which will be risk-based);
- for most forces, fewer days of inspection than with the split approach we used before (though, for high-risk forces, the number of days could be greater);
- extra evidence from FMSs, which we use in our risk assessments and final judgments;
- three groups of fieldwork (with 14–15 forces in each group);
- single rather than multiple reports for each force (with reports published in batches after each group of inspections);
- alongside each batch of force reports, a PEEL spotlight report that draws out emerging or recurring themes;
- monitoring of each force’s performance between each group of inspections, drawing on all the available evidence; and
- risk assessments for each force, minimising the fieldwork we need to do.

Well-performing forces are inspected on fewer areas.

We now also update our evidence more often through monitoring.
PEEL spotlight reports
We will publish a PEEL spotlight report alongside each batch of force reports. Spotlight reports will bring out the themes we identified during that batch of inspections.

The operating context
The challenge of providing services throughout an entire police force area is affected by many things. These include the area’s size, geography, road network, financial condition, levels of affluence and deprivation, industries and employment patterns and, most importantly, the people who live, work and spend time there. Police and crime plans – established by local policing bodies – contain priorities of especial importance to which chief constables must have regard. Taken together, these and other factors are often called the operating context.

We take account of the operating context for each force and recognise that differing operating contexts create different needs for policing. Information about each force’s local context is included in the ‘force in context’ section of our PEEL reports.

Understanding our graded judgments
It is important to emphasise that police forces aren’t in competition with each other. Inevitably, some people will want to re-order our graded judgments into a form of league table. But representing the breadth and complexity of police performance, while taking account of the operating context, needs a more sophisticated approach.

Similarly, it is important to read beyond the headlines and consider why some forces have been graded higher than others. The nuances are in the individual force reports on our website.

On the following pages, you can see our most recent graded judgments for all 43 forces in England and Wales. We split these into the effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy pillars. We show if the current graded judgment is based on inspection fieldwork from 2018/19, 2017 or 2016. For the three pillar-level judgments, we indicate if a force has improved, declined or not changed since our previous inspection of that force.

The 14 forces in our first group of 2018/19 inspections are:
- City of London Police
- Cumbria Constabulary
- Durham Constabulary
- Dyfed-Powys Police
- Essex Police
- Gloucestershire Constabulary
- Greater Manchester Police
- Humberside Police
- Kent Police
- Leicestershire Police
- Norfolk Constabulary
- Nottinghamshire Police
- West Midlands Police
- Wiltshire Police.

The other 29 forces’ pillar judgments are from our 2017 effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy inspections of them.
### PEEL judgments table

#### Effectiveness

- **How effective is the force at preventing crime, tackling anti-social behaviour and keeping people safe?**
  - **Judgment**
  - **Trend**
  - **Last inspected**
  - **Avon and Somerset**
    - Good
    - Unchanged
    - 2016/17
  - **Bedfordshire**
    - Requires improvement
    - Improved
    - 2017/18
  - **Cambridgeshire**
    - Requires improvement
    - Declined
    - 2016/17
  - **Cheshire**
    - Good
    - Unchanged
    - 2017/18
  - **City of London**
    - Good
    - Unchanged
    - 2016/17
  - **Cleveland**
    - Good
    - Unchanged
    - 2017/18
  - **Cumbria**
    - Requires improvement
    - Unchanged
    - 2017/18
  - **Derbyshire**
    - Good
    - Unchanged
    - 2016/17
  - **Devon and Cornwall**
    - Requires improvement
    - Unchanged
    - 2017/18
  - **Dorset**
    - Good
    - Unchanged
    - 2016/17
  - **Durham**
    - Outstanding
    - Unchanged
    - 2016/17
  - **Dyfed-Powys**
    - Good
    - Unchanged
    - 2018/19
  - **Essex**
    - Good
    - Unchanged
    - 2016/17
  - **Gloucestershire**
    - Good
    - Improved
    - 2016/17
  - **Greater Manchester**
    - Requires improvement
    - Declined
    - 2018/19
  - **Hampshire**
    - Good
    - Unchanged
    - 2017/18
  - **Hertfordshire**
    - Good
    - Improved
    - 2017/18
  - **Humberside**
    - Good
    - Improved
    - 2017/18
  - **Kent**
    - Good
    - Unchanged
    - 2017/18
  - **Lancashire**
    - Good
    - Unchanged
    - 2016/17
  - **Leicestershire**
    - Good
    - Unchanged
    - 2017/18
  - **Lincolnshire**
    - Good
    - Unchanged
    - 2016/17
  - **Merseyside**
    - Requires improvement
    - Unchanged
    - 2017/18
  - **Metropolitan Police**
    - Requires improvement
    - Unchanged
    - 2017/18

- **How effective is the force at investigating crime and reducing re-offending?**
  - **Judgment**
  - **Last inspected**
  - **Avon and Somerset**
    - Good
    - 2016/17
  - **Bedfordshire**
    - Requires improvement
    - 2017/18
  - **Cambridgeshire**
    - Good
    - 2016/17
  - **Cheshire**
    - Good
    - 2017/18
  - **City of London**
    - Good
    - 2016/17
  - **Cleveland**
    - Good
    - 2016/17
  - **Cumbria**
    - Requires improvement
    - 2017/18
  - **Derbyshire**
    - Good
    - 2016/17
  - **Devon and Cornwall**
    - Requires improvement
    - 2017/18
  - **Dorset**
    - Good
    - 2016/17
  - **Durham**
    - Outstanding
    - 2016/17
  - **Dyfed-Powys**
    - Good
    - 2018/19
  - **Essex**
    - Good
    - 2016/17
  - **Gloucestershire**
    - Good
    - 2018/19
  - **Greater Manchester**
    - Requires improvement
    - 2018/19
  - **Hampshire**
    - Good
    - 2017/18
  - **Hertfordshire**
    - Good
    - 2017/18
  - **Humberside**
    - Good
    - 2018/19
  - **Kent**
    - Good
    - 2016/17
  - **Lancashire**
    - Good
    - 2016/17
  - **Leicestershire**
    - Good
    - 2017/18
  - **Lincolnshire**
    - Good
    - 2016/17
  - **Merseyside**
    - Requires improvement
    - 2017/18
  - **Metropolitan Police**
    - Requires improvement
    - 2017/18

- **How effective is the force at protecting those who are vulnerable from harm, and supporting victims?**
  - **Judgment**
  - **Last inspected**
  - **Avon and Somerset**
    - Good
    - 2016/17
  - **Bedfordshire**
    - Requires improvement
    - 2017/18
  - **Cambridgeshire**
    - Good
    - 2016/17
  - **Cheshire**
    - Good
    - 2017/18
  - **City of London**
    - Good
    - 2016/17
  - **Cleveland**
    - Requires improvement
    - 2017/18
  - **Cumbria**
    - Requires improvement
    - 2017/18
  - **Derbyshire**
    - Good
    - 2016/17
  - **Devon and Cornwall**
    - Requires improvement
    - 2017/18
  - **Dorset**
    - Good
    - 2016/17
  - **Durham**
    - Outstanding
    - 2016/17
  - **Dyfed-Powys**
    - Good
    - 2018/19
  - **Essex**
    - Good
    - 2016/17
  - **Gloucestershire**
    - Good
    - 2018/19
  - **Greater Manchester**
    - Requires improvement
    - 2018/19
  - **Hampshire**
    - Good
    - 2017/18
  - **Hertfordshire**
    - Good
    - 2017/18
  - **Humberside**
    - Good
    - 2018/19
  - **Kent**
    - Good
    - 2016/17
  - **Lancashire**
    - Good
    - 2016/17
  - **Leicestershire**
    - Good
    - 2017/18
  - **Lincolnshire**
    - Good
    - 2016/17
  - **Merseyside**
    - Requires improvement
    - 2017/18
  - **Metropolitan Police**
    - Requires improvement
    - 2017/18

- **How effective is the force at tackling serious and organised crime?**
  - **Judgment**
  - **Last inspected**
  - **Avon and Somerset**
    - Good
    - 2016/17
  - **Bedfordshire**
    - Requires improvement
    - 2017/18
  - **Cambridgeshire**
    - Good
    - 2016/17
  - **Cheshire**
    - Good
    - 2017/18
  - **City of London**
    - Good
    - 2016/17
  - **Cleveland**
    - Requires improvement
    - 2017/18
  - **Cumbria**
    - Requires improvement
    - 2017/18
  - **Derbyshire**
    - Good
    - 2016/17
  - **Devon and Cornwall**
    - Requires improvement
    - 2017/18
  - **Dorset**
    - Good
    - 2016/17
  - **Durham**
    - Outstanding
    - 2016/17
  - **Dyfed-Powys**
    - Good
    - 2018/19
  - **Essex**
    - Good
    - 2016/17
  - **Gloucestershire**
    - Good
    - 2018/19
  - **Greater Manchester**
    - Requires improvement
    - 2018/19
  - **Hampshire**
    - Good
    - 2017/18
  - **Hertfordshire**
    - Good
    - 2017/18
  - **Humberside**
    - Good
    - 2018/19
  - **Kent**
    - Good
    - 2016/17
  - **Lancashire**
    - Good
    - 2016/17
  - **Leicestershire**
    - Good
    - 2017/18
  - **Lincolnshire**
    - Good
    - 2016/17
  - **Merseyside**
    - Requires improvement
    - 2017/18
  - **Metropolitan Police**
    - Requires improvement
    - 2017/18
### PEEL judgments table continued

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**Totals**

- Outstanding: 1
- Good: 33
- Requires improvement: 9
- Inadequate: 0
## PEEL judgments table

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<th>Force</th>
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| How well does the force treat the people it serves with fairness and respect? |
| Last inspected |
|----------------|--------------|
| Good           | 2017/18      |

| How well does the force ensure that its workforce behaves ethically and lawfully? |
| Last inspected |
|----------------|--------------|
| Good           | 2017/18      |

| How well does the force treat its workforce with fairness and respect? |
| Last inspected |
|----------------|--------------|
| Good           | 2017/18      |
Our first group of 2018/19 PEEL inspections

We published the first group of 2018/19 PEEL reports in May 2019.

With only 14 of the 43 forces in England and Wales inspected in this first group, we don’t yet know whether our conclusions will be replicated nationally. The remaining 29 forces in England and Wales will be covered in the next two sets of inspections over the rest of 2019.

Summary of grades

On effectiveness, we graded one force as outstanding, twelve as good and one as requiring improvement.

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On efficiency, we graded three as outstanding, eight as good and three as requiring improvement.

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<td>requires improvement</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inadequate</td>
<td>0</td>
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On legitimacy, we graded one as outstanding, 11 as good and two as requiring improvement.

<table>
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</tr>
<tr>
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Because we inspect forces using a risk-based approach, it is a realistic possibility that a small minority of these results may be more positive than they would otherwise have been.

Change in grades

Across all three pillars of the PEEL programme, we graded most forces the same in 2018/19 as in 2017.

After the terrorist attack in Manchester on 22 May 2017, we agreed with Greater Manchester Police that we wouldn’t make a graded judgment for the efficiency and legitimacy pillars in 2017. The changes in Greater Manchester Police’s grades are measured from its 2016 graded judgments for efficiency and legitimacy.

For the effectiveness pillar: the grades for 11 of the 14 forces inspected stayed the same, three got better and none got worse.

<table>
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The efficiency pillar had the largest movement in grades: we graded four forces higher than the previous year; one force got a worse grade.

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<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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For the legitimacy pillar: the grades for 12 forces stayed the same, one got better and one got worse.

<table>
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Our findings

Overall, we found that the forces we inspected are performing well. Most are keeping people safe and reducing crime, using their resources efficiently, and treating their workforces and the communities they serve fairly and with respect.

But despite this relatively positive picture of performance, our findings indicate that some forces are straining under significant pressure as they try to meet growing complex and high-risk demand with weakened resources. This pressure has grown since our 2017 inspections and is affecting different forces in different ways. We have seen the effects from neighbourhood policing and investigations to counter-corruption and workforce health and wellbeing.

Demand is changing, but few forces have plans in place to meet the demand they have identified

The demand for policing is becoming increasingly complex and involves greater risk. This problem is made worse by restricted resources, especially a shortage of detectives.

Meeting this demand with constrained resources is the biggest challenge currently facing the forces we inspected. Forces’ change programmes may mitigate some of the problem. But some forces weren’t clear about the benefits they expected to achieve from these programmes.

Forces are improving their ability to predict demand. But few had tested the assumptions that underpinned their forecasts or had plans to meet the demands they had identified.

Officers and staff are taking on a wider range of activities, with some negative consequences

Response, investigation and neighbourhood policing roles are becoming less distinct. This helps meet the short-term challenges of demand, but we also noted some negative consequences.

Moving neighbourhood officers to other duties, such as response, can damage forces’ crime prevention work, limiting their community engagement. In some forces, this is also leading to inexperienced and underqualified staff investigating frequently committed crimes such as burglary, often without good enough supervision.

Managing demand is stretching forces’ ability to root out corruption

The pressures of increased demand are being felt right across forces, including in some of their most sensitive functions.

Some of the forces we inspected had poorly resourced counter-corruption units and significant vetting backlogs. Failing to uncover and deal with corruption at an early stage has profound ethical implications. It also threatens to increase demand on forces in the longer term.
Most forces have improved their understanding of hidden forms of vulnerability.

Forces are identifying vulnerability more effectively and investing in technology to better match resources to demand

Despite the forces we inspected being under pressure, there were areas of improvement and innovation.

Most forces have improved their understanding of hidden forms of vulnerability, with officers and staff showing a good understanding of what they are looking for. Several of the forces we inspected were developing good practice in how they use technology to manage their demand and resources better.

The pressures of demand affect the health and wellbeing of the workforce

Changing demand, higher workloads, longer hours, more lone working, and the cancellation of leave and rest days take a toll. Staff taking more sick days, or going to work when they are ill, threatens to compound all the other problems we have identified.

The forces we inspected were promoting and taking action on wellbeing, but officers and staff didn’t always feel able to access the support on offer. And some force occupational health services were struggling to meet demand.

Some forces aren’t monitoring their use of stop and search well enough

The Government recently announced changes to stop and search powers as part of the response to an increase in knife crime. Proper scrutiny by both forces and the public of the use of these powers is essential and must not be compromised.

Some forces don’t monitor a comprehensive enough set of data on how they use force and stop and search powers. This monitoring is necessary to maintain public trust and confidence.

Force management statements

As part of our inspection process, we now require forces to send us information they use as part of their planning processes, in the form of a force management statement (FMS).

FMSs are self-assessments that chief constables (and their London equivalents) prepare and submit to us each year. It is their statement and explanation of:

- the demand (crime and non-crime, latent and patent) that their force expects to face in the next four years;
- how their force will develop and improve its workforce and other assets to cope with that demand;
- how their force will improve its efficiency to make sure the gap between future demand and future capability is as small as it can reasonably be made to be; and
- the money the force expects to have to do all this.

All 43 Home Office forces submitted their first FMSs to us in 2018. We also received FMSs from British Transport Police and Jersey Police.
We have used information from the FMSs in our risk-based approach to integrated PEEL assessment (IPA) fieldwork. As a result, for some forces, the breadth and intensity of inspection was reduced. We expect this reduction to be more pronounced within forces as the risk-based approach and IPA become more established and forces become more accustomed to producing FMSs.

**Why FMSs are important**

To police communities effectively and efficiently, forces need to manage their assets proactively and competently.

All enterprises need sound and easily accessible information about the capacity, condition and capability of their assets; the effectiveness and efficiency of the assets’ performance; and what it costs to maintain, operate and develop them. Without that, performance will suffer, costs will be unnecessarily high, and the assets will deteriorate. This is no less true with people as it is with physical assets; it is probably more so. Despite this, too many forces have incomplete or inadequate information about these things.

To make sound decisions about how to maintain, develop and enhance its assets, a force needs to make a sound assessment of the demands it is likely to face in the foreseeable future. These demands will be affected by a complex set of variables that interact with each other. They include social deprivation, the local and national economy, demographic changes and developments in technology and its use by criminals.

**Advantages of the FMS process**

Many forces and interested parties recognise that the FMS presents a great opportunity to improve policing in several ways. In devising and promoting FMSs, we have encouraged the service to work and plan together, exchanging ideas and examples of best practice.

The FMS process has:

– brought to light things that some forces weren’t aware of;
– established gaps in knowledge and skills;
– encouraged a longer-term view of force planning and priorities;
– helped establish links between areas of policing both within a force and across force boundaries; and
– allowed many forces to reflect on and assess the decisions and choices they have made.

The FMS also acts as a tool to examine the full breadth of demand and difficulties facing the service, providing evidence of how it plans to meet its obligations to the public.

**The first FMSs**

It is clear how much hard work and commitment went into producing the first FMSs. As forces engaged with the process, we saw a growing appreciation of their value.

Most forces submitted an FMS that contained a lot of valuable information. This indicates that they already have most of the information they need to produce one. Overall, they approached the task with dedication, although it was entirely new to them.
But there is still much work to do. The first FMSs are too focused on being a snapshot of today: they need to reflect and explain forces’ plans to be more effective and efficient in the future.

Observations from the first FMSs

We used FMSs to establish common themes and make observations about the pressures on policing in England and Wales. However, for their first FMSs, forces had some flexibility in how they used the template. This meant there was a variation in how they presented their responses, which made it difficult to assess the range of challenge accurately.

Workforce wellbeing

Nearly all forces described as important their approach to the wellbeing of their workforces. Several explained how a member of the chief officer team leads on wellbeing, supported by a strategic group. Many described their involvement with an externally recognised wellbeing programme or framework, although it varied how developed these were.

In their FMSs, most forces said they were giving their wellbeing or occupational health teams more resources or were planning to do so. Several have paid for these extra resources through temporary funding. This is a concern. At a time when most forces described the demand for wellbeing and health support services as increasing, in some cases there is a lack of sustainable funding.

FMSs indicate that workforce wellbeing is a significant and complex matter. Dealing with it well could make a significant contribution to improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the police service. However, the understanding of that complexity is under-developed: in too many respects, the focus is currently on reacting to wellbeing problems, rather than addressing their root causes. While it is welcome that forces are being responsive, the police service could do more preventative work to reduce the need for wellbeing and occupational health referrals.

Workload and demand

A common theme of all FMSs is that the workload on the service has increased significantly. But most forces didn’t show a detailed enough understanding of this and how it relates to the changes they are making or the results they expect to achieve.

Forces often made the general point that demand is increasing and becoming more complex. But sometimes the data showed a more nuanced picture. For example, some forces showed an increase in the number of 999 calls and pointed to the rise in demand they were facing. However, some had data that showed fewer 101 calls, or that the number of incidents they chose to deploy officers to had remained static.
Many forces may be facing increasing demand, increasing workload or both. But the reasons presented for this need to consider all the available data. There needs to be a more considered explanation as to why forces’ assessments are sometimes different from the picture presented by the data.

Despite the limitations of this data, the FMSs indicate that the workforce is under strain. Workload may have increased because of:
- increased demand;
- higher expectations from the public;
- certain emerging crime areas (for example, cybercrime) increasing and becoming more complex;
- more effort being needed to complete work (for example, reporting, process or paperwork); and
- a reduction in workforce availability (for example, officers having been redeployed to duties outside their main responsibilities, or unfilled vacancies).

Data
Data about the demand forces had to deal with was more readily available in areas they have traditionally focused on, such as control rooms, and in activities such as crime recording. It was less evident in:
- developing areas of crime such as cybercrime;
- areas where the need for police intervention is hidden, such as modern slavery, child abuse and other crimes against vulnerable people; and
- areas where the police have traditionally been more proactive in prevention, such as organised crime and neighbourhood policing.

FMSs are a four-year forward look. The aim isn’t pinpoint accuracy – which would, of course, be impossible – but to encourage forces to use their data, knowledge and expertise to develop the most likely interpretation of the future landscape and the risks it contains. This should form the basis of all the strategic decisions forces make. When forces do this well, and with ease, this will be a marker of the FMS’s success.

Performance
Overall, there wasn’t good evidence that forces understand well enough how they are performing or will be able to perform in the future. The same applies to their understanding of workforce capacity, capability and productivity.

The police service has acknowledged that most of its analytical expertise is focused at operational and tactical level, dealing with crimes and trends related to those crimes. Often, it was clear that many forces have only limited capacity or capability to analyse their data, and that capacity is generally focused on monitoring current and past performance. The service recognised its limited experience with this sort of performance and organisational analysis. It is working to deal with these skills gaps and further develop its ability to analyse its workforce’s productivity.
Developing the FMS

To achieve the maximum benefit from the investment that the FMS represents for the police service, developing it needs to be a collaborative process.

Most chief constables have shown a welcome and strong commitment to working with us to improve FMSs and develop them in ways which not only provide high-quality information for us, but also enable them to establish and benefit from the discipline of producing them. They recognise that every well-managed organisation needs sound and comprehensive information about future demand, asset stewardship and resources, and that is what FMSs are. It follows that forces, and others (including local policing bodies, other public services and the Home Office), will derive great value from the work which FMSs represent, and what they tell us.

We have therefore established a steering group that includes representatives from the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners, the College of Policing, the Home Office, the National Crime Agency and staff associations.

This group is committed to giving forces support in producing their FMSs. This will include:

– continuously improving the guidance about what goes into a high-quality FMS;
– facilitating the discussion about how forces best develop the tools and skills they need to plan and anticipate threats, risks, problems and trends;
– consulting with forces about how to make the FMS a rolling process linked to, and in harmony with, their individual yearly planning cycles; and
– information for forces about how others produce their FMSs, thus disseminating best practice.

Our monitoring arrangements

Our monitoring process is a vital part of our work to help forces become more effective and efficient, based on our inspection judgments and other information we have about them. It informs the inspections we do under section 54 of the Police Act 1996.

Although our in-force inspections are when forces see our staff on site, our work in assessing the performance of each force never stops. The monitoring process is a critical part of this continuous scrutiny. It helps to:

– inform our decisions about what inspections are necessary;
– make sure we maintain a sound view of forces’ performance; and
– design and run future inspections – for example, by highlighting where there are risks that merit an inspection or enough concerns to affect its timetabling.

We review all forces regularly as part of this monitoring work.
The continuous monitoring process

Our monitoring regime places all forces in either Scan status or Engage status. At Scan status, we collect and analyse data and information from several sources about all forces’ performance. We use this to identify the good things they are doing and any areas of concern. This work includes following up on previous inspection findings and recommendations where there is a need to assess progress – for example, in response to a cause of concern.

Based on this information, our monitoring group will consider the performance of a force and the HMI with primary responsibility for the force will decide whether to escalate it to Engage status. This is the higher level of monitoring and intervention. At this stage, the force is formally considered at our policing performance oversight group.

Through this group, chaired by Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary, we help forces in Engage status find ways to improve and resolve any areas of concern, if they haven’t been able to do so on their own. We also help them get advice and support from other organisations, such as the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council.
Child protection inspections

National child protection

We started the national child protection inspection programme in April 2014. By the end of March 2019, we had published reports on 25 police forces. We had also gone back to 23 of those forces to assess their progress against our recommendations.

In 2016, we published a report that was highly critical of the Metropolitan Police Service’s (MPS’s) child protection practices. Following this, the Home Secretary commissioned us to publish a series of quarterly reports over the course of 2017. Each report assessed the progress the MPS had made to improve its practices. We published the last of these quarterly reports in February 2018.

More people are reporting abuse and exploitation. It is a good thing that victims have more confidence to report these types of crimes, but it increases demand on the police and other agencies. Nonetheless, in every force area, we find senior leaders (with the support of their PCCs), frontline officers and staff who are committed to keeping vulnerable children safe.

How we carry out our national child protection inspections

In these inspections, we put the experiences of children at the centre of our analysis. We use that analysis to support learning and development. We assess decision making, leadership, training and forces’ awareness of their safeguarding responsibilities.

We don’t make graded judgments, but our reports give forces a detailed blueprint for recommended effective practice. We describe the strengths they should build on and where they can improve. We are pleased that, in every follow-up inspection, we have found clear (and in some cases significant) improvements.

Helping forces to improve

But, at the start of 2018, we also felt there was more we should do to help forces, and policing nationally, to improve. We aren’t an improvement agency, but we do want the police to succeed. Our child protection inspection team is made up of highly skilled and experienced specialists whose sole focus is this area of police work. We felt we could use their experience to give greater support to the forces we inspect.

As a result, we have changed the way we carry out child protection inspections. Each force now receives support and engagement from our team before, during and after each inspection. We make sure forces understand our approach and we let them know our findings throughout the fieldwork. We invite challenge and professional discussion, and emphasise our aim to support learning and improvement.

Feedback about this approach has been positive and has highlighted the benefits of working collaboratively. We find our engagement with forces is now more productive. More importantly, when we revisit forces, we now find they have made more progress than they would have done before.
However, our inspections this year still found many of the same problems as in previous years. This means it is likely that we will find these problems in future inspections. So we have developed ways to help promote improvements in the forces we haven’t yet inspected. For example, we host regular learning events for forces around the country. We have started an annual national vulnerability conference to promote learning and good practice. We also work closely with the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council to make sure our inspection findings can help forces learn.

We want our inspections to influence national policy more swiftly and directly, and we will continue to find new ways to do this. We are also developing our methods for working collaboratively.

**Our findings**

**How the police treat vulnerable children detained in custody**

Children are still being held in police stations when they shouldn’t be. This isn’t changing quickly enough.

It is almost always best for a child not to be held in a police station. Local authorities are responsible for providing accommodation which, in rare cases, might need to be secure. A 2017 Home Office concordat reinforced this, but it hasn’t led to more accommodation being made available.

Police forces now know they shouldn’t hold children in police stations. They ask for accommodation from local authorities more often (see figure 1). That said, forces should be more proactive at escalating cases when local authorities fail to find suitable accommodation, and at working with local authorities to find solutions. We found some evidence of forces using alternatives such as bail more effectively. But, in most cases where appropriate accommodation isn’t available, children are still detained until they go to court. This is often for a long time.

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**Figure 1:**

Comparison of children charged and refused bail with number of referrals for removal to accommodation and total number moved, England and Wales, 1 April 2017 to 30 September 2018

- Number of children charged and had bail refused
- Total requests for secure or appropriate accommodation
- Total number of children moved to secure or appropriate accommodation

*Source: HMICFRS data collection*
Criminal exploitation
We found that police forces are now better at recognising children at risk of criminal exploitation. They understand that organised criminals move children across the country and coerce them into committing crime. These offences are often referred to as ‘county lines’.

But we also found that responses to this problem vary widely. In too many areas, children are still likely to be prosecuted despite clear evidence of coercion. The police aren’t yet using all the tools available to them to protect children who are forced to commit crime. As a result, too many children are being criminalised when they shouldn’t be.

The response to those who pose a risk to children
The way the police deal with people who pose a risk to children is inconsistent. Examining seized electronic devices often causes delays. Some forces have equipment that can quickly identify which devices may have indecent images on them. But not all forces use this. As a result, images and other evidence of abuse can only be found by costly and time-consuming digital forensic examinations. Often, the police don’t take any action to safeguard children until devices have been examined. We found that this can lead to delays in children getting the support and protection they need.

The sheer number of complex cases means that some are investigated by officers who don’t have the right training, skills or experience. The outcomes of these cases are almost always worse than they would have been otherwise.

The number of indecent images of children on the internet means that the police need new approaches to identify suspects quickly and protect their victims. But the police can’t do this alone. The Government, and social media and technology companies, should also reflect on how they support the police to protect children in need of help.

Innovative work the police are doing to protect children
We have found many examples of good, innovative work to protect vulnerable children. In Wales, the police are part of a programme to give early support to children exposed to adverse childhood experiences.

Adverse childhood experiences are stressful events that occur during childhood, such as homelessness, domestic abuse or having a parent who is an alcoholic or abuses drugs. Children who have several adverse childhood experiences are more likely to need substantial, continuous support. Research shows that, in these cases, there are benefits to intervening early in a way that recognises the cumulative impact of trauma over time.

In too many areas, children are still likely to be prosecuted despite clear evidence of coercion.
In England, the approach to early intervention isn’t consistent. The new National Policing Vulnerability Coordination Centre aims to address this by evaluating best practice. The Government could help this work by recognising and promoting the benefits of early intervention by people who understand trauma.

**Using child-centred approaches**

We are encouraged that the police are becoming more aware of the need to use child-centred approaches. In Camden, the police have worked with other organisations to create the UK’s first ‘child house’, known as ‘the Lighthouse’, which is based on an Icelandic model. This is designed to help make sure children who have been sexually assaulted aren’t further traumatised by the investigation of a crime.

The Lighthouse model provides medical, advocacy, social care, police and therapeutic support in one specially designed place. Setting it up has taken a lot of multi-agency work and investment. It is too early to assess its impact, but the model has the needs of children at its heart.

**Joint targeted child protection inspections**

In 2016, we started a programme of joint child protection inspections. We carry them out with Ofsted, the Care Quality Commission and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation (HMI Probation). The programme is continuing.

In these inspections, we consider how well police, education, health and social services work together to help children in need of protection.

By the end of March 2019, we had carried out joint in-depth inspections in 28 local authority areas. These focused on child sexual exploitation, children living with domestic abuse, children at risk of neglect, children at risk of criminal exploitation and those at risk of sexual abuse in the family environment.¹
Our findings
We continue to find examples of good joint working, but agencies can do more. All children and young people, in all areas, should get consistently good support. We still find examples of poor practice by some professionals and agencies. Some children who are at risk of exploitation and abuse still don’t get the response they need as quickly as they should.

Older children who are living with neglect
In July 2018, we published a report covering six inspections of the multi-agency response to older children living with neglect.

We found that agencies have been working hard to improve their responses to child neglect. However, their work has largely focused on younger children. Our inspections showed that agencies, including adult services, need a ‘whole system’ approach to identifying and responding to the neglect of older children.

To achieve the best possible outcomes for children, leaders in all agencies need to come together to form a clear local strategy to deal with neglect. This should include the neglect of older children. Leaders should make sure all partners and professionals have the same understanding of how neglect of older children manifests itself.

All partners and professionals also need to be clear about their role in identifying and responding to neglect. Decisions about how to respond to neglect must be informed by good evidence, and by listening to the experiences of the children themselves.

Next steps
During late 2018 and early 2019, we have focused on child sexual abuse in the family environment. When this round of inspections is complete, we will focus on the multi-agency response to children experiencing mental health problems. We will then move on to early intervention, and the response to 16 and 17-year-olds.

Together with HMI Probation and colleagues from the Welsh education, social care and health inspectorates, we will develop an integrated inspection programme for Wales. We hope to carry out a pilot inspection in late 2019, with further inspections taking place in 2020.
Youth Offending Services

We carry out joint inspections of Youth Offending Services (YOSs) with HMI Probation. YOSs are multi-agency teams, co-ordinated by local authorities, which aim to reduce offending by young people. Police forces have a statutory responsibility to support YOSs, and to share information with them.

YOSs deal with some of the most vulnerable young people in society. Effective partnership working can help keep these young people safe and stop them committing further offences. We inspected five force areas to assess how well the police were carrying out their responsibilities within this partnership approach.

Together with HMI Probation, we revised the methodology for our joint inspection programme in 2018. Changes included a formal assessment of how the agencies involved in YOSs work together, and an examination of the work taking place to deal with out-of-court disposals (such as youth cautions).

Our findings

We found that the police are committed to the YOS partnership approach. We also found that the police play an active and valuable part in the process of deciding if a young person should receive an out-of-court disposal.

However, we are still finding that the police could be better at sharing information with other organisations.
Specialist inspections

Counter-terrorism

In 2018, we carried out the third in a series of counter-terrorism (CT) inspections. This inspection assessed the effectiveness of the CT network in providing the ‘bridge’ between national and local levels of policing in England, Wales and Scotland to reduce the risk from terrorism.

The CT network isn’t a single organisation. It is a collaboration of regional hubs working together, supported by a headquarters function. This structure is unique in British policing.

We reviewed a range of documents and visited 16 police forces. We also visited ten regional hubs (including the CT command in London and the organised crime and CT unit in Police Scotland). Finally, we interviewed senior officers carrying out national CT work.

What we inspected

We assessed whether the national CT network gave forces effective strategic direction to help them reduce the risk from terrorism. We also considered national, regional and local structures to see if they were well connected and consistent in their approach to the terrorist threat.

To test this effectiveness, we examined how the police respond in two critical areas: safeguarding (protecting vulnerable people from radicalisation) and CT intelligence handling. We considered these to be two of the highest areas of risk and of significant public interest.

We also discussed other areas of CT policing during this inspection.

Our findings

We were reassured to find that, nationally, there is a consistent and highly effective process for handling terrorism intelligence. We also found that the police are playing a prominent role in protecting vulnerable people from radicalisation.

We found strong evidence that the police provide an effective and co-ordinated approach to the terrorist threat. Following the five terrorist attacks in the summer of 2017, the CT network has improved its intelligence handling and safeguarding. This has made people safer.

Our recommendations

We made recommendations at national, regional and force levels. Because of the sensitive nature of CT work and legal constraints in place to protect national security, we didn’t publish the report.
Hate crime

We carried out an inspection of how the police deal with reports of hate crime. For the first time, the inspection assessed how the police deal with reports of hate crime of all types.

The volume of hate crimes has been increasing. While it is a low proportion in terms of overall numbers of recorded crimes, the effect on individual victims and communities can be devastating. There is also strong evidence to suggest that hate crime is significantly underreported to the police.

Our findings

Our report emphasised the importance of the police getting their response right first time and during their first contact with victims. We saw good, innovative practice in several forces, and found that the forces we visited had worked hard to raise awareness of hate crime among staff and in their communities.

The inspection also found that some forces:
– incorrectly flagged hate incidents and crimes;
– didn’t gather comprehensive data about hate crime victims;
– didn’t gather enough intelligence about hate crime;
– didn’t always give hate crime victims enough information; and
– didn’t consistently refer hate crime victims to support services.

Our report made several recommendations for improvement. We concluded that there was still much work to do to make sure victims who report hate crime to the police get the service they deserve.

As part of our hate crime inspection, we also commissioned NatCen Social Research to speak to hate crime victims. Victims told us that they wanted police officers and staff to be better at recognising hate crime and better trained to deal with it. It was important to victims that officers showed an understanding of their personal circumstances.

We will consider what we can do next to help the police service implement our recommendations.
Disability hate crime
We helped Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate (HMCPSI) carry out an inspection of how the police and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) deal with disability hate crime. This was the third inspection to focus on this area.2

Our findings
We found that the police need to be better at investigating disability hate crime and to improve some aspects of victim care. More than half the cases we examined hadn’t been dealt with well enough. The problems included failing to flag cases as disability hate crime on police force systems or to refer cases to the CPS in line with the charging guidelines.4

We also found there were often delays in the investigation process and a lack of effective supervision of cases. Risk assessments were missing in many of the cases we assessed, and risk management plans weren’t always put in place.

Despite some of these shortcomings, referrals to victim support services and compliance with the Victims’ Code of Practice were more consistent.

Mental health
In November 2018, we published Picking Up the Pieces,5 our first report into policing and mental health. This examined in detail the findings from our 2017 effectiveness inspection.

Mental ill-health is said to affect one in four of us at some point in our lives. It is a complex topic that cuts across every area of policing.

Our findings
The police approach to people with mental health problems is generally supportive, considerate and compassionate. However, the police service is carrying too much of the burden of responding to mental health problems.

Many aspects of the broader mental health system are broken, and police forces are picking up the pieces. This is letting down people with mental health problems, as well as placing an intolerable burden on police officers and staff. It is a national crisis that should not be allowed to continue. There needs to be a fundamental rethink and urgent action.

Our report expressed grave concerns about whether the police should be involved in responding to mental health problems to the degree they are. Our inspection found that, in dealing with people with mental health problems, police officers and staff must do complex and high-risk work. They often don’t have the skills they need to support people with mental health problems. And, too often, they find themselves responsible for the safety and welfare of people whom other professionals would be better placed to deal with.

This means that already overstretched (and all-too-often overwhelmed) police officers can’t always respond appropriately, and people in mental health crisis don’t always get the help they need. All this can take a heavy emotional toll on both officers and staff.
Despite these problems, many forces have done innovative work in this area. This includes:

**Collaborating with other organisations**

The police are working with the NHS and others to improve joint understanding of mental ill-health. We found that these partnerships need to have a clear understanding of mental health demand to respond appropriately.

**Leadership and governance**

Most forces have policies in place for dealing with mental health problems, and officers and staff are generally good at recognising and responding when people are in crisis. Forces are investing in training in this area, but the quality is inconsistent.

Only a few forces are seeking the views of people who have experienced mental health problems. This could help to improve the quality of their training, and shape future services.

**Mental health triage services**

All forces now have some form of mental health triage. This may be a mobile unit staffed by a police officer alongside a nurse and/or paramedic, or a mental health specialist based in the control room.

This means that the police can access health records and arrange appropriate care. Forces now need to evaluate these services to assess whether they are meeting the needs of those with mental health problems.

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**Next steps**

We have identified some areas in which police forces can improve, in terms of training and building a clearer view of demand. However, our main recommendation is that there should be a fundamental review of the state response to people with mental ill-health, carried out by the Mental Health Crisis Care Concordat steering group.

We will continue to work with forces, the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead and the Home Office to follow up on these recommendations.

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**All forces now have some form of mental health triage.**

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Domestic abuse

In February 2019, we published the fourth in a series of thematic reports that consider the police service’s approach to victims of domestic abuse. The first, Everyone’s Business: Improving the Police Response to Domestic Abuse, was published in March 2014. Since then, the police’s performance in this area has improved markedly. Victims are now better supported and protected.

The most recent report presents the findings from our 2017 effectiveness inspection and recognises the good work most police forces are doing to deal with domestic abuse. This includes:

– continued investment in training on domestic abuse;
– continued development of multi-agency safeguarding hubs, where the police work in partnership with other organisations to protect victims of domestic abuse;
– increased use of body-worn video to record evidence at the scene of an incident; and
– the continual roll-out of Operation Encompass and other schemes in which the police work with schools to support children present at domestic abuse incidents.

Our findings

A big increase in recorded levels of domestic abuse

There was an 88 percent increase in recorded levels of domestic abuse in the 12 months to 30 June 2017, compared with levels reported in our first specialist inspection on the issue (for the 12 months to 31 August 2013).

This is likely to be because crimes are being recorded more consistently, and complainants feel more confident about reporting them to the police. There may be other reasons too, but not all forces understand these or are able to explain them.

Delays and declining arrest rates put victims at risk

In some cases, we found that delays in response were hampering effective investigations and potentially putting victims of domestic abuse at serious risk of harm.

We continue to be concerned that the rate of arrests in domestic abuse cases is falling (see figure 3). While most frontline officers know that it is important to make an arrest as early as possible, the number of arrests for domestic abuse-related crimes fell in 23 forces, despite the overall number of recorded domestic abuse crimes increasing. Forces need to be able to explain why this is happening so they can address it.

Figure 3:
Domestic abuse arrest rate (per 100 domestic abuse crimes), by force, for the 12 months to 30 June 2017

There was an 88 percent increase in recorded levels of domestic abuse in the 12 months to 30 June 2017.
The impact of bail changes

Last year, as part of our effectiveness inspection, we started to examine the effect of changes to pre-charge bail introduced by the Policing and Crime Act 2017. These changes came into force on 3 April 2017.

The aim of the changes is to end the police practice of keeping people on pre-charge bail for long periods without independent judicial scrutiny. Bail can only be used when it is necessary and proportionate. When bail can’t be justified, accused persons are released under investigation. In these cases, the police can’t place restrictions on the person’s release, for example to prevent them from contacting the complainant or witnesses, or otherwise interfering with an investigation.

Since the 2017 PEEL inspections, we have wanted to gain more of an understanding of the use of bail for domestic abuse-related offences. We will be working with forces through our inspection programme and with our technical advisory group to better understand data on the use of bail.

In our fourth thematic report, we highlighted our concern that these changes to the use of bail could be having a detrimental effect on victims of domestic abuse. It is important that an unintended consequence of this legislation shouldn’t be less protection for vulnerable victims, nor a feeling on their part that they are less supported and protected by the police.

In our PEEL: police effectiveness 2017 report, we were so concerned about the use of pre-charge bail that we made a national recommendation that, by September 2018, all forces review how they implemented the changes. Forces should now make any necessary changes to make sure they are using bail effectively, and that vulnerable victims get the protection that bail conditions can give them. We will be assessing this issue in more detail as part of the PEEL 2018/2019 inspections.

Next steps

We will continue to inspect the police approach to victims of domestic abuse every year and will report on the findings from our latest inspection in 2019.
Fraud
Fraud makes up around a third of all crime and is the largest standalone crime type.\(^7\)

In June 2017, the Home Secretary commissioned a national thematic inspection of the police approach to fraud. We inspected 11 police forces, all nine regional organised crime units and the National Crime Agency (NCA). We also inspected Action Fraud (the national reporting centre for fraud) and the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB), both of which are run by City of London Police. We published our report in April 2019.\(^8\)

Our findings
There is a centralised process for reporting and investigating fraud. While this is sensible in principle, there are problems with the way the process is run.

We found:
– a lack of a national policing strategy for fraud;
– a lack of understanding of roles and responsibilities;
– a lack of co-ordination of work to protect businesses and the public;
– a wide variation in the way cases are allocated for investigation;
– a lack of proactive management of fraudsters; and
– a general need to improve the service to victims of fraud.

Our inspection was separated into five distinct areas:

The strategic approach to fraud
There is no government or national policing strategy for tackling fraud. Police forces have put in place a range of different approaches based on local priorities. But even collectively, these aren’t enough to cope with the full scale of fraud.

In general, the police don’t prioritise fraud. But tackling fraud isn’t just a job for the police. National government, public bodies and the private sector all have a role to play.

How policing is structured to respond to fraud
When it comes to dealing with fraud, police leaders don’t always understand which organisations should do what. They also don’t always understand well enough the capacity of the organisations involved. This confusion leads to some activities being carried out more than once in different organisations. And some other activities aren’t carried out at all because roles and responsibilities aren’t clear.
We found too much variation in the quality of case handling and prioritisation.

How the public is protected from fraud
We found good examples of locally led fraud prevention work. We also found examples of good joint working between the police and the private sector. Nationally, more could be done to learn from good local projects and make use of the intelligence they can provide.

Improvements to the digital systems used to report and analyse fraud have been delayed. Police forces don’t always make good use of the intelligence the NFIB provides. This means forces don’t always identify or use trends and threats to help support people who are at risk of fraud.

How fraud is investigated and fraudsters managed
We found too much variation in the quality of case handling and prioritisation. For example, some forces investigate all cases sent to them by the NFIB. Others investigate fewer than 10 percent of cases. We also found avoidable delays and a lack of proactive targeting of offenders.

The forces we inspected didn’t do enough to identify the threat of fraud by organised crime groups. The process for allocating large-scale fraud cases doesn’t work well. As a result, investigations often ‘bounce around’ between agencies.

How fraud victims are treated
Vulnerable victims tend to receive a good service. They generally receive good care and advice about how to protect themselves from fraud. Other, less vulnerable victims don’t always get such a good service.

Among both the police and the public, there is still a lack of understanding about the national fraud reporting process. Victims often receive poor information about how their cases will be investigated and how they are progressing.

Our recommendations
Our report made 16 recommendations and identified five areas for improvement.

The recommendations included:
– developing a national strategic approach to fraud;
– publishing performance and accountability information;
– identifying best practice and co-ordinating protection work;
– improving the police and public understanding of the reporting, response and recording processes;
– making better use of regional and national-level arrangements for dealing with large-scale fraud; and
– improving the service and information given to victims.

The areas for improvement we identified included:
– organised crime group mapping;
– how forces and regional units manage fraudsters;
– how forces identify vulnerable victims of fraud; and
– improving the service to victims under the Victims’ Code of Practice.

Next steps
We will work with City of London Police to develop an inspection regime for all aspects of Action Fraud and the NFIB.

Fraud is closely linked to cybercrime. In 2019, we will carry out a thematic inspection of cyber-dependent crime.
Stalking and harassment

Between 2016 and 2017, we carried out our first inspection into the police and the CPS’s approach to stalking and harassment. This was a joint inspection with HMICPSI.

Our July 2017 national report, Living in Fear – The Police and CPS Response to Harassment and Stalking, concluded that the police and the CPS were letting victims down, and made recommendations for improvement. Sussex Police was one of six forces we visited as part of the inspection.

The police and crime commissioner for Sussex was concerned about Sussex Police’s performance in this area and asked us to carry out a follow-up inspection in 2018. We were pleased to accept: we see great value in working with police and crime commissioners, particularly to assess the local effects of our thematic inspections.

Our findings

We found that Sussex Police had done a great deal of work to improve its approach to stalking and harassment. However, the force still has more work to do, particularly in recording crimes correctly, so we have made several recommendations to the chief constable.

Since our initial inspection, we have also been working closely with interested parties on a national level. So we decided to review what progress they had made against the recommendations in our 2017 report.

National organisations have made some good progress on some of our recommendations and continue to work on others. Again, there is more work to do, and in some cases urgent work, to make sure the police protect victims of both stalking and harassment. So we have also made some new recommendations to national organisations.

Next steps

Recently published recorded crime figures show that stalking and harassment crimes increased by 41 percent in 2018, compared with the previous year. This is the largest increase in any crime category. We will continue to monitor how the police approach these serious and damaging crimes.
Specialist rolling inspections

Joint custody inspections

We carry out inspections of police custody suites jointly with Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons. We do this as a member of the UK’s National Preventive Mechanism (NPM). NPM members monitor and inspect places of detention, in line with the UK’s obligations under the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture.

Between March 2018 and the end of April 2019, we published 11 reports after unannounced inspections of police custody suites across England and Wales. In 2018/19, we also inspected, for the first time, the custody suites that are used to detain people arrested on suspicion of terrorism offences. We will publish our findings for this inspection in summer 2019.

Follow-up visits to forces

One year after we have inspected them, we carry out follow-up visits to forces. We use these visits to assess the progress each force has made in response to our findings. Between March 2018 and March 2019, we carried out ten of these visits. We found that most forces had started to improve their custody services. But when forces were dependent on other organisations, particularly mental health and local authority children’s services, progress was slow in achieving better outcomes for detainees.

We continue to inform the work of the NPM and national police custody policy development. We attend the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s national custody forum and its sub-groups, and the national Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) strategy board. We also work with the Independent Custody Visiting Association, so we can learn from each other.

Following Dame Elish Angiolini’s review of deaths in custody, we changed our methodology to focus more on the welfare of detainees who are under the influence of drugs or alcohol. We have also taken steps to tell the public more about how we carry out our inspections and the type of information we ask forces for.
Our findings
As in previous years, we have found that custody officers treat most detainees respectfully, and generally provide good levels of care. They usually make good assessments of individual risks, such as existing health conditions or a history of self-harm. Because most forces don’t monitor waiting times or delays, it is difficult to measure the true scale of these problems.

Reviewing detention
Some of the forces we inspected didn’t always meet the requirements of the PACE Codes of Practice in reviewing detention. For example, too many forces review detention too early, too late or without speaking to the detainee. Reviews are important because they assess whether keeping a person in custody is still justified.

Some reviews didn’t consider the detainee’s welfare properly. We also found examples of forces reviewing detention while detainees were asleep and not reminding them of their rights when they woke up.

Release under investigation
In April 2017, the Policing and Crime Act 2017 came into force, which resulted in changes to bail arrangements. In some cases, these changes have led to delays while forces get to grips with the new legislation.

The changes included the introduction of ‘release under investigation’, whereby detainees are released from custody but their investigation is still ongoing. Unlike bail, there is no requirement for a detainee to return to the police station on a particular date.

Most forces haven’t done enough to monitor the cases of people who are released under investigation. In some forces, we were concerned that arrangements to protect victims, which would previously have been dealt with by bail conditions, weren’t good enough. In 2019/20, we will carry out a thematic inspection of police arrangements for releasing people from custody while still under investigation.

Other areas of concern
Other common areas that concern us are:
– custody suites not always having enough staff to keep detainees safe;
– ligature points, which we are still finding in custody suites;
– poor recording and monitoring of incidents involving the use of force;
– a general lack of information about the performance of custody services; and
– some long waits for children and vulnerable adults before they receive support from an appropriate adult.12

Also, too few forces are recording information about the ethnicity and other protected characteristics of detainees. This information is important to show whether detainees are treated fairly. Even when forces do record this information, we found few that are monitoring it well.

Most forces haven’t done enough to monitor the cases of people who are released under investigation.
Crime data integrity

Crime data integrity (CDI) is hugely important to public confidence in the police, as we found in our 2014 thematic inspection: Crime Recording: Making the Victim Count. Accurate crime recording helps forces prioritise investigations using suitably skilled staff. It also helps them manage their resources, plan effectively for the future and give victims and the community the service they deserve.

This data has an effect on every area of policing, from call handling to investigations and crime prevention to how forces work with other organisations. It also helps forces monitor whether they are treating people fairly, as set out in the Public Sector Equality Duty. As such, it is very important that the data is accurate.

In April 2016, we started a new programme to inspect all 43 forces in England and Wales on how well they record reported crime. The programme builds on our 2014 thematic inspection, which found that 800,000 reported crimes (19 percent) went unrecorded nationally.

Our inspections cover several areas:
- how accurately the police record reports of crime in general;
- how accurately the police record reports of violent and sexual crimes;
- how accurately the police record reports of rape;
- how well victims of domestic abuse are treated; and
- how well the police record reports of modern slavery crimes.

We examine reports made by the public, and by organisations such as social services, to specialist police departments dealing with vulnerable victims. We assess these to see whether crimes have been appropriately recorded. We also examine cases in which the police have amended crime reports to show that no crime has been committed.

Our findings

We found that most forces appreciated the importance of accurate crime recording and were determined to get it right first time.

In forces where crime recording was of a high standard, we found that leadership was strong, oversight was effective, and systems and processes worked well – all contributing to a healthy, victim-focused culture. Three forces are highlighted below, as their performance stood out from the rest. We have examined these forces in detail, to understand why they did so well.
The big picture

So far, we have published the findings from our CDI inspections of 34 police forces, eight of which we have re-inspected. These showed that senior police leaders and many officers and staff recognise the importance of CDI. However, crime recording standards still vary a great deal.

The combined recording accuracy for all reported crime across those 34 forces\(^1\) was 89.3 percent; for violent offences it was 87.5 percent, and for sexual offences 93.3 percent.\(^2\) These figures are better than those we reported last year\(^3\) for the 20 forces we had inspected to that point, which shows the effort forces are making to improve and the value of our continued inspection work. However, there is room for further improvement.

Figure 4:
Overall crime recording accuracy by force

We estimate that, in comparison with the findings of our 2014 inspection, forces recorded around 490,000 more crimes during 2018 because of better recording standards.\(^4\) However, we estimate that around 610,000 crimes reported to the police were still unrecorded in the year.

Improving crime recording: what works?

We found that Cheshire Constabulary, Kent Police and West Yorkshire Police had all made significant performance improvements to their CDI.

In November 2016, we inspected Cheshire Constabulary and Kent Police and estimated that both forces recorded 83.6 percent of reported crimes. We graded them both as inadequate in this area. We re-inspected both forces in May 2018 and October 2018 respectively. We found that Cheshire Constabulary was recording 96.4 percent and Kent Police 96.6 percent of reported crimes. We regraded both forces as outstanding in this area.

In 2014, we assessed West Yorkshire Police’s crime recording arrangements as needing immediate improvement. Our latest inspection of the force took place in November 2018; we found the force was recording 94.6 percent of reported crime. In contrast to our initial inspections in Cheshire Constabulary and Kent Police, we noted that recorded crime in West Yorkshire Police had been on an upward trend since the publication of our 2014 thematic inspection report. This suggests that the force had taken immediate steps to improve its crime recording practices.

Source: HMICFRS CDI inspections
Note: This figure shows the forces in the order in which we carried out the inspections. It shows the overall crime recording accuracy as a range for each force. The middle line is the central estimate within this range.
Figure 5: Trends in recorded crime in Cheshire, Kent and West Yorkshire, rolling 12-month totals, December 2013 to December 2018

We revisited these forces to understand and examine each force’s approach and to learn from their experiences. Our analysis revealed that they had some things in common in their approach to CDI.

Leadership

In all three forces, senior leaders prioritised CDI. They provided effective governance, active leadership and clear direction to staff, often via personal messages. Regular CDI strategic meetings and briefings influenced how chief officers oversaw and managed improvement plans.

This approach has resulted in a noticeable and encouraging cultural change among staff, and a victim-focused approach to crime recording. Having more of an understanding of crime demand helps these forces to understand better when and where to deploy their resources to make sure they respond most appropriately to calls for help.

Having more of an understanding of crime demand helps forces to understand better when and where to deploy their resources.

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Effective systems and processes

Each of the three forces had carried out a thorough review to improve its crime recording. Kent Police had invested in more posts (although it was starting from a low base) and more systems in its incident management unit, which is responsible for crime recording in the force. Cheshire and West Yorkshire forces had redesigned their processes and systems in smaller ways; neither reported any substantial structural or technological changes, or significant increases in staff or funding. This is important because it indicates that forces don’t need to spend more money to improve their CDI.

Despite the different approaches, a consistent element was an emphasis on the needs of complainants. This means recording the crime as early as possible, as this helps keep the complainant safe and preserve evidence. In all three forces, the final decision about how to record a crime is taken by somebody who is independent of the investigation.

John Robins, Temporary Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police, said: “Ultimately, CDI is all about being victim-focused. Ethical crime recording is essential to understanding repeat and vulnerable victims. Repeat offenders can be identified more accurately and resources directed efficiently and effectively to reduce risk and harm within our communities.”

Force crime registrars and dedicated crime recording staff contributed a great deal to the success of the three forces. They were empowered and trusted to make decisions. The Home Office Counting Rules (HOCR) were applied consistently and to a high standard.

Training for decision making

Training was one of the main ways in which the three forces achieved success. Each had developed bespoke CDI training packages for specific roles – for example, safeguarding and control room staff. Cheshire Constabulary had supplemented this with a single point of contact for CDI in each of its local policing units. West Yorkshire Police had introduced CDI personal development review objectives for officers and staff responsible for making crime recording decisions, and a CDI exam for certain roles.

The HOCR require all force crime registrars and their deputies to complete the accreditation course for force crime registrars run by the College of Policing. But these forces gave extra training to other staff, too. West Yorkshire Police was particularly creative in supporting staff via a dedicated forum, a CDI helpline, social media and videos to explain changes to the HOCR.
Quality assurance and audits
Each force had carried out a mapping exercise to better understand the various routes by which crime is reported – for example, over the phone and online. This allowed them to audit each route to make sure crimes were being recorded properly. Each force also had good systems for reviewing recent high-risk crime reports – for example, domestic abuse, rape, sexual offences and violence – to make sure the correct records had been created.

Next steps
When the Audit Commission stopped auditing crime recording in 2004, our subsequent inspections and audits showed a gradual decline in crime recording accuracy. This decline has only reversed since we implemented the CDI programme.

The current CDI programme is scheduled to finish in spring 2020. It will then become part of the integrated PEEL assessment process, informing other areas such as investigating crime, protecting the vulnerable and managing demand.
Inspections of non-Home Office forces

British Transport Police

In October 2016, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Transport commissioned us to inspect the effectiveness of British Transport Police (BTP). We used the methodology set out in our spring 2016 PEEL (police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy) all-force inspection programme. The fieldwork took place in December 2017, and our report was published in July 2018.

We used the same criteria as we do for inspecting Home Office police forces. Although BTP has a different type of jurisdiction, focused on the rail network, the principles of keeping people safe and reducing crime are the same.

We focused on how effective the force is in five areas:
- preventing crime and tackling anti-social behaviour;
- investigating crime and reducing reoffending;
- protecting vulnerable people;
- tackling serious and organised crime; and
- its specialist capabilities.

Our findings

This is the first time we have inspected BTP’s effectiveness using the PEEL methodology. We found that the force compares favourably with the best-performing Home Office forces at keeping people safe and reducing crime.

Preventing crime and tackling anti-social behaviour

BTP has an effective approach to preventing crime and reducing anti-social behaviour. It understands its communities: the people who use and work on the rail network.

The force uses innovative methods to communicate with the travelling public and to get feedback from both rail users and staff. It uses this feedback to prioritise its services.

However, BTP needs to give training in problem solving for all its officers and relevant staff. This would improve the standard of crime prevention across the whole organisation.

Investigating crime and reducing reoffending

Crimes are investigated to a high standard and investigators keep victims regularly updated. The force attends incidents promptly and takes immediate action at the scene to make sure it collects good evidence.

Figure 6:
Proportion of crimes where action was taken, by offence group, 12 months to 30 September 2018

The force is good at continuing to investigate crimes even when the victim doesn't support police action, particularly in cases of domestic abuse. But it needs to improve how it records what action supervisors have taken on investigations. It also needs to recruit enough detectives to make sure investigators can manage their workloads.

Protecting vulnerable people
The force has a highly effective approach to protecting vulnerable people on the rail network. Its officers and staff work with other organisations and the rail industry to protect people who are vulnerable because of their age or disability, or because they have been subjected to repeated offences or are at high risk of abuse.

The force has an exceptionally good understanding of its role in identifying and supporting people with mental health conditions, and particularly in suicide prevention. In 2016/17, together with other organisations, it made 1,837 life-saving interventions on the rail network to help people in mental health crisis.

Tackling serious and organised crime
BTP has adopted a new approach to serious and organised crime. It already has effective processes for identifying, assessing and prioritising action on organised criminal groups. It has ready access to the specialist capabilities it needs to tackle serious and organised crime. And it uses intelligence effectively to understand the threat to the rail industry and the travelling public from organised crime groups.

However, the force needs to improve how it records what it is doing to disrupt organised crime groups. This will help it better assess how its work affects serious and organised crime in the long term.

Specialist capabilities
BTP has arrangements in place to meet its national policing responsibilities. It is well prepared to make an initial response to an attack that needs armed officers. It has carried out thorough assessments of all six threats in the strategic policing requirement (SPR), with clear accountability for each threat area.

The force carries out regular exercises with the rail industry, the Department for Transport, other police forces and the armed forces. These allow it to test its ability to respond to the threats set out in the SPR.

BTP has met its commitment to increase its armed officers in London. It is also part-way through increasing armed officers in Manchester and Birmingham. The force should consider working with the MPS and City of London Police to assess threats that need a response by armed police. This would allow all three forces to focus on the threats facing the whole of London.
National Crime Agency tasking, co-ordination and governance

The NCA is responsible for leading, supporting and co-ordinating the fight against organised crime across the UK. It has 4,200 of its own officers, but its national tasking and co-ordination work relies on the co-operation of the police and other law enforcement bodies.

Our inspection considered the NCA’s responsibility to lead, support and co-ordinate the national law enforcement approach to serious and organised crime. The NCA allocates tasks, to both its own officers and other bodies. We assessed how efficiently and effectively it does this.

We assessed the NCA’s national tasking and co-ordination procedure, and how its strategic governance groups are organised. We also considered how its national tasking and co-ordination work links in with national policing priorities.

Our findings

We found that the NCA’s national arrangements were generally effective and efficient. But there are still gaps in its understanding of the threats it is responsible for.

The National Strategic Tasking and Co-ordination Group (NSTCG) sets the priority of national-level threats. This group is led by the NCA and involves all police chiefs, plus senior NCA representatives and other interested parties.

We were reassured to see that the NCA has adopted the group’s priorities and is using them to guide the approach of the police and other law enforcement bodies. But more work needs to be done on:

– how national threats are prioritised;
– achieving a consensus about the nature of the response to specific threats;
– the relevance of the national control strategy; and
– the oversight arrangements for the strategic governance groups.

Our recommendations

We concluded that the NCA has effective and efficient processes in place to support its role in combating serious and organised crime.

We have made 11 recommendations for improvement. These are mostly directed at the NCA, but some need action from the police and other law enforcement bodies.

They include:

– improving how intelligence is gathered from forces and regional organised crime units;
– better representation by forces at meetings; and
– evaluating and prioritising threats more effectively.
Bailiwick of Guernsey

In 2017, the Bailiwick of Guernsey’s Committee for Home Affairs invited us to inspect policing and border control arrangements. These are provided by two closely connected organisations, collectively known as Bailiwick Law Enforcement (BLE).

We examined most aspects of BLE’s operations and the governmental, political and social context in which they take place.

Our findings

Among the Committee for Home Affairs and BLE personnel, we found a great deal of frustration about governance arrangements. Many people we spoke to felt that the arrangements weren’t functioning as well as they should.

We found some very serious shortcomings with ICT systems. For example, BLE officers don’t have access to the Police National Database.

The force’s leaders want to meet public expectations and largely do so. But BLE could involve the public more in setting its priorities. Most incidents receive a police response and crimes are investigated that most police forces in England and Wales would see as too minor to follow up.

We found that immigration controls for scheduled arrivals were robust. We found several examples of Guernsey Border Agency carrying out complex investigations relating to cross-border crime. The Agency works with colleagues in Jersey, the UK and France, and exchanges intelligence with them.

Since 2012, the number of suspicious activity reports has increased a great deal, providing valuable information about potential criminality. The number of money laundering investigations that BLE officers carry out has also increased. But we were concerned to hear about long delays in obtaining financial orders. This frustrates investigators, seriously limits the rate at which investigations can progress and has an adverse effect on asset recovery.

We found that BLE used more than one definition of vulnerability, so vulnerable people weren’t consistently identified. But most of the public protection unit cases we examined had been investigated effectively. In almost all, we found evidence of effective supervision and good victim care.

We found a widespread feeling that police buildings were inadequate. At the time of our inspection, BLE didn’t have an estates strategy, nor was there an estates strategy covering Home Affairs services as a whole.
Our recommendations
We recommended that the force should:
– improve how it investigates financial crimes and cares for victims;
– review changes to its structure; and
– complete staff vetting.

We also recommended that the Committee for Home Affairs should publish the objectives and priorities of BLE, and a document that clarifies its responsibilities as well as those of the head of law enforcement.

Finally, we recommended that the complaints procedure for Guernsey Border Agency should be made available to the public.

Royal Navy Police
We inspect the independence and effectiveness of investigations carried out by the Royal Navy Police (RNP).

In April 2018, we inspected the RNP’s policing performance inspection (PPI) process. The force uses PPIs to oversee performance in line with various professional standards.

Our findings
We found that the PPI process gives senior officers enough assurance that the force’s activities meet the relevant standards.

The scope of the PPI process is appropriate and covers the full range of duties the RNP carries out. The units being inspected value the process. The inspections are moderated to help make sure findings are consistent.

The PPI process includes checks on progress the units have made since previous inspections. Lessons learned and good practice are publicised throughout the RNP.

Areas for improvement
We didn’t make any recommendations as a result of our inspection. But we did find several areas for improvement. These included:
– circulating annual reports of self-inspections to senior officers;
– including staff wellbeing in the PPI process; and
– using documents and input from regional crime and intelligence managers before the start of a PPI.
Royal Air Force Police

We inspect the independence and effectiveness of investigations carried out by the Royal Air Force Police (RAFP). In May 2018, we inspected how effectively the RAFP manages performance in investigations.

Our findings

The RAFP has good processes in place to set priorities and manage resources. But the force needs to improve the way it reports its activity against its objectives.

The force has set up meetings to monitor and oversee its work, but it doesn’t cover all aspects of performance in a single series of meetings. That said, we were impressed by the way the RAFP uses these meetings to map demand against available resources.

The force’s technical evaluation quality assurance programme forms an effective part of this performance management regime. But we found that the RAFP’s lack of analysts and poor IT stop it from using more advanced performance measures.

Since our last inspection in 2016, the RAFP has improved how it monitors and supports victims of crime.

Areas for improvement

We didn’t make any recommendations as a result of our inspection. But we did find several areas for improvement. These included:

– having, and using, performance measures for all objectives;
– improving crime data integrity;
– appointing an analyst; and
– developing technical evaluations.
Other work

Rape monitoring profiles

The Rape Monitoring Group (RMG) is a multi-agency group in England and Wales, established to promote improvements in the response to rape across all the agencies that make up the criminal justice system.

We publish criminal justice system data on rape on the group’s behalf. This shows the number of rapes reported, arrests made, prosecutions brought and successful convictions (and other data) for each force. We want those who are involved in preventing rape and supporting victims to use this data to better understand what improvements they should focus on within their local areas.

In May 2018, we introduced a new interactive dashboard to show this data (see figure 8). This replaced the PDFs of 70 pages or more that we had used up until then. It allows for a better analysis of how rape is dealt with across the criminal justice system.

Figure 8: HMICFRS Rape Monitoring Group interactive dashboard

Joint inspection standard methodology

In May 2018, we updated our standard methodology for joint inspections.

The methodology sets out a consistent approach for criminal justice joint thematic inspections. It gives the organisations we inspect a clear idea of how we plan and carry out these inspections, and aims to make sure we do so as effectively and efficiently as possible.

We updated the methodology to provide the information more clearly and concisely, and to reflect current practice.

Operation Lynemouth

On 21 March 2017, the Mayor of London’s Office for Policing and Crime asked us to inspect Operation Lynemouth. This is a Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) operation into alleged criminal offences during the 2014 mayoral election in the London Borough of Tower Hamlets.

The MPS investigated these allegations both at the time and after an election court ruling that declared the election result void. The court found there were corrupt practices during the elections of both the mayor and the councillors for the 20 wards of Tower Hamlets.

However, there were concerns when there were no criminal convictions after initial MPS investigations. As a result, in 2017, the MPS set up Operation Lynemouth to review and reassess the allegations.

Our findings

We were asked to carry out quarterly inspections of the operation. We were to publish interim reports of our findings and a final report identifying lessons learned and best practice for the future. We published our fourth and final report in March 2019.

Operation Lynemouth had clear governance arrangements and made good progress, but it took longer than
the MPS had first thought it would. The operation’s investigators adopted a thorough and painstaking approach. They identified lines of enquiry that could still be explored. City of London Police has agreed to carry out an independent criminal investigation on behalf of the MPS.

But the operation could have been avoided if the MPS had treated the election and subsequent investigation as a priority at the time. There was a lack of corporate responsibility and training, and there weren’t enough resources for the original investigation. There were also failures of communication and engagement with interested parties; chief officers should have explained better why investigations came to nothing.

The MPS has done much to improve its systems and processes since 2014. But we highlight in our report seven areas for the force to consider in future. They relate to prioritisation, leadership, resources (including training), consistency, communication, record keeping and legal decisions.

Special grants

Forces should include reasonable contingencies in their policing and budget plans to allow for unexpected events in their areas. But there may be exceptional events that generate unforeseen pressure.

The threshold for an application for a special grant is normally where the extraordinary expenditure is more than 1 percent of the force’s net-revenue grant from the Home Office. The Home Office criteria also mention cases where the refusal of a special grant might threaten the financial stability of the force or its ability to provide effective policing. In these cases, police and crime commissioners can apply to the Home Office for special grant funding under the Police Act 1996, section 48; the Local Government Act 2003, section 31; or the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, section 170.

The Home Office may refer applications to us to review. We are normally asked to consider whether the resources the force used were reasonable and proportionate to the aims of the operation or investigation and the risks associated with it. Our reports aren’t published, but, based on our findings, Home Office officials advise ministers, who then make the final decisions about funding.

Special grants work in 2018

In 2018, we produced seven reports on applications for funding from eight forces. The applications related to 26 police operations. They involved major or critical incidents and serious offences, such as the criminal use of firearms, child sexual exploitation, nerve-agent poisonings and the Hillsborough inquiry.

We have noticed an increase in applications that cover a combination of smaller and more routine pre-planned policing operations, rather than unexpected and exceptional events. There is a risk that forces could become reliant on special grants to support normal police work. We are also concerned that they might not look for the most cost-effective options if they are confident that they won’t need to meet the costs. For example, a force might call on other forces for help, which is a more expensive option than making the best use of its own resources.
Police relations with the media

The College of Policing has published authorised professional practice (APP) on engagement and communication between the police and the media. It says that police forces shouldn’t name those arrested, or suspected of a crime, unless in exceptional circumstances where there is “a legitimate policing purpose” in doing so.

An example of a legitimate policing purpose is where the police need to make a public warning about someone who is wanted. However, parliamentarians and others have in the past expressed concern about some occasions when police forces have released names.

Our review and initial findings

The Home Office asked us to carry out a short, targeted review on relations between the police and the media, focusing on pre-charge anonymity. We carried out some initial research to understand the current situation and help direct any future inspection work.

We conducted a review of the evidence and data in the public domain. To collect more evidence, we spoke to other organisations, including those who oversee data management and protection and complaints against the police. We also commissioned reviews of parliamentary debates and media coverage of decisions to release names before people are charged.

The organisations we spoke to said they had seen little evidence of information being systematically leaked to the media. But they said there was a risk of accidental disclosure through the media piecing together several individual pieces of information. The growth of social media increases this risk.

Next steps

Our initial research proposes a more in-depth thematic inspection designed to gauge the extent to which forces are complying with the APP. The inspection would also explore whether the scope of, and guidance within, the APP are fulfilling their intended purpose.

We found through our research that the time before a person is charged is not the only point in the criminal justice system when their anonymity could be compromised. Our recommended approach reflects this and would consider the wider context.

The methodology we have developed would need fieldwork in six to ten forces, a document review and a data gathering exercise.

It is now for the Home Office to decide whether to proceed with the inspection.
Super-complaints

The new police super-complaints system went live on 1 November 2018.

The framework for the new system is set out in the Policing and Crime Act 2017, which amends the Police Reform Act 2002. It considers complaints that “a feature, or combination of features, of policing in England and Wales by one or more than one police force is, or appears to be, significantly harming the interests of the public”.

The system isn’t designed for individual complaints. It doesn’t replace existing police complaints systems, nor is it a way to escalate complaints from those systems. It will instead focus on systemic issues of local, regional or national significance, which may not be addressed elsewhere.

Only bodies designated by the Home Secretary can make a super-complaint. In June 2018, 16 bodies were designated:

- Action on Elder Abuse
- Advocacy After Fatal Domestic Abuse
- Centre for Women’s Justice
- Children’s Commissioner for England
- Criminal Justice Alliance
- Faith Matters
- Galop
- Hestia
- Liberty
- Missing People
- Pathway Project
- Tees Valley Inclusion Project
- Southall Black Sisters
- Suzy Lamplugh Trust
- Welsh Women’s Aid
- Women’s Aid

Super-complaints must be made in writing to Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary. They are considered by HMICFRS, the College of Policing and the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC), which together decide what (if anything) needs to happen as a result of the super-complaint.

Super-complaints can be made about:
- any one or more of the 43 police forces in England and Wales;
- the National Crime Agency;
- the Ministry of Defence Police;
- the Civil Nuclear Constabulary; and
- the British Transport Police.
Setting up the super-complaints system
The past year has seen considerable joint work between HMICFRS, the College of Policing and the IOPC to set up the new system. This included:

– recruiting and establishing a new super-complaints team;
– setting up a super-complaints page on GOV.UK;
– holding a briefing event for the designated bodies;
– meeting with designated bodies to discuss potential super-complaints;
– identifying and briefing interested parties;
– carrying out detailed work to design processes and governance arrangements for the new system; and
– running a pilot super-complaint investigation.

Super-complaints we have received so far
We received the first-ever super-complaint on 18 December 2018. It was made jointly by Liberty and Southall Black Sisters.

It is about the policies and practices of all police forces in England and Wales in how they treat victims of crime and witnesses with insecure immigration status. In particular, it focuses on the practice of passing people’s data to the Home Office for immigration enforcement. This super-complaint was assessed as being eligible for investigation by senior officials at HMICFRS, the College of Policing and the IOPC.

We received the second super-complaint on 19 March 2019. It came from the Centre for Women’s Justice and is about police use of protective measures in cases of violence against women and girls. They are concerned about the police’s use of bail conditions; their treatment of breach of non-molestation orders; and their use of domestic violence protection notices and orders, and restraining orders. This super-complaint was assessed as being eligible for investigation by senior officials at HMICFRS, the College of Policing and the IOPC.

We received the third super-complaint on 25 March 2019. It came from Hestia and focuses on how police treat victims and survivors of modern slavery and trafficking. This super-complaint was assessed as being eligible for investigation by senior officials at HMICFRS, the College of Policing and the IOPC.

We publish up-to-date information about police super-complaints on GOV.UK. 23
Part 3: Our reports
Our reports

Between 1 April 2018 and 2 May 2019, we published 224 reports, which are all available on our website.

As well as our work with the 43 Home Office forces, and the other inspectorates, we carried out various other inspections. These are part of our statutory duties to inspect non-Home Office police forces and certain other law enforcement agencies. We gave our reports for these inspections to the relevant Secretaries of State. Except where national security considerations precluded it, these were then published on our website.

Over the next few pages, we have listed our reports, along with:

- a short description of the inspection’s focus;
- the names of the other inspectorates, if it was a joint inspection;
- the publication date; and
- the name(s) of Her Majesty’s Inspector(s) (HMI) responsible for the inspection.

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Reports published
1 April 2018 to 2 May 2019

PEEL inspections

**PEEL: Police Effectiveness 2017: An Inspection of British Transport Police**
An inspection of the effectiveness of British Transport Police.
Lead HMI: Matt Parr
Published: 2 May 2019

**Police Effectiveness, Efficiency and Legitimacy 2018/19**
The first group of integrated PEEL assessment inspections, combining the effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy areas of PEEL into a single inspection. We assessed 14 forces.
Lead HMI: Matt Parr
Published: 5 April 2018 – 11 April 2019

**Complaints and Misconduct File Review 2018**
A review of forces’ complaints and misconduct case files. We wrote letters to three forces setting out our findings.
Lead HMI: Matt Parr/Wendy Williams
Published: 25 January 2019

**Child protection inspections**

**National Child Protection Inspections**
Inspections, re-visit inspections and post-inspection reviews of how the police protect children. We assessed 13 forces.
Lead HMI: Wendy Williams
Published: 6 July 2018

**Joint Targeted Area Inspections of the Multi-Agency Response to Abuse and Neglect**
Inspections of the multi-agency response to abuse and neglect in three local authority areas, including a focus on responses to children who have been neglected or live with domestic abuse.
Lead HMI: Wendy Williams
Published: 9 May 2018 – 24 August 2018

**Growing Up Neglected: A Multi-Agency Response to Older Children**
An overview of six joint targeted area inspections of the multi-agency response to older children who are experiencing neglect.
Lead HMI: Wendy Williams
Published: 6 July 2018

**Joint Targeted Area Inspection of the Multi-Agency Response to Domestic Abuse in Medway**
An inspection of the multi-agency response to domestic abuse in Medway, including a focus on responses to children living with domestic abuse.
Lead HMI: Wendy Williams
Published: 3 August 2018

**Joint Targeted Area Inspection of the Multi-Agency Response to Child Sexual Exploitation, Children Associated with Gangs and at Risk of Exploitation and Children Missing from Home, Care or Education in Dorset**
An inspection of the multi-agency response to child sexual exploitation, children associated with gangs and at risk of exploitation, and children missing from home, care or education in Dorset, including a focus on responses to children vulnerable to these situations.
Lead HMI: Wendy Williams
Published: 9 July 2018
Joint Targeted Area Inspection of the Multi-Agency Response to Sexual Abuse in the Family
Inspections of the multi-agency response to sexual abuse in the family in five local authority areas, including a focus on the response to sexual abuse in the family environment.
Lead HMI: Wendy Williams

Protecting Children from Criminal Exploitation and Modern Slavery: An Addendum
An overview of three joint targeted area inspections of the multi-agency response to child exploitation and children missing from home, care or education.
Lead HMI: Wendy Williams

Inspections of Youth Offending Services
Inspections of youth offending services (YOSs). We inspected YOSs in three force areas.
Lead HMI: Wendy Williams

Crime Data Integrity Inspections
Inspections of forces’ progress against recommendations we made in our 2014 crime data integrity inspections. We inspected 19 forces.
Lead HMI: Matt Parr

Counter-Terrorism Policing: An Inspection of Police Counter-Terrorism Commanders
An inspection of the role and training of counter-terrorism commanders.
Lead HMI: Matt Parr

Unannounced Inspections of Police Custody Suites
Inspections of police custody suites to assess whether people are being detained safely and treated respectfully. We inspected nine force areas.
Lead HMI: Wendy Williams

Operation Lynemouth: Fourth Interim and Final Reports
Inspections of the Metropolitan Police Service’s re-investigation of 2014 electoral fraud in Tower Hamlets.
Lead HMI: Matt Parr

National Crime Agency Inspection: National Tasking, Co-ordination and Governance of the Response to Serious and Organised Crime
An inspection of the National Crime Agency’s national tasking and co-ordination process, and the related arrangements of the strategic governance groups.
Lead HMI: Matt Parr

Understanding the Difference: The Initial Police Response to Hate Crime
An inspection of how effectively the police identify, record and respond to reports of hate crime.
Lead HMI: Wendy Williams
Joint Inspection of the Handling of Cases Involving Disability Hate Crime
An inspection of how effectively the police and Crown Prosecution Service handle disability hate crime cases.
Lead HMI: Wendy Williams

Published: 9 October 2018

Bailiwick of Guernsey Law Enforcement: An Inspection of the Capability and Capacity of Guernsey Police and Guernsey Border Agency
An inspection of the Bailiwick of Guernsey’s policing and border control arrangements.
Lead HMI: Matt Parr

Published: 2 November 2018

A Joint Inspection of Search Application and Production Order Processes: An Inspection of the Promised Improvements from the National Crime Agency’s Warrant Review in 2015
An inspection to assess how effectively the National Crime Agency deals with applications to search premises and obtain production orders.
Lead HMI: Matt Parr

Published: 24 January 2019

Policing and Mental Health: Picking Up the Pieces
An inspection of how effectively the police respond to and support people with mental health problems.
Lead HMI: Zoë Billingham

Published: 27 November 2018

The Police Response to Domestic Abuse: An Update Report
An inspection of forces’ progress in responding to and protecting domestic abuse victims since our 2014, 2015 and 2017 domestic abuse inspections.
Lead HMI: Zoë Billingham

Published: 28 February 2019

An Inspection of the Royal Navy Police’s Performance Inspection Process
An inspection of the Royal Navy Police’s policing performance inspections of its headquarters, Special Investigation Branch, shore establishments and ship-based units.
Lead HMI: Matt Parr

Published: 17 December 2018

An Inspection of the Royal Air Force Police’s Performance Management Process
Lead HMI: Dru Sharping

Published: 2 April 2019

Fraud: Time to choose – An Inspection of the Police Response to Fraud
An inspection of the police strategy and approach to tackling fraud, and the response to victims.
Lead HMI: Matt Parr

Published: 2 April 2019

Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority Inspection
An inspection of the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority’s use of investigative powers.
Lead HMI: Matt Parr

Published: 4 April 2019

Stalking and Harassment: An Inspection of Sussex Police Commissioned by the Police and Crime Commissioner, and an Update on National Recommendations in HMICFRS’s 2017 Report
An inspection of Sussex Police’s response to stalking and harassment, and an update on national progress in line with our recommendations in the 2017 report Living in Fear.
Lead HMI: Wendy Williams

Published: 10 April 2019
### HMIs’ Force Assessments

Our overall assessments of 43 forces, drawing together, for each one, our PEEL assessments, other insights, the operating context and HMIs’ future expectations.

*All HMIs*

**Published:** 11 April 2018

### State of Policing – The Annual Assessment of Policing in England and Wales 2018


*Lead HMI: Sir Thomas Winsor*

**Published:** 12 June 2018

### Hate Crime: What Do Victims Tell Us? – A Summary of Independent Research into Experiences of Hate Crime Victims

A research project, carried out by NatCen on our behalf, into the experiences of hate crime victims. This report summarises the research findings.

*Lead HMI: Wendy Williams*

**Published:** 16 October 2018

### Rape Monitoring Group Digests

An interactive data dashboard showing how rape is dealt with locally at each stage of the criminal justice system. The dashboard includes data from the 43 English and Welsh forces and British Transport Police.

*Lead HMI: Wendy Williams*

**Published:** 24 May 2018

### Policing Inspection Programme and Framework 2018/19

Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary’s 2018/19 inspection programme and framework, prepared under Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996.

*Lead HMI: Sir Thomas Winsor*

**Published:** 12 July 2018

### Public Perceptions of Policing in England and Wales 2018

Results of the BMG Research survey we commissioned of the public’s views and experiences of local policing.

*Lead HMI: Matt Parr*

**Published:** 26 October 2018

### HMICFRS Value for Money Profiles 2018

Full profiles of each England and Wales force, giving a comparative analysis of policing activities and highlighting differences in expenditure and performance.

*Lead HMI: Matt Parr*

**Published:** 28 October 2018
References

Foreword


Part 1


3 Section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 provides, under particular conditions, a defence for slavery or trafficking victims who commit certain offences. Schedule 4 to the Act lists offences for which the defence does not apply.

4 See: https://sammywoodhouse.com/campaigns.


PART 3: OUR REPORTS


20 As before, page 60.


24 See: http://www.preventknifecrime.co.uk/news


26 Throughout 2018, and into 2019, the UK threat level has been at ‘severe’, meaning an attack is highly likely. See: www.mi5.gov.uk/international-terrorism


33 Section 81 of the Policing and Crime Act 2017 creates restrictions on places that may be used as places of safety.


35 As before.


37 Since April 2018, among the forces inspected in our crime data integrity programme, 13 were judged as “inadequate” or “requires improvement”: Derbyshire Constabulary; Hampshire Constabulary; West Midlands Police; Leicestershire Police; Gwent Police; Dyfed-Powys Police; Nottinghamshire Police; South Yorkshire Police; Cleveland Police; Bedfordshire Police; Lincolnshire Police; Humberside Police; and Greater Manchester Police.
Part 2

1. Child sexual abuse in the family environment is sexual abuse perpetrated or facilitated in or out of the home, against a child under the age of 18, by a family member, or someone otherwise linked to the family, whether or not they are a family member. Within this definition, perpetrators may be close to the victim (for example, a parent, step-parent, aunt or uncle) or less familiar (for example, a family friend or babysitter).

2. By ‘partners’ we mean public sector entities, such as those concerned with health, education, social services and the management of offenders, which from time to time work with the police to attain their common or complementary objectives.


4. Section 53A of the Police Act 1996; the Secretary of State may by regulations make provision requiring one or more police forces to adopt particular procedures or practices, or to adopt procedures or practices of a particular description. If, however, the College of Policing proposes draft regulations to the Secretary of State, he is obliged to make regulations in terms of the College’s draft, unless any of three conditions applies. The first is that the proposed regulations would impair police efficiency or effectiveness. The second is illegality. The third is that it would, for some other reason, be wrong to do so.


12 Appropriate adults are responsible for protecting the rights and welfare of a child who is detained by the police. They must be present before various police processes (such as identification procedures) can take place. The appropriate adult may be a parent, guardian or social worker. If no-one matching this description is available, local authorities have a statutory duty to provide a responsible person over the age of 18 to fill the role.


15 To produce the figures for the 34 forces combined, we applied simple weighting to the individual force-recorded crime figures.

16 These figures have confidence intervals of: +/- 0.3 percent for all reported crime; +/- 0.5 percent for violent offences; and +/- 0.5 percent for sexual offences. The confidence interval gives an estimated range within which the figures are likely to fall. For example, if an audit found that 85 percent of crimes were correctly recorded with a confidence interval of +/- 3 percent, we could be confident that between 82 percent and 88 percent of crimes were correctly recorded.

17 85.9 percent for all crime, 80.8 percent for violent offences and 91.5 percent for sexual offences; based on our findings of inspections in 20 forces.

18 We calculated this estimate by applying our latest audit findings from 34 forces to Home Office police-recorded crime figures (excluding fraud) for all forces in England and Wales for the 12 months ending December 2018.

19 The force crime registrar is the person in a police force who is responsible for making sure it complies with crime recording rules. The Home Office Counting Rules say that they are ultimately responsible for all decisions to record a crime or make a no-crime decision, as the final arbiter. Registrars’ responsibilities include training staff in the crime recording process and carrying out audits to check that the force is complying with all the relevant rules.


21 Serious and organised crime remains one of the greatest risks to the national security of the United Kingdom. The NCA, police forces and a wide range of other public bodies are responsible for tackling it. The Crime and Courts Act 2013 allows the NCA to collect information from these other public bodies and, in certain circumstances, to direct their activities. If the activities of all these bodies are to be as effective as possible, they must be co-ordinated. This is the responsibility of the NCA.

22 The NCA Blueprint and Operating Model envisaged the creation of multi-agency ‘strategic governance groups’. These would “[work] with [law enforcement] partners to develop new operations against agreed multi-agency priorities and commissioning new activity through requests to [national tasking and co-ordination].” The NCA describes these strategic governance groups as sub-groups to the National Tactical Tasking and Co-ordination Group (NTTCG). They “are tasked to develop Strategic Action Plans for mitigating the threats contained within the National Strategic Assessment and to co-ordinate the multi-agency response to those threats”.

Annex B: About us

Our history

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary was established in 1856, under the same statute that required every county and borough that hadn’t already done so to set up and maintain a permanent salaried police force (the County and Borough Police Act 1856).

Under the 1856 Act, three Inspectors of Constabulary in England and Wales were appointed. It was their duty to “inquire into the state and efficiency of the police” (section 15). The Act also introduced the concept of annual inspection.

The first Chief Inspector of Constabulary (HMCIC) was appointed in 1962, as part of a major package of reforms to improve police governance and expand the role of the Inspectorate.

Our role and influence have evolved over the last century and a half. Most of our current functions are set out in the Police Act 1996 (as amended by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 and the Policing and Crime Act 2017).

We are independent of both the police service and the Government. Both our independence and inspection rights are vested in Her Majesty’s Inspectors, who are Crown appointees (section 54(1), Police Act 1996).
Our statutory responsibilities

Inspecting territorial police forces in England and Wales

We must inspect and report on the efficiency and effectiveness of every police force maintained for a police area (section 54(2), Police Act 1996).

The Secretary of State may at any time direct us to carry out an inspection of a police force in any police area (section 54(2B), Police Act 1996).

From time to time, the Home Secretary may also direct us to carry out other duties to help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the police (section 54(3), Police Act 1996).

The local policing body for a police area may at any time ask us to carry out an inspection of a police force in that area (section 54(2BA), Police Act 1996).

Inspecting other police forces and agencies

We also have statutory duties to inspect other police forces and agencies, whose remits are not limited to a particular territorial area. Instead, they police specific areas of infrastructure or particular types of crime. In these cases, we give our report to whichever government body is responsible for what the force or agency does.

We have a duty to inspect:

- Armed Forces Police – Royal Navy, Royal Military and Royal Air Force Police (section 321A, Armed Forces Act 2006);
- British Transport Police (section 63, Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003);
- Civil Nuclear Constabulary (section 62, Energy Act 2004);
- HM Revenue & Customs (section 27, Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005, and the Revenue and Customs (Inspections) Regulations 2005 (SI 2005/1133));
- Ministry of Defence Police (section 4B, Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987);
- Police Service of Northern Ireland (section 41, Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998, subject to appointment by the Department of Justice, Northern Ireland);
- National Crime Agency (section 11, Crime and Courts Act 2013); and
- Customs functions (section 29, Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, and the Customs (Inspections by Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Constabulary and the Scottish Inspectors) Regulations 2012 (SI 2012/2840)).
In summer 2017, we took on inspections of England’s fire and rescue services, assessing and reporting on their efficiency, effectiveness and people. To reflect this new role, our name changed to Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS).

Collaborative working
The long history of collaborative working between the criminal justice inspectorates – of Constabulary, the Crown Prosecution Service, Prisons and the National Probation Service – was enshrined in law through the Police Act 1996.

Schedule 4A to the 1996 Act says that the Inspectors of Constabulary:
– must co-operate with other inspectorates, where appropriate, so they can operate efficiently and effectively (paragraph 4);
– must draw up a joint inspection programme with other inspectorates (paragraph 5); and
– may tell certain other inspectorates not to carry out an inspection, or not to do so in a particular way, if HMIC believes the inspection would impose an unreasonable burden (paragraph 3).

Publishing reports
We must publish the reports we prepare under section 54 of the Police Act 1996 (section 55(1), Police Act 1996).

We must not publish anything the Inspectors believe would be against the interests of national security or might put anyone in danger (section 55(2), Police Act 1996).

We must send a copy of every published report to the Secretary of State, the local policing body maintaining the police force the report is about, the chief officer for that police force and the police and crime panel for that police area (section 55(3), Police Act 1996).

HMCIC must each year give the Secretary of State a report on our inspections. HMCIC must lay a copy of this report before Parliament (section 54(4), Police Act 1996). The report must include his assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of policing in England and Wales for that year (section 54(4A), Police Act 1996). This is our State of Policing report.

Producing the HMICFRS inspection programme and framework
HMCIC must prepare, consult on and publish an inspection programme and framework (paragraph 2 of Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996). He must gain the Home Secretary’s approval of the inspection programme and framework. He must then lay the inspection programme and framework before Parliament (paragraphs 2(2A)–(2B) of Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996).
Complaints and misconduct

HM Inspectors (HMIs) inspecting a police force must make sure they stay informed about all complaints and misconduct matters relating to that force (section 15(1), Police Reform Act 2002).

Super-complaints

The Policing and Crime Act 2017 established a new system of police super-complaints. The system considers complaints that “a feature, or combination of features, of policing in England and Wales by one or more than one police force is, or appears to be, significantly harming the interests of the public”.

Only bodies designated by the Home Secretary can make a super-complaint. In June 2018, 16 bodies were designated.

Super-complaints must be made in writing to Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary. They are considered by HMICFRS, the College of Policing and the IOPC, who together decide what (if anything) needs to happen as a result of the super-complaint.

Participating in misconduct proceedings

In misconduct proceedings for chief constables and other senior officers above the rank of chief superintendent, HMCIC, or an HMI he nominates, will sit on the panel for misconduct meetings and misconduct hearings (Police (Conduct) Regulations 2012 (SI 2012/2632), regulation 26). For all chief officer ranks (including chief constables), HMCIC, or an HMI he nominates, will sit on any police appeals tribunal (Police Act 1996, Schedule 6, paragraph 1).

Acting as a check on the removal of senior officers

If a police and crime commissioner is proposing to call on a chief constable or other senior officer to retire or resign, they must invite HMCIC to give his written views on the proposed removal. HMCIC must then give his views and the police and crime commissioner must consider them (Police Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/527), regulations 11A and 11B). The police and crime panel may consult HMCIC before making a recommendation to the police and crime commissioner on dismissing a chief constable (Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, Schedule 8, paragraph 15).
Our powers
Amendments made by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 to the Police Act 1996 have strengthened our role as a policing body independent of both the Government and the police. This makes us more fully accountable to the public and to Parliament.

Access to documents and premises
The chief officer of police must give inspectors information, documents, evidence or other things the inspector needs to carry out the inspection (paragraph 6A of Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996). The chief officer must also give inspectors access to the force’s premises, and to documents and other things on those premises that we need to carry out the inspection (paragraph 6B of Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996).

Power to delegate functions
An Inspector has the power to delegate any of his or her functions to another public authority (paragraph 1 of Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996).

Power to act jointly with another public body
We can act jointly with another public body where appropriate, to work efficiently and effectively (paragraph 5(1) of Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996).

Power to provide assistance to any other public authority
HMCIC may, if he thinks it is appropriate, help any other public authority carry out its role. HMCIC can do this on reasonable terms, including payment terms (paragraph 6 of Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996).

Who we are

Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary

Sir Thomas Winsor
In October 2012, Sir Thomas was appointed as Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary. He is the first holder of that office to come from a non-policing background.

Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Constabulary

Zoë Billingham
Zoë Billingham is Her Majesty’s Inspector for the Eastern Region.

Phil Gormley
Phil Gormley QPM is Her Majesty’s Inspector for the Northern region.

Matt Parr
Matt Parr CB is Her Majesty’s Inspector for the National and London Regions. He is also temporarily Her Majesty’s Inspector for Bedfordshire Police.

Dru Sharpling
Dru Sharpling CBE is Her Majesty’s Inspector and also sits on the panel of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse.

Wendy Williams
Wendy Williams is Her Majesty’s Inspector for the Wales and Western Region.
How we are accountable

The first Inspectors of Constabulary were appointed under the County and Borough Police Act 1856. The Act required them to inspect and report on the efficiency and effectiveness of most of the police forces in England and Wales.

Our main role hasn’t changed materially since then, except that our remit now covers the 43 forces in England and Wales, and several other forces and agencies. Our main empowering statute is now the Police Act 1996.

There are six Inspectors of Constabulary. They are neither civil servants nor police officers, and are appointed by the Crown for a fixed term of up to five years. That means we are independent of the police, Government, police and crime commissioners (and their equivalents), other agencies in the criminal justice system and all outside parties.

However, independence doesn’t mean a lack of accountability. We are accountable in these ways:

– our statutory duties, enforceable through judicial review or by action for breach of statutory duty;
– our obligation to submit an annual report to the Home Secretary under section 54 of the Police Act 1996; each report must be published and laid before Parliament: section 54(4), Police Act 1996;
– our obligation to lay before Parliament a copy of each inspection programme and inspection framework: Police Act 1996, schedule 4A, paragraph 2(2A)(a);
– written Parliamentary questions;
– our obligation to give written and oral evidence to Committees of Parliament, including the Home Affairs Select Committee, the Public Accounts Committee and any other select committee which may call on us to give evidence;
– our obligation to carry out other duties the Home Secretary directs us to: section 54(3), Police Act 1996; and
– our obligation to comply with the rules of administrative law and the rules of good public administration, enforceable in the High Court by judicial review.

As a public body, we are also subject to the legal obligations imposed on public authorities, including:

– Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974;
– Data Protection Act 2018 and the General Data Protection Regulation (2016/679/EU);
– Human Rights Act 1998;
– Freedom of Information Act 2000; and

Independence doesn’t mean a lack of accountability.
How we work with other organisations

We are mostly funded by the Home Office and are accountable to the Home Office for our spending, even though we are neither a subsidiary nor a part of the Home Office.

We have three concordats with others which set out the relationship or working arrangements between us. These are:

– a concordat with the Home Office which explains the material parts of the relationship between our two organisations. The concordat sets out our respective roles, and the responsibilities of the main people involved in running, sponsoring and overseeing our affairs. The concordat is published on our website;

– a concordat with the College of Policing. As we have complementary purposes and different powers by which we aim to achieve those purposes, the concordat sets out our respective roles and responsibilities, and how we work with each other;

– a concordat with the College of Policing and the Independent Office for Police Conduct. The concordat sets out our respective roles and responsibilities, and how we work with each other.

We also have a statutory duty to co-operate with the other criminal justice inspectorates, namely those concerned with the Crown Prosecution Service and the probation and prisons services, and the other named inspectorates set out in paragraph 4, Schedule 4A, Police Act 1996. Our obligations relating to joint inspections are set out in paragraphs 2–5 of that Schedule and we cover those inspections in this report.

Our regions

The National and London regions’ responsibilities include:

– Metropolitan Police Service
– City of London Police
– National Crime Agency
– British Transport Police
– Civil Nuclear Constabulary
– Ministry of Defence Police
– Armed Forces Police
– Guernsey Police
– Royal Gibraltar Police
– States of Jersey Police
– Isle of Man Constabulary
– HM Revenue & Customs
– others by invitation.

We have a statutory duty to co-operate with the other criminal justice inspectorates.
Our purpose, values and objectives

Our purpose is to promote improvements in policing and fire and rescue services to make everyone safer.

Our values of respect, honesty, independence, integrity and fairness are at the heart of how we work. They act as a touchstone to help us make decisions – both as individuals and as an organisation.

Annex C: Peelian principles

1. The basic mission for which the police exist is to prevent crime and disorder.
2. The ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval of police actions.
3. Police must secure the willing co-operation of the public in voluntary observance of the law to be able to secure and maintain the respect of the public.
4. The degree of co-operation of the public that can be secured diminishes proportionately to the necessity of the use of physical force.
5. Police seek and preserve public favour not by pandering to public opinion but by constantly demonstrating absolute impartial service to the law.
6. Police use physical force to the extent necessary to secure observance of the law or to restore order only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient.
7. Police, at all times, should maintain a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and the public are the police; the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.
8. Police should always direct their action strictly towards their functions and never appear to usurp the powers of the judiciary.
9. The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with it.

Sir Robert Peel became Home Secretary in 1822. In 1829, he established the first full-time, professional and centrally-organised police force in England and Wales, for the Greater London area.

His police reforms were based on a philosophy that the power of the police comes from the common consent of the public, as opposed to the power of the state. This philosophy is underpinned by nine principles which have shaped our approach when assessing forces.
Annex D: Our finances

We are funded mainly by the Home Office. We also receive funding for inspections commissioned by others (such as the National Crime Agency).

We spend just over 80 percent of our funding on our workforce, with the rest spent on travel, subsistence, accommodation and other expenses.

Expenditure breakdown 2017/18 (£)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IT and telephony</td>
<td>0.4m</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office expenditure and other costs</td>
<td>0.7m</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveys and inspection services</td>
<td>0.9m</td>
<td>4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Travel and subsistence</td>
<td>1.9m</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffing costs including associates</td>
<td>18.8m</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We spend just over 80 percent of our funding on our workforce.

Our workforce comprises the Inspectors of Constabulary, civil servants, police officers and staff secondees. We also have a register of associate inspectors.

Staffing breakdown 2017/18

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permanent staff</td>
<td>146</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police secondees</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fixed-term appointments</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire secondees</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>People from other government departments</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

256 members of staff
# Annex E:

**Our inspections by force**

1 April 2018 to 2 May 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territorial police forces of England and Wales</th>
<th>PEEL inspections</th>
<th>HMIs’ Force Assessments</th>
<th>Child protection inspections</th>
<th>Other police forces and agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avon and Somerset</td>
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<td>West Yorkshire</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wiltshire</td>
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- **PEEL: Police Effectiveness 2017: An Inspection of British Transport Police**
- **Complaints and Misconduct File Review 2018**
- **Police Effectiveness, Efficiency and Legitimacy 2018/19**
- **National Child Protection Inspections**
- **Joint Targeted Area Inspections of the Multi-Agency Response to Abuse and Neglect**
- **Joint Targeted Area Inspection of the Multi-Agency Response to Child Sexual Exploitation, Children Associated with Gangs and at Risk of Exploitation and Children Missing from Home, Care or Education**
- **Joint Targeted Area Inspection of the Multi-Agency Response to Domestic Abuse**
- **Joint Targeted Area Inspections of the Multi-Agency Response to Sexual Abuse in the Family**
- **Growing Up Neglected: A Multi-Agency Response to Older Children**
- **Protecting Children from Criminal Exploitation and Modern Slavery: An Addendum**
- **Inspections of Youth Offending Services**

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*Note: The table indicates whether an inspection was conducted or not, represented by a dot. Different columns represent different categories of inspections.*
## Our inspections by force
### 1 April 2018 to 2 May 2019

### Territorial police forces of England and Wales

| Force | Avon and Somerset | Bedfordshire | Cambridgeshire | Cheshire | City of London | Cleveland | Cumbria | Derbyshire | Devon and Cornwall | Dorset | Durham | Dyfed-Powys | Essex | Gloucestershire | Greater Manchester | Gwent | Hampshire | Hertfordshire | Kent | Leicestershire | Lancashire | Leicestershire | Lincolnshire | Merseyside | Metropolitan Police | Norfolk | Northamptonshire | Northumbria | Nottinghamshire | North Wales | North Yorkshire | South Wales | South Yorkshire | Staffordshire | Suffolk | Surrey | Sussex | Thames Valley | Warwickshire | West Mercia | West Midlands | West Yorkshire | Wiltshire |
|-------|------------------|--------------|----------------|----------|---------------|-----------|----------|------------|-------------------|--------|---------|-------------|------|---------------|------------------|------|-----------|-------------|-------|--------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|----------------|--------|----------------|--------------|------------|-------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|--------------|------------|---------|--------|--------|----------|--------|---------|--------|

### Specialist inspections

| Inspection Type | Avon and Somerset | Bedfordshire | Cambridgeshire | Cheshire | City of London | Cleveland | Cumbria | Derbyshire | Devon and Cornwall | Dorset | Durham | Dyfed-Powys | Essex | Gloucestershire | Greater Manchester | Gwent | Hampshire | Hertfordshire | Kent | Leicestershire | Lancashire | Leicestershire | Lincolnshire | Merseyside | Metropolitan Police | Norfolk | Northamptonshire | Northumbria | Nottinghamshire | North Wales | North Yorkshire | South Wales | South Yorkshire | Staffordshire | Suffolk | Surrey | Sussex | Thames Valley | Warwickshire | West Mercia | West Midlands | West Yorkshire | Wiltshire |
|-----------------|------------------|--------------|----------------|----------|---------------|-----------|----------|------------|-------------------|--------|---------|-------------|------|---------------|------------------|------|-----------|-------------|-------|--------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|----------------|--------|----------------|--------------|------------|-------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|--------------|------------|---------|--------|--------|----------|--------|---------|--------|
Promoting improvements in policing and fire and rescue services to make everyone safer

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) independently assesses the effectiveness and efficiency of police forces and fire and rescue services – in the public interest.

In preparing our reports, we ask the questions that citizens would ask, and publish the answers in accessible form, using our expertise to interpret the evidence and make recommendations for improvement.

We provide authoritative information to allow the public to compare the performance of their police force or fire and rescue service against others. Our evidence is used to bring about improvements in the services they provide to the public.