

## **PEEL: Police effectiveness 2016**

### An inspection of Surrey Police



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### Introduction

As part of our annual inspections of police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy (PEEL), Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) assesses the effectiveness of police forces across England and Wales.

### What is police effectiveness and why is it important?

An effective police force is one which keeps people safe and reduces crime. These are the most important responsibilities for a police force, and the principal measures by which the public judge the performance of their force and policing as a whole.

To reach a judgment on the extent of each force's effectiveness, our inspection answered the following overall question:

How effective is the force at keeping people safe and reducing crime?

To answer this question HMIC explores five 'core' questions, which reflect those areas of policing that we consider to be of particular interest and concern to the public:<sup>1</sup>

- 1. How effective is the force at preventing crime, tackling anti-social behaviour and keeping people safe?
- 2. How effective is the force at investigating crime and reducing re-offending?
- 3. How effective is the force at protecting those who are vulnerable from harm, and supporting victims?
- 4. How effective is the force at tackling serious and organised crime?
- 5. How effective are the force's specialist capabilities?

HMIC's effectiveness inspection assessed all of these areas during 2016. More information on how we inspect and grade forces as part of this wide-ranging inspection is available on the HMIC website (<a href="www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/peel-assessments/how-we-inspect/">www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/peel-assessments/how-we-inspect/</a>). This report sets out our findings for Surrey Police.

Reports on the force's efficiency, legitimacy and leadership inspections are available on the HMIC website (<a href="www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/peel-assessments/peel-2016/surrey/">www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/peel-assessments/peel-2016/surrey/</a>).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> HMIC assessed forces against these questions between September and December 2016, except for Kent Police – our pilot force – which we inspected in June 2016.

### Force in numbers



### Calls for assistance

Calls for assistance per 1,000 population 12 months to 30 June 2016





### Crime (excluding fraud)

Crimes recorded per 1,000 population 12 months to 30 June 2016

Change in recorded crime 12 months to 30 June 2015 against 12 months to 30 June 2016

Change in recorded crime for the 5 years to the 12 months to 30 June 2016





### Crime outcomes\*

Charged/summonsed

Evidential difficulties: suspect identified but victim does not support action

Investigation completed but no suspect identified

Surrey Police	England and Wales
7.9%	12.1%
Surrey Police	England and Wales
8.8%	10.6%
Surrey Police	England and Wales
43.4%	47.4%
1.4	1 11 41 40

<sup>\*</sup>Figures are shown as proportions of outcomes assigned to offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016.



## Anti-social behaviour

Anti-social behaviour incidents per 1,000 population 12 months to 31 March 2016

Anti-social behaviour incidents per 1,000 population 12 months to 31 March 2015





### Domestic abuse

Domestic abuse calls for assistance per 1,000 population 12 months to 30 June 2016

Domestic abuse as a percentage of all recorded crime (excluding fraud) 12 months to 30 June 2016


Domestic abuse as a percentage of all recorded crime (excluding fraud) 12 months to 31 March 2015





### Organised crime groups


Organised crime groups per million population as at 1 July 2016





### Victim satisfaction rate

Victim satisfaction with the overall service provided by the police 12 months to 30 June 2016



For further information about the data in this graphic please see annex A

## Overview – How effective is the force at keeping people safe and reducing crime?

### Overall judgment<sup>2</sup>



Surrey Police is good in respect of its effectiveness at keeping people safe and reducing crime. Our overall judgment this year is an improvement on last year, when we judged the force to require improvement.

The force still needs to improve how it investigates and supervises less serious crime. However, there have been marked improvements in the way it safeguards those who are vulnerable from harm and the way it supports victims. The force has also improved its response to serious and organised crime and has the specialist capabilities necessary to prepare for national threats.

### **Overall summary**

How effective is the force at preventing crime, tackling anti-social behaviour and keeping people safe?



How effective is the force at investigating crime and reducing re-offending?

Requires improvement

How effective is the force at protecting those who are vulnerable from harm, and supporting victims?

Good Good

How effective is the force at tackling serious and organised crime?



How effective are the force's specialist capabilities? Ungraded

Surrey Police is good at preventing crime, tackling anti-social behaviour and keeping people safe. It is committed to keeping neighbourhood policing at the heart of its service. The force uses a structured problem-solving approach and works well with partner organisations. However, the force has a limited understanding of the threats facing its communities, and it needs to communicate more effectively with local people to obtain their views about neighbourhood priorities.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> HMIC judgments are outstanding, good, requires improvement and inadequate.

The way in which the force investigates crime and manages offenders still requires improvement. It has made some progress since last year. For example, it has increased the number of specialist staff investigating more complex and serious crimes, and has reduced the backlog of mobile phones and computers awaiting forensic examination. However, the force needs to improve the standard of investigation of less serious crime (such as minor criminal damage) and the supervision of these cases. The force recognises this and has provided additional training and mentoring for officers, and has employed agency staff in supporting roles. Nevertheless, some frontline officers and staff still do not have the skills to investigate some of the crimes that are allocated to them.

The force should also consider widening its approach to integrated offender management to maximise its impact on reducing threat, harm and risk. It also needs to ensure that suspects and offenders who are listed as being wanted on the police national computer, people who fail to appear on police bail, named and outstanding suspects, and suspects identified through forensic evidence are found quickly, and arrested.

Surrey Police is good at protecting people who are vulnerable from harm, and supporting victims. The force has made considerable improvements since 2015 and now has a good understanding of the nature and scale of vulnerability in its local area. Officers and staff understand their responsibility to assess and safeguard vulnerable people at the earliest opportunity. The force responds well to vulnerable people based on its assessment of vulnerability and risk at the initial point of contact. Improvements to its IT systems would allow the force to make a more robust assessment of vulnerability and risk.

The force has also improved its response to serious and organised crime. It has a better understanding of the threats posed to its communities, and neighbourhood officers are used effectively to collect intelligence and disrupt organised crime groups in their areas. However, the force should take steps to identify those people who might be at risk of being drawn into serious and organised crime, and work with other organisations to deter offending.

Surrey Police has good plans to ensure that it can respond to the threats set out in the *Strategic Policing Requirement*, including firearms incidents. It collaborates with Sussex Police and the two forces have effective procedures to test their preparedness to respond to civil emergencies and public order incidents. The force has a comprehensive training programme for firearms officers and firearms commanders, which is often carried out jointly with other forces in the south east region.

# How effective is the force at preventing crime, tackling anti-social behaviour and keeping people safe?


The police's ability to prevent crime and anti-social behaviour and to keep people safe is a principal measure of its effectiveness. Crime prevention is more effective than investigating crime, stops people being victims in the first place and makes society a safer place. The police cannot prevent crime on their own; other policing organisations and organisations such as health, housing and children's services have a vital role to play. Police effectiveness in this matter therefore depends on their ability to work closely with other policing organisations and other interested parties to understand local problems and to use a wide range of evidence-based interventions to resolve them.


## How much crime and anti-social behaviour is there in Surrey?

Although police-recorded crime is by no means a complete measure of the totality of demand for calls on its service that a force faces, it does provide a partial indication of performance across all forces. Crime rates are reported as the number of crimes per 1,000 population in each force area to enable comparison between areas. Total recorded crime is made up of victim-based crime (crimes involving a direct victim such as an individual, a group, or an organisation) and other crimes against society (e.g. possession of drugs). In the 12 months to 30 June 2016, the majority of forces (39 out of 43 forces) showed an annual increase in total police-recorded crime (excluding fraud). This increase in police-recorded crime may have been affected by the renewed focus on the quality and compliance of crime recording since HMIC's 2014 inspection of crime data in all forces across England and Wales.

In 2010 the Home Secretary set a clear priority for the police service to cut crime. Figure 1 shows how police-recorded crime has fluctuated over the longer term. When compared with the 12 months to 30 June 2011, police-recorded crime (excluding fraud) for the 12 months to 30 June 2016 has decreased by 8.9 percent in Surrey compared with a decrease of 3.4 percent across all forces in England and Wales.

Over this same period, victim-based crime decreased by 9.0 percent in Surrey, compared with a decrease of 0.5 percent for England and Wales as a whole.





Source: Home Office data For further information about these data, please see annex A

More recently, when compared with the previous 12 month period, police-recorded crime (excluding fraud) in Surrey increased by 11.9 percent for the year ending 30 June 2016. This is compared with an increase of 7.8 percent across all forces in England and Wales over the same period.

The rate of police-recorded crimes and incidents of anti-social behaviour per head of population indicates how safe it is for the public in that police area. Figures 2 and 3 show crime rates (per 1,000 population) and the change in the rate (per 1,000 population) of anti-social behaviour in Surrey compared with England and Wales.

HMIC used a broad selection of crime types to indicate crime levels in the police force area during the inspection. We are not judging the effectiveness of the force on police-recorded crime rates only. The figure below shows police-recorded crime rates in the force area for a small selection of crime types.


Figure 2: Police-recorded crime rates (per 1,000 population) in Surrey, for the 12 months to 30 June 2016

Rates per 1,000 population	Surrey Police	England and Wales
Recorded crime (excluding fraud)	50.7	68.2
Victim-based crime	43.2	60.4
Sexual offences	1.4	1.9
Assault with injury	5.1	7.0
Burglary in a dwelling*	5.2	8.1

<sup>\*</sup> The rate of burglary in a dwelling is the rate for 1,000 households, rather than population Source: Home Office data

For further information about these data, please see annex A

Figure 3: Percentage change in the rate of anti-social behaviour incidents (per 1,000 population), by force, comparing the 12 months to 31 March 2016 with the 12 months to 31 March 2015



Source: Home Office data

For further information about these data, please see annex A

In the 12 months to 31 March 2016, Surrey Police recorded 27 incidents of antisocial behaviour per 1,000 population. This is 10 percent fewer incidents per 1,000 population than the force recorded during the previous 12 months. In England and Wales as a whole, there were 8 percent fewer incidents per 1,000 population in the 12 months to 31 March 2016, than were recorded during the previous 12 months.

## How effectively does the force understand the threat or risk of harm within the communities it serves?

It is vital that forces have a detailed understanding of the communities they serve in order to protect them from harm. This understanding should include those communities which may – for a variety of reasons – need the police to work differently to understand their requirements, for example migrant communities, elderly people or groups which might be mistrustful towards the police. A good understanding of what matters to these communities helps the police to gain their confidence and create safer neighbourhoods for citizens.

In order to tackle crime and anti-social behaviour, police forces need to understand the threat and risk faced by communities. Forces must also operate a model of local policing in which police officers and police community support officers (PCSOs) have sufficient time for community engagement, visible targeted foot patrols and working with other policing organisations and other interested parties to promote resolutions that protect communities and prevent crime. Successfully undertaking these three activities leads to crime reduction and increased public confidence.

### Does Surrey Police understand the risk posed to its communities?

In order to tackle crime and anti-social behaviour, police forces need to understand the threat and risk faced by communities and a model of local policing in which police officers and police community support officers (PCSOs) have sufficient time for community engagement, visible targeted foot patrols and working with partners to promote resolutions that protect communities and prevent crime. Successfully undertaking these three activities leads to crime reduction and increased public confidence.

Surrey Police is able to respond to crime and anti-social behaviour as it occurs, and has some understanding of the problems within affected communities. Neighbourhood policing remains at the heart of its service, and in this respect there is evidence of good practice. During 2015 the force reviewed the way in which it provides neighbourhood and response policing and in April 2016 launched a new way of working called Policing in Your Neighbourhood (PIYN). Safer Neighbourhood Teams (SNT) focus on neighbourhood problems and are made up of specialist police constables and police community support officers (PCSOs), all supervised by a police sergeant. The new model has resulted in fewer specialist officers working in dedicated teams, but working relationships with other public services such as community safety partnerships remain effective. Specialist neighbourhood officers are rarely taken away from their core roles to carry out other functions such as policing public events or football matches.

Area policing teams (APTs) are uniformed response teams working a 24/7 shift pattern. The APTs are based within local boroughs and work closely with the dedicated neighbourhood officers responding to calls for service, investigating crimes and tackling local anti-social behaviour. All of the borough-based officers (SNT and APT) are the responsibility of the neighbourhood inspector who is able to move resources to meet local demand and tackle the highest priority problems. The force has a dedicated team of anti-social behaviour specialists who are aligned to the three police divisions and led by the force anti-social behaviour manager. Each division has a community safety team, supervised by a police sergeant working with partners such as the local authority. They work on longer term crime prevention projects which might, for instance, have been set up to tackle drug or alcohol problems in a community. This structure is working effectively, as evidenced by the decrease in anti-social behaviour (see above).

However, the force has a limited understanding of the threats facing its communities. It does not have neighbourhood profiles which would provide much of that information, and the force does not have sufficient analytical resources to gather, collate and analyse the detailed information which is required to produce them. A missing person profile has recently been completed which includes analysis on the threats of child sexual exploitation to those missing children, but there has not been an assessment of other emerging threats such as human trafficking. Local areas do analyse lower level crime and anti-social behaviour trends to identify problem offenders or hotspots, and this informs local patrol plans for SNT and APT officers.

HMIC commissioned Ipsos MORI to conduct a survey of attitudes towards policing between July and August 2016. The survey indicated that there has been no change in public satisfaction with Surrey Police. Some 403 people were interviewed and 56 percent were very or fairly satisfied with local policing in their area. This was the same as 2015.<sup>3</sup>

### How does Surrey Police engage with the public?

Surrey Police communicates with the public in a number of ways but there is more that it could do to ensure that the voice of local people is heard, and that subsequent action is taken. The force has an effective daily task assignment system which ensures that incidents are prioritised appropriately according to the level of threat, harm and risk. There are also good arrangements in place with partners to ensure that at a local level the neighbourhood problems are prioritised appropriately and are dealt with. However, since the PIYN took effect in April 2016 the level of structured communication with the local community by neighbourhood officers has reduced significantly. Although the neighbourhood inspector maintains contact with local councillors, neighbourhood officers no longer routinely talk to local communities at meetings such as residents' associations, neighbourhood watches, parish meetings,

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> For further details, see annex A.

police panels or community events where there is no specific policing purpose. This means that there is no structured way for neighbourhood teams to find out what the community thinks the priorities should be. Priorities are set according to the views of the police and partners alone.

Communication does take place on a more informal, ad hoc basis. Officers speak to members of the Polish community and representatives from the local mosque, but this does not appear to influence neighbourhood priorities. There are other communication strategies in some neighbourhoods, but it is not clear what these achieve.

Surrey Police does make effective use of social media and the internet. Examples of this include using social media to announce that wanted suspects have been arrested, to tell the public about an anti-social behaviour awareness week, and to promote a domestic abuse awareness campaign. Other engagement projects include 'Street a Week', in which a specific street is leafleted with information about policing, and residents are encouraged to provide feedback. Again, however, there is no structured way of recording this feedback, and acting on it.

## How effectively do force actions and activities prevent crime and anti-social behaviour?

Effective forces use a range of options to prevent crime, tackle anti-social behaviour and keep people safe. They use structured approaches to solving local problems which aim to rid communities of criminal and anti-social behaviour. They also use a range of legal powers and specific tactics which vary depending on the situation. HMIC expects forces to review their activity as well as other sources of evidence in order to improve their ability to protect people over the long term.

### Does the force have a problem-solving approach?

Surrey Police uses a structured problem-solving approach to tackle some of its most problematic, 'chronic and enduring' crime, and anti-social behaviour. Problems are identified through the local task assignment meetings or reviews of incident logs by SNT officers to identify repeat locations or offenders. A record is kept on the force IT system NICHE and the SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment) model is used to inform the way that officers tackle the problem. The response to the problem is implemented based on the EPIC (Enforcement, Prevention, Intelligence and Communication) model.

Where a problem requires partner involvement, it is taken to the Community Incident Action Group (CIAG) for problematic individuals, or the Joint Action Group (JAG) for problematic locations. If the problem is adopted by partners at this meeting a record is created on a multi-agency information sharing system called SafetyNet. This enables contributing partners from relevant agencies to access, update and monitor progress towards agreed goals. We found good examples of this being done, with a

wide range of tactics having been adopted and documented on the system. The sixweekly CIAG review process ensures that work is reviewed regularly, and that risks are assessed regularly.

### Does the force use effective approaches and tactics to tackle crime and antisocial behaviour?

We saw evidence of the force effectively using a range of tactics to prevent crime and disorder. There is a well-established and effective dedicated anti-social behaviour team. The manager and seven anti-social behaviour specialists, each with an area responsibility, provide a high level of knowledge and experience to neighbourhood teams to help them to resolve local problems. The team takes an active role, and there are strong working relationships with principal partners. Tasks are co-ordinated and evidence is collected and prepared accurately. The anti-social behaviour team provided numerous examples of criminal behaviour orders (CBOs) and anti-social behaviour injunctions being used to change the behaviour of individuals. In addition, the team is starting to use these orders to tackle organised crime groups (OCGs). Five of the 54 current CBOs have been taken out against young OCG drug dealers.

Some examples of tackling anti-social behaviour showed the force working effectively with partners. In Guildford large groups of people were gathering around a shop selling so-called legal highs, and residents reported increased levels of anti-social behaviour. The police worked with the Town Rangers, Town Pastors, the licensing department of the local authority and security staff working in a local shop to resolve the problem, and the shop was closed down by using new legislation.

In another case, the inhabitants of two houses close to each other were involved in the possession and supply of drugs. There were numerous related anti-social behaviour problems such as fighting in the street, the use of foul and abusive language, drunk and disorderly behaviour and dogs being out of control. This blighted the daily lives of local residents, some of whom were vulnerable. The CIAG coordinated a multi-agency project that included the local council, (who were the landlords), social services and the police. This resulted in anti-social behaviour powers being used to close the premises and evict the offenders. Victims were supported, and were re-housed where necessary.

## Does the force use evidence of best practice and its own learning to improve the service to the public?

The force does some limited sharing of good practice and learning. Anti-social behaviour practitioner events and community safety forums are now being used to try and share good work and ideas and achieve consistent working practices across agencies. These need to be developed further so that the force and its partners can establish 'what works'. The anti-social behaviour practitioners' event is held three times a year and the most recent event focused on sharing ideas and good practice

about the needs of victims. There is also a public website shared between the police and the council, Surreycommunitysafety.org.uk, which is used to promote consistent messages to the public during joint projects. The force and its partners would benefit by carrying out formal evaluations of the problem-solving activity it carries out in the neighbourhoods.

Force-level governance and scrutiny is provided by a senior anti-social behaviour group, which identified that there is at present no direct referral mechanism to support victims of anti-social behaviour when no specific crime has been recorded. Funding has recently been agreed by the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner (OPCC) and from April 2017 there will be a support service available for victims of anti-social behaviour for the whole of Surrey.

### **Summary of findings**



Good

Surrey Police is good at preventing crime, tackling anti-social behaviour and keeping people safe. It is committed to keeping neighbourhood policing at the heart of its service. Specialist neighbourhood officers are rarely taken away from their core roles to carry out other functions such as policing public order or football matches.

The force is good at addressing some of its most problematic, 'chronic and enduring' crime and anti-social behaviour problems. It uses a structured problem-solving approach, employing a range of tactics to prevent crime and disorder. It works well with partner agencies and has a well-established and effective anti-social behaviour team. We found numerous examples of the force and its partners tackling crime and disorder effectively.

However, the force does not do enough to understand the threats facing vulnerable communities. It does not have the neighbourhood profiles which would provide much of that information. There is some good ad hoc engagement by neighbourhood officers, but the force should communicate with the public in a more structured way.

### Areas for improvement

- The force should work with local people and partner organisations to improve its understanding of local communities, including those which are harder to reach such as migrant communities or elderly people.
- The force should evaluate and share effective practice routinely, both internally and with partners, continually to improve its approach to the prevention of crime and anti-social behaviour.

## How effective is the force at investigating crime and reducing re-offending?

When a crime occurs, the public must have confidence that the police will investigate it effectively, take seriously their concerns as victims, and bring offenders to justice. To be effective, investigations should be well planned and supervised, based on approved practice, and carried out by appropriately-trained staff. In co-operation with other organisations, forces must also manage the risk posed by those who are identified as being the most prolific or dangerous offenders, to minimise the chances of continued harm to individuals and communities.

### How well does the force bring offenders to justice?

Since April 2014, police forces in England and Wales have been required to record how investigations are concluded in a new way, known as 'outcomes'. Replacing what was known as 'detections', the outcomes framework gives a fuller picture of the work the police do to investigate and resolve crime and over time all crimes will be assigned an outcome. The broader outcomes framework (currently containing 21 different types of outcomes) is designed to support police officers in using their professional judgment to ensure a just and timely resolution. The resolution should reflect the harm caused to the victim, the seriousness of the offending behaviour, the impact on the community and deter future offending.

Outcomes are likely to differ from force to force for various reasons. Forces face a different mix of crime types in their policing areas, so the outcomes they assign will also vary depending on the nature of the crime. Certain offences are more likely to be concluded without offenders being prosecuted; typically these include types of crime such as cannabis misuse. If this type of crime is particularly prevalent in the force then it is likely that the level of 'cannabis/khat<sup>4</sup> warning' outcomes would be greater. Other offences such as those involving domestic abuse or serious sexual offences, are unlikely to result in a high usage of the 'cautions' outcome.

The frequency of outcomes may also reflect the force's policing priorities. For example, some forces work hard with partners to ensure that first time and low-level offenders are channelled away from the criminal justice system. In these areas locally-based community resolutions are likely to be more prevalent than elsewhere.

It is also important to understand that not all of the crimes recorded in the year will have been assigned an outcome as some will still be under investigation. For some crime types such as sexual offences, the delay between a crime being recorded and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> A plant native to Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, the leaves of which are frequently chewed as a stimulant. The possession and supply of khat became a criminal offence in England and Wales in 2014.

an outcome being assigned may be particularly pronounced, as these may involve complex and lengthy investigations.

Figure 4: Proportion of outcomes assigned to offences recorded in Surrey Police, in 12 months to 30 June 2016, by outcome type<sup>5,6</sup>

Outcome number	Outcome type / group	Surrey Police	England and Wales
1	Charged/Summonsed	7.9	12.1
4	Taken into consideration	0.0	0.2
	Out-of-court (formal)	3.2	3.2
2	Caution - youths	0.1	0.4
3	Caution - adults	2.3	2.3
6	Penalty Notices for Disorder	0.8	0.6
	Out-of-court (informal)	5.4	3.6
7	Cannabis/Khat warning	0.8	0.9
8	Community Resolution	4.6	2.8
*	Prosecution prevented or not in the public interest	2.1	1.8
	Evidential difficulties (victim supports police action)		
15	Suspectidentified	16.8	8.3
	Evidential difficulties (victim does not support police action)	11.1	13.8
16	Suspectidentified	8.8	10.6
14	Suspect not identified	2.3	3.2
18	Investigation complete – no suspect identified	43.4	47.4
20	Action undertaken by another body / agency	0.6	0.6
21	Further investigation to support formal action not in the public interest	0.0	0.1
	Total offences assigned an outcome	90.5	91.3
	Not yet assigned an outcome	9.5	8.7
	Total	100.00	100.00

\*Includes the following outcome types: Offender died, Not in public interest (CPS),
Prosecution prevented – suspect under age, Prosecution prevented – suspect too ill,
Prosecution prevented – victim/key witness dead/too ill, Prosecution time limit expired

Source: Home Office crime outcomes data For further information about these data, please see annex A

<sup>5</sup> Dorset Police is excluded from the table. Therefore figures for England and Wales will differ from those published by the Home Office. For further details see annex A.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> 'Taken into consideration' is when an offender admits committing other offences in the course of sentencing proceedings and requests those other offences to be taken into consideration.

In the 12 months to 30 June 2016, Surrey Police's use of 'evidential difficulties (victim supports police action)' was among the highest in England and Wales. Its use of 'charged/summonsed' was among the lowest in England and Wales. However, any interpretation of outcomes should take into account that outcomes will vary dependent on the crime types that occur in each force area, and how it deals with offenders for different crimes.

The force has a lower proportion (7.9 percent) of charge/summons outcomes assigned to offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016, than the proportion for England and Wales (12.1 percent) as a whole. There is a higher proportion of offences recorded given the outcome of evidential difficulties where a suspect is identified and the victim supports action (16.8 percent), compared to 8.3 percent across England and Wales. The force also has 5.4 percent of offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016 given an informally out of court outcome compared to an England and Wales proportion of 3.6 percent. This means that compared to England and Wales fewer cases are formally passing through the criminal justice systems.

### How effective is the force's initial investigative response?

The initial investigative response is critical for an effective investigation. From the moment victims and witnesses make contact with the police the investigative process should start, so that accurate information and evidence can be gathered. It is important that forces record evidence as soon as possible after a crime. The longer it takes for evidence-recording to begin, the more likely it is that evidence will be destroyed, damaged or lost. Recording this evidence is usually the responsibility of the first officer who attends the scene. After the officer has completed this initial investigation the case may be handed over to a different police officer or team in the force. This process must ensure that the right people with the right skills investigate the right crimes.

#### **Control room response**

The assessment of calls and the immediate response to incidents is appropriate in most cases. Contact centre and control room staff have a good knowledge of the force's investigative framework and the way that this should be used to assess calls and refer them for further action. A broad range of offences are appropriately investigated by police staff and police constable investigators in the Telephone Investigation Bureau (TIB) and the Demand Reduction Team (DRT) including some fraud, public order offences such as affray, and theft from motor vehicles. In making decisions about allocating resources, staff use the National Decision Model (NDM) and THRIVE and – if an incident involves a child – a risk assessment method known as SNAPPER. This prompts the call-taker to identify any risk to a child where a call is not likely to need the attendance of an officer. Since our last PEEL Effectiveness

inspection in 2015 additional training has been provided to help improve the understanding which officers and staff have of vulnerability.

The SNAPPER risk assessment takes time to complete, with call times of up to 45 minutes. As previously reported in our 2016 efficiency inspection, this has resulted in 30 percent of 101 calls not being answered within 60 seconds. By October 2016 this had been reduced to 20 percent, which indicates that the force has been working hard to tackle the problem.

#### How well do response officers investigate?

In HMIC's 2015 effectiveness inspection we recommended that the force should improve the timeliness and consistency of its investigations, and that it should ensure that there is regular supervision to check quality and progress. In 2016 we found that the force has made some progress, but there is still more to do to bring standards to a satisfactory level.

We saw good targeted oversight of cases in Reigate, where investigative coaches focus their attention on officers and staff who have been identified as requiring additional support. This approach should be used across the force, and the investigative coaches could also be used to provide more structured support to the sergeants who manage APT officers investigating lower level crimes.

An increase in the number of supervisors in the Safeguarding Investigation Units (SIU) and the introduction of the Public Protection Standards Team (PPST) means there is better supervision of more serious and complex cases. However, there is not enough supervision of less serious crime investigations. The force has provided training and mentoring, as well as employing agency staff, who are retired investigators, to support officers. However some frontline staff still do not have the capability to investigate some crimes which are allocated to them. Many supervisors do not review or endorse crime investigations or are not sufficiently trained to do so.

HMIC reviewed 60 police case files across crime types for: robbery, common assault (flagged as domestic abuse), grievous bodily harm (GBH), stalking, harassment, rape and domestic burglary. Files were randomly selected from crimes recorded between 1 January 2016 and 31 March 2016 and were assessed against several criteria. Due to the small sample size of cases selected, we have not used results from the file review as the sole basis for assessing individual force performance but alongside other evidence gathered.

In our review of crime files a quarter of investigations had ineffective or no recorded supervisory oversight. The quality of arrest handover packages between officers is also of a poor quality which means that further work is often required before a suspect can be interviewed or charged. In the majority of cases the appropriate officer dealt with the crime. However, we found some evidence of cases being allocated to officers who had not been trained to deal with them. For example, an

APT officer was investigating a protracted action fraud case with multiple victims across the country which should have been dealt with by a qualified detective constable.

### How effective is the force's subsequent investigation?

Every day police forces across England and Wales investigate a wide range of crimes. These range from non-complex crimes such as some burglary and assault cases through to complex and sensitive investigations such as rape and murder. HMIC referred to national standards and best practice in examining how well forces allocate and investigate the full range of crimes, including how officers and staff can gather evidence to support investigations. These include the more traditional forensics, such as taking fingerprints, as well as more recently developed techniques like gathering digital evidence from mobile telephones or computers to find evidence of online abuse.

### Quality of the investigation

The quality of Surrey Police's crime investigations is variable, and needs improvement. Under the new model, APT officers investigate low-level crimes from the point of initial reporting through to finalisation. This is a significant change to the way the force has previously operated, and some staff have found it easier to adapt than others. APT officers are now generally investigating between five and ten cases of lower level crime, such as criminal damage and theft, at any one time. Before the PIYN model was introduced in April 2016, APT officers did not investigate crimes, they simply made an arrest or took the initial crime report and handed it over to investigation teams.

Some criminal investigation department (CID) and SIU staff are regularly working additional hours before the start of duty in order to keep on top of their workloads, sometimes without being paid for this work. Some APT officers are also changing shift times to undertake investigative work when their normal shift patterns do not allow time for it. This is particularly the case in Reigate where workloads are higher than in the rest of the force. Officers told us that stress levels were high, and that they had colleagues who were on sick leave as a result.

As reported in previous HMIC inspections in 2016, APTs are still not fully staffed and carry a number of vacancies. SIUs and the CID do not have the number of detective constables they need to manage the workload. The force recognises this and is working hard to address it. The force reviewed the PIYN model before our inspection and made over 30 recommendations. It is too early to see whether those recommendations have led to improvements, but staff told us they were optimistic about the new model.

#### Support to investigations

In HMIC's 2015 effectiveness inspection we found that that the force needed to improve its ability to retrieve digital evidence in a timely and effective way. Since then, the force has invested in reducing its digital forensic backlog and its future plan ensures greater accessibility to technology for frontline staff. Five 'kiosk' machines have been placed in stations and departments, enabling staff to examine items such as mobile phones quickly while an offender is in custody. 124 staff have been trained to use the kiosks, and more training is planned. Although the backlog has been reduced significantly, at the time of inspection in October 2016 there was still delays of up to four months before some computers and phones were examined.

### **Supporting victims**

The force clearly intends to put victims at the centre of its investigations. For example, the chief constable's 'Plan on a Page' includes this as a force priority. However, victim satisfaction has fallen significantly in recent months, following the introduction of PIYN, and this is a cause for concern. Senior officers provide clear direction to the workforce on putting victims at the centre of an investigation, for example the chief constable's 'Plan on a Page' carries a straightforward message about this. Although victim satisfaction has fallen in recent months the force has been working successfully to tackle many other issues identified as requiring improvement by HMIC particularly in respect of safeguarding vulnerable people. This means that there are changes to many working practices which may have adversely affected the service the force provides to its communities.

In the 12 months to 30 June 2016, 80.1 percent of victims were satisfied with their whole experience with the police in Surrey. This is lower than the England and Wales victim satisfaction rate of 83.3 percent. This is a drop of 4.1 percentage points compared with the 12 months to 30 June 2015, when the figure for Surrey Police was 86 percent. The force has recognised this decline and through its review of the PIYN is working to identify and address the reasons for it.

There have been improvements in some areas of victim support. In HMIC's 2015 effectiveness inspection we found that the force needed to comply with its duties under the *Code of Practice for Victims of Crime*, in relation to Victim Personal Statements (VPS) and keeping victims informed about the progress of their cases. Officers and staff now have received training about the importance of complying with the code, including a module on VPS. The force monitors its compliance in respect of VPS in two ways. It has added a question to the victim satisfaction survey to ask specifically if a victim has been offered the opportunity to complete a VPS, and compliance is checked during the monthly rolling audits of crimes which are being investigated. The results of the survey and audits are given to supervisors, and they speak to officers who are not complying.

However, contact with victims is inconsistent. The force does not have an automated system to remind officers to make contact. As reported in our vulnerability re-visit in April 2016, officers are not always able to update victims on the progress of their cases because of shift patterns. For example, officers on a six-day shift pattern are only able to make personal contact on four out of ten days if they are working the early or late shift.

The new outcomes framework introduced in 2014 includes some outcomes where there were evidential difficulties, which had not previously been recorded. This was to gain an insight into the scale of crimes that the police could not progress further through the criminal justice process due to limited evidence. Furthermore, these outcomes can be thought of as an indicator for how effective the police are at working with victims and supporting them through investigative and judicial processes, as they record when victims are unwilling or unable to support continued investigations or when they have withdrawn their support for police action.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Evidential difficulties also includes where a suspect has been identified and the victim supports police action, but evidential difficulties prevent further action being taken.




Figure 5: Percentage of 'Evidential difficulties; victim does not support action' outcomes assigned to offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016, by force<sup>8,9</sup>

Source: Home Office crime outcomes data For further information about these data, please see annex A

For all offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016, Surrey Police recorded 11.1 percent as 'Evidential difficulties; victim does not support police action'. This compares with 13.8 percent for England and Wales over the same period. However, it should be noted that not all of the offences committed in the 12 months to 30 June 2016 were assigned an outcome and consequently, these figures are subject to change over time.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Percentages of evidential difficulties can be affected by the level of certain types of crime within a force, such as domestic abuse related offences.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Dorset Police is excluded from the graph. Therefore, figures for England and Wales will differ from those published by the Home Office. For further details see annex A.

### How effectively does the force reduce re-offending?

We assessed how well the force works with other policing authorities and other interested parties to identify vulnerable offenders and prevent them from reoffending, and how well it identifies and manages repeat, dangerous or sexual offenders.

#### How well does the force pursue suspects and offenders?

The force does have governance structures in place to manage offenders, but it must ensure that those offenders who pose the greatest risk of harm are targeted and pursued. Offenders who pose a risk to the public are monitored at daily meetings, and oversight of this process occurs at the fortnightly force crime performance board. However, in our 2015 effectiveness inspection we found that the force had the third lowest number of police national computer (PNC) circulations (that is the number of suspects who are wanted for offences they are suspected of having committed) in England and Wales, and that it was commonplace for the details of suspects not to be circulated until investigations and statements were almost complete. There has been little improvement in this respect. This year, the number of people wanted and circulated on PNC per 1,000 population in Surrey is below the rate for England and Wales. Officers and staff do not fully understand how the process should operate and the force needs to address this.

All suspects, including offenders from foreign countries, who are taken to a custody unit for offences (including immigration offences) have their personal details entered on the force IT system Niche. If a person is identified as a non European Union foreign national, his or her details are entered on a manual spreadsheet which is monitored by the force data bureau. However if the person is a European Union foreign national the details are automatically uploaded onto the force IT system - NICHE. That data is forwarded to ACRO for checks on overseas convictions to be completed. The results are returned to the divisional quality assurance team and detective sergeant for appropriate action to be taken. There is, however, no oversight of the process to ensure that the force takes robust action against foreign nationals residing illegally in the UK.

#### How well does the force protect the public from the most harmful offenders?

The force protects the public from the most harmful offenders with an Integrated Offender Management (IOM) scheme, but this is limited to very small numbers of offenders and should be extended where there is capacity to do so. For example, in Guildford, three police officers are responsible for 40 offenders (several of whom are in prison), and there should be capacity for more. The team currently works with just over 100 offenders in total, split across the three police divisions. However, the force is unable to assess how effective the scheme is as no evaluation has been carried

out. A proper assessment would help to identify an optimum size for a group of offenders and the type of offences that the force and its partners need to prioritise.

Approximately 25 percent of the offenders in the IOM are perpetrators of domestic abuse, but we saw no evidence of work specifically targeting this type of offending. A small number of offenders who are members of organised crime groups are being monitored under the scheme.

There is generally good information-sharing about offenders. Neighbourhood and APT staff are kept informed about the offenders on the IOM scheme through daily briefings. Where appropriate they are directed to arrest or obtain intelligence on them.

A member of the IOM team attends the daily task assignment meeting which ensures that those in the scheme are managed effectively, and that action is taken promptly when required. There is an effective working relationship between Surrey Police and Surrey and Sussex Probation Trust, and multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPAs) are good. Police and probation officers share the same offices and there are good information-sharing protocols in place. This means that intelligence and information is being shared in a timely way. There are good working relationships with the VISOR teams.

The force is well placed to reduce the risk posed by those who pose a danger to the public, including sex offenders. There are currently 842 registered sex offenders (RSOs) in Surrey, of whom 765 are currently living in the community. There are 15 officers who each supervise approximately 60 offenders. There is adequate supervision and intelligence support to reduce the likelihood of re-offending. Administrators ensure that staff visit RSOs regularly which means any changes in behaviour or circumstances are identified swiftly.

The force uses a range of powers to protect the public from sexual offenders. In the 12 months to 30 June 2016 the force issued 95 Sexual Harm Prevention Orders (SHPOs), 2 of which have been breached. There were also 6 breaches of Sexual Offence Prevention Orders (SOPOs) in the same time period. Preventative ancillary orders are also used effectively. Staff within the VISOR unit are notified when someone is charged with a sexual offence and they then discuss and advise the officer dealing with the case on the suitability of applying for a preventative order. There is a good working relationship with the force legal services department in order to ensure that the orders are worded correctly. Officers visit RSOs in order to check compliance with the orders. Conditions are entered on the police national computer and the force IT system, NICHE, and also regularly feature in briefings to officers and staff.

### **Summary of findings**



### Requires improvement

Surrey Police's approach to investigating crime and managing offenders requires improvement. This is consistent with the findings of HMIC's effectiveness inspections in 2014 and 2015, in which we also found that the way the force investigated offending required improvement.

Some progress has been made. Over the last 12 months there has been a reduction in the backlog of mobile phones and computers that need to be forensically examined and there has been an increase in specialist staff, and improved supervision in the SIUs. However, the quality of many investigations remains poor.

The force recognises that it needs to improve the standard of investigations of less serious crime and it is working hard to address this through increased training provision, employing agency staff to support officers, and mentoring. However, some frontline staff still do not have the skills to investigate some of the crimes which are allocated to them. In addition, some supervisors do not review and endorse crime investigations or they are insufficiently trained to do so. The quality of arrest handover packages between officers is also poor.

The PIYN model, implemented in April 2016, has made significant changes to how the force operates. The chief constable and his team are confident the changes will result in improvements in the longer term, and this view is supported by many officers and staff.

### **Areas for improvement**

- The force should ensure that all investigations are completed to a consistently good standard, and in a timely manner. There should be regular and active supervision of investigations to improve quality and progress.
- The force should improve its ability to retrieve digital evidence from mobile phones, computers and other electronic devices quickly enough to ensure that investigations are not delayed.
- The force should ensure that people who are circulated as being wanted on the police national computer, people who fail to appear on police bail, named and outstanding suspects, and suspects identified through forensic evidence are swiftly found and arrested.

 The force should consider widening its approach to integrated offender management to maximise its impact on reducing threat, harm and risk.
 There should be clear measures of success which enable the force to evaluate how effectively it is protecting the public from prolific and harmful offenders.

## How effective is the force at protecting those who are vulnerable from harm, and supporting victims?

Protecting the public, particularly those who are most vulnerable, is one of the most important duties placed on police forces. People can be vulnerable for many reasons and the extent of their vulnerability can change during the time they are in contact with the police. Last year HMIC had concerns about how well many forces were protecting those who were vulnerable. In this section of the report we set out how the force's performance has changed since last year.

#### Has the force improved since HMIC's 2015 vulnerability inspection?

In HMIC's 2015 vulnerability inspection we judged Surrey Police to be inadequate. As a result of that inspection HMIC re-visited the force in April 2016 to specifically report on the recommendations and areas for improvement that had been identified in 2015. We were pleased to see that there had been improvements in most of the weakest areas.

More staff have been allocated to public protection roles and there is a good governance and audit of cases. Staff have lower caseloads and better supervision.

The investigation of missing person investigations has improved significantly. A comprehensive assessment has been completed and staff understand the importance of assessing the risk thoroughly and taking appropriate safeguarding action. There is better supervision at daily management meetings and elsewhere.

The force has improved how it deals with child sexual exploitation (CSE). There is better training provision for all staff and a new CSE analyst in post. Control room and contact centre staff now have a better understanding of how to assess risk as a result of the training.

In this inspection we found that the force had continued to improve its response to dealing with vulnerable people. Staff have a renewed focus on safeguarding and protecting vulnerable people. The force has done impressive work in understanding the missing person problems in Surrey, and developing its response when a person goes missing.

## How effectively does the force identify those who are vulnerable and assess their level of risk and need?

In order to protect those who are vulnerable effectively forces need to understand comprehensively the scale of vulnerability in the communities they police. This requires forces to work with a range of communities, including those whose voices may not often be heard. It is important that forces understand fully what it means to be vulnerable, what might make someone vulnerable and that officers and staff who come into contact with the public can recognise this vulnerability. This means that forces can identify vulnerable people early on and can provide them with an appropriate service.

### **Understanding the risk**

Surrey Police has a good understanding of the nature and scale of vulnerability across the force area and it is a priority for the force. 'Protect vulnerable people' is included in the force's mission statement, and all staff are clear about their responsibility to assess and safeguard vulnerable people at the earliest opportunity. The force uses the definition from the National Police Chiefs' Council's guidance to define a vulnerable adult as, "Any person aged 18 years or over who is or may be in need of community care services by reason of mental, physical, or learning disability, age or illness AND is or may be unable to take care of him or herself or unable to protect him or herself against significant harm or exploitation."

With the support of its partners, the force has completed a comprehensive missing person profile which provides a broad understanding of the problems. For instance, it shows information on the people who go missing the most frequently and the locations they go missing from the most often. This enables the force to tackle the problem effectively, by getting to the root cause of the reasons why some people repeatedly go missing. The force no longer uses the lesser grade 'absent' category for a missing child, which means that an investigation takes place every time a child goes missing.

A child sexual exploitation (CSE) profile was completed in December 2015. It included data from the force and the local authority, but still requires data from health and education partners to provide a comprehensive understanding of the problem. Each of the three divisions now has a CSE coordinator and missing person coordinator, and the OPCC has recently funded a CSE analyst. Training has been provided to all operational officers and staff on CSE. Together, this means that the force has a far better understanding of this problem than it had a year ago.

The domestic abuse action plan is progressing well and the charity 'Safe Lives' has provided training to all frontline officers and staff to improve their understanding of the safeguarding problems which they should consider in a domestic abuse incident.

In the 12 months to 30 June 2016, 3.1 percent of incidents in Surrey were flagged to identify mental health concerns. This is in line with the rate in England and Wales of 2.4 percent. Between the hours of 4pm and midnight, seven days a week, a mental health professional works in the police contact centre. This professional is available to advise callers who are in crisis, or to support and advise officers who are dealing with mental health-related incidents. All APT officers and staff have received training on mental health.

Forces define a vulnerable victim in different ways. This is because there is not a standard requirement on forces to record whether a victim is vulnerable on crime recording systems. Some forces use the definition from the government's *Code of Practice for Victims of Crime*, <sup>10</sup> others use the definition referred to in ACPO guidance<sup>11</sup> and the remainder use their own definition.

Surrey Police uses the definition from the ACPO guidance and defines a vulnerable adult as:

"any person aged 18 years or over who is or may be in need of community care services by reason of mental, physical, or learning disability, age or illness AND is or may be unable to take care of him or herself or unable to protect him or herself against significant harm or exploitation"

Data returned by forces to HMIC show that in the 12 months to 30 June 2016, the proportion of crime recorded which involves a vulnerable victim varies considerably between forces, from 3.9 percent to 44.4 percent. For the 12 months to 30 June 2016, 5.6 percent of all recorded crime in Surrey was identified as having a vulnerable victim, which is below the England and Wales figure of 14.3 percent.

This difference may be explained by the fact that 'flags' on the IT systems identifying a vulnerable person are reliant on being entered manually as opposed to automatically by the IT system once a vulnerability has been identified. However, the force needs to reassure itself that all repeat vulnerable victims are being identified where appropriate.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Code of Practice for Victims of Crime, Ministry of Justice, 2013. Available from <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\_data/file/254459/code-of-practicevictims-of-crime.pdf">www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\_data/file/254459/code-of-practicevictims-of-crime.pdf</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> 4 The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) is now the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC). ACPO Guidance on Safeguarding and Investigating the Abuse of Vulnerable Adults, NPIA, 2012. Available from: <a href="www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/major-investigation-and-public-protection/vulnerable-adults/">www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/major-investigation-and-public-protection/vulnerable-adults/</a>




Figure 6: Percentage of police-recorded crime with a vulnerable victim identified, by force, for the 12 months to 30 June 2016<sup>12</sup>

Source: HMIC data return, Home Office data

For further information about these data, please see annex A

## How effectively does the force initially respond to vulnerable victims?

The initial work of officers responding to a vulnerable person is vital, because failure to carry out the correct actions may make future work with the victim or further investigation very difficult. This could be the first time victims have contacted the police after suffering years of victimisation or they may have had repeated contact with the police; either way, the response of officers is crucial. The initial response to a vulnerable victim must inspire confidence that the victim's concerns are being taken seriously as well as provide practical actions and support to keep the victim safe. The officer should also assess the risk to the victim at that moment and others in the same household, and collect sufficient information to support the longer-term response of the force and other partner organisations.

### Do officers assess risk correctly and keep victims safe?

The Home Office has shared domestic abuse related offences data, recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016, with HMIC. These are more recent figures than those previously published by the Office for National Statistics. These data shows that in

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> City of London, Devon and Cornwall, Essex, Gloucestershire and Lancashire forces were unable to provide data for recorded crimes with a vulnerable victim identified. Therefore, these forces' data are not included in the graph or in the calculation of the England and Wales rate.

the 12 months to 30 June 2016, police-recorded domestic abuse in Surrey increased by 16 percent compared with the 12 months to 31 March 2015. This compares with an increase of 23 percent across England and Wales. In the same period, police-recorded domestic abuse accounted for 12 percent of all police-recorded crime in Surrey, compared with 11 percent of all police-recorded crime across England and Wales.

The rate of arrest for domestic abuse offences can provide an indication of a force's approach to handling domestic abuse offenders. Although for the purpose of this calculation arrests are not directly tracked to offences, a high arrest rate may suggest that a force prioritises arrests for domestic abuse offenders over other potential forms of action (for further details, see annex A). HMIC has evaluated the arrest rate alongside other measures during our inspection process to understand how each force deals with domestic abuse overall.

In Surrey Police, for every 100 domestic abuse related offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016, there were 49 arrests made in the same period

90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 Dorset Suffolk Nottinghamshire Cheshire Cleveland Cumbria Bedfordshire **Nest Midlands** Northumbria South Yorkshire South Wales North Wales Kent **Northampton shire Dyfed-Powys** Hertfordshire **Jorth Yorkshire West Yorkshire** Wiltshire **Devon and Cornwall** Surrey Cambridgeshire Staffordshire Lancashire Norfolk Avon and Somerset Essex **Thames Valley** Merseyside Sussex Metropolitan Police **Narwickshire** -eicestershire Greater Manchester Gwent West Mercia Hampshire City of London England and Wales Surrey Police

Figure 7: Domestic abuse arrest rate (per 100 domestic abuse crimes), by force, for the 12 months to 30 June 2016<sup>13</sup>

Source: HMIC data return, Home Office data For further information about these data, please see annex A

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Derbyshire, Durham and Gloucestershire forces were not able to provide domestic abuse arrest data. Therefore, these forces' data are not included in the graph or in the calculation of the England and Wales rate.

The force responds well to vulnerable people based on its assessment of vulnerability and risk at the initial point of contact. Emergency calls and prompt calls (those that should be responded to within an hour) are generally allocated appropriately. The telephone Investigation Bureau (TIB) and Demand Reduction Team (DRT), both located in the contact centre, deal with less urgent calls. During our inspection we reviewed a number of cases that the teams had dealt with, and all had been assessed appropriately regarding any safeguarding or vulnerability concerns.

Vulnerable victims are identified in the contact centre with operators applying the NDM and asking questions in a structured way called the THRIVE model, or the SNAPPER risk assessment tool which is used for any person under the age of 18 or an adult who might be considered vulnerable in some way. There is a thorough understanding of assessing vulnerability, because of the training given to contact centre and control room officers and staff by the PPST.

The DRT in the control room carries out additional supervision and checking processes and the control room has a 24/7 intelligence research capability. This means that when officers attend incidents more thorough checks of police systems can be made, which makes subsequent risk assessments and safeguarding more informed.

However, improvements to its IT systems would give Surrey Police a more robust way of identifying repeat victims. The command and control system does not identify a repeat victim by name alone when the initial call is received, although it can identify a repeat location of a caller. This means that call takers sometimes have to make manual searches to check if a caller is a repeat victim if a 'flag' has not been manually entered on the system or the person is calling from a different location. The force is aware of this longstanding problem and is working to find a solution.

In HMIC's 2015 vulnerability inspection we reported that the force's response to missing children was a cause of concern. The force had a poor understanding of the scale and nature of the problem as it had only partially analysed information held by itself and partner agencies. Staff were not always clear about the correct process, or who was responsible for the investigation. Risk-assessments were not carried out consistently and supervisors had a poor understanding of risk factors when completing and reviewing risk-assessments. This led to inconsistent decisions and inappropriate grading.

The force has responded positively to the recommendations we made in 2015. Governance, partnership working and data sharing has improved. An interim missing person profile was published in November 2016 and the full document was scheduled for December 2016. The charity 'Missing' now routinely carries out interviews with children who have been found after they have gone missing, and there is far closer scrutiny at daily tasking meetings to ensure that comprehensive

investigations take place for missing people deemed as high risk. Officers and staff, including supervisors, have better awareness of their responsibilities when they are investigating a report of a missing person.

To support the multi-agency missing and exploited children conferences (MAECC) which take place on division every four weeks, the force has recently created a multi-agency 'Children's Panel' which includes representatives from children's services, and the child and adolescent mental health services (CAMHS). Approximately 25 cases of children who have been reported missing in the previous week are discussed to ensure that all appropriate actions have been taken. In addition, each division now has over 40 trigger plans that are used when a known child, who regularly goes missing, is reported to the contact centre.

The force has established good working arrangements with its partners, and the newly created multi-agency safeguarding hub (MASH) opened before the scheduled date. As processes start to become more familiar to all agencies the police and partners may wish to consider using the unit for strategy meetings to help manage cases in order to safeguard vulnerable people in a more efficient way.

# How effectively does the force investigate offences involving vulnerable victims and work with external partners to keep victims safe?

Those who are vulnerable often have complex and multiple needs that a police response alone cannot always meet. They may need support with housing, access to mental health services or support from social services. Nonetheless, the police still have an important responsibility to keep victims safe and investigate crimes. These crimes can be serious and complex (such as rape or violent offences). Their victims may appear to be reluctant to support the work of the police, often because they are being controlled by the perpetrator (such as victims of domestic abuse or child sexual exploitation).

Since we carried out our PEEL vulnerability inspection in 2015, Surrey Police has improved its ability to investigate offences involving vulnerable victims and its ability to work with external partners. It has increased its investment in safeguarding, with additional officers, staff and supervisors within the SIUs, the paedophile online investigation unit (POLIT) and MASH. Additional training has been provided across the force, emphasising that safeguarding is not simply the responsibility of specialist teams. The PPST supports officers and supervisors who are doing safeguarding and investigative work and this has contributed to improved investigative practice.

However, as discussed above, the workloads of some SIU staff are so high that they are unmanageable, particularly in Reigate. Despite the recruitment drive, the SIUs are still not fully staffed. The force is working hard through recruitment processes to solve this problem.

The force has yet to introduce body-worn video for its officers. It is missing an opportunity to obtain first-hand evidence at the scene of many incidents including domestic abuse, because video increases the likelihood of securing better evidence and subsequently improves the quality of an investigation.

#### Victims of domestic abuse

The force has assessed the problem of domestic abuse across the county, and made several recommendations for action, including training for frontline officers. The force has undertaken a number of projects to improve its response, but it still needs to improve its understanding of the reasons for a reduction in arrest rates and then take the necessary action.

In the 12 months to 30 June 2016, Surrey's domestic abuse arrest rate was 49.5 percent, which is below the England and Wales rate of 51.3 percent. This is a 10.2 percentage point decrease compared to the 59.6 percent arrest rate in the 12 months to March 2015. Also, the force's charged/summonsed rate in the 12 months to the June 2016 was 20 percent compared to the England and Wales figure of 23.3 percent. The force was also unable to provide data on the number of domestic abuse-related calls per 1000 population, which means it cannot fully understand the scale of the problem. As discussed above, the force is unable to identify repeat victims (including domestic abuse) on its command and control system. There are manual systems in place for operators to check, but there is the potential for repeat victims not to be identified at the first point of contact.

In April 2015, the Home Office began collecting information from the police on whether recorded offences were related to domestic abuse. Crimes are identified by the police as domestic abuse related if the offence meets the government definition of domestic violence and abuse.<sup>14</sup>

The rate of outcomes recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016 for domestic abuse offences is shown in figure 8. Domestic abuse crimes used in this calculation are not necessarily those to which the outcomes have been assigned and are only linked by the fact that they both occur in the 12 months to 30 June 2016. Therefore, direct comparisons should not be made between general outcomes in figure 4, where each crime is linked to its associated outcome (for further details see annex A).

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Any incident or pattern of incidents of controlling, coercive or threatening behaviour, violence or abuse between those aged 16 or over who are or have been intimate partners or family members regardless of gender or sexuality.

Figure 8: Rate of outcomes recorded in 12 months to 30 June 2016 for domestic-related offences in Surrey Police<sup>15</sup>

Outcome type / group	Surrey Police	England and Wales
Charged / Summonsed	20.0	23.2
Caution – adults	7.0	5.6
Caution – youths	0.1	0.3
Community resolution	5.6	1.4
Evidential difficulties prevent further action; victim supports police action	40.1	24.1
Evidential difficulties prevent further action; victim does not support police action	32.3	35.4

Source: HMIC data return, Home Office data

For further information about these data, please see annex A

In the 12 months to 30 June 2016, Surrey Police's use of 'community resolution' and 'evidential difficulties prevent further action; victim supports police action' was among the highest in England and Wales in cases with identified domestic abuse. However, any interpretation of outcomes should take into account that outcomes will vary dependent on the crime types that occur in each force area, and how it deals with offenders for different crimes.

Domestic abuse incidents assessed as standard risk are dealt with by APT officers and those of medium and high risk by SIU staff. All domestic abuse and child abuse investigations are reviewed by a supervisor in the SIU to ensure that the risk assessment is correct and there are no 'hidden crimes' that should be investigated and to ensure that police and / or other public services act on any relevant intelligence.

Domestic abuse prevention notices (DVPN) and domestic abuse prevention orders (DVPO) are used effectively. In the 12 months to 30 June 2016, 162 DVPNs had been issued and 138 DVPOs granted at court. These are monitored to ensure that enforcement action is taken when necessary. All operational staff are trained in when and how these powers should be used. Training also covers the 'voice of the child', and this approach is also emphasised by the CHECK (child, household, environment, culprit, and knowledge) assessment and DASH risk-assessment that officers are required to complete at the scene of a domestic abuse incident.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Dorset Police and Nottinghamshire Police were unable to submit domestic abuse outcomes data. Therefore, these forces' data are not included in the graph or in the calculation of the England and Wales rate.

The force has an improved concentration on domestic abuse. Evidence for this includes the review of domestic abuse investigations, as part of the domestic abuse action plan, better completion of DASH forms, and additional training, provided by 'Safe Lives', about domestic abuse. There are also domestic abuse mentors who give additional support and guidance.

### **Summary of findings**



Good

Since our vulnerability inspection in 2015, Surrey Police has made a huge effort to improve its response to vulnerable people. The force now has a good understanding of the nature and scale of vulnerability across the force area. Officers and staff are aware of their responsibility to assess and safeguard vulnerable people at the earliest opportunity, and the initial assessment process is good. There is improved governance, partnership working and data sharing and dissemination. A missing person profile is being published and there is considerable investment in safeguarding through additional officers, staff and supervisors within specialist public protection teams. Additional training has been provided across the force to emphasise that safeguarding is not simply the role of specialist teams.

There is still room for improvement, however. The force is still unable to identify a repeat victim by name alone when the initial call is received. Also, the domestic abuse arrest rate is in line with the England and Wales rate but the force itself has seen a 10.1 percentage point fall in the 12 months to 30 June 2016 compared to the 12 months to 31 March 2016. The force needs to improve its understanding of the reasons for this and take appropriate action.

#### **Areas for improvement**

- The force should ensure that it can identify repeat victims (including domestic abuse victims) when an initial call is received, so that the assessment of risk can be identified at the earliest opportunity.
- The force should improve its understanding of the reasons for the declining domestic abuse arrest and charge/summons rate and take appropriate action to address it.

# How effective is the force at tackling serious and organised crime?

Serious and organised crime poses a threat to the public across the whole of the UK and beyond. Individuals, communities and businesses feel its damaging effects. Police forces have a critical role in tackling serious and organised crime alongside regional organised crime units (ROCUs), the National Crime Agency (NCA) and other partner organisations. Police forces that are effective in this area of policing tackle serious and organised crime not just by prosecuting offenders, but by disrupting and preventing organised criminality at a local level.

# How effectively does the force understand the threat and risk posed by serious and organised crime?

In order to tackle serious and organised crime effectively forces must first have a good understanding of the threats it poses to their communities. Forces should be using a range of intelligence (not just from the police but also from other partner organisations) to understand threats and risks, from traditional organised crime such as drug dealing and money laundering to the more recently-understood threats such as cyber-crime and child sexual exploitation.

Surrey Police has improved its understanding of the threat posed by serious and organised crime (SOC) since our 2015 effectiveness inspection, but still needs to do more to understand its nature fully, and to understand the impact it has in local communities. The force has completed new problem profiles on modern-day slavery, domestic abuse, child sexual exploitation and cyber-crime. These profiles are improving and the community safety partnership has provided some data to enhance them. The force recognises that data from other organisations (such as health and education) will further improve its understanding of the threats from SOC. We found effective methods in place to collect and assess intelligence. This informs the force's strategic threat and risk assessment, allowing it to develop an effective plan to target its resources and priority areas. As at 1 July 2016, Surrey Police was actively disrupting, investigating or monitoring 34 organised crime groups (OCGs) per one million of the population. This compares to 46 OCGs per one million of the population across England and Wales.

In HMIC's 2015 effectiveness inspection we identified that the force was not consistently applying the correct procedures for organised crime groups (OCGs) in line with national standards, and the force could not accurately provide us with the correct data about the exact number of recorded OCGs. This has now been addressed and the force has a better system in place for managing and monitoring its current OCGs. In the last year 60 percent of OCGs have been archived, and while that number is above the rate for England and Wales it has provided the force with a

far clearer picture of the OCGs which cause the most harm in its communities. OCGs are now mapped, assessed, and reviewed using national guidance and archived appropriately.

OCGs are also included in task-assignment processes across the force, and intelligence officers have a good understanding of how best to gather intelligence from police and law enforcement agencies.




Figure 9: Organised crime groups per one million population, by force, as at 1 July 2016<sup>16</sup>


Source: HMIC data return

For further information about these data, please see annex A

Forces categorise OCGs by the predominant form of criminal activity in which the group is involved. Although OCGs are likely to be involved in multiple forms of criminality (for example groups supplying drugs may also be supplying firearms and be involved in money laundering), this indicates their most common characteristic. 'Drug activity' was the most common predominant crime type of the OCGs managed by Surrey Police as at 1 July 2016. This was also the most common OCG crime type recorded by all forces in England and Wales.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> City of London Police data have been removed from the chart and the England and Wales rate as its OCG data are not comparable with other forces due to size and its wider national remit.

Figure 10: Active organised crime groups by predominant crime type in Surrey, as at 1 July 2016



Source: HMIC data return

Note: Figures may not sum to 100 percent due to rounding. For further information about these data, please see annex A.

For example, 20 percent of active OCGs in Surrey are predominantly involved in organised theft and 15 percent are involved in specialist money laundering. There are 44 people who may be involved in street gangs who it handles as part of its OCG work.

# How effectively does the force respond to serious and organised crime?

An effective force will pursue and prosecute offenders and disrupt organised criminality at a local level. The force will use specialist capabilities, both in the force and at regional level, and non-specialist capabilities such as its neighbourhood teams. While it can be complex for a force to assess the success of its actions against serious and organised crime, it is important that the force understands the extent to which it disrupts this crime and reduces harm.

Surrey Police responds well to serious and organised crime. In conjunction with Sussex Police it has a serious organised crime partnership steering group which is chaired by the office of the Police and crime commissioner (PCC) and meets every six months. Police representatives and staff from local councils attend the group. It is not clear what level of scrutiny this board holds and the effect it has. The PCC is clearly committed to tackling serious and organised crime and has funded an analyst specifically to provide the force with a comprehensive analysis of CSE.

The force uses neighbourhood officers effectively to disrupt, dismantle and investigate OCGs. These officers are well briefed and play a regular and active part in collecting intelligence about OCGs in their areas and help to disrupt criminal activity. In our 2015 effectiveness inspection we identified that the force needed to enhance its local response to organised crime groups by ensuring that safer neighbourhood teams play a routine, active part in collecting intelligence and disrupting the activity of OCGs. We were pleased to find during this inspection that neighbourhood officers now have a good knowledge of OCGs and are involved in disrupting their activity. They regularly receive briefings about OCGs, and there is prominent display of 'OCGs on a page' in the APT and Intelligence offices. A neighbourhood officer explained his involvement in Operation Washington targeting an OCG and how he had taken safeguarding action to protect a vulnerable person whose house was being used by drug dealers.

All active OCG investigations are co-ordinated through a management plan based on the 4Ps approach (prevent, pursue, protect, prepare) set out in the national serious and organised crime strategy. More could be done on the 'prepare' and 'protect' strands which means the focus is very much on 'pursuing' OCGs. The management plans demonstrate the use of disruption tactics using partner agencies.

An assistant chief constable (ACC) in Surrey Police has responsibility for serious and organised crime across both Surrey and Sussex forces. The ACC also attends regional meetings hosted by SEROCU which provides both forces, as well as other forces in the region, with a consistent response to serious and organised crime. In Surrey the ACC is working with partner organisations to develop a community safety partnership board which will start work in December 2016. This will enable force problems to be raised to a partnership level and means that Surrey Police can jointly tackle priority concerns in a co-ordinated way across all organisations.

There is a four weekly joint force tasking meeting, chaired by the ACC, and includes examination of progress against some long standing OCGs. There are also fortnightly tasking meetings held on the three separate divisions. This meeting is in its infancy and HMIC is encouraged to see partners involved. During our inspection we saw staff from immigration enforcement in attendance. There are plans to involve more partner agencies.

In addition to the specialist resources available through the South East Regional Organised Crime Unit (SEROCU), Surrey Police maintains its own serious and organised crime unit which supports regional resources and provides additional capacity for the county in areas such as surveillance, cyber-crime and asset recovery. The SEROCU does not have capacity to assist in dealing with lower level criminality such as burglary offences and therefore the force uses its own resources to deal with such matters. An HMIC recommendation made in a previous report required Surrey Police in conjunction with its partners in SEROCU to produce an action plan by June 2016. Together with Thames Valley, Hampshire and Sussex forces, Surrey Police has been working together to produce that plan to improve its collaboration arrangements. The current action plan, however, is more a structured review of current arrangements with recommendations for actions that are expected to be agreed by December 2016. The force needs to ensure that the plan is agreed with the other forces and actions addressed appropriately.

We found several successful operations aimed at tackling OCGs both within the force area and across boundaries with other forces such as Hampshire, Thames Valley and Sussex. Surrey Police uses disruption tactics that draw upon the legislative powers of partner organisations to respond to serious and organised crime effectively. For instance, Operation Yew in North Surrey where criminal behaviour orders (CBOs) were obtained to disrupt a drugs OCG, and Operation Washington again in North Surrey where anti-social behaviour legislation and licensing offences were considered involving another drugs OCG around a public house. In Reigate information was shared with the local council to target successfully OCG members who were committing housing frauds.

Surrey Police made 18.0 referrals for every 100 OCGs (active and archived between 1 January 2016 to 30 June 2016) to the Government Agency Intelligence Network (GAIN) in the 12 months to 30 June 2016. This is below the rate of 26.3 percent for England and Wales. HMIC identified during the inspection that LROs have knowledge of GAIN and proactively make referrals, but more could be done to ensure that the process is accepted and understood by everyone in the force.

Surrey Police obtains good specialist support from SEROCU to disrupt and dismantle organised crime effectively. Operation Hickory targeted an Albanian OCG. Members of the OCG had entered the United Kingdom, and their criminality involved supplying drugs and using false documents. The GAIN network, immigration and environmental health departments were engaged to build the intelligence picture and 20 suspects were arrested. With the strong links this group had with Sussex Police and the Metropolitan Police Service, the OCG was well managed by the SEROCU.

The force operates a review process for OCGs. There is a quarterly meeting for the specialist crime command teams across both Sussex and Surrey forces which reviews the progress that has been made. Despite the number of operations carried out to dismantle OCGs the force does not measure the impact of the work which has

been done to disrupt them. As highlighted earlier in this report the force and its partners have limited analytical capacity and this means that they cannot fully understand whether the tactics employed are effective. There is also no structured way in which the force learns from what works and what does not.

# How effectively does the force prevent serious and organised crime?

A force that effectively tackles serious and organised crime needs to be able to stop people being drawn in to this crime. Many of these people may be vulnerable and already involved in gang and youth violence. It should also be using a range of approaches and powers to prevent those known criminals continuing to cause harm. HMIC expects a force's approach to prevention to be a significant element of its overall strategy to tackle the harm that serious and organised crime causes communities.

Surrey Police takes some steps to prevent serious and organised crime but recognises there is more it could do. The force is above the England and Wales rate for the number of serious and organised crime prevention orders it has applied for per 100 mapped OCGs in the 12 months to 30 June 2016 with 38.6 compared to 15.6 for England and Wales as a whole. The force makes good use of ancillary orders such as CBOs and acceptable behaviour contracts to help prevent serious and organised crime which is supported by the anti-social behaviour manager being an active member of the SOC steering group.

We found limited evidence of the force trying to deter young people being drawn into organised crime but the force is establishing a new MASH and is funding a dedicated analyst. This role will examine data on vulnerable children and those linked to OCGs, and will enable the force and its partner organisations to target those young people who are at risk of harm as a result of being linked to an OCG.

The integrated offender management scheme is used to manage a small number of offenders to help prevent serious and organised crime. These offenders receive targeted police and partner monitoring and enforcement where appropriate.

The force is taking steps to improve its understanding of emerging threats such as those being experienced in the prison system. Each of the seven prisons in the Surrey and Sussex areas has seen an increase in violence and drug supply. Prison intelligence officers visit regularly and discuss with the prison governor how OCGs are managed within the prison system and how the two organisations can ensure that there is an effective intelligence flow so that a prisoner linked to an OCG is managed in prison, and also in preparation for release.

The force communicates messages to the public about successful operations and campaigns to prevent serious and organised crime. It has a clear communication plan to raise awareness of serious and organised crime and the role the whole organisation has in tackling this area of criminality. It uses press and social media to publicise campaigns, and successes which it has achieved. A good example included Operation Edisto which involved a fraud carried out by couriers. To support communication with elderly and vulnerable victims the force worked closely with pharmacies, and gave them crime prevention information which was included with prescriptions when they were dispensed.

### **Summary of findings**



Good

Surrey Police has a better understanding of the threats posed to its communities by serious and organised crime since our 2015 effectiveness inspection, but still has more to do. Local profiles created for each of the three divisions include a sound understanding of emerging and traditional serious and organised crime threats, but contain limited intelligence and information from partnership agencies such as health and education.

The force has improved greatly its mapping of organised crime groups (OCGs) in the last year and has a much clearer understanding of the threats and risks posed by those OCGs that cause the most harm.

Surrey Police responds well to serious and organised crime, and neighbourhood officers are used effectively to help the disruption, dismantling and investigation of OCGs. They are well-briefed and play a regular and active part in collecting intelligence about OCGs in their areas. There are effective working relationships with the anti-social behaviour team, and these relationships result in good use of ancillary orders such as criminal behaviour orders.

The force obtains specialist support from South East Regional Organised Crime Group and has carried out several successful operations to target OCGs. However, the force does not measure the impact of the activity it carries out to disrupt OCGs or share learning systematically to improve its effectiveness.

#### **Areas for improvement**

- The force should further develop its serious and organised local crime profiles in conjunction with partner organisations to enhance its understanding of the threat posed by serious and organised crime and inform joint activity aimed at reducing this threat.
- The force should take steps to identify those people who are at risk of being drawn into serious and organised crime, and ensure that preventative projects are put in place with partner organisations to deter them from offending.
- The force should improve its understanding, across the government's national 4P framework, of the impact of its activity against serious and organised crime, and ensure that it learns from experience to maximise the force's disruptive effect on this activity.

### How effective are the force's specialist capabilities?

Some complex threats require both a specialist capability and forces to work together to respond to them. This question assesses both the overall preparedness of forces to work together on a number of strategic threats and whether forces have a good understanding of the threat presented by firearms incidents and how equipped they are to meet this threat.

# How effective are the force's arrangements to ensure that it can fulfil its national policing responsibilities?

The *Strategic Policing Requirement* (SPR)<sup>17</sup> specifies six national threats. These are complex threats and forces need to be able to work together if they are to respond to them effectively. These include serious and organised crime, terrorism, serious cyber-crime incidents and child sexual abuse. It is beyond the scope of this inspection to assess in detail whether forces are capable of responding to these national threats. Instead, HMIC has checked whether forces have made the necessary arrangements to test their own preparedness for dealing with these threats should they materialise.

Surrey Police has good arrangements in place to ensure that it can fulfil its national policing responsibilities. The force collaborates with Sussex Police, with a joint chief officer responsible for overseeing the development of the necessary arrangements. Responsibilities for leading on each of the threats set out in the SPR are allocated to individual chief officers at both force and regional level. The force has assessed its SPR requirements and the two forces have put in place good procedures to test their preparedness to respond to civil emergencies and public order events.

The force has taken part in regional mobilisation exercises with partners to address local and national risks and is fully engaged with the local resilience forum (LRF). It also meets quarterly with Kent Police, Hampshire Constabulary, Sussex Police, Thames Valley Police and Dorset Police to share information about the best ways of doing things, and gain a better understanding of how each force is assessing and managing both local and national risks. The force ran an operation called 'Dual Tempest' in February 2016 and worked with the Cabinet Office to test the response

www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\_data/file/417116/The\_Strategic\_Policing\_Requirement.pdf

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> The SPR is issued annually by the Home Secretary, setting out the latest national threats and the appropriate national policing capabilities required to counter those threats. National threats require a co-ordinated or aggregated response from a number of police forces. Forces often need to work collaboratively, and with other partners, national agencies or national arrangements, to ensure such threats are tackled effectively. *Strategic Policing Requirement*, Home Office, March 2015. Available at:

of the individual LRFs simultaneously in Surrey and Sussex. Each force works with its own partners but ensures there are links between the two continuity plans which are developed in consultation with partner agencies.

All officers and staff are trained in joint emergency services interoperability programme (JESIP) principles and there is a programme in place to continue to develop this. In June 2016 the force mandated training on JESIP principles to all sergeants and above. Ad hoc training is provided and the workforce has completed an online JESIP / National Centre for Applied Learning Technologies (NCALT) package. Partners, British Transport Police and HM Coastguard are also involved in the training programme.

## How well prepared is the force to respond to a firearms attack?

Following the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, the government allocated £143 million to the 43 England and Wales police forces to increase their armed capability. This funding has enabled some forces to increase the number of armed police officers able to respond to a terrorist attack. These attacks include those committed by heavily armed terrorists across multiple sites in quick succession, as in Paris. These attacks are known as marauding terrorist firearms attacks. The funding is for those forces considered to be at greatest risk of a terrorist attack. This also has the effect of increasing the ability of the police service to respond to other forms of terrorist attacks (and another incident requiring an armed policing response). Forces have begun to recruit and train new armed officers. This process is due to be completed by March 2018.

Surrey Police understands the threat posed by a firearms attack and this understanding is based on recent and relevant information. The force completes an annual armed policing strategic threat and risk assessment (APSTRA) to enable it to understand and respond to identified threats. It includes a broad assessment of intelligence locally, regionally and nationally. This is overseen by the assistant chief constable who is the lead senior officer for firearms in both Surrey and Sussex.

The force's firearms response is undertaken in collaboration with Sussex Police, which increases its overall capability and capacity. The force has carried out a fundamental review of the APSTRA and has used it to quantify the number of officers required at each skill level. This assessment is in line with national guidance and considers the force's ability to respond to a spontaneous firearms-related terrorist attack. Following the terrorist attacks in France during 2015 the force reviewed its levels of resources at high-profile events such as Ride London.

Surrey Police is making progress towards increasing its firearms capability. The force plans to increase its firearms capability by training and deploying 50 percent more armed officers than it now has. There is a comprehensive plan to achieve this

which is scheduled to be fully implemented in 2018. The force has not received any funding from central government to meet the extra cost and is using money from its own budget to fund the increase. The force covers a diverse area and shares much of its northern border with the metropolitan area of London.

There is a comprehensive training programme for firearms officers and firearms commanders which the force often carries out jointly with other south east forces (Sussex, Kent, Hampshire and Thames Valley forces). In order to train the new firearms officers the force has also increased the number of instructors. However, one of the problems the force faces is not just the recruitment of new officers but retaining those who have already been trained. Many officers choose to move to the Metropolitan Police Service because the pay is higher.

At a regional level there is a memorandum of understanding in place which ensures that resources across the region respond collaboratively if required. Operation Boreham, which involved a search for a dangerous armed suspect, involved a planned operation in which firearms officers from Kent, Thames Valley, Sussex and Hampshire forces, and the National Crime Agency all collaborated. This is a good example of forces working together to keep the public safe.

### **Summary of findings**

#### **Ungraded**

Surrey Police has good plans to mobilise in response to the threats set out in the *Strategic Policing Requirement*. It works well with other forces in the region when the need arises.

The force is well prepared to respond to an attack which requires an armed response. The force has recently reviewed its assessment of threat, risk and harm and this now explicitly includes the threats posed by marauding armed terrorists. To be appropriately prepared for this threat Surrey Police plans to increase its firearms capacity and capability, both as part of a national programme to increase the capability and capacity of trained firearms officers but also through local projects. The force is progressing with the implementation of these plans.

### **Next steps**

HMIC assesses progress on causes of concern and areas for improvement identified within its reports in a number of ways. We receive updates through our regular conversations with forces, re-assess as part of our annual PEEL programme, and, in the most serious cases, revisit forces.

HMIC highlights recurring themes emerging from our PEEL inspections of police forces within our national reports on police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy. These reports identify those issues that are reflected across England and Wales and may contain additional recommendations directed at national policing organisations, including the Home Office, where we believe improvements can be made at a national level.

Findings and judgments from this year's PEEL effectiveness inspection will be used to direct the design of the next cycle of PEEL effectiveness assessments. The specific areas for assessment are yet to be confirmed, based on further consultation, but we will continue to assess how forces keep people safe and reduce crime to ensure our findings are comparable year on year.

### Annex A - About the data

The information presented in this report comes from a range of sources, including published data by the Home Office and Office for National Statistics, inspection fieldwork and data collected directly from all 43 geographic police forces in England and Wales.

Where HMIC has collected data directly from police forces, we have taken reasonable steps to agree the design of the data collection with forces and with other relevant interested parties such as the Home Office. We have given forces several opportunities to check and validate the data they have provided us to ensure the accuracy of our evidence. For instance:

- We checked the data that forces submitted and queried with forces where figures were notably different from other forces or were internally inconsistent.
- We asked all forces to check the final data used in the report and correct any errors identified.

The source of the data is presented with each figure in the report, and is set out in more detail in this annex. The source of Force in numbers data is also set out below.

## Methodology

#### Data in the report

The British Transport Police was outside the scope of inspection. Therefore any aggregated totals for England and Wales exclude British Transport Police data and numbers will differ from those published by the Home Office.

Where other forces have been unable to supply data, this is mentioned under the relevant sections below.

#### **Population**

For all uses of population as a denominator in our calculations, unless otherwise noted, we use Office for National Statistics (ONS) mid-2015 population estimates. These were the most recent data available at the time of the inspection.

For the specific case of City of London Police, we include both resident and transient population within our calculations. This is to account for the unique nature and demographics of this force's responsibility.

#### Survey of police staff

HMIC conducted a short survey of police staff across forces in England and Wales, to understand their views on workloads, redeployment and the suitability of tasks assigned to them. The survey was a non-statistical, voluntary sample which means that results may not be representative of the population. The number of responses varied between 8 and 2,471 across forces. Therefore, we treated results with caution and used them for exploring further during fieldwork rather than to assess individual force performance.

#### Ipsos MORI survey of public attitudes towards policing

HMIC commissioned Ipsos MORI to conduct a survey of attitudes towards policing between July and August 2016. Respondents were drawn from an online panel and results were weighted by age, gender and work status to match the population profile of the force area. The sampling method used is not a statistical random sample and the sample size was small, varying between 331 to 429 in each force area. Therefore, any results provided are only an indication of satisfaction rather than an absolute.

The findings of this survey will be shared on our website by summer 2017:

www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/data/peel-assessments/

#### **Review of crime files**

HMIC reviewed 60 police case files across crime types for: robbery, common assault (flagged as domestic abuse), grievous bodily harm (GBH), stalking, harassment, rape and domestic burglary. The file review was designed to provide a broad overview of the identification of vulnerability, the effectiveness of investigations and to understand how victims are treated through police processes. Files were randomly selected from crimes recorded between 1 January 2016 and 31 March 2016 and were assessed against several criteria. Due to the small sample size of cases selected, we have not used results from the file review as the sole basis for assessing individual force performance but alongside other evidence gathered.

#### Force in numbers

A dash in this graphic indicates that a force was not able to supply HMIC with data.

#### Calls for assistance (including those for domestic abuse)

These data were collected directly from all 43 forces. In 2016, the questions contained a different breakdown of instances where the police were called to an incident compared to the 2015 data collection, so direct comparisons to the equivalent 2015 data are not advised.

#### Recorded crime and crime outcomes

These data are obtained from Home Office police-recorded crime and outcomes data tables for the 12 months to 30 June 2016 and are taken from the October 2016 Home Office data release, which is available from:

#### www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-recorded-crime-open-data-tables

Total police-recorded crime includes all crime (excluding fraud offences) recorded by police forces in England and Wales. Home Office publications on the overall volumes and rates of recorded crime and outcomes include the British Transport Police, which is outside the scope of this HMIC inspection. Therefore, England and Wales rates in this report will differ from those published by the Home Office.

Figures about police-recorded crime should be treated with care, as recent increases are likely to have been affected by the renewed focus on the quality and compliance of crime recording since HMIC's national inspection of crime data in 2014.

For crime outcomes, Dorset Police has been excluded from the England and Wales figure. Dorset Police experienced difficulties with the recording of crime outcomes for the 12 months to 30 June 2016. This was due to the force introducing the Niche records management system in Spring 2015. Problems with the implementation of Niche meant that crime outcomes were not reliably recorded. The failure to file investigations properly meant that a higher than normal proportion of offences were allocated to 'Not yet assigned an outcome'. During 2016, the force conducted additional work to solve the problem. In doing so, some crime outcomes from the 12 months to 30 June 2016 were updated after that date and are reflected in a later period. This makes Dorset Police's crime outcome data inconsistent with that provided by other forces. HMIC has decided not to use Dorset Police's outcome data in the interests of consistency of data use and to maintain fairness to all forces.

Other notable points to consider when interpreting outcome data are listed below and also apply to figure 4.

- For a full commentary and explanation of outcome types please see Crime
  Outcomes in England and Wales: year ending March 2016, Home Office, July
  2016. Available from:
   <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\_data/file/53944">https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\_data/file/53944</a>
   7/crime-outcomes-hosb0616.pdf
- Crime outcome proportions show the percentage of crimes recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016 that have been assigned each outcome. This means that each crime is tracked or linked to its outcome.
- These data are subject to change, as more crimes are assigned outcomes over time. These data are taken from the October 2016 Home Office data release.

- Providing outcomes data under the new framework is voluntary if not provided directly through the Home Office Data Hub. However, as proportions are used, calculations can be based on fewer than four quarters of data. For the 12 months to 30 June 2016, Derbyshire Constabulary and Suffolk Constabulary were unable to provide the last quarter of data. Therefore, their figures are based on the first three quarters of the year.
- Leicestershire, Staffordshire and West Yorkshire forces are participating in the Ministry of Justice's out of court disposals pilot. This means these forces no longer issue simple cautions or cannabis/khat warnings and they restrict their use of penalty notices for disorder as disposal options for adult offenders, as part of the pilot. Therefore, their outcomes data should be viewed with this in mind.
- It is important to note that the outcomes that are displayed in figure 8 are based on the number of outcomes recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016, irrespective of when the crime was recorded. Therefore, the crimes and outcomes recorded in the reporting year are not tracked, so direct comparisons should not be made between general outcomes and domestic abuse related outcomes in this report. For more details about the methodology for domestic abuse outcomes please see explanatory notes below, under figure 8.

#### Anti-social behaviour

These data are obtained from Office for National Statistics data tables, available from:

www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/policeforceareadatatables

All police forces record incidents of anti-social behaviour reported to them in accordance with the provisions of the National Standard for Incident Recording (NSIR). Incidents are recorded under NSIR in accordance with the same 'victim focused' approach that applies for recorded crime, although these figures are not subject to the same level of quality assurance as the main recorded crime collection. Incident counts should be interpreted as incidents recorded by the police, rather than reflecting the true level of victimisation. Other agencies also deal with anti-social behaviour incidents (for example, local authorities and social landlords); incidents reported to these agencies will not generally be included in police figures.

When viewing this data the user should be aware of the following:

Warwickshire Police had a problem with its incident recording. For a small
percentage of all incidents reported during 2014-15 and 2015-16 it was not
possible for the force to identify whether these were anti-social behaviour or
other types of incident. These incidents have been distributed pro rata for

Warwickshire, so that one percent of anti-social behaviour in 2014-15 and two percent of anti-social behaviour in 2015-16 are estimated.

- From May 2014, South Yorkshire Police experienced difficulties in reporting
  those incidents of anti-social behaviour that resulted from how it processed
  calls for assistance, specifically for scheduled appointments. In November
  2016, South Yorkshire Police resolved this problem and resubmitted antisocial behaviour data to Office for National Statistics. HMIC has used
  corrected data for South Yorkshire Police which are available in the
  November 2016 release of anti-social behaviour incidents data in the link
  above.
- Bedfordshire Police resubmitted anti-social behaviour data to Office for National Statistics for the 12 months to 30 June 2016. This was because data had been double counted for the second quarter of the financial year. HMIC has used corrected data for Bedfordshire Police which are available in the November 2016 release of anti-social behaviour incidents data in the link above.

#### **Domestic abuse**

Data for domestic abuse flagged offences were provided by the Home Office for the 12 months to 30 June 2016. These are more recent figures than those previously published by Office for National Statistics.

Data relating to domestic abuse arrests, charges and outcomes were collected through the HMIC data collection.

Further information about the domestic abuse statistics and recent releases are available from:

www.ons.gov.uk/releases/domesticabuseinenglandandwalesyearendingmarch2016

#### Organised crime groups (OCGs)

These data were collected directly from all 43 forces. City of London Police is excluded from the England and Wales rate as its OCG data are not comparable with other forces due to size and its wider national remit.

The number of OCGs in the Warwickshire Police and West Mercia Police force areas is a combined total of OCGs for the two force areas. The OCGs per one million population rate is based upon their areas' combined population figures.

OCGs which are no longer active – for example because they have been dismantled by the police – can be archived. This means that they are no longer subject to disruption, investigation or monitoring. From 1 September 2014 to 31 December 2015, forces were given a directive by the National Police Chiefs' Council to suspend archiving, pending a review of OCG recording policy. This directive was removed on

1 January 2016, but resulted in many forces archiving more OCGs than they otherwise would have in the 12 months to June 2016. Therefore, direct comparisons should not be made with OCG figures from previous years.

#### Victim satisfaction

Forces were required by the Home Office to conduct satisfaction surveys with specific victim groups. Force victim satisfaction surveys are structured around principal questions exploring satisfaction responses across four stages of interactions:

- initial contact;
- actions:
- follow-up;
- treatment plus the whole experience.

The data used in this report use the results to the question relating to the victim's whole experience, which specifically asks, "Taking the whole experience into account, are you satisfied, dissatisfied, or neither with the service provided by the police in this case?"

The England and Wales average is calculated based on the average of the rates of satisfaction in all 43 forces.

### Figures throughout the report

Figure 1: Police-recorded crime rates (per 1,000 population) for the five year period to 30 June 2016

Please see 'Recorded Crime and Crime Outcomes' above.

Figure 2: Police-recorded crime rates (per 1,000 population) for the 12 months to 30 June 2016

Please see 'Recorded Crime and Crime Outcomes' above.

Figure 3: Percentage change in the rate of anti-social behaviour incidents (per 1,000 population), by force, comparing the 12 months to 31 March 2016 with the 12 months to 31 March 2015

Please see 'Anti-social behaviour' above.

Figure 4: Proportion of outcomes assigned to offences recorded, in 12 months to 30 June 2016, by outcome type

Please see 'Recorded Crime and Crime Outcomes' above.

The outcome number has been provided to improve usability across multiple publications and is in line with Home Office categorisation.

For these data, we state whether the force's value is 'one of the highest', 'one of the lowest' or 'broadly in line with' all forces in England and Wales. This is calculated by ranking the usage of outcomes and then highlighting the top and bottom 25 percent of forces. All other forces will be broadly in line with England and Wales. However, any interpretation of outcomes should take into account that outcomes will vary dependent on the crime types that occur in each force area, and how the force deals with offenders for different crimes.

This methodology is not comparable with figure 8, so direct comparisons should not be made between the two tables.

# Figure 5: Percentage of 'Evidential difficulties; victim does not support action' outcomes assigned to offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016, by force

Please see 'Recorded Crime and Crime Outcomes' above.

In addition, it is important to understand that the percentages of evidential difficulties can be affected by the level of certain types of crime within a force, such as domestic abuse related offences. The category of evidential difficulties also includes where a suspect has been identified and the victim supports police action, but evidential difficulties prevent further action being taken.

## Figure 6: Percentage of police recorded crime with a vulnerable victim identified, by force, for the 12 months to 30 June 2016

Please see 'Recorded Crime and Crime Outcomes' above.

The number of offences identified with a vulnerable victim in a force is dependent on the force's definition of vulnerability.

City of London, Devon and Cornwall, Essex, Gloucestershire and Lancashire forces were unable to provide data for the number of recorded crimes with a vulnerable victim identified. Therefore, these forces' data are not included in the graph or in the calculation of the England and Wales rate.

When viewing this data the user should be aware of the following:

 Suffolk Constabulary was only able to provide eight months of vulnerability data to the 30 June 2016 due to transferring to a different crime management system. Its previous system did not record vulnerability. Therefore, these are the most reliable data it can provide.

## Figure 7: Domestic abuse arrest rate (per 100 domestic abuse crimes), by force, for the 12 months to 30 June 2016

Please see 'Domestic abuse' above.

Derbyshire, Durham and Gloucestershire forces were unable to provide domestic abuse arrest data. Therefore, these forces' data are not included in the graph or in the calculation of the England and Wales rate.

The arrest rate is calculated using a common time period for arrests and offences. It is important to note that each arrest is not necessarily directly linked to its specific domestic abuse offence recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016 in this calculation. It is also possible to have more than one arrest per offence although this is rare. In addition, the reader should note the increase in police-recorded crime which has affected the majority of forces over the last year (39 out of 43). This may have the effect of arrest rates actually being higher than the figures suggest. Despite this, the calculation still indicates whether the force prioritises arrests for domestic abuse offenders over other potential forms of action. HMIC has evaluated the arrest rate alongside other measures (such as use of voluntary attendance or body-worn video cameras) during our inspection process to understand how each force deals with domestic abuse overall.

When viewing this data the user should be aware of the following:

- Cambridgeshire Constabulary identified a recording issue and that it could only obtain accurate data from a manual audit of its custody records. This means its data may indicate a lower arrest rate. However, at the time of publication this was the most reliable figure the force could provide for the 12 months to 30 June 2016. The force plans to conduct regular manual audits while the recording issue is resolved. HMIC will conduct a further review to test this evidence when more data are available.
- Lancashire Constabulary experienced difficulties in identifying all domestic abuse flagged arrests. This affected 23 days in the 12 months to 30 June 2016. The force investigated this and confirmed that the impact on data provided to HMIC would be marginal and that these are the most reliable figures it can provide.

## Figure 8: Rate of outcomes recorded in 12 months to 30 June 2016 for domestic-related offences

Please see 'Domestic Abuse' above.

Dorset Police is excluded from our data for the reasons described under 'Recorded Crime and Crime Outcomes' above.

Nottinghamshire Police has been excluded from domestic abuse outcomes data. The force experienced difficulties with the conversion of some crime data when it

moved to a new crime recording system. This means that the force did not record reliably some crime outcomes for domestic abuse related offences. The force subsequently solved the problem and provided updated outcomes figures. However, this makes Nottinghamshire Police's outcomes data for domestic abuse related offences inconsistent with that provided by other forces. HMIC has decided not to use Nottinghamshire Police's outcomes data for domestic abuse related offences in the interests of consistency of data use and to maintain fairness to all forces.

In April 2015, the Home Office began collecting information from the police on whether recorded offences were related to domestic abuse. Crimes are identified by the police as domestic abuse related if the offence meets the government definition of domestic violence and abuse:

"Any incident or pattern of incidents of controlling, coercive or threatening behaviour, violence or abuse between those aged 16 or over who are or have been intimate partners or family members regardless of gender or sexuality."

In figure 8, the rate is calculated by the number of each outcome recorded for domestic abuse flagged offences in the 12 months to 30 June 2016, divided by the total number of domestic abuse offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016. The domestic abuse-related crimes used in this calculation are not necessarily those to which the outcomes have been assigned. Therefore, direct comparisons should not be made between general outcomes in figure 4, where each crime is linked to its associated outcome, and domestic abuse outcomes in figure 8.

For these data, we state whether the force's value is 'one of the highest', 'one of the lowest' or 'broadly in line with' all forces in England and Wales. This is calculated by ranking the usage of outcomes and then highlighting the top and bottom 25 percent of forces. All other forces will be broadly in line with England and Wales. However, any interpretation of outcomes should take into account that outcomes will vary dependent on the crime types that occur in each force area, and how the force deals with offenders for different crimes.

## Figure 9: Organised crime groups per one million population, by force, as at 1 July 2016

Please see 'Organised Crime Groups' above.

## Figure 10: Active organised crime groups by predominant crime type, as at 1 July 2016

Humberside Police was unable to provide the full data for predominant crime types in the time available. Therefore, this force's data are not included in the graph or in the calculation of the England and Wales proportion.

Numbers may not sum to 100 percent due to rounding.