



Promoting improvements
in policing to make
everyone safer

PEEL: Police effectiveness 2016

An inspection of the Metropolitan Police Service



March 2017

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ISBN: 978-1-78655-361-4

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Introduction

As part of our annual inspections of police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy (PEEL), Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) assesses the effectiveness of police forces across England and Wales.

What is police effectiveness and why is it important?

An effective police force is one which keeps people safe and reduces crime. These are the most important responsibilities for a police force, and the principal measures by which the public judge the performance of their force and policing as a whole.

To reach a judgment on the extent of each force's effectiveness, our inspection answered the following overall question:

- How effective is the force at keeping people safe and reducing crime?

To answer this question HMIC explores five 'core' questions, which reflect those areas of policing that we consider to be of particular interest and concern to the public:¹

1. How effective is the force at preventing crime, tackling anti-social behaviour and keeping people safe?
2. How effective is the force at investigating crime and reducing re-offending?
3. How effective is the force at protecting those who are vulnerable from harm, and supporting victims?
4. How effective is the force at tackling serious and organised crime?
5. How effective are the force's specialist capabilities?

HMIC's effectiveness inspection assessed all of these areas during 2016. More information on how we inspect and grade forces as part of this wide-ranging inspection is available on the HMIC website (www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/peel-assessments/how-we-inspect/). This report sets out our findings for the Metropolitan Police Service.

Reports on the force's efficiency, legitimacy and leadership inspections are available on the HMIC website (www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/peel-assessments/peel-2016/metropolitan/).

¹ HMIC assessed forces against these questions between September and December 2016, except for Kent Police – our pilot force – which we inspected in June 2016.

Force in numbers



Calls for assistance

Calls for assistance per 1,000 population 12 months to 30 June 2016

Metropolitan Police Service

138

England and Wales

240



Crime (excluding fraud)

Crimes recorded per 1,000 population 12 months to 30 June 2016

Metropolitan Police Service

86

England and Wales

68

Change in recorded crime 12 months to 30 June 2015 against 12 months to 30 June 2016

Metropolitan Police Service

+3.3%

England and Wales

+7.8%

Change in recorded crime for the 5 years to the 12 months to 30 June 2016

Metropolitan Police Service

-9.6%

England and Wales

-3.4%



Crime outcomes*

Charged/summonsed

Metropolitan Police Service

10.6%

England and Wales

12.1%

Evidential difficulties: suspect identified but victim does not support action

Metropolitan Police Service

8.8%

England and Wales

10.6%

Investigation completed but no suspect identified

Metropolitan Police Service

50.8%

England and Wales

47.4%

*Figures are shown as proportions of outcomes assigned to offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016.



Anti-social behaviour

Anti-social behaviour incidents per 1,000 population 12 months to 31 March 2016

Metropolitan Police Service

England and Wales

28

31

Anti-social behaviour incidents per 1,000 population 12 months to 31 March 2015

Metropolitan Police Service

England and Wales

31

34



Domestic abuse

Domestic abuse calls for assistance per 1,000 population 12 months to 30 June 2016

Metropolitan Police Service

England and Wales

8

16

Domestic abuse as a percentage of all recorded crime (excluding fraud) 12 months to 30 June 2016

Metropolitan Police Service

England and Wales

10.3%

11.1%

Domestic abuse as a percentage of all recorded crime (excluding fraud) 12 months to 31 March 2015

Metropolitan Police Service

England and Wales

9.4%

10.0%



Organised crime groups

Organised crime groups per million population as at 1 July 2016

Metropolitan Police Service

England and Wales

84

46



Victim satisfaction rate

Victim satisfaction with the overall service provided by the police 12 months to 30 June 2016

Metropolitan Police Service

England and Wales


79.5%

83.3%

For further information about the data in this graphic please see annex A

Overview – How effective is the force at keeping people safe and reducing crime?

Overall judgment²



The Metropolitan Police Service requires improvement in respect of its effectiveness at keeping people safe and reducing crime. Our overall judgment is the same as last year. The force works hard to prevent crime and anti-social behaviour, but its inadequate approach to keeping vulnerable people safe is a cause of concern to HMIC. The quality of some investigations and its management of offenders also require improvement. Its response to gangs is impressive, but its wider approach to tackling serious and organised crime requires improvement.

Overall summary

How effective is the force at preventing crime, tackling anti-social behaviour and keeping people safe?		Good
How effective is the force at investigating crime and reducing re-offending?		Requires improvement
How effective is the force at protecting those who are vulnerable from harm, and supporting victims?		Inadequate
How effective is the force at tackling serious and organised crime?		Requires improvement
How effective are the force's specialist capabilities?	Ungraded	

The Metropolitan Police Service requires improvement at keeping people safe and reducing crime.

The force is clearly committed to preventing crime and anti-social behaviour. It understands the importance of involving the public in setting neighbourhood level policing priorities. It is investing well in crime prevention, but the force does not

² HMIC judgments are outstanding, good, requires improvement and inadequate.

routinely review the effectiveness of its tactics to tackle crime and anti-social behaviour.

The force has good processes in place to respond to reported incidents. However, the quality of initial investigations needs to improve, which, together with a shortage of trained detectives, is undermining the force's investigation performance. The force's approach to integrated offender management has improved but needs to be more consistent. Local police teams are not routinely involved in the management and monitoring of registered sex offenders who live in their local community.

How the force protects vulnerable people and supports victims is inadequate. Awareness and consideration of vulnerable people³ by officers and staff has improved a little since 2015. Information, systems and process for dealing with vulnerability in general, and in areas such as missing and absent children, have been made clearer. Despite this, problems remain: examples are understanding the links between missing and absent children and child sexual exploitation, and thinking about all individuals and risk in domestic abuse incidents.

The force makes good use of its own intelligence to tackle serious and organised crime, but the absence of information from other organisations with which it works means that it does not have a full picture of the threats to London's communities. The force's response to serious and organised crime is effective in some respects; however, it does not routinely the best use of partner organisations or neighbourhood policing to tackle serious and organised crime.

The force has the necessary arrangements in place to test its preparedness for national threats. It has assessed comprehensively the threat of attacks requiring an armed response.

³ People who are vulnerable through their age, disability, or because they have been subjected to repeated offences, or are at high risk of abuse, for example.

How effective is the force at preventing crime, tackling anti-social behaviour and keeping people safe?

The police's ability to prevent crime and anti-social behaviour and to keep people safe is a principal measure of its effectiveness. Crime prevention is more effective than investigating crime, stops people being victims in the first place and makes society a safer place. The police cannot prevent crime on their own; other policing organisations and organisations such as health, housing and children's services have a vital role to play. Police effectiveness in this matter therefore depends on their ability to work closely with other policing organisations and other interested parties to understand local problems and to use a wide range of evidence-based interventions to resolve them.


How much crime and anti-social behaviour is there in the Metropolitan Police area?

Although police-recorded crime is by no means a complete measure of the totality of demand for calls on its service that a force faces, it does provide a partial indication of performance across all forces. Crime rates are reported as the number of crimes per 1,000 population in each force area to enable comparison between areas. Total recorded crime is made up of victim-based crime (crimes involving a direct victim such as an individual, a group, or an organisation) and other crimes against society (e.g. possession of drugs). In the 12 months to 30 June 2016, the majority of forces (39 out of 43 forces) showed an annual increase in total police-recorded crime (excluding fraud). This increase in police-recorded crime may have been affected by the renewed focus on the quality and compliance of crime recording since HMIC's 2014 inspection of crime data in all forces across England and Wales.

In 2010 the Home Secretary set a clear priority for the police service to cut crime. Figure 1 shows how police-recorded crime has fluctuated over the longer term. When compared with the 12 months to 30 June 2011, police-recorded crime (excluding fraud) for the 12 months to 30 June 2016 has decreased by 6.3 percent in Bedfordshire compared with a decrease of 3.4 percent across all forces in England and Wales.

Over this same period, victim-based crime decreased by 6.8 percent in the Metropolitan Police area, compared with a decrease of 0.5 percent for England and Wales as a whole.

Figure 1: Police-recorded crime rates (per 1,000 population) in the Metropolitan Police area, for the five-year period to 30 June 2016



Source: Home Office data

For further information about these data, please see annex A

More recently, when compared with the previous 12 month period, police-recorded crime (excluding fraud) in the Metropolitan Police area increased by 3.3 percent for the year ending 30 June 2016. This is compared with an increase of 7.8 percent across all forces in England and Wales over the same period.

The rate of police-recorded crimes and incidents of anti-social behaviour per head of population indicates how safe it is for the public in that police area. Figures 2 and 3 show crime rates (per 1,000 population) and the change in the rate (per 1,000 population) of incidents of anti-social behaviour in the Metropolitan Police area compared with England and Wales.

During the inspection HMIC used a broad selection of crime types to indicate crime levels in the police force area. We are not judging the effectiveness of the force on police-recorded crime rates only. The figure below shows police-recorded crime rates in the force area for a small selection of crime types.

Figure 2: Police-recorded crime rates (per 1,000 population) in the Metropolitan Police area, for the 12 months to 30 June 2016


Rates per 1,000 population	Metropolitan Police	England and Wales
Recorded crime (excluding fraud)	85.7	68.2
Victim-based crime	74.4	60.4
Sexual offences	1.9	1.9
Assault with injury	7.9	7.0
Burglary in a dwelling*	12.8	8.1

* The rate of burglary in a dwelling is the rate for 1,000 households, rather than population

Source: Home Office data

For further information about these data, please see annex A

Figure 3: Percentage change in the rate of anti-social behaviour incidents (per 1,000 population), by force, comparing the 12 months to 31 March 2016 with the 12 months to 31 March 2015



Source: Home Office data

For further information about these data, please see annex A

In the 12 months to 31 March 2016, the Metropolitan Police Service recorded 28 incidents of anti-social behaviour per 1,000 population. This is 8 percent fewer incidents per 1,000 population than the force recorded during the previous 12 months. In England and Wales as a whole, there were 8 percent fewer incidents per 1,000 population in the 12 months to 31 March 2016, compared to the previous 12 months.

How effectively does the force understand the threat or risk of harm within the communities it serves?

It is vital that forces have a detailed understanding of the communities they serve in order to protect them from harm. This understanding should include those communities which may – for a variety of reasons – need the police to work differently to understand their requirements, for example migrant communities, elderly people or groups which might be mistrustful towards the police. A good understanding of what matters to these communities helps the police to gain their confidence and create safer neighbourhoods for citizens.

In order to tackle crime and anti-social behaviour, police forces need to understand the threat and risk faced by communities. Forces must also operate a model of local policing in which police officers and police community support officers (PCSOs) have sufficient time for community engagement, visible targeted foot patrols and working with other policing organisations and other interested parties to promote resolutions that protect communities and prevent crime. Successfully undertaking these three activities leads to crime reduction and increased public confidence.

Does the Metropolitan Police Service understand the risk posed to its communities?

The Metropolitan Police Service has an effective structure in place to enable it to understand the threat or risk of harm in its communities. Each of the force's 32 boroughs is divided into smaller geographical areas called wards, with a neighbourhood policing team, which includes named officers and police community support officers (PCSOs), dedicated to each ward. These officers and staff are commonly referred to as safer neighbourhood teams. They patrol the ward to which they are dedicated to provide a visible presence to the public, and carry out community engagement and prevention activities. Ward profiles are in place in each ward. These profiles include partner data and are one of the methods used by the safer neighbourhood teams to provide as detailed a picture of local policing issues as possible.

The force is clear about how its safer neighbourhood teams should spend their time. Its policy on 'abstractions' – how often staff are taken away from their own roles to support others – is that safer neighbourhood teams should not be frequently

redeployed to cover reactive duties in other areas. However, HIMC found that the frequency of such redeployments varies between boroughs.

HMIC conducted a short survey of police staff across forces in England and Wales, to understand their views on workloads, redeployment and the suitability of tasks assigned to them. The survey was a non-statistical, voluntary sample, so results were explored further during fieldwork rather than being used on their own to assess force performance. In the Metropolitan Police Service, some 2,471 officers and staff responded to our survey.

Safer neighbourhood officers and staff in some boroughs are redeployed routinely to other teams. In other boroughs, redeployments are kept to a minimum allowing these personnel to focus on engagement and prevention activities. This is in line with the force's policy. This variance was also apparent from the survey. When asked whether they had been abstracted in the previous week, of the approximate 600 police constables who responded around half said that they had not been abstracted. Of the approximate 100 PCSOs who responded, around two-thirds said the same. When asked the same question in respect of the previous three months, around one-sixth of the police constables who responded said they had not been abstracted; just under half of the PCSOs who responded said the same.

The force is proposing a reorganisation of local policing to make it more effective. This change should increase neighbourhood policing resources in accordance with demand and risk. These officers will be exempt from being abstracted from their own roles to backfill or support others. The force recognises that this will be difficult, given the number of incidents and planned events that regularly occur in the force area. The force also intends to increase the delegated powers of PCSOs in line with the powers they can use under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, for example dispersal powers in sections 34 to 42 of the Act to deal with individuals engaging in anti-social behaviour, crime and disorder in the same way as their police officer colleagues. PCSOs will also participate in a four day training module which is being developed to improve the effectiveness of neighbourhood policing teams.

The Metropolitan Police Service has a good understanding of the threats facing its communities, including new and emerging threats. It is using the management of risk in law enforcement (MoRiLE)⁴ process to identify the areas of highest threat, risk and harm. The force has drafted a plan setting out how it will tackle different types of crime. This covers both traditional threats (such as burglary and robbery) and some aspects of 'hidden crime' (such as child sexual exploitation and predatory paedophilia, domestic abuse, female genital mutilation, human trafficking and

⁴ The 'management of risk in law enforcement' process developed by the National Police Chiefs' Council. This tool assesses the types of crimes, which most threaten communities and highlights where the force does not currently have the capacity or capability to tackle them effectively.

organised immigration crime,⁵ and the night time economy) under the umbrella of safeguarding. Where it is available, information from other organisations with which the force works, such as local authorities and the health and education services, has been applied in priority areas to improve the force's understanding of these threats. The plan was recently approved by the force's leadership, and a chief officer has been allocated to each of the priority areas .

The force also makes good use of intelligence in some areas to identify the threat and risk of harm within communities. It has produced traditional national intelligence model (NIM)⁶ products such as problem profiles for crimes ranging from moped thefts to child sexual exploitation and female genital mutilation. However, the data contained in other profiles, for example the serious and organised crime profile, are all police-generated. Using information from partner organisations such as local authorities and the health service would enhance the force's understanding of the threats in these areas.

How does the Metropolitan Police Service engage with the public?

The force understands the importance of involving the public in setting neighbourhood-level policing priorities. The public can become involved in priority setting and problem solving in several ways. These include neighbourhood ward panels which are made up of members of the community who live or work within that ward. The panels meet regularly to discuss the concerns of the local community about crime and anti-social behaviour, and set the priorities that the local police team will tackle. The force also works with independent advisory groups that act as 'critical friends' by providing advice on how its services may be, or are being, perceived by communities. As well as independent advisory groups, each borough also has a Safer Neighbourhood board which is designed and facilitated by the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC), and a stop and search monitoring group, all of which enable members of the public to have a say on local policing.

The safer neighbourhood teams hold street briefings in their borough at which the community can tell them about those concerns that are important to them. Social and digital media are also widely used. This includes the use of Twitter by the safer neighbourhood teams to engage with communities and respond to local problems.

⁵ Organised immigration crime is the term is used in the force's control strategy to describe both human trafficking and the facilitation of illegal entry into the country as well as the presence of those who do not have the legal right to be here.

⁶ The National Intelligence Model (NIM) is a well-established and recognised model within policing that managers use for setting strategic direction, making prioritised and defensible resourcing decisions, allocating resources intelligently, formulating tactical plans and tasking and co-ordinating resulting activity and managing the associated risks. It is important to note that the NIM is not just about crime and not just about intelligence – it is a business and decision-making model that can be used for most areas of policing. It provides a standardised approach to gathering, co-ordinating and disseminating intelligence that can be integrated across all forces and law enforcement agencies.

The force plans in 2017 to train all its neighbourhood officers and PCSOs to use social media. Borough commanders give fortnightly updates by blogging to explain what they have done in response to what the community has told them. Newsletters are also used to keep local communities informed about that they have said matters to them.

The force introduced a 'listening to London campaign' to demonstrate to local communities that it is part of the community and is determined to tackle community concerns. The campaign took place over three months in 2014, and the force used different methods to listen to one million Londoners who would not normally engage with it. The information the force gathered during the campaign helped it to understand better the communities that it serves and to improve engagement activity accordingly. The force is continuing to engage with those communities which may – for a variety of reasons – need the police to work differently to understand their requirements. For example, the force undertakes youth engagement activities about stop and search in all boroughs, to enable young people to understand their rights and responsibilities and to build their trust and confidence in the police.

HMIC commissioned Ipsos MORI to conduct a survey of public attitudes towards policing. This was done between July and August 2016. The survey indicated that there has been an increase in public satisfaction with the Metropolitan Police Service. Some 429 people were interviewed and 56 percent were very or fairly satisfied with local policing in their area. This is a 5 percent increase on 2015.⁷

How effectively do force actions and activities prevent crime and anti-social behaviour?

Effective forces use a range of options to prevent crime, tackle anti-social behaviour and keep people safe. They use structured approaches to solving local problems which aim to rid communities of criminal and anti-social behaviour. They also use a range of legal powers and specific tactics which vary depending on the situation. HMIC expects forces to review their activity as well as other sources of evidence in order to improve their ability to protect people over the long term.

Does the force have a problem-solving approach?

The Metropolitan Police Service has an inconsistent approach to problem solving. It uses the SARA approach to problem solving. The SARA acronym stands for scanning, analysis, response, and assess, a process aimed at identifying legal and ethical solutions to policing problems such as anti-social behaviour. The force uses its Airspace ICT system to record problem-solving plans and activities and this system is set up in line with the SARA approach. People working in the safer neighbourhood teams refer to Airspace, and can clearly explain their approach to

⁷ For further details, see annex A.

problem solving, but mostly do not associate their problem-solving work with SARA. Problem-solving plans are supervised, but the quality of the plans is variable. Officers and PCSOs complete the sections in Airspace including information about the victim, the offender, the location, background information and the tasks required in varying levels of detail, meaning that not all the information about a problem is readily available. Plans should also be updated as problem-solving activities are undertaken and their effects become known. The updating of plans also varies, so it is not always known what problem-solving activities have been completed and what their impact has been. One plan that we reviewed had not been updated for 252 days.

In addition, different approaches are taken to working with partner organisations. Some boroughs have formal information sharing agreements in place and others do not, instead relying upon the good working relationship that they have with colleagues in these organisations. Airspace is also used to record all non-crime incidents of anti-social behaviour to ensure that it identifies repeat victims and potentially vulnerable victims of anti-social behaviour, enabling the safer neighbourhood team and local partners to respond appropriately. The information held in Airspace can be shared electronically with partners. Despite this, different approaches are taken to sharing information to enable the analysis of problems and for collaborative problem solving.

Training in collaborative problem-solving is planned as part of a four-day training module which is being developed to improve the effectiveness of neighbourhood policing teams. This training will also assure the use of SARA as the force's chosen problem-solving model. The force is considering how best to evaluate this training once it has been completed.

Does the force use effective approaches and tactics to tackle crime and anti-social behaviour?

The force is particularly effective at preventing crime and anti-social behaviour. It uses a range of approaches which have achieved good results. For example, in May 2015 the force introduced its MetTrace burglary reduction initiative,⁸ which also provides an opportunity to engage with residents about crime prevention. At the time of inspection, MetTrace had been gradually introduced into 205,136 homes and the results show a 26.2 percent reduction in crimes in the MetTrace initiative areas compared to 4.4 percent in non-MetTrace areas.

Another example is the force's knife-crime strategy which was created in January 2016. It incorporates a wide range of tactics and interventions to tackle knife crime in the force area; these include joint working with partners such as the National Crime Agency, Immigration Enforcement and the Home Office, the use of intelligence-led

⁸ An initiative to provide property-marking kits and crime prevention advice to homes in high-burglary areas to reduce crime and make people feel safer.

patrols in knife crime hotspots, and providing briefings to schools to discourage young people from engaging in knife crime.

Other strategies used to prevent crime and anti-social behaviour include deploying crime officers to work with housing scheme developers to create an environment that deters crime, and crime-reduction partnerships with businesses across London. Two safer neighbourhood officers in each borough have received crime-prevention training and crime prevention is regularly promoted at neighbourhood ward panel meetings; there are plans for all dedicated ward officers to receive this training. The force has launched its new website, part of which will focus on crime prevention advice. The force's directorate of media and communications has started sending out new crime-prevention messages based on the format used by the National Health Service (which is successful in promoting preventative healthcare). It has designed a campaign called 'Be Safe', the aim of which is to encourage the public to get the simple things right to avoid becoming victims of crime. The force is working with partner organisations including retailers, academia and emergency services to shape and promote this campaign.

The force has a lead officer for prevention whose role includes co-ordinating lessons from the force's analysis of the causes of demand, which are then used to improve crime-prevention activities. The force's crime-prevention strategy was developed jointly with the MOPAC; this is likely to be revised because of the change of mayor in May 2016. The current strategy is underpinned by a crime-prevention plan that sets out how its objectives will be achieved.

The force's rate of use of anti-social behaviour powers is in line with the England and Wales average. The force makes good use of criminal behaviour orders, community protection notices and civil injunctions; its use of these is relatively high when compared to other forces. In the 12 months to June 2016 the force used anti-social behaviour powers 379 times per million of population. Officers are confident in the use of orders, notices and injunctions; information about these is routinely shared with partner organisations, and information about breaches are included in briefings so that the appropriate action can be taken.

Does the force use evidence of best practice and its own learning to improve the service to the public?

For some initiatives only, the force assesses the effectiveness of problem-solving and crime-prevention activities. It regularly assesses the effects of the MetTrace burglary reduction initiative. Also, it routinely analyses and formally reviews the effects of the operations it introduced to respond to the increase in knife and gun crime in the capital (called Operation Teal and Operation Viper respectively), and to keep burglaries down in the autumn and winter months (Operation Bumblebee). The force has two formal partnerships with academics to look for solutions to complex problems, set out how they can be implemented, and evaluate initiatives following implementation to assess their effectiveness.

Despite this, the safer neighbourhood teams do not routinely assess their problem-solving activities so often they do not know the effect of their approaches on reducing crime and anti-social behaviour, nor do they identify the lessons learned and good practice. The force recognises this as an area where it needs to improve, and it will be included in the four day training module for neighbourhood policing teams.

Summary of findings



Good

The Metropolitan Police Service is good at preventing crime, tackling anti-social behaviour and keeping people safe.

The force is good at assessing the areas of highest threat, risk and harm, and planning how it will tackle both traditional threats and some aspects of 'hidden crime'. However, it uses only police-generated data for some problem profiles about threat or risk of harm within communities, limiting its understanding.

The force understands the importance of involving the public in setting policing priorities at the neighbourhood level. It makes sure that the public can become involved in priority setting and problem solving. It has also works closely to engage those communities that are less likely to trust and have confidence in the police.

The force invests substantially in its crime prevention work, although in some boroughs officers and staff are frequently redeployed to cover reactive duties, which limits their ability to prevent crime in neighbourhoods. For some initiatives, the force assesses the effectiveness of problem-solving and crime prevention activities. However, problem-solving activity is inconsistent, and not routinely assessed by the safer neighbourhood teams. This means that the effect on reducing crime and anti-social behaviour, the lessons learned, and good practice are not identified.

Areas for improvement

- The force should ensure that local policing teams engage routinely, and work closely, with local communities, and undertake structured problem solving alongside partner organisations in order to prevent crime and anti-social behaviour.
- The force should adopt a structured and consistent problem-solving process to enable it to tackle crime and anti-social behaviour more effectively.
- The force should evaluate and share effective practice routinely, both internally and with partners, in order continually to improve its approach to the prevention of crime and anti-social behaviour.

How effective is the force at investigating crime and reducing re-offending?

When a crime occurs, the public must have confidence that the police will investigate it effectively, take seriously their concerns as victims, and bring offenders to justice. To be effective, investigations should be well planned and supervised, based on approved practice, and carried out by appropriately-trained staff. In co-operation with other organisations, forces must also manage the risk posed by those who are identified as being the most prolific or dangerous offenders, to minimise the chances of continued harm to individuals and communities.

How well does the force bring offenders to justice?

Since April 2014, police forces in England and Wales have been required to record how investigations are concluded in a new way, known as 'outcomes'. Replacing what was known as 'detections', the outcomes framework gives a fuller picture of the work the police do to investigate and resolve crime and over time all crimes will be assigned an outcome. The broader outcomes framework (currently containing 21 different types of outcomes) is designed to support police officers in using their professional judgment to ensure a just and timely resolution. The resolution should reflect the harm caused to the victim, the seriousness of the offending behaviour, the impact on the community and deter future offending.

Outcomes are likely to differ from force to force for various reasons. Forces face a different mix of crime types in their policing areas, so the outcomes they assign will also vary depending on the nature of the crime. Certain offences are more likely to be concluded without prosecution of offenders; typically these include types of crime such as cannabis misuse. If this type of crime is particularly prevalent in the force then it is likely that the level of 'cannabis/khat⁹ warning' outcomes would be greater. Other offences such as those involving domestic abuse or serious sexual offences, are unlikely to result in a high usage of the 'cautions' outcome.

The frequency of outcomes may also reflect the force's policing priorities. For example, some forces work hard with partner organisations to ensure that first time and low-level offenders are channelled away from the criminal justice system. In these areas locally-based community resolutions are likely to be more prevalent than elsewhere.

It is also important to understand that not all of the crimes recorded in the year will have been assigned an outcome as some will still be under investigation. For some

⁹ A plant native to Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, the leaves of which are frequently chewed as a stimulant. The possession and supply of khat became a criminal offence in England and Wales in 2014.

crime types such as sexual offences, the delay between a crime being recorded and an outcome being assigned may be particularly pronounced, as these may involve complex and lengthy investigations.

Figure 4: Proportion of outcomes assigned to offences recorded in the Metropolitan Police Service, in 12 months to 30 June 2016, by outcome type^{10,11}

Outcome number	Outcome type / group	Metropolitan Police	England and Wales
1	Charged/Summoned	10.6	12.1
4	Taken into consideration	0.0	0.2
	Out-of-court (formal)	3.8	3.2
2	Cautions - youths	0.2	0.4
3	Cautions - adults	2.8	2.3
6	Penalty Notices for Disorder	0.8	0.6
	Out-of-court (informal)	3.0	3.6
7	Cannabis/Khat warning	1.8	0.9
8	Community Resolution	1.2	2.8
*	Prosecution prevented or not in the public interest	2.7	1.8
	Evidential difficulties (victim supports police action)		
15	Suspect identified	6.2	8.3
	Evidential difficulties (victim does not support police action)	13.8	13.8
16	Suspect identified	8.8	10.6
14	Suspect not identified	5.0	3.2
18	Investigation complete – no suspect identified	50.8	47.4
20	Action undertaken by another body / agency	0.3	0.6
21	Further investigation to support formal action not in the public interest	0.1	0.1
	Total offences assigned an outcome	91.4	91.3
	Not yet assigned an outcome	8.6	8.7
	Total	100.00	100.00

*Includes the following outcome types: Offender died, Not in public interest (CPS), Prosecution prevented – suspect under age, Prosecution prevented – suspect too ill, Prosecution prevented – victim/key witness dead/too ill, Prosecution time limit expired

Source: Home Office crime outcomes data

For further information about these data, please see annex A

¹⁰ Dorset Police is excluded from the table. Therefore figures for England and Wales will differ from those published by the Home Office. For further details see annex A.

¹¹ 'Taken into consideration' is when an offender admits committing other offences in the course of sentencing proceedings and requests those other offences to be taken into consideration.

In the 12 months to 30 June 2016, the Metropolitan Police Service's use of 'taken into consideration' was among the lowest in England and Wales. However, any interpretation of outcomes should take into account that outcomes will vary dependent on the crime types that occur in each force area, and how it deals with offenders for different crimes.

How effective is the force's initial investigative response?

The initial investigative response is critical for an effective investigation. From the moment victims and witnesses make contact with the police the investigative process should start, so that accurate information and evidence can be gathered. It is important that forces record evidence as soon as possible after a crime. The longer it takes for evidence-recording to begin, the more likely it is that evidence will be destroyed, damaged or lost. Recording this evidence is usually the responsibility of the first officer who attends the scene. After the officer has completed this initial investigation the case may be handed over to a different police officer or team in the force. This process must ensure that the right people with the right skills investigate the right crimes.

Control room response

The Metropolitan Police Service has robust processes in place to enable it to assess and respond appropriately to contacts from victims and witnesses. The force does not use a triage model such as THRIVE¹² to prioritise calls. Instead, staff within the Metropolitan Communications Command (MetCC) have access to comprehensive written guidance (called standard operating procedures) to support them with gathering information at the first point of contact. They also have access to information about specific locations during a call. These act as warning markers to alert call handlers to additional information from previous incidents, but the information that is automatically displayed is limited. Standard message formats are available to help call handlers when completing vulnerability assessments. Once they have completed the questions in the standard operating procedure, and, if applicable, the vulnerability assessment, call handlers assess the information that they have been given and apply an initial grade to the call. Following the grading, calls are checked by a MetCC supervisor to ensure that incidents are allocated an appropriate response. Where one has been completed, the vulnerability assessment is also checked by the supervisor as part of this process.

A permanently staffed intelligence desk in MetCC provides information to response officers. Intelligence is provided in real time using an integrated intelligence platform which enables information to be drawn from several systems in a single search.

¹² THRIVE is a structured assessment based on the levels of threat, harm, risk and vulnerability faced by the victim, rather than simply by the type of incident or crime being reported in order to help staff determine the appropriate level of response to a call.

Initial intelligence checks often focus on officer safety concerns meaning that information about the vulnerability of the victim or the repeat nature of the incident may not be passed to responding officers. Where no risk is identified at the point of first contact and officer attendance is judged not necessary, a crime incident may be transferred to the telephone investigation bureau which contacts the caller by telephone to obtain details of the crime and completes a crime report.

A quality assurance process is in place in MetCC. As part of this, the quality assurance review team reviews the work of call handlers, despatchers (who allocate calls to response officers) and the intelligence teams. They listen to two calls per handler each day to ensure that calls are being managed appropriately. Feedback is then given to the call handler and their supervisor on areas for improvement. The quality assurance review team also reviews and assesses the quality of anti-social behaviour calls. We listened to ten live emergency calls and assessed them as being dealt with professionally and appropriately. Actions were: dispatching an immediate response, making a referral to the telephone investigation bureau, calling back the maker of an abandoned call¹³ to check that there was not a problem, or referring callers to their local police station or another agency.

How well do response officers investigate?

The way that the force supports its officers to carry out initial investigations needs to improve. In HMIC's 2015 effectiveness report, we stated that an area for improvement for the force was for it to ensure that officers attending the scenes of crime were appropriately trained and equipped to record all available evidence. In our 2016 inspection, we found that the standard message formats used in MetCC now include guidance on preserving evidence for forensic examination. The call handlers use this to guide callers when necessary so that they can preserve any evidence.

However, response officers still do not have access to basic equipment, such as digital cameras. Response officers are commonly the first to arrive at the scene of an incident and are responsible for carrying out the initial investigation. This includes completing 'golden hour' evidence retrieval. The officers have received training to do this. Not having the right equipment, however, hinders their ability to gather evidence when they first respond to a crime. The force recently started introducing body-worn video cameras to help to address this. The cameras will be issued to 22,000 frontline officers, police staff and detectives. At the time of inspection, 379 cameras had been issued; the project was due to be implemented by summer 2017.

We also found that important information is often not passed to officers by MetCC before their arrival at an incident, even though it is held on the force's systems. This could be because intelligence checks are prioritised and done first, based on the

¹³ A call or other type of contact initiated to a call centre that is ended before any conversation occurs.

grade of the response. When they try to contact the intelligence desk to make their own enquiries, response officers often experience difficulty with getting through. This can cause delays at the scene of an incident.

The force is aiming to improve the effectiveness of its investigations through a process that it calls 'Mi Investigation'. In this process, officers who are first on the scene of an incident will continue with the investigation, improving victim confidence and satisfaction as a result. But many of the force's response officers do not have investigation skills; these are not required in their current role. They will need to be trained to ensure they can undertake investigations to the standard required. Uniformed supervisors are also being trained to support response officers effectively. So far, 2,800 supervisors have been on the force's one-week 'leading investigation' programme, the aim of which is to improve the skills of those who supervise initial responders to enable them to supervise, direct, manage, and lead initial investigations better.

The Mi Investigations initiative has been in development since 2014. It was intended to carry out a trial of it in 2015, but this was delayed. A pilot trial has now commenced in one borough but it is in the early stages. The force is proposing to reorganise local policing and test the new model by 'merging' three boroughs in the east, and two boroughs in the north. of London. It is now intended to pilot Mi Investigations in these 'pathfinder'¹⁴ sites starting in March 2017. The force recognises the difficulty presented by this cultural change, and the training that will be required. It has designed initiatives to address these issues, such as the leadership development and leading investigation programmes. It has evaluated both of these initiatives. Some improvement is evident, for example in supervision and the time taken to conduct investigations, but the force has yet to see their full effects.

In HMIC's 2015 effectiveness report we said that the force needed to improve the quality of initial investigations; in our 2016 inspection, we still found cause for concern about the quality of initial investigations, their supervision and the handover paperwork. Because of these deficiencies, secondary investigators are spending unnecessary time carrying out enquiries and research that should already have been completed, delaying the progress of investigations and reducing the quality of service provided to some victims.

Crimes are effectively allocated for secondary investigation. Uniformed officers investigate most low-level crimes, with more serious crimes being allocated to specialist teams for investigation. Cases are allocated appropriately to the teams of uniformed officers and detectives who carry out secondary investigations. HMIC reviewed 90 police case files across crime types for: robbery, common assault

¹⁴ London boroughs in which new ways of working are tested so that their effectiveness can be evaluated before they are implemented across the force.

(when flagged as domestic abuse), grievous bodily harm (GBH), stalking, harassment, rape and domestic burglary. Files were randomly selected from crimes recorded between 1 January 2016 and 31 March 2016 and were assessed against several criteria. Due to the small sample size of cases selected, we have not used results from the file review as the sole basis for assessing individual force performance but considered them alongside other evidence gathered. Our review found that in vast majority of these cases the most appropriate team led the investigation.

How effective is the force's subsequent investigation?

Every day police forces across England and Wales investigate a wide range of crimes. These range from non-complex crimes such as some burglary and assault cases through to complex and sensitive investigations such as rape and murder. HMIC referred to national standards and best practice in examining how well forces allocate and investigate the full range of crimes, including how officers and staff can gather evidence to support investigations. These include the more traditional forensics, such as taking fingerprints, as well as more recently developed techniques like gathering digital evidence from mobile telephones or computers to find evidence of online abuse.

Quality of the investigation

Overall, the quality of secondary investigations in the force is good. Investigation plans are good and the majority of cases are regularly reviewed by a supervisor to ensure that progress is being made appropriately and that victim contact is maintained throughout the investigation. The evidence we gathered about secondary investigations support the results of our case file review. This showed that of the 90 files that we reviewed, a large majority showed there was an effective investigation, and that there was effective, or limited but appropriate, supervision. The force's crime allocation policies ensure that the right people with the right skills are investigating the right crimes. Cases are allocated to the right teams, but for more serious crimes, which are assigned to specialist teams for investigation, we found a shortage of trained detectives. The force currently has 15 percent fewer trained detectives than it considers necessary. This, together with an increase in some types of recorded crime, means that workloads are very high in some teams, which can create pressure on the ability of detectives to maintain the required standard for investigations. To assist, some investigation teams are supplemented by police constables and temporary detective constables who are undergoing the necessary training to be appointed as detectives.

The ability to collect forensic evidence to identify the perpetrators of crime is an essential element of any investigation. We found that the force is prioritising its provision of forensic services to ensure it uses resources in the most beneficial way. The force understands which crimes are most likely to yield forensic evidence that

will identify the offender and prioritises these, together with all major or serious crime such as murder, serious sexual assaults and rape. Investigators in both borough and specialist teams reported satisfaction with the forensic attendance for their cases, though some had experienced delays with receiving evidence for routine submissions and a consequent delay in their investigation.

The force has a dedicated intelligence command called Met Intel which is responsible for evaluating, analysing and developing intelligence to support investigations and operations. The force exploits digital sources of intelligence such as 'open source'¹⁵ and social media. It has provided training and detailed guidance for officers and staff engaged in online research and investigation. It also has a central open source unit that provides assistance in more complex cases.

Support to investigations

The force has a comprehensive capability to manage digital device examinations in support of investigations. In HMIC's 2015 effectiveness report we identified as an area of improvement that the force should improve its ability to retrieve digital evidence from mobile phones, computers and other electronic devices quickly enough to ensure that investigations are not delayed. The force has responded to this by continuing to increase its digital forensics capacity. This includes, for example, the implementation of self-service digital forensics kiosks that allow officers to download digital evidence from mobile devices. At the time of our 2016 inspection, 60 of a planned 96 such kiosks had been installed. At the time of our inspection the force had trained over 1,100 officers. There are also eight hubs across the force that conduct examinations of computers and advanced digital forensic examination of mobile devices. These hubs have no significant backlogs of work. In addition, the force's central digital forensics laboratory conducts the most complex digital forensics examinations and techniques.

The force has also actively sought to limit the demand for digital forensics. The training for kiosk users includes a module on how to identify which devices require examination and what information should be downloaded from them. The force has also introduced a policy that stipulates the requisite level of digital forensics examination for each type of offence. This represents a practical approach to managing demand. Notwithstanding this, the force should ensure that, as the demand for digital evidence inevitably increases, its cohort of trained officers continues to grow to meet this demand.


¹⁵ Intelligence from publicly available sources that is used to predict, prevent, investigate, prosecute crime.

Supporting victims

The new outcomes framework introduced in 2014 includes some outcomes where there were evidential difficulties,¹⁶ which had not previously been recorded. This was to gain an insight into the scale of crimes that the police could not progress further through the criminal justice process due to limited evidence. Furthermore, these outcomes can be thought of as an indicator for how effective the police are at working with victims and supporting them through investigative and judicial processes, as they record when victims are unwilling or unable to support continued investigations or when they have withdrawn their support for police action.

¹⁶ Evidential difficulties also includes where a suspect has been identified and the victim supports police action, but evidential difficulties prevent further action being taken.

Figure 5: Percentage of ‘Evidential difficulties; victim does not support action’ outcomes assigned to offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016, by force^{17,18}



Source: Home Office crime outcomes data

For further information about these data, please see annex A

For all offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016, the Metropolitan Police Service recorded 13.8 percent as 'Evidential difficulties; victim does not support police action'. This compares with 13.8 percent for England and Wales over the same period. However, it should be noted that not all of the offences committed in the 12 months to 30 June 2016 were assigned an outcome and consequently, these figures are subject to change over time.

The force is improving the effectiveness with which it keeps victims at the centre of its investigations. The force’s crime recording information system (CRIS) automatically prompts officers to make contact with a victim as required by the *Code*

¹⁷ Percentages of evidential difficulties can be affected by the level of certain types of crime within a force, such as domestic abuse related offences.

¹⁸ Dorset Police is excluded from the graph. Therefore, figures for England and Wales will differ from those published by the Home Office. For further details see annex A.

*of Practice for Victims of Crime.*¹⁹ The response to these alerts is monitored as part of the supervision process. This is a priority for senior leaders - officers are disciplined for non-compliance and this is being communicated across the organisation. A good quality of victim care was evident in the vast majority of case files that we reviewed. The officers we spoke with understood why victim care is important and were aware of the code. Many said that they routinely agree the frequency of their contact with the victims but as this cannot be logged in CRIS compliance with individual agreements cannot be monitored.

In HMIC's 2015 effectiveness (vulnerability) inspection of the force, we identified shortcomings in the force's use of victim personal statements and identified this as an area for improvement. The force has responded to this and improved its compliance with the code, and it is now mandatory to submit the victim personal statement in the electronic case file that is exchanged with the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). A performance report to measure compliance is in the early stages of development. However, the offer of a victim personal statement is often made later than the taking of the initial statement. The force should continue with its efforts to improve compliance in this area.

The force does not have a policy for dealing with prosecutions that are not supported by the victim. The decision about whether to proceed with an unsupported prosecution is made on a case-by-case basis, and is dependent on factors such as victims' understanding of the risk posed to them by not proceeding, for example where the victim is a child, and whether the evidence held is enough to support the prosecution.

How effectively does the force reduce re-offending?

We assessed how well the force works with other policing authorities and other interested parties to identify vulnerable offenders and prevent them from re-offending, and how well it identifies and manages repeat, dangerous or sexual offenders.

How well does the force pursue suspects and offenders?

The force monitors wanted persons and outstanding suspects effectively. The details of all offenders who are wanted in respect of warrants, breach of orders and other powers of arrest are entered onto the force's Emerald Warrants Management system (EWMS). The system is used to analyse trends, which are presented in an offender management report. This report is available to each borough for review and further

¹⁹ All police forces have a statutory duty to comply with the *Code of Practice for Victims of Crime*, which sets out the service victims of crime can expect from all parts of the criminal justice system. The code states that all victims of crime should be able to make a personal statement, which they can use to explain how the crime has affected them. Victims should also be kept updated about the progress of their case.

action and it is regularly used to assign tasks to frontline officers for the apprehension of wanted people. Many boroughs have enforcement teams, which also analyse the EWMS and use the outputs to undertake activity against wanted individuals as well as wider activity, for example to respond to a rise in a specific crime type.

The force has a detailed, phased, enforcement guide designed to assist investigators with locating and tracking down wanted offenders. The guide lists the actions that officers should undertake over three phases to increase the chances of locating wanted offenders. The EWMS has a case management function so that boroughs can record activity or information against individual records to ensure the sharing of information across all boroughs, and to enable the analysis of the effectiveness of enforcement activities. Information about persons wanted is also circulated on the Police National Computer.

The phased enforcement guide also sets out the approach to be taken in the case of foreign national offenders or subjects that are believed to be out of the UK. The force checks arrested foreign nationals with the National Police Chiefs' Council's criminal records office (ACRO)²⁰ though the results of these checks take some time to come through and are often received once the suspect has been released on bail.

How well does the force protect the public from the most harmful offenders?

The force is beginning to improve how it protects the public from the most harmful offenders. Although we saw some improvement in its approach to integrated offender management (IOM),²¹ the force could do more to ensure that this programme is implemented consistently across all areas. In HMIC's 2015 effectiveness report we noted that changes to the management of offenders were being inconsistently applied and needed to improve. The force has an IOM programme in place across London to manage repeat offenders. It has signed up to the pan-London integrated offender management strategic framework which sets out the roles and responsibilities of IOM partners including the force, London Probation, local authorities, CPS, HM Prison Service, youth offending teams and health services. The framework sets out the cohort definition, selection process and RAG (red, amber, green) ratings, which represent the likelihood of re-offending. Not all partner organisations have signed up to the framework, though we did not see evidence to suggest that they are not undertaking their responsibilities.

²⁰ ACRO Criminal Records Office manages criminal record information and is able to receive/share information with foreign countries in relation to foreign offenders arrested within the United Kingdom

²¹ IOM is a multi-agency response to the crime and reoffending threats faced by local communities. The most persistent and problematic offenders are identified and managed jointly by partner organisations working together.

Resources have been increased in some teams to improve resilience, a consistent scoring matrix is used and there is a joint approach to selecting offenders to be subject to IOM at monthly multi-agency meetings. The size of the cohorts varies from borough to borough but, in the main, they comprise offenders who have committed acquisitive crime. One borough's cohort included a small number of domestic abuse perpetrators. Another borough had a separate cohort, also of those who had committed domestic abuse.

The force is taking part in the MOPAC-funded 'Gripping the offender' pilot whereby £2 million has been allocated to eight boroughs over two years to assist with standardising the approach to IOM across the force. In one borough the benefits of being in the pilot were said to be improved access to public services and the attendance of a criminal rehabilitation company probation officer at court to fast track pre-sentencing reports. MOPAC and the force will evaluate the pilot in March 2017 to assess its effectiveness.

Not all IOM teams have co-located staff; those that are co-located have better access to partner information sharing, planning and decision making. A range of activities is undertaken to reduce the likelihood of re-offending, including referrals to statutory agencies and support organisations. However, there are no clear and consistent performance measures which could indicate the success of the programme. The measures for success vary, meaning that the basis on which an offender is removed from the cohort also differs. Some officers working in the IOM teams keep track of their performance using locally-designed spreadsheets so this information is not automatically available to other boroughs or partners. The force has taken steps to implement IDIOM.²² However, technical difficulties with the IDIOM system itself, such as inaccurate reporting of the costs of offending and a lack of access for partner agencies, including local authorities and community resolution companies (CRC), prevent the force from being able to make full use of this system. It is unclear when the Home Office and the Police ICT company²³ will resolve the technical problems.

Each borough has a 'Jigsaw' team that is responsible for managing registered sex offenders (RSOs) in the community. The average ratio of sex offender manager to RSO is approximately 1:50. The Jigsaw teams are small, so staff redeployments or sickness can increase the ratio quite significantly. Due to the type of work and level of training required this can present problems. The force is aware of this and tries to

²² IDIOM is a national web based IT system used by police forces and some other partners to support the delivery of local IOM arrangements across England and Wales. IDIOM enables the police and partners to monitor both their IOM cohort, and other, locally identified, offender cohorts.

²³ The Police ICT Company is a private company established by police and crime commissioners to support policing to make the public safer through better ICT. For more information see <https://ict.police.uk/>

use alternative solutions such as backfilling with officers who have the necessary experience.

The force has a small unit that is responsible for entering data on the violent sex offender register (ViSOR); suspects' details are entered on ViSOR when they are charged. The ViSOR unit has a compliance and quality assurance role to ensure that the Jigsaw teams update ViSOR records quickly and accurately. A central offender management unit also provides support to the Jigsaw teams. In addition, the central unit takes national responsibility for ensuring sex offenders deported from overseas are met on arrival at Heathrow Airport, summonsed, a notification order obtained and the relevant borough or force notified.

The Jigsaw teams are in the process of completing active risk management system (ARMS) assessments on their RSOs. ARMS is a structured assessment process to assess dynamic risk factors that are known to be associated with sexual re-offending, and protective factors that are known to be associated with reduced offending. It is intended to provide the police and probation services with information to plan the effective management of convicted sex offenders in the community. We were concerned to see that as at 1 July 2016, 736 RSOs were awaiting assessment. This means that the activities being undertaken to manage a large number of RSOs are not based on the most up-to-date assessment of risk, which could have an impact on their effectiveness. Work to complete the outstanding assessments is continuing but progress remains slow. The force should make arrangements for the backlog to be cleared so that the risk posed to the public by RSOs is managed effectively.

Sexual harm prevention orders (SHPOs) impose restrictions on individuals, such as being unable to work with children or to frequent certain places, in order to minimise the risk of harm by sex offenders living in the community. In the 12 months to 30 April 2016, the force issued 181 SHPOs; in the same period, 7 SHPOs and 85 sexual offences prevention orders²⁴ were breached. The Jigsaw teams apply for the appropriate order on conviction and are responsible for their monitoring. However, response and neighbourhood teams have limited knowledge of the RSOs in the community and do not routinely monitor or collect intelligence about them. The force should involve local teams more fully in this area. This is not to say that this does not occur, but we found it to be the exception rather than the norm.

²⁴ Sexual offences prevention orders (SOPOs) were introduced by the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and are designed to protect the public or any particular members of the public from serious sexual harm from an offender. As of March 2015, SOPOs were re-named sexual harm prevention orders (SHPOs).

Each borough has multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPAs)²⁵ in place. In the MAPPA meeting we observed that there was evidence of effective joint working. The conference was well-attended by partners including: probation; health workers; local housing officials and representatives of third sector organisations, such as the National Association for the Care and Rehabilitation of Offenders. The meeting was chaired by a senior police officer and considered how to respond effectively to a wide range of offending behaviour. We also spoke with partner agencies within MAPPA and, overall, they considered the involvement of the force to be good. The detective inspector from the central offender management unit sits on the London MAPPA strategic management board where MAPPA processes and procedures are discussed with other partner organisations.

Summary of findings



Requires improvement

The Metropolitan Police Service's investigation of crime and management of offenders requires improvement.

The force has robust processes in place to enable it to respond appropriately to reported incidents. Important information is passed to first responders, but difficulty with getting additional information causes delays at crime scenes.

Crimes are allocated effectively for secondary investigation; overall, the quality of investigation is good but initial investigations need to improve. The force is aiming to do this through 'Mi Investigation', but this is some way off implementation. The force has restructured its forensic provision successfully and works hard to meet the increased demand for this service. It has taken steps to improve compliance with the requirement to take victim personal statements, but further improvement is required.

The force monitors wanted persons and outstanding suspects actively. Its approach to integrated offender management is improving, but more needs to be done to ensure consistency. Progress in completing risk assessments for registered sex offenders is too slow. Response and neighbourhood teams have limited knowledge of these offenders locally and do not monitor or collect intelligence about them routinely.

Some improvement has certainly been made since HMIC's 2015 assessment of 'requires improvement'; the force needs to ensure that this continues.

²⁵ Multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPAs) are in place to ensure the successful management of violent and sexual offenders. Agencies involved include as responsible bodies the police, probation trusts and prison service. Other agencies may become involved, for example the Youth Justice Board will be responsible for the care of young offenders.

Areas for improvement

- The force should ensure that the risks posed by registered sex offenders are managed effectively.
- The force should ensure that frontline staff are aware of the registered sex offenders in their area so that they can play a part in their monitoring and management.
- The force should ensure that its integrated offender management programme is implemented consistently across all areas.

How effective is the force at protecting those who are vulnerable from harm, and supporting victims?

Protecting the public, particularly those who are most vulnerable, is one of the most important duties placed on police forces. People can be vulnerable for many reasons and the extent of their vulnerability can change during the time they are in contact with the police. Last year HMIC had concerns about how well many forces were protecting those who were vulnerable. In this section of the report we set out how the force's performance has changed since last year.

Has the force improved since HMIC's 2015 vulnerability inspection?

In HMIC's 2015 effectiveness (vulnerability) report we judged the Metropolitan Police Service to require improvement. This report provides an update on the force's progress against the areas for improvement identified in that report, which were that the force should:

- improve its response to missing and absent children by ensuring that it develops its understanding of the nature and scale of the issue, specifically in relation to persistently missing children, through an up-to-date assessment of available data, including that of partner organisations. It should also ensure that specialist staff receive appropriate training in relation to safeguarding and understanding how to prevent repeat instances which could lead to harm; and
- improve its compliance with the *Code of Practice for Victims of Crime* specifically in relation to victim personal statements.

Between February and May 2016 the force was inspected as part of HMIC's national child protection programme. We identified serious weaknesses in the quality and consistency of child protection investigations and subsequent action to keep victims safe. The force recognised quickly the work it needs to do to address our concerns, and is taking active steps to improve. However, in this inspection, HMIC found that serious weaknesses remain, some of which are similar to those identified in our child protection inspection of the force. For example:

- appropriate information on registered sex offenders not being routinely available to local officers;
- referrals the force receives not being allocated to those with the skills, capacity and competence to undertake the investigation in every case; and
- not determining how well officers and staff understand child sexual exploitation, including its potential links with missing and absent children.

In this 2016 effectiveness inspection we saw an early indication of the work that the force is doing to improve its services to vulnerable people. Officer and staff awareness of vulnerability has improved slightly since 2015, and vulnerability is now recognised as a force priority at all levels in the organisation. Other improvements include the force refreshing its child sexual exploitation problem profile to improve its understanding, and making clearer its systems and processes for dealing with missing and absent children. The force recognises that the changes it has made will take time to have an effect, and also that there is still much more work to do before its services to vulnerable people are of the standard that is expected and required.

Therefore, we judge the force to be inadequate in its approach to protecting vulnerable people, and supporting victims.

How effectively does the force identify those who are vulnerable and assess their level of risk and need?

In order to protect those who are vulnerable effectively forces need to understand comprehensively the scale of vulnerability in the communities they police. This requires forces to work with a range of communities, including those whose voices may not often be heard. It is important that forces understand fully what it means to be vulnerable, what might make someone vulnerable and that officers and staff who come into contact with the public can recognise this vulnerability. This means that forces can identify vulnerable people early on and can provide them with an appropriate service.

Understanding the risk

Forces define a vulnerable victim in different ways. This is because there is not a standard requirement on forces to record whether a victim is vulnerable on crime recording systems. Some forces use the definition from the government's *Code of Practice for Victims of Crime*,²⁶ others use the definition referred to in ACPO guidance²⁷ and the remainder use their own definition.

²⁶ *Code of Practice for Victims of Crime*, Ministry of Justice, 2013. Available from www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/254459/code-of-practicevictims-of-crime.pdf


²⁷ The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) is now the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC). ACPO Guidance on Safeguarding and Investigating the Abuse of Vulnerable Adults, NPIA, 2012. Available from: www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/major-investigation-and-public-protection/vulnerable-adults/

The Metropolitan Police Service uses its own definition of a vulnerable victim, which is:

“Vulnerability may result from an environmental or individual's circumstance or behaviour, indicating that there may be a risk to that person or another. Those who come to notice of the police as vulnerable will require an appropriate safeguarding response. Additional factors to vulnerability may include Mental Health, Disability, Age or illness and should include an appropriate multi-agency intervention, especially in cases of repeat victimisation”

Data returned by forces to HMIC show that in the 12 months to 30 June 2016, the proportion of crime recorded which involves a vulnerable victim varies considerably between forces, from 3.9 percent to 44.4 percent. For the 12 months to 30 June 2016, 10.0 percent of all recorded crime in the Metropolitan Police area was identified as having a vulnerable victim, which is broadly in line with the England and Wales figure of 14.3 percent.

Figure 6: Percentage of police-recorded crime with a vulnerable victim identified, by force, for the 12 months to 30 June 2016²⁸



Source: HMIC data return, Home Office data

For further information about these data, please see annex A

²⁸ City of London, Devon and Cornwall, Essex, Gloucestershire and Lancashire forces were unable to provide data for recorded crimes with a vulnerable victim identified. Therefore, these forces' data are not included in the graph or in the calculation of the England and Wales rate.

The Metropolitan Police Service has some understanding of the nature and scale of vulnerability in the force area although it has not used a clear definition of vulnerability until recently.

In HMIC's 2015 effectiveness (vulnerability) report we noted that the force was identifying vulnerability as set out by the College of Policing definition of adults at risk. This includes environmental factors or an individual's circumstances or behaviour. Officers and staff were using this definition, and as a result a large number of victims were placed in the vulnerable category. This creates high demand and leads to supervisors finding it difficult to prioritise a response for the most vulnerable. Before HMIC's 2016 effectiveness inspection, the force advised us that it used its own definition of vulnerability. (See above in 'Understanding the risk'). However, the force has since undertaken to adopt the definition of vulnerability referred to in the ACPO guidance to improve the identification of vulnerable individuals. It was intended to put this in place across the organisation during 2016. Everyone that we spoke to during the inspection understood that vulnerability is a priority for the force, but most did not know what the force's current definition of vulnerability is and could only describe vulnerability in its most obvious form. This is a slight improvement on our 2015 findings but falls short of what is required.

The force has established a safeguarding board to oversee the work of the diamond groups²⁹ in areas of vulnerability such as domestic abuse, missing persons, mental health and child sexual exploitation. The board will identify cross-cutting themes, lessons learned and good practice from sources such as HMIC's 2015 effectiveness (vulnerability) and national child protection reports which it will use to inform the development of the force's strategies and improvement plans. During our 2016 inspection, the board held its first meeting and started to draft formal terms of reference. Pacesetter or management meetings, held three times a day, consider the needs of vulnerable people both through the pre-meeting research processes undertaken by the local intelligence teams, and through discussion on standing agenda items. We saw examples of tasks being assigned in relation to high risk domestic abuse victims, offenders and missing persons, and actions being co-ordinated by the meeting's chair and allocated by the chair to the appropriate resource these actions included referrals to support agencies.

²⁹ Governance meetings known as diamond groups are chaired at chief officer level to oversee specific areas of vulnerability including domestic violence and missing and absent children.

In 2016, the force refreshed its child sexual exploitation problem profile. This document is based on the NPCC child sexual exploitation definition which mirrors that set out in the statutory 'Working Together' child sexual exploitation supplementary guidance, 2009.³⁰ The profile covers the London area and focuses exclusively on child sexual exploitation offending resulting in contact abuse. It includes information collected by the force, City of London Police, British Transport Police and 57 safeguarding partners. Also included in the profile is a list of the gaps in the intelligence held by the force and its partners. However, the force still does not fully understand how to identify the nature and scale of other vulnerabilities, such as those involving missing and absent children and domestic abuse, through profiling.

The force complied with the comprehensive 125 point national domestic abuse action plan which was created after HMIC's 2014 domestic abuse inspection. The force has since published an updated 60-point action plan. Progress against the plan is overseen through the strategic domestic abuse diamond group that is chaired by a force officer of National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) rank. The diamond group's membership consists of the chairs of the working groups that are allocated sections of the plan and held accountable for its progress. The working sub-groups cover: initial response; technology; training; criminal justice; offenders; communications; recommendations; and policy. There are eight areas from the previous plan where actions have yet to be completed. One of these is the commissioning of a domestic abuse problem profile; it is not known when this will be completed.

In the 12 months to 30 June 2016, 1.4 percent of the incidents reported to MetCC were flagged to identify cases involving mentally ill people. This is below the 2.4 percent for England and Wales as a whole. Many of the first responders whom we spoke with did not recall receiving mental health training in the past 12 months but said that mental health issues feature in the majority of incidents that they attended. The force needs to assure itself that mental health incidents are being flagged by MetCC as far as possible to enable it to understand fully the demand that mental health presents.

Repeat vulnerability or repeat victimisation occur are flagged up on the computer-aided despatch system if a call is received from the same address or telephone number as previous calls. In addition, call handlers use standard message formats to ask supplementary questions to identify repeat callers. Despite this, information about repeat vulnerability and repeat victimisation is often not passed to the first responders with the other details of an incident. This could be because the provision of additional information to ensure officer safety is the primary concern. Call handlers also use standard message formats to guide them through the vulnerability assessment process. We observed this being used appropriately to prioritise the

³⁰ *Safeguarding children and young people from sexual exploitation*, Department for Education, 2009. Available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/safeguarding-children-and-young-people-from-sexual-exploitation-supplementary-guidance

response in the live emergency calls that we listened to. The identification of vulnerability is one element that is assessed in the force's call handling quality assurance process to ensure that it is appropriate.

How effectively does the force initially respond to vulnerable victims?

The initial work of officers responding to a vulnerable person is vital, because failure to carry out the correct actions may make future work with the victim or further investigation very difficult. This could be the first time victims have contacted the police after suffering years of victimisation or they may have had repeated contact with the police; either way, the response of officers is crucial. The initial response to a vulnerable victim must inspire confidence that the victim's concerns are being taken seriously as well as provide practical actions and support to keep the victim safe. The officer should also assess the risk to the victim at that moment and others in the same household, and collect sufficient information to support the longer-term response of the force and other partner organisations.


Do officers assess risk correctly and keep victims safe?

The Home Office has shared domestic abuse related offences data, recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016, with HMIC. These are more recent figures than those previously published by the Office for National Statistics. These data show that in the 12 months to 30 June 2016, police-recorded domestic abuse in the Metropolitan Police area increased by 15 percent compared with the 12 previous months. This compares with an increase of 23 percent across England and Wales. In the same period, police-recorded domestic abuse accounted for 10 percent of all police-recorded crime in the Metropolitan Police area, compared with 11 percent of all police-recorded crime across England and Wales.

The rate of arrest for domestic abuse offences can provide an indication of a force's approach to handling domestic abuse offenders. Although for the purpose of this calculation arrests are not directly tracked to offences, a high arrest rate may suggest that a force prioritises arrests for domestic abuse offenders over other potential form of action (for further details, see annex A). HMIC has evaluated the arrest rate alongside other measures during our inspection process to understand how each force deals with domestic abuse overall.

In the Metropolitan Police Service, for every 100 domestic abuse related offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016, there were 45 arrests made in the same period.

Figure 7: Domestic abuse arrest rate (per 100 domestic abuse crimes), by force, for the 12 months to 30 June 2016³¹



Source: HMIC data return, Home Office data

For further information about these data, please see Annex A

The force has an effective process for identifying and assessing vulnerability at first response. In order to identify any vulnerability, first responders are required to complete the vulnerability assessment framework when they come into contact with an adult member of the public; they then decide what to do next. The framework requires officers to assess the vulnerability of adults across five areas:³² If there is a cause for concern in three or more of these areas a Merlin³³ report is created. Under Every Child Matters³⁴ officers are required to assess the wellbeing and safety of children and young people who come to their notice. If there are concerns that a

³¹ Derbyshire, Durham and Gloucestershire forces were not able to provide domestic abuse arrest data. Therefore, these forces' data are not included in the graph or in the calculation of the England and Wales rate.

³² The five areas across which officers are required to assess vulnerability under the force's vulnerability assessment framework are: appearance; behaviour; communication/capacity; danger; and environmental circumstances.

³³ Merlin is a database that stores information on missing persons or children who have become known to the police for any reason.

³⁴ Every Child Matters (ECM) is a UK government initiative for England and Wales, that was launched in 2003, at least partly in response to the death of Victoria Climbié. It is an approach to the wellbeing of children and young people from birth through to age 19. For policing purposes, the Children Act applies to children and young people under the age of 18, and also includes unborn children.

child or young person does not meet the five main outcomes³⁵ officers are required to complete the Merlin pre-assessment checklist. All Merlin reports go to the multi-agency safeguarding hub (MASH)³⁶ for assessment. The first responders and other staff we spoke with were very knowledgeable about the vulnerability assessment framework and pre-assessment checklist, and knew when and how they should be used.

The force is working to improve its approach to dealing with missing and absent children. An area for improvement for the force in HMIC's 2015 effectiveness (vulnerability) report was that it should improve its response to such children by ensuring that it develops its understanding of the nature and scale of the issue, specifically in relation to persistently missing children, through an up-to-date assessment of available data, including that of partner organisations. It should also ensure that specialist staff received appropriate training in relation to safeguarding and understanding how to prevent repeat instances which could lead to harm. To respond to this, the force has reviewed and made clearer the systems and processes that it has in place for the categorisation and subsequent review of missing and absent persons, both within MetCC and by supervisors in the boroughs. Standard- and medium-risk incidents are retained by response teams for the first 48 hours to carry out intelligence checks and make further enquiries. During this time, incidents are subject to review by a response inspector at set points. If an incident is not resolved within 48 hours it is passed to the specialist missing persons unit for further investigation.

Following first response and the completion of initial enquiries, high-risk incidents are passed to the specialist missing persons unit immediately for investigation, though not all of these units provide this service all day every day. High-risk incidents are therefore retained by a senior detective on duty (who may be from another team), until the handover can take place. All open incidents are reviewed in the daily management meeting to ensure that every possible action is being taken to locate missing persons. The MetCC quality assurance team reviews calls of this type, the initial action taken and the policing response. Trigger plans are in place for the most frequently-missing children and systems are in place for conducting safe and well checks upon their return. Some of the borough-based missing persons units work alongside officers from teams such as the child sexual exploitation team within the sexual offences, exploitation and child abuse command, so recognise that there may

³⁵ The five main outcomes of the Every Child Matters frameworks are: be healthy, stay safe, enjoy and achieve, make a positive contribution and achieve economic wellbeing.

³⁶ A multi-agency safeguarding hub (MASH) brings together into a single location key safeguarding agencies to better identify risks to children (and in some areas, vulnerable adults), and improve decision-making, interventions, and outcomes. The MASH enables the multi-agency team to share all appropriate information in a secure environment, and ensure that the most appropriate response is provided to effectively safeguard and protect the individual.

be a link between a missing child and sexual exploitation. However, it is of concern that the sexual exploitation risks associated with missing children are not consistently appreciated in all of these units.

First responders have access to a range of 'toolkits' or guidance to support them with taking the appropriate action when attending incidents such as domestic abuse, missing and absent children, stalking and harassment and hate crime. The domestic abuse toolkit makes clear the requirement for all attending officers to complete a domestic abuse, stalking and harassment (DASH)³⁷ form to identify risk and decide whether immediate safeguarding is required for the members of the household, particularly children. All of the first responders that we spoke with know what DASH is and when they are required to complete it.

The toolkits provide guidance to first responders on conducting immediate safeguarding actions. They can also contact specialist teams, most of which provide a 24/7 service to seek further advice if required. Of the case files that we reviewed, and that had a vulnerable victim, the vast majority showed evidence that immediate safeguarding had been considered and the risk of danger mitigated. Arresting a domestic abuse suspect is one of the safeguarding actions that can be taken. However, in the 12 months to 30 June 2016 the force's arrest rate showed a notable decrease compared to the previous 12 months. Comparatively, the caution rate remains relatively stable. The disparity between arrest rates and charge rates may mean that opportunities to protect victims are not always being taken. The DASH form is checked as part of the initial investigation supervision process to ensure that risk has been appropriately assessed, and the safeguarding actions taken reflect this. At this point, supervisors can also revise the level of risk and safeguarding actions and document the reason for doing this.

The investigation of domestic abuse cases is carried out by the force's community safety units, of which there is one on each borough. The supervisor in each unit reviews the CRIS (crime recording information system) record for all domestic abuse incidents in the borough. Cases are then allocated to an investigator in the unit. During our inspection we visited a number of these units. A consistent theme is that the quality of the completed DASH form is variable, and mistakes or concerns are not addressed by the completing officer's supervisor. Examples were given where the response to a question was noted as 'yes' but more information was not sought or documented even though it was obvious that this should have been done. In another example no mention was made originally of children as members of a household and then the presence of children is identified during the secondary investigation. The force recently undertook a dip-sample of 600 domestic abuse incidents and identified that 18 percent did not have a corresponding DASH record.

³⁷ DASH is a risk identification, assessment and management model adopted by UK police forces and partner agencies in 2009. The aim of the DASH assessment is to help front-line practitioners identify high risk cases of domestic abuse, stalking and so-called honour-based violence.

This means that the force cannot be sure that early safeguarding opportunities are not being missed. It also means that secondary investigators are spending unnecessary time completing, researching and quality assuring the DASH form to understand fully the level of risk posed to all the individuals involved.

The force shares information about vulnerable people with its partner agencies. A Merlin report is created if there is a cause for concern in three or more areas of the vulnerability assessment framework, or if a pre-assessment checklist is completed. It is also the force's policy to create a Merlin report if a child is featured in a domestic abuse investigation, regardless of whether that child was present at the incident. Merlin reports are assessed by the partner organisations working in the MASH and follow-on actions should be jointly agreed.

Operation Encompass is a scheme which provides support to children who are affected by domestic abuse.³⁸ The force recognises the benefits of this initiative, but at the time of our inspection no decision had been made to implement it more widely in the force area. Information about children affected by domestic abuse is shared with schools through the MASH structure, based on the level of risk.

How effectively does the force investigate offences involving vulnerable victims and work with external partners to keep victims safe?

Those who are vulnerable often have complex and multiple needs that a police response alone cannot always meet. They may need support with housing, access to mental health services or support from social services. Nonetheless, the police still have an important responsibility to keep victims safe and investigate crimes. These crimes can be serious and complex (such as rape or violent offences). Their victims may appear to be reluctant to support the work of the police, often because they are being controlled by the perpetrator (such as victims of domestic abuse or child sexual exploitation).

The force needs to improve the way in which it investigate offences involving vulnerable victims and works with external partner agencies to keep victims safe. The arrangements for investigating offences involving vulnerability and safeguarding fall to specialist teams, both centrally and borough-based. The benefit of this is that specialist skills and experience are practised and readily available. However, this 'silo' way of working in isolation adversely affects the force's ability to provide a consistent service in relation both to the investigations and from a victim-focused perspective, and was an aggravating factor in our national child protection

³⁸ Operation Encompass is in operation across 15 police force areas. It aims to safeguard and support children and young people who have been involved in or affected by incidents involving domestic abuse. Following such an incident, a school's 'key adult' is contacted by 9am the next day and made aware. Arrangements can then be put in place to support children during their school day.

inspection.³⁹ The force recognises this and has plans to address this as part of the reorganisation of local policing.

The force has too few detectives. When we spoke with the officers who had been brought in to supplement a specialist team some said that they had yet to undergo the training they need to make them fully effective in their role. In one example, an officer had moved to a team 18 months previously but had yet to receive role-specific training. In another, police constable investigators were carrying inappropriate crimes for their training rather than fulfilling their core role of supporting the detectives in the team with their investigations. This is reducing the effectiveness of some investigations. The force needs to explore how it can resource these teams better or how the work in these teams can be better managed. Courses for those in specialist teams are included in the force's 2016/17 training plan; the force needs to understand why this gap in specialist training remains.

The force's use of domestic abuse protection orders and notices (DVPOs and DVPNs)⁴⁰ is very low. Its use of Clare's Law⁴¹ is also very low. In the 12 months to 30 June 2016, the force applied for 126 DVPOs, which is a rate of 0.2 applications per 100 domestic-abuse-flagged offences. This is below the 1.0 applications per 100 domestic abuse-flagged-offences for England and Wales as a whole. In the same period 120 DVPOs were granted. The force does not record DVPO breaches. When we asked about the low use of orders and notices, the reasons cited included officers lacking experience in using them, the orders being seen as too much work, and being expensive (especially if they are not granted by the court). The force

³⁹ *National Child Protection Inspections – The Metropolitan Police Service*, HMIC, 2016. Available from: www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/publications/metropolitan-police-service-national-child-protection-inspection/

⁴⁰ Domestic Violence Prevention Notice (DVPN) is the initial notice issued by the police to provide emergency protection to an individual believed to be the victim of domestic violence. This notice, which must be authorised by a police superintendent, contains prohibitions that effectively bar the suspected perpetrator from returning to the victim's home or otherwise contacting the victim. A DVPN may be issued to a person aged 18 years and over if the police superintendent has reasonable grounds for believing that: the individual has been violent towards, or has threatened violence towards an associated person, and the DVPN is necessary to protect that person from violence or a threat of violence by the intended recipient of the DVPN. Domestic Violence Protection Orders (DVPOs) are designed to provide protection to victims by enabling the police and magistrates courts to put in place protection in the immediate aftermath of a domestic abuse incident. Where there is insufficient evidence to charge a perpetrator and provide protection to a victim via bail conditions, a DVPO can prevent the perpetrator from returning to a residence and from having contact with the victim for up to 28 days, allowing the victim time to consider their options and get the support they need.

⁴¹ The domestic violence disclosure scheme (DVDS), also known as Clare's Law, increases protection for domestic abuse victims and enables the police to better identify domestic abuse perpetrators. For more information, see: www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/major-investigation-and-public-protection/domestic-abuse/leadership-strategic-oversight-and-management/#domestic-violence-disclosure-scheme-clares-law

provides data to its community safety units in respect of repeat domestic abuse victims and perpetrators. This data is circulated with advice on the cases where the use of DVPOs and DVPNs is likely to be most effective; however, this work is not followed up to see if the advice has been taken.

The force's Operation Bellona⁴² aims to take action on 50 cases of the most serious child sexual exploitation offences a month, but is currently only dealing with 31 each month. We were told that it can take between two and four months from receiving the initial intelligence to taking action, to build a case. In building a case, investigators make a number of internal and external checks. Checks of police systems can be carried out quickly but checks with agencies such as the Driver Vehicle Licensing Authority, HM Revenue & Customs, HM Passport Office and the Department for Work and Pensions take longer; hence it is taking a long time to get a case to the point where a warrant can be executed. During this time, a suspect can continue to be active and can therefore continue to pose a risk. Cases are built in the force's intelligence system; CRIS and Merlin entries are not made during this time so it is unclear what, if any, safeguarding measures are taken while an investigation is ongoing.

The force contributes to multi-agency work to safeguard vulnerable victims with external agencies such as local authority children and adult services, probation services and other community safety partners. We spoke with a number of partner organisations who said that, overall, the working relationship with police officers and staff is good at both local and force-wide levels. Information-sharing processes were said to work well and examples were given showing where the force and its partners had participated in joint training aimed at improving their shared understanding and effectiveness. Each borough has a MASH, although these are not consistent in structure, responsibilities or processes across the force. The MASH units we visited were essentially a co-located process for the police to make referrals into children services, and, in some boroughs, adults' services, rather than co-located, joined up safeguarding services. We visited several MASH units and we found that there are no shared ICT systems, the police are not involved in final safeguarding decisions, nor could they track subsequent actions, as these are documented on non-police systems. The force needs to consider how best to work with its partners to standardise the MASHs in all areas.

⁴² An operation identifying suspects who are sharing digital images of child sexual exploitation.

Victims of domestic abuse

In April 2015, the Home Office began collecting information from the police on whether recorded offences were related to domestic abuse. Crimes are identified by the police as domestic abuse related if the offence meets the government definition of domestic violence and abuse.⁴³

The rate of outcomes recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016 for domestic abuse offences is shown in figure 8. Domestic abuse crimes used in this calculation are not necessarily those to which the outcomes have been assigned and are only linked by the fact that they both occur in the 12 months to 30 June 2016. Therefore, direct comparisons should not be made between general outcomes in figure 4, where each crime is linked to its associated outcome (for further details see annex A).

Figure 8: Rate of outcomes recorded in 12 months to 30 June 2016 for domestic-abuse-related offences in the Metropolitan Police Service area⁴⁴

Outcome type / group	Metropolitan Police	England and Wales
Charged / Summoned	21.2	23.2
Caution – adults	10.2	5.6
Caution – youths	0.2	0.3
Community resolution	0.9	1.4
Evidential difficulties prevent further action; victim supports police action	22.1	24.1
Evidential difficulties prevent further action; victim does not support police action	26.4	35.4

Source: HMIC data return, Home Office data

For further information about these data, please see annex A

In the 12 months to 30 June 2016, The Metropolitan Police's use of 'caution – adults' was among the highest in England and Wales in cases with identified domestic abuse. However, any interpretation of outcomes should take into account that outcomes will vary dependent on the crime types that occur in each force area, and how it deals with offenders for different crimes.

⁴³ Any incident or pattern of incidents of controlling, coercive or threatening behaviour, violence or abuse between those aged 16 or over who are or have been intimate partners or family members regardless of gender or sexuality.

⁴⁴ Dorset Police and Nottinghamshire Police were unable to submit domestic abuse outcomes data. Therefore, these forces' data are not included in the graph or in the calculation of the England and Wales rate.

The force's response to domestic abuse victims varies and needs to improve. Risks to domestic abuse victims are initially managed by the response officer who attends in the first instance. Responsibility for ongoing safety planning, contact with the victim and managing any criminal investigation then passes to officers in the borough-based community safety unit. Cases are dealt with according to the level of risk.

High-risk victims are given the option of additional support through the services of an independent domestic violence adviser (IDVA), with each case being referred to a multi-agency risk assessment conference (MARAC)⁴⁵ to enable police and partner organisations to agree a co-ordinated set of actions to minimise the risk to victims. Cases that are assessed as medium- or standard-risk are actively reviewed to identify any changes to the level of risk and adapt the investigation and safeguarding plans accordingly. However, as mentioned above, the quality of the completed DASH form is variable, and mistakes or concerns are not addressed by managers during supervision. Also, an internal review showed that 20 percent of 300 domestic abuse incidents did not have a corresponding DASH record. This means that the force cannot be sure that the right level of risk is being assessed by first responders, if at all, which will have an effect on the initial response to victims of domestic abuse.

Operation Dauntless was launched in 2013 as part of the force's domestic abuse action plan, and aims through reducing re-offending, to reduce repeat victimisation. Under this operation all 'crimes' and 'no crimes' recorded on CRIS in the previous six months which have a domestic violence flag are analysed to identify the victims at high risk and the offenders who pose the highest risk of harm. A formula is used to score each victim and offender. This takes into account factors such as the number of incidents, the average time between incidents occurring, and the severity of injury. Another formula is then applied to identify the highest risk victims and offenders in a borough, a list of whom is sent monthly to the detective inspector in the borough's community safety unit for review. This list is used to decide the activities that will be undertaken by officers in the unit to detect, deter and disrupt offenders, and plan safeguarding measures with the victims who are highest on the list. The inspectors are required to document in their domestic abuse operational plan who on the list will be targeted, the activities that will be undertaken and the rationale for this. They also meet on a monthly basis; discussions include lessons learned and the sharing of good practice. Monthly analysis of domestic abuse data would enable the force to assess the effect that targeted activity under Operation Dauntless is having on repeat victimisation and on reducing re-offending. However, at the time of the inspection only one of the force's 32 borough was evaluating the effects of this operation.

⁴⁵ Multi-agency risk assessment conferences (MARACs) are local, multi agency victim-focused meetings where information is shared on the highest risk cases of domestic violence and abuse between different statutory and voluntary sector agencies.

Summary of findings



Inadequate

The Metropolitan Police Service is inadequate in its capacity and capability to protect those who are vulnerable from harm and support victims. HMIC's 2016 child protection inspection found serious shortcomings in the force's response to missing and absent children. These findings have been considered as part of HMIC's 2015 effectiveness assessment.

The force's awareness, consideration and assessment of vulnerability have improved slightly since 2015. The force has also updated its child sexual exploitation problem profile, although it still does not fully understand the nature and scale of other forms of vulnerability. Systems and processes in place for dealing with missing and absent persons have been made clearer, and support systems are in place to help officers and staff when dealing with vulnerable people. Despite these changes, problems remain in understanding the links between missing and absent children and child sexual exploitation, and in considering all individuals and risk in domestic abuse incidents. Officers and staff often fail to complete the proper risk assessments to ensure that victims of domestic abuse are kept safe.

Specialist teams investigate offences involving vulnerability and safeguarding. However, there is a shortage of detectives in these teams, and a lack of co-ordination between teams hampers the quality of some investigations involving vulnerable victims. Opportunities to protect victims of domestic abuse are being missed.

Cause of concern

The Metropolitan Police Service's approach to protecting vulnerable people from harm and supporting victims is a cause of concern to HMIC. There are a range of shortcomings which, taken together, mean that the force is providing a poor service to vulnerable people and putting victims at risk.

Recommendations

The force should immediately take steps to improve its services to vulnerable people by:

- developing its understanding of the nature and scale of other vulnerabilities in the force area, such as missing and absent children and domestic abuse;
- assuring itself that mental health incidents are being flagged as far as possible, to enable it to understand fully the demand that this presents;
- ensuring that frontline officers have the awareness and knowledge required to recognise vulnerability in all its forms;
- improving the completion rate, quality and supervision of DASH forms;
- understanding why training gaps remain in specialist teams and considering how best to respond to these;
- improving the uptake of training for specialist investigation where this is available;
- increasing the use of Domestic Abuse Protection Orders, Domestic Abuse Prevention Notices, and Clare's Law; and
- improving the consistency of the structure, responsibilities and processes in the multi-agency safeguarding hubs.

How effective is the force at tackling serious and organised crime?

Serious and organised crime poses a threat to the public across the whole of the UK and beyond. Individuals, communities and businesses feel its damaging effects. Police forces have a critical role in tackling serious and organised crime alongside regional organised crime units (ROCU), the National Crime Agency (NCA) and other partner organisations. Police forces that are effective in this area of policing tackle serious and organised crime not just by prosecuting offenders, but by disrupting and preventing organised criminality at a local level.

HMIC judged the Metropolitan Police Service to be good at tackling serious and organised crime in its 2015 effectiveness report. That report highlighted the good work that the force is doing to tackle gang and cyber-crime, and armed robbery on commercial premises. It also highlighted the good work being done in respect of organised crime groups (OCGs), although the force was not working in line with national guidance. The force was found to be completing only the basic analytical functions of OCG mapping and was not exploiting other opportunities to analyse the impact on London of OCGs based in other forces. In addition, the force was not routinely reassessing OCGs after significant operational activity had taken place. The knowledge, awareness and involvement of neighbourhood policing teams in respect of OCG was also limited.

The force has completed a review of OCGs since 2015, which is a positive development; however, there has been no significant change in the force's approach to organised crime group mapping. It is primarily for this reason that the force is judged to require improvement at tackling serious and organised crime in its 2016 effectiveness inspection. We do not dispute, however, that London clearly has a greater challenge with OGCs than most forces and (in places) achieves some excellent results. What follows should be seen in that context.

How effectively does the force understand the threat and risk posed by serious and organised crime?

In order to tackle serious and organised crime effectively forces must first have a good understanding of the threats it poses to their communities. Forces should be using a range of intelligence (not just from the police but also from other partner organisations) to understand threats and risks, from traditional organised crime such as drug dealing and money laundering to the more recently-understood threats such as cyber-crime and child sexual exploitation.

As at 1 July 2016, the Metropolitan Police Service was actively disrupting, investigating or monitoring 84 organised crime groups (OCGs) per million of the population. This compares to 46 OCGs per million of the population across England and Wales.

The Metropolitan Police Service's understanding of the threat and risk posed by serious and organised crime is incomplete. The force has a dedicated intelligence command (called Met Intel) which is responsible for assessing threat, harm and risk and this includes that posed by serious and organised crime. The force uses MoRiLE scoring as a structured process to assess serious and organised crime. A force-wide problem profile was created in 2015, but there is no serious and organised crime partnership board in the force to appraise the profile (other than by thematic area), and there is no evidence that partner agencies contributed to its production. The profile is therefore an incomplete description of the threat from serious and organised crime in London.

In an attempt to improve the serious and organised crime local profile, the force shared information about organised crime groups (OCGs) with the local authority in one of its boroughs. No overlap between intelligence held on the names of people involved in OCGs (nominals) and information held by the local authority was found. This may be because only the more serious OCGs are mapped by the force, and these are likely to be less visible to local partner organisations. However, as a result, no new opportunities for the disruption of OCGs using local partners were found, and this work has been put on hold. The force does not intend to pursue any further development of the local profile, with or without partners, until the results of the reorganisation of local policing (which will create 'pathfinder' boroughs) are known. This is unlikely to be before 2017/18. We found it surprising that there were no common elements, such as repeat reports of anti-social behaviour to both parties, found between the data held by the force and by the local authority. The force should consider how best to re-visit these findings to ensure that useable intelligence has not been missed.


In contrast, the force uses police intelligence well to develop its understanding of the threat from serious and organised crime. The intelligence development team in Met Intel covers four control strategy⁴⁶ priority areas: gangs, guns, public order and sexual offences. Each area is divided into sub-groups, for example knife crime and child sexual exploitation. An analyst research team is allocated to each area to carry out daily scanning and assist in the development of intelligence. Newer threats such as child sexual exploitation, modern slavery and foreign national offenders, are integral to the work of this team. The intelligence products are used to inform the task assignment process.

⁴⁶ Control strategy: this sets out and communicates the operational priorities for the force or command area and sets the long-term priorities for crime prevention, intelligence and enforcement.

Neighbourhood policing teams have little involvement in tackling serious and organised crime, although they sometimes undertake activities such as executing warrants. They do not gather intelligence routinely, even on lower level OCG networks, and are often unaware of the OCGs that operate in their communities. This is because of cultural and historical reasons explained later on in the report (see page 56). In contrast, there is good local knowledge and awareness of the gangs that operate in a community. Trident (the force's gang crime command) uses a range of tactics to deal with gangs, both locally and across London; there is good local awareness of and involvement in these activities.

The force's organised crime group mapping (OCGM) is poor; we conclude, therefore, that its understanding of organised crime is incomplete. It identifies and maps some OCGs, but not in accordance with national guidance. Mapping is largely carried out as a means to obtain resources as part of the task assignment process, rather than as a means of understanding the threats facing the force and the public. In addition, the force does not review OCG scores in accordance with the timescales set in the national manual. This is because the resources currently allocated to OCG mapping are insufficient for the force to meet national standards. Both of these concerns were raised in HMIC's 2015 effectiveness report. Since then, some progress has been made with reviewing OCGs, which has reduced the number not reviewed in the previous 12 months significantly: and limited extra analyst resource has been allocated to OCGM. The force has also started training across the organisation to improve understanding and compliance with the entire mapping process.

Figure 9: Organised crime groups per one million population, by force, as at 1 July 2016⁴⁷




Source: HMIC data return

For further information about these data, please see annex A

Forces categorise OCGs by the predominant form of criminal activity in which the group is involved. Although OCGs are likely to be involved in multiple forms of criminality (groups supplying drugs may also be supplying firearms and be involved in money laundering), this indicates their most common characteristic. 'Drug activity' was the most common predominant crime type of the OCGs managed by the Metropolitan Police Service as at 1 July 2016. This was also the most common OCG crime type recorded by all forces in England and Wales.

⁴⁷ City of London Police data have been removed from the chart and the England and Wales rate as its OCG data are not comparable with other forces due to size and its wider national remit.

Figure 10: Active organised crime groups by predominant crime type in the Metropolitan Police area, as at 1 July 2016



Source: HMIC data return

Note: Figures may not sum to 100 percent due to rounding. For further information about these data, please see annex A.

As well as OCGs, as at 1 July 2016 the force was managing 195 urban street gangs. Its Trident gang crime command has responsibility for tackling gang violence and the prevention and investigation of all non-fatal shootings in London, regardless of the victim’s background. Its aims include reducing the harm caused by street gangs and organised criminal networks across London. The force assesses gangs using a similar, structured process to OCG mapping. It refers to this as a gangs matrix. The gangs matrix is used to target the highest harm individuals. For an entry on the local gangs matrix, two corroborated pieces of intelligence that the individual is in a gang are required; the level of propensity to violence is also taken into account. The matrix is used to inform the force’s local and pan-London activities. At the time of our inspection there were 3,563 people on the matrix.

The force fulfils its responsibilities to other forces, but only where there is a link between OCGs that the force and other forces have mapped. An example of this co-operation is Operation Alchemist, where forensics from two armed robberies in different parts of the country confirmed the involvement of the same suspects. The joint enterprise that ensued between the force and West Yorkshire Police resulted in the convictions and lengthy custodial sentences.

How effectively does the force respond to serious and organised crime?

An effective force will pursue and prosecute offenders and disrupt organised criminality at a local level. The force will use specialist capabilities, both in the force and at regional level, and non-specialist capabilities such as its neighbourhood teams. While it can be complex for a force to assess the success of its actions against serious and organised crime, it is important that the force understands the extent to which it disrupts this crime and reduces harm.

The force's approach to dealing with serious and organised crime is not as effective as it could be and should improve. As at 1 July 2016, the force had 727 active OCGs recorded on its OCGM tracker. We found that investigations into OCGs are, in the main, carried out by staff within its organised crime and Trident gang crime commands. The force dedicates significant resources to both commands: there are 1,065 officers and 68 staff working in organised crime, and 478 officers working in Trident. As a result, in the year 2015-16 the force seized £73m of cash and assets; this is an increase of 10.4 percent on the previous year. It also recovered just over 675 and 5,606 kilos of Class A and Class B drugs respectively. Clearly, the force is achieving excellent results in this area.

However, we found that investigations are mapped primarily for the purpose of obtaining additional investigative resources or to gain access to resources that operate undercover. In many cases the investigation process controls the OCGM process rather than the investigation being initiated once the OCG is mapped. This means that OCGs are identified and prioritised for intervention based on a flawed approach to OCGM. There is a perception by the force that it should not have to map what it is not working on. This is incorrect: it means that decisions about which OCGs to prioritise for intervention cannot be properly informed by an understanding of their intent and capability.

The force has chosen not to adopt the lead responsible officer (LRO) role described in national guidance. LROs should take a long-term view and work towards dismantling an OCG. They adopt the 4Ps approach,⁴⁸ working with partners and neighbourhood teams where appropriate, with the aim of reducing the level of serious and organised crime in the force area. By contrast, the force uses senior investigating officers who take a shorter-term approach to tackling OCGs. The 4Ps

⁴⁸ These are the four components of the government's serious and organised crime strategy. The 4Ps provides a national framework for tackling serious and organised crime. Developed for national counter-terrorist work, it has four thematic pillars, often referred to as the 4Ps, which can be adapted for other areas: Pursue - prosecuting and disrupting people engaged in serious and organised crime; Prevent - preventing people from engaging in serious and organised crime; Protect - increasing protection against serious and organised crime; Prepare - reducing the impact of this criminality where it takes place.

are inconsistently applied. The force has started to use the 4Ps approach to serious and organised crime at a strategic level and there is evidence of the 4Ps in the work of FALCON,⁴⁹ the Flying Squad,⁵⁰ the modern slavery and kidnap unit and Trident. However, in only a small number of cases are OCGs subject to prevent, protect or prepare activity; instead, the force's approach to OCGs is overwhelmingly based on pursue.

The force's approach to tackling OCGs usually lacks the involvement of partner agencies and local policing teams. Documentation provided by the force shows that only around 6 percent of the force's OCGs have non-law enforcement partner agency activity recorded against them. This may be because responsibility for the management and investigation of all OCGs rests with specialist commands such as the modern slavery and kidnap unit, where a range of partners is involved in the approaches being taken. To its credit, the force is trying to increase partner involvement in tackling OCGs. A pilot scheme to cross-reference individuals recorded as part of the Troubled Families programme⁵¹ against its OCGM data identified 26 who were common to both and a further 21 who qualified to enter the Troubled Families programme. This sharing of data increases the force's understanding of the extent of OCG networks and identifies additional families to whom local authorities offer support.

Neighbourhood policing teams are not fully engaged in tackling OCGs: documentation provided by the force shows that fewer than 5 percent of OCGs are subject to a local or neighbourhood policing response. Neighbourhood policing teams are generally unaware of the force's activity against OCGs, and serious and organised crime is not seen as being within the remit of neighbourhood policing officers and staff. There are cultural and historical reasons for this – officers fear that neighbourhood teams might compromise sensitive information or lack the necessary skills or time. At more senior levels, the force accepts that an effective approach to tackling OCGs should include both specialist and neighbourhood officers. It has developed plans to use neighbourhood policing teams in this way and will deploy them in the two 'pathfinder' sites.

⁴⁹ FALCON (Fraud and Linked Crime Online) is the team in the force that is dedicated to tackling cyber-crime and fraud.

⁵⁰ The branch of the force's organised crime command that investigates armed commercial premises robbery.

⁵¹ Troubled Families is a programme of targeted-intervention for families with multiple problems, including crime, anti-social behaviour, mental health problems, domestic abuse and unemployment. Local authorities identify 'troubled families' in their area and usually assign a key worker to act as a single point of contact. Central government pays local authorities by results for each family they 'turn around'.

The London Regional Organised Crime Unit (ROCU)⁵² was disbanded in 2015 following a reduction in its funding. However, the force has retained a Government Agency Information Network (GAIN)⁵³ co-ordinator who acts as a conduit between agencies and the national ROCU network to exchange information and intelligence. The force also uses prison intelligence and covert tactics in prisons to target organised criminals. This is mainly during the operational phase of an investigation or to gather intelligence immediately after operational activity. Once an OCG member is sentenced, intelligence on the individual will not be sought unless the offender is part of the force's lifetime offender management process, and so is managed by its lifetime offender management unit.

It is not straightforward for the force to get a true measure of the effectiveness of its activity on serious and organised crime. This is because the force's OCG mapping is a record of operational activity rather than a true picture of organised crime. An OCG is sometimes closed down or archived when arrests have been made. There is little follow up work to assess whether the OCG is still active once the principal targets have been arrested, and plans are not put into place to use partner organisations or local policing resources to manage the remaining members.

Nationally, forces use a disruption scale to quantify how effectively they disrupt OCGs. Disruptions are categorised as major, moderate, minor or negative (for example if covert tactics are exposed). The nationally-agreed disruption forms should be submitted to the National Crime Agency (NCA) every quarter. They are then collated to provide a picture of how well each force and England and Wales is tackling serious and organised crime. The force follows this guidance, but did not submit disruption forms to the NCA during 2016. It is the largest police force in England and Wales; so it follows that the force's non-submission of disruption forms will undermine an accurate national picture. We were advised that the force will start submitting its disruption forms at the same time as the ROCUs in England and Wales in March 2017.

⁵² Regional organised crime units (ROCUs) provide police forces with access to a standardised range of 'capabilities' to help them tackle serious and organised crime. These capabilities encompass specialist areas such as undercover policing, surveillance and cyber-crime investigation. The regional provision of these capabilities can reduce or remove the need for forces to maintain specialist capabilities of their own, many of which are expensive to maintain and only required on relatively rare occasions.

⁵³ The Government Agency Intelligence Network (GAIN) is a large network of partners, including all police forces in England and Wales, which shares information about organised criminals.

How effectively does the force prevent serious and organised crime?

A force that effectively tackles serious and organised crime needs to be able to stop people being drawn in to this crime. Many of these people may be vulnerable and already involved in gang and youth violence. It should also be using a range of approaches and powers to prevent those known criminals continuing to cause harm. HMIC expects a force's approach to prevention to be a significant element of its overall strategy to tackle the harm that serious and organised crime causes communities.

The force has had real success preventing serious and organised crime involving gangs. London currently has 18 'gang boroughs' (out of 32) each with a gangs unit; each non-gang borough has a single point of contact who keeps abreast of the activities carried out by the force in respect of gangs. It has several successful initiatives to deter people at risk of being drawn into gang activity. For example, the Trident command houses Operation Boa which supports boroughs with applications for post-conviction criminal behaviour orders or stand-alone judicial orders. It works closely with a range of partners to obtain enhanced prison licence conditions for gang members approaching release, and monitors these post-release. It also has a prevention and diversion team that works with a conflict management company to provide mediation services. Due to the joint work of this team and the gang boroughs, 44 percent of the individuals on the force's gangs matrix are either now in custody or subject to an order restricting their activities. This is an increase from 30 percent three years ago.

Other initiatives include London Gang Exit (a two-year programme jointly funded by the MOPAC and the criminal rehabilitation company) supporting 16-24 year-olds who want to leave gangs. 'Information sharing to tackle violence' is a two-year partnership between the force, the Greater London Authority and MOPAC which collects anonymised assault data from hospitals to get a more accurate picture of violence in London and target problem locations accordingly. DIVERT is a force-wide custody programme, that is designed to divert 18-25 year-olds away from re-offending and into employment, personal development and education. Of the 161 people on this programme, the force has worked with a partner to find employment for 50. Only 11 of the 161 people on the programme have re-offended. FALCON and Flying Squad also work closely with businesses to provide crime prevention advice and support.

The lifetime offender management unit is a small team that monitors those who are subject to serious crime prevention orders (SCPOs) issued upon their conviction. These orders impose restrictions on the activities an offender can undertake (such as owning multiple mobile telephones or frequenting certain venues) which, if breached, can result in an immediate recall to prison. When offenders who are subject to SCPOs are released, a team of five officers is responsible for

co-ordinating police activity to monitor them; the plan may involve periodic surveillance of the offender. The force submits the application for SCPOs in conjunction with the CPS, and the force's team has developed a good understanding of how to secure SCPOs. As at 1 July 2016, the unit was managing 94 individuals on a SCPO. The force maintains records of how it has used SCPOs successfully, which it has shared with other police forces. This is an example of good practice.

In some instances, the force communicates well with the public about serious and organised crime. There are regular meetings between the safer neighbourhood teams and local communities in the designated gangs' boroughs, along with high levels of publicity in local media. However, there is more that the force could do to inform the public of its plan to tackle organised crime and how organised crime manifests itself in volume crime⁵⁴ across London. The force could also take more opportunities to inform the public of successful disruptions and help them link organised crime to the volume crime in their communities. Communication on gangs activity is more effective since awareness of the Trident brand is high among Londoners. A similar brand for tackling organised crime might assist the force to communicate with the public in this respect.

Summary of findings



Requires improvement

There is much effective work by the Metropolitan Police Service on serious and organised crime and positive results are easy to identify. Nonetheless, the force requires improvement in some areas. Although it makes good use of its own intelligence, it has failed to produce a serious and organised crime profile in conjunction with its partners, so does not have a shared picture of the threats to London's communities. The force does not map identified organised crime groups (OCGs) as well as it should and does not fully comply with the national guidance. Despite the force updating mapped OCG records during 2016, and providing training to officers on the OCG mapping process, its understanding of serious and organised crime remains incomplete.

This is a finely-balanced judgment, since in many respects the force's response to serious and organised crime is admirable. It is able to investigate OCGs successfully. However, its approach is overwhelmingly based on pursuit, and too

⁵⁴ Volume crime: any crime which, through its sheer volume, has a significant impact on the community and the ability of the local police to tackle it. Volume crime often includes priority crimes such as street robbery, burglary and vehicle-related criminality, but can also apply to criminal damage or assaults.

often lacks the involvement of partner organisations and neighbourhood policing teams.

In contrast, the force's response to gang crime is impressive. It has initiatives to deter people at risk of being drawn into gang activity, good local awareness of the gangs that operate in communities, and good partnership and local policing involvement in activities targeting gangs. The force communicates well with the public about serious and organised crime.

Areas for improvement

- The force should further develop its serious and organised crime local profile in conjunction with partner organisations to enhance its understanding of the threat posed by serious and organised crime and inform joint activity aimed at reducing this threat.
- The force should engage routinely with partner agencies at a senior level to enhance intelligence sharing and promote an effective, multi-agency response to serious and organised crime.
- The force should ensure that it maps all organised crime groups promptly following identification and re-assesses them at regular intervals in line with national standards.
- The force should improve the awareness of organised crime groups among neighbourhood teams to ensure that they can reliably identify these groups, collect intelligence and disrupt their activity.
- The force should assign capable lead responsible officers to all active organised crime groups as part of a long term, multi-agency approach to dismantling them. These officers should have a clear understanding of their responsibilities, and adopt a '4 Ps' structure for OCG management plans.

How effective are the force's specialist capabilities?

Some complex threats require both a specialist capability and forces to work together to respond to them. This question assesses both the overall preparedness of forces to work together on a number of strategic threats and whether forces have a good understanding of the threat presented by firearms incidents and how equipped they are to meet this threat.

How effective are the force's arrangements to ensure that it can fulfil its national policing responsibilities?

The *Strategic Policing Requirement* (SPR)⁵⁵ specifies six national threats. These are complex threats and forces need to be able to work together if they are to respond to them effectively. These include serious and organised crime, terrorism, serious cyber-crime incidents and child sexual abuse. It is beyond the scope of this inspection to assess in detail whether forces are capable of responding to these national threats. Instead, HMIC has checked whether forces have made the necessary arrangements to test their own preparedness for dealing with these threats should they materialise.

The Metropolitan Police Service has comprehensive arrangements in place to ensure that it can fulfil its national policing responsibilities. The force has a strategic threat and risk assessment (STRA) in respect of the six threats outlined in the SPR, and these are considered in the way that tasks are assigned throughout the year. There is National Crime Agency representation at task assignment meetings. Each of the force's specialist teams has its own STRA which informs the force-wide STRA. The specialist team STRAs are subject to six-monthly reviews and annual re-writing; this is done to enable the management board to ensure that prioritisation against the force-wide STRA continues to be relevant. The force has raised the profile of vulnerability within the task assignment process linked to the child sexual exploitation STRA. There has been a noticeable increase in the bids for overt and covert (undercover) assets and resources in the last three to four months, to support safeguarding in child sexual exploitation investigations.

The force has a wide range of capabilities to meet its SPR requirements. It has taken part in London exercises and regional mobilisation exercises, and maintains duty

⁵⁵ The SPR is issued annually by the Home Secretary, setting out the latest national threats and the appropriate national policing capabilities required to counter those threats. National threats require a co-ordinated or aggregated response from a number of police forces, who often need to work collaboratively, and with other partners and national agencies or arrangements, to ensure threats are tackled effectively. *Strategic Policing Requirement*, Home Office, March 2015. Available at: www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/417116/The_Strategic_Policing_Requirement.pdf

information which informs its daily capability to support public order requirements. The force is fully engaged with the local resilience forum (LRF). It maintains this engagement via its testing and exercising unit which works closely with the LRF to run live and table-top exercises for most big events. The force conducts a wide range of regular exercises with partner organisations to address local and strategic risks. It has carried out extensive testing and exercising with other agencies and partners to improve its response to terrorism incidents. It has developed and is due to run a simulated live training exercise for a marauding terrorist firearms attack. Any tests or exercises that are carried out by the force must be advised to the force's testing and exercising unit so that they can be logged on its database. A copy of the exercise debrief and recommendations must also be submitted to the unit. This enables the identification of lessons learned and of good practice; these then inform and improve future exercises.

The testing and exercising unit provides briefings to the Protect and Prepare thematic board which reviews national Protect and Prepare strategy and performance. In turn, this board provides regular updates to the London Contest board. This forum was established by the MOPAC and is a multi-agency meeting that reviews the four pillars of CONTEST (pursue, prevent, protect and prepare). The unit recently ran two big events for local authority chief executives and borough planners on what a move to 'critical' state would entail and how this would affect London generally. The force has business continuity plans in place, which it developed in consultation, and tested in exercises, with partners. The testing and exercising unit keeps track of all businesses in the force to ensure that all which should have a business continuity plan do indeed have one. The unit also quality-assures the plans and ensures that they are tested and exercised; it provides regular updates at the force's performance meeting.

How well prepared is the force to respond to a firearms attack?

Following the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, the government allocated £143 million to the 43 England and Wales police forces to increase their armed capability. This funding has enabled some forces to increase the number of armed police officers able to respond to a terrorist attack. These attacks include those committed by heavily armed terrorists across multiple sites in quick succession, as in Paris. These attacks are known as marauding terrorist firearms attacks. The funding is for those forces considered to be at greatest risk of a terrorist attack. This also has the effect of increasing the ability of the police service to respond to other forms of terrorist attacks (and another incident requiring an armed policing response). Forces have begun to recruit and train new armed officers. This process is due to be completed by March 2018.

The force has assessed comprehensively the threat of an attack requiring an armed response. It has carried out an armed policing strategic threat assessment (APSTRA) which complies with College of Policing requirements. Part of the assessment is a structured process to inform itself of threats and risks. The APSTRA is dated November 2015 and the force carries out regular and comprehensive reviews of the level of armed resource it requires to confront the current threat.

The force has reassessed the threats it faces following changes in the national planning assumptions. It has decided to increase its armed capability and is actively working to achieve this. The decision to provide the uplift is documented, and has been scrutinised by the force's management board. Regular meetings are held to check progress. In addition, the force has developed plans for a national uplift in armed policing capability on behalf of the police service. The force is now engaged with the service nationally to ensure the uplift in armed policing is achieved by April 2018.

The force has plans in place to increase its firearms capability and has made progress towards achieving this. It has a comprehensive exercising programme with neighbouring forces and partner agencies. For example, it has recently undertaken a table-top exercise with Essex Police to test mobilisation and interoperability arrangements in the event of a marauding terrorist firearms attack.

The force routinely trains with other blue-light services such as the London Ambulance Service and London Fire Brigade to test interoperability in the event of an armed deployment.

The force has determined that it requires an increased firearms capability in order to confront the current threat. The target date set by the national armed policing uplift programme to implement this increase is April 2017. The commissioner aims to achieve the effect of this uplift sooner (by January 2017) through a combination of increased training of new officers and overtime. In order to implement and sustain the uplift, additional officers will need to be trained both to replace those who leave as part of natural turnover and to provide the extra officers required by the uplift.

Summary of findings

Ungraded

The Metropolitan Police Service has comprehensive arrangements in place to ensure that it can fulfil its national policing responsibilities. It has carried out an assessment of the six threats in the *Strategic Policing Requirement* (SPR) and understand its obligations under the SPR.

The force has undertaken a comprehensive assessment of the threat of firearms attack, with different scenarios. It has an armed policing strategic threat assessment that is reviewed regularly. The commissioner has determined that the force's armed capability should be increased further, and plans are in place to achieve this.

Next steps

HMIC assesses progress on causes of concern and areas for improvement identified within its reports in a number of ways. We receive updates through our regular conversations with forces, re-assess as part of our annual PEEL programme, and, in the most serious cases, revisit forces.

HMIC highlights recurring themes emerging from our PEEL inspections of police forces within our national reports on police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy. These reports identify those issues that are reflected across England and Wales and may contain additional recommendations directed at national policing organisations, including the Home Office, where we believe improvements can be made at a national level.

Findings and judgments from this year's PEEL effectiveness inspection will be used to direct the design of the next cycle of PEEL effectiveness assessments. The specific areas for assessment are yet to be confirmed, based on further consultation, but we will continue to assess how forces keep people safe and reduce crime to ensure our findings are comparable year on year.

Annex A – About the data

The information presented in this report comes from a range of sources, including published data by the Home Office and Office for National Statistics, inspection fieldwork and data collected directly from all 43 geographic police forces in England and Wales.

Where HMIC has collected data directly from police forces, we have taken reasonable steps to agree the design of the data collection with forces and with other relevant interested parties such as the Home Office. We have given forces several opportunities to check and validate the data they have provided us to ensure the accuracy of our evidence. For instance:

- We checked the data that forces submitted and queried with forces where figures were notably different from other forces or were internally inconsistent.
- We asked all forces to check the final data used in the report and correct any errors identified.

The source of the data is presented with each figure in the report, and is set out in more detail in this annex. The source of Force in numbers data is also set out below.

Methodology

Data in the report

The British Transport Police was outside the scope of inspection. Therefore any aggregated totals for England and Wales exclude British Transport Police data and numbers will differ from those published by the Home Office.

Where other forces have been unable to supply data, this is mentioned under the relevant sections below.

Population

For all uses of population as a denominator in our calculations, unless otherwise noted, we use Office for National Statistics (ONS) mid-2015 population estimates. These were the most recent data available at the time of the inspection.

For the specific case of City of London Police, we include both resident and transient population within our calculations. This is to account for the unique nature and demographics of this force's responsibility.

Survey of police staff

HMIC conducted a short survey of police staff across forces in England and Wales, to understand their views on workloads, redeployment and the suitability of tasks assigned to them. The survey was a non-statistical, voluntary sample which means that results may not be representative of the population. The number of responses varied between 8 and 2,471 across forces. Therefore, we treated results with caution and used them for exploring further during fieldwork rather than to assess individual force performance.

Ipsos MORI survey of public attitudes towards policing

HMIC commissioned Ipsos MORI to conduct a survey of attitudes towards policing between July and August 2016. Respondents were drawn from an online panel and results were weighted by age, gender and work status to match the population profile of the force area. The sampling method used is not a statistical random sample and the sample size was small, varying between 331 to 429 in each force area. Therefore, any results provided are only an indication of satisfaction rather than an absolute.

The findings of this survey will be shared on our website by summer 2017:

www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/data/peel-assessments/

Review of crime files

HMIC reviewed 60 police case files across crime types for: robbery, common assault (flagged as domestic abuse), grievous bodily harm (GBH), stalking, harassment, rape and domestic burglary. The file review was designed to provide a broad overview of the identification of vulnerability, the effectiveness of investigations and to understand how victims are treated through police processes. Files were randomly selected from crimes recorded between 1 January 2016 and 31 March 2016 and were assessed against several criteria. Due to the small sample size of cases selected, we have not used results from the file review as the sole basis for assessing individual force performance but alongside other evidence gathered.

Force in numbers

A dash in this graphic indicates that a force was not able to supply HMIC with data.

Calls for assistance (including those for domestic abuse)

These data were collected directly from all 43 forces. In 2016, the questions contained a different breakdown of instances where the police were called to an incident compared to the 2015 data collection, so direct comparisons to the equivalent 2015 data are not advised.

Recorded crime and crime outcomes

These data are obtained from Home Office police-recorded crime and outcomes data tables for the 12 months to 30 June 2016 and are taken from the October 2016 Home Office data release, which is available from:

www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-recorded-crime-open-data-tables

Total police-recorded crime includes all crime (excluding fraud offences) recorded by police forces in England and Wales. Home Office publications on the overall volumes and rates of recorded crime and outcomes include the British Transport Police, which is outside the scope of this HMIC inspection. Therefore, England and Wales rates in this report will differ from those published by the Home Office.

Figures about police-recorded crime should be treated with care, as recent increases are likely to have been affected by the renewed focus on the quality and compliance of crime recording since HMIC's national inspection of crime data in 2014.

For crime outcomes, Dorset Police has been excluded from the England and Wales figure. Dorset Police experienced difficulties with the recording of crime outcomes for the 12 months to 30 June 2016. This was due to the force introducing the Niche records management system in Spring 2015. Problems with the implementation of Niche meant that crime outcomes were not reliably recorded. The failure to file investigations properly meant that a higher than normal proportion of offences were allocated to 'Not yet assigned an outcome'. During 2016, the force conducted additional work to solve the problem. In doing so, some crime outcomes from the 12 months to 30 June 2016 were updated after that date and are reflected in a later period. This makes Dorset Police's crime outcome data inconsistent with that provided by other forces. HMIC has decided not to use Dorset Police's outcome data in the interests of consistency of data use and to maintain fairness to all forces.

Other notable points to consider when interpreting outcome data are listed below and also apply to figure 4.

- For a full commentary and explanation of outcome types please see Crime Outcomes in England and Wales: year ending March 2016, Home Office, July 2016. Available from:
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/539447/crime-outcomes-hosb0616.pdf
- Crime outcome proportions show the percentage of crimes recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016 that have been assigned each outcome. This means that each crime is tracked or linked to its outcome.
- These data are subject to change, as more crimes are assigned outcomes over time. These data are taken from the October 2016 Home Office data release.

- Providing outcomes data under the new framework is voluntary if not provided directly through the Home Office Data Hub. However, as proportions are used, calculations can be based on fewer than four quarters of data. For the 12 months to 30 June 2016, Derbyshire Constabulary and Suffolk Constabulary were unable to provide the last quarter of data. Therefore, their figures are based on the first three quarters of the year.
- Leicestershire, Staffordshire and West Yorkshire forces are participating in the Ministry of Justice's out of court disposals pilot. This means these forces no longer issue simple cautions or cannabis/khat warnings and they restrict their use of penalty notices for disorder as disposal options for adult offenders, as part of the pilot. Therefore, their outcomes data should be viewed with this in mind.
- It is important to note that the outcomes that are displayed in figure 8 are based on the number of outcomes recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016, irrespective of when the crime was recorded. Therefore, the crimes and outcomes recorded in the reporting year are not tracked, so direct comparisons should not be made between general outcomes and domestic abuse related outcomes in this report. For more details about the methodology for domestic abuse outcomes please see explanatory notes below, under figure 8.

Anti-social behaviour

These data are obtained from Office for National Statistics data tables, available from:

www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/policeforceareadatatables

All police forces record incidents of anti-social behaviour reported to them in accordance with the provisions of the National Standard for Incident Recording (NSIR). Incidents are recorded under NSIR in accordance with the same 'victim focused' approach that applies for recorded crime, although these figures are not subject to the same level of quality assurance as the main recorded crime collection. Incident counts should be interpreted as incidents recorded by the police, rather than reflecting the true level of victimisation. Other agencies also deal with anti-social behaviour incidents (for example, local authorities and social landlords); incidents reported to these agencies will not generally be included in police figures.

When viewing this data the user should be aware of the following:

- Warwickshire Police had a problem with its incident recording. For a small percentage of all incidents reported during 2014-15 and 2015-16 it was not possible for the force to identify whether these were anti-social behaviour or other types of incident. These incidents have been distributed pro rata for

Warwickshire, so that one percent of anti-social behaviour in 2014-15 and two percent of anti-social behaviour in 2015-16 are estimated.

- From May 2014, South Yorkshire Police experienced difficulties in reporting those incidents of anti-social behaviour that resulted from how it processed calls for assistance, specifically for scheduled appointments. In November 2016, South Yorkshire Police resolved this problem and resubmitted anti-social behaviour data to Office for National Statistics. HMIC has used corrected data for South Yorkshire Police which are available in the November 2016 release of anti-social behaviour incidents data in the link above.
- Bedfordshire Police resubmitted anti-social behaviour data to Office for National Statistics for the 12 months to 30 June 2016. This was because data had been double counted for the second quarter of the financial year. HMIC has used corrected data for Bedfordshire Police which are available in the November 2016 release of anti-social behaviour incidents data in the link above.

Domestic abuse

Data for domestic abuse flagged offences were provided by the Home Office for the 12 months to 30 June 2016. These are more recent figures than those previously published by Office for National Statistics.

Data relating to domestic abuse arrests, charges and outcomes were collected through the HMIC data collection.

Further information about the domestic abuse statistics and recent releases are available from:

www.ons.gov.uk/releases/domesticabuseinenglandandwalesyearendingmarch2016

Organised crime groups (OCGs)

These data were collected directly from all 43 forces. City of London Police is excluded from the England and Wales rate as its OCG data are not comparable with other forces due to size and its wider national remit.

The number of OCGs in the Warwickshire Police and West Mercia Police force areas is a combined total of OCGs for the two force areas. The OCGs per one million population rate is based upon their areas' combined population figures.

OCGs which are no longer active – for example because they have been dismantled by the police – can be archived. This means that they are no longer subject to disruption, investigation or monitoring. From 1 September 2014 to 31 December 2015, forces were given a directive by the National Police Chiefs' Council to suspend archiving, pending a review of OCG recording policy. This directive was removed on

1 January 2016, but resulted in many forces archiving more OCGs than they otherwise would have in the 12 months to June 2016. Therefore, direct comparisons should not be made with OCG figures from previous years.

Victim satisfaction

Forces were required by the Home Office to conduct satisfaction surveys with specific victim groups. Force victim satisfaction surveys are structured around principal questions exploring satisfaction responses across four stages of interactions:

- initial contact;
- actions;
- follow-up;
- treatment plus the whole experience.

The data used in this report use the results to the question relating to the victim's whole experience, which specifically asks, "Taking the whole experience into account, are you satisfied, dissatisfied, or neither with the service provided by the police in this case?"

The England and Wales average is calculated based on the average of the rates of satisfaction in all 43 forces.

Figures throughout the report

Figure 1: Police-recorded crime rates (per 1,000 population) for the five year period to 30 June 2016

Please see 'Recorded Crime and Crime Outcomes' above.

Figure 2: Police-recorded crime rates (per 1,000 population) for the 12 months to 30 June 2016

Please see 'Recorded Crime and Crime Outcomes' above.

Figure 3: Percentage change in the rate of anti-social behaviour incidents (per 1,000 population), by force, comparing the 12 months to 31 March 2016 with the 12 months to 31 March 2015

Please see 'Anti-social behaviour' above.

Figure 4: Proportion of outcomes assigned to offences recorded, in 12 months to 30 June 2016, by outcome type

Please see 'Recorded Crime and Crime Outcomes' above.

The outcome number has been provided to improve usability across multiple publications and is in line with Home Office categorisation.

For these data, we state whether the force's value is 'one of the highest', 'one of the lowest' or 'broadly in line with' all forces in England and Wales. This is calculated by ranking the usage of outcomes and then highlighting the top and bottom 25 percent of forces. All other forces will be broadly in line with England and Wales. However, any interpretation of outcomes should take into account that outcomes will vary dependent on the crime types that occur in each force area, and how the force deals with offenders for different crimes.

This methodology is not comparable with figure 8, so direct comparisons should not be made between the two tables.

Figure 5: Percentage of 'Evidential difficulties; victim does not support action' outcomes assigned to offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016, by force

Please see 'Recorded Crime and Crime Outcomes' above.

In addition, it is important to understand that the percentages of evidential difficulties can be affected by the level of certain types of crime within a force, such as domestic abuse related offences. The category of evidential difficulties also includes where a suspect has been identified and the victim supports police action, but evidential difficulties prevent further action being taken.

Figure 6: Percentage of police recorded crime with a vulnerable victim identified, by force, for the 12 months to 30 June 2016

Please see 'Recorded Crime and Crime Outcomes' above.

The number of offences identified with a vulnerable victim in a force is dependent on the force's definition of vulnerability.

City of London, Devon and Cornwall, Essex, Gloucestershire and Lancashire forces were unable to provide data for the number of recorded crimes with a vulnerable victim identified. Therefore, these forces' data are not included in the graph or in the calculation of the England and Wales rate.

When viewing this data the user should be aware of the following:

- Suffolk Constabulary was only able to provide eight months of vulnerability data to the 30 June 2016 due to transferring to a different crime management system. Its previous system did not record vulnerability. Therefore, these are the most reliable data it can provide.

Figure 7: Domestic abuse arrest rate (per 100 domestic abuse crimes), by force, for the 12 months to 30 June 2016

Please see 'Domestic abuse' above.

Derbyshire, Durham and Gloucestershire forces were unable to provide domestic abuse arrest data. Therefore, these forces' data are not included in the graph or in the calculation of the England and Wales rate.

The arrest rate is calculated using a common time period for arrests and offences. It is important to note that each arrest is not necessarily directly linked to its specific domestic abuse offence recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016 in this calculation. It is also possible to have more than one arrest per offence although this is rare. In addition, the reader should note the increase in police-recorded crime which has affected the majority of forces over the last year (39 out of 43). This may have the effect of arrest rates actually being higher than the figures suggest. Despite this, the calculation still indicates whether the force prioritises arrests for domestic abuse offenders over other potential forms of action. HMIC has evaluated the arrest rate alongside other measures (such as use of voluntary attendance or body-worn video cameras) during our inspection process to understand how each force deals with domestic abuse overall.

When viewing this data the user should be aware of the following:

- Cambridgeshire Constabulary identified a recording issue and that it could only obtain accurate data from a manual audit of its custody records. This means its data may indicate a lower arrest rate. However, at the time of publication this was the most reliable figure the force could provide for the 12 months to 30 June 2016. The force plans to conduct regular manual audits while the recording issue is resolved. HMIC will conduct a further review to test this evidence when more data are available.
- Lancashire Constabulary experienced difficulties in identifying all domestic abuse flagged arrests. This affected 23 days in the 12 months to 30 June 2016. The force investigated this and confirmed that the impact on data provided to HMIC would be marginal and that these are the most reliable figures it can provide.

Figure 8: Rate of outcomes recorded in 12 months to 30 June 2016 for domestic-related offences

Please see 'Domestic Abuse' above.

Dorset Police is excluded from our data for the reasons described under 'Recorded Crime and Crime Outcomes' above.

Nottinghamshire Police has been excluded from domestic abuse outcomes data. The force experienced difficulties with the conversion of some crime data when it

moved to a new crime recording system. This means that the force did not record reliably some crime outcomes for domestic abuse related offences. The force subsequently solved the problem and provided updated outcomes figures. However, this makes Nottinghamshire Police's outcomes data for domestic abuse related offences inconsistent with that provided by other forces. HMIC has decided not to use Nottinghamshire Police's outcomes data for domestic abuse related offences in the interests of consistency of data use and to maintain fairness to all forces.

In April 2015, the Home Office began collecting information from the police on whether recorded offences were related to domestic abuse. Crimes are identified by the police as domestic abuse related if the offence meets the government definition of domestic violence and abuse:

“Any incident or pattern of incidents of controlling, coercive or threatening behaviour, violence or abuse between those aged 16 or over who are or have been intimate partners or family members regardless of gender or sexuality.”

In figure 8, the rate is calculated by the number of each outcome recorded for domestic abuse flagged offences in the 12 months to 30 June 2016, divided by the total number of domestic abuse offences recorded in the 12 months to 30 June 2016. The domestic abuse-related crimes used in this calculation are not necessarily those to which the outcomes have been assigned. Therefore, direct comparisons should not be made between general outcomes in figure 4, where each crime is linked to its associated outcome, and domestic abuse outcomes in figure 8.

For these data, we state whether the force's value is 'one of the highest', 'one of the lowest' or 'broadly in line with' all forces in England and Wales. This is calculated by ranking the usage of outcomes and then highlighting the top and bottom 25 percent of forces. All other forces will be broadly in line with England and Wales. However, any interpretation of outcomes should take into account that outcomes will vary dependent on the crime types that occur in each force area, and how the force deals with offenders for different crimes.

Figure 9: Organised crime groups per one million population, by force, as at 1 July 2016

Please see 'Organised Crime Groups' above.

Figure 10: Active organised crime groups by predominant crime type, as at 1 July 2016

Humberside Police was unable to provide the full data for predominant crime types in the time available. Therefore, this force's data are not included in the graph or in the calculation of the England and Wales proportion.

Numbers may not sum to 100 percent due to rounding.