PEEL

Police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy 2018/19

An inspection of Cleveland Police

Contents

What this report contains

This report is structured in four parts:

1. Our overall assessment of the force's 2018/19 performance.
2. Our judgments and summaries of how effectively, efficiently and legitimately the force keeps people safe and reduces crime.
3. Our judgments and any areas for improvement and causes of concern for each component of our inspection.
4. Our detailed findings for each component.

Our inspection approach

In 2018/19, we adopted an integrated PEEL assessment (IPA) approach to our existing PEEL (police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy) inspections. IPA combines into a single inspection the effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy areas of PEEL. These areas had previously been inspected separately each year.

As well as our inspection findings, our assessment is informed by our analysis of:

- force data and management statements;
- risks to the public;
- progress since previous inspections;
- findings from our non-PEEL inspections;
- how forces tackle serious and organised crime locally and regionally; and
- our regular monitoring work.

We inspected all forces in four areas:

- protecting vulnerable people;
- firearms capability;
- planning for the future; and
- ethical and lawful workforce behaviour.

We consider the risk to the public in these areas important enough to inspect all forces every year.

We extended the risk-based approach that we used in our 2017 effectiveness inspection to the efficiency and legitimacy parts of our IPA inspections. This means that in 2018/19 we didn't inspect all forces against all areas. The table below shows the areas we inspected Cleveland Police against.

IPA area	Inspected in 2018/19?
Preventing crime and anti-social behaviour	Yes
Investigating crime	Yes
Protecting vulnerable people	Yes
Tackling serious and organised crime	Yes
Firearms capability	Yes
Meeting current demands	Yes
Planning for the future	Yes
Treating the public fairly	Yes
Ethical and lawful workforce behaviour	Yes
Treating the workforce fairly	Yes

Force in context

	Cleveland rate	England and Wales rate
999 calls per 1,000 population 12 months ending 31 March 2019	192	175

	Cleveland rate	Most Similar Forces rate
Recorded crime per 1,000 population 12 months ending 30 September 2018	109	113

Cleveland workforce

	FTE in post on 31 March 2019	FTE in post on 31 March 2014	Percentage change
Police Officer	1,198	1,382	-13%
Police Community Support Officer	130	150	-13%
Police Staff	319	201	58%

	Cleveland spend	England and Wales spend
Spend per head of population 2018/19 projection	£222	£192

Overall summary

⚙ **Effectiveness**	●○○○ **Inadequate**		**Last inspected**
Preventing crime and tackling anti-social behaviour	●○○○ Inadequate		2018/19
Investigating crime	●●○○ Requires improvement		2018/19
Protecting vulnerable people	●○○○ Inadequate		2018/19
Tackling serious and organised crime	●●●○ Good		2018/19
Armed response capability	Ungraded		2018/19
£ **Efficiency**	●○○○ **Inadequate**		**Last inspected**
Meeting current demands and using resources	●○○○ Inadequate		2018/19
Planning for the future	●○○○ Inadequate		2018/19

⚖ **Legitimacy**	● ○ ○ ○ **Inadequate**	**Last inspected**
Fair treatment of the public	● ○ ○ ○ Inadequate	2018/19
Ethical and lawful workforce behaviour	● ○ ○ ○ Inadequate	2018/19
Fair treatment of the workforce	● ○ ○ ○ Inadequate	2018/19

How does the force compare with similar forces?

We compare Cleveland Police's performance with the forces in its most similar group (MSG). MSGs are groups of similar police forces, based on analysis of demographic, social and economic factors. For more information about MSGs, see our website.

Cleveland Police's MSG forces are Merseyside Police, Northumbria Police, Greater Manchester Police, West Yorkshire Police and Humberside Police. We haven't yet inspected Merseyside Police and West Yorkshire Police as part of IPA 2018/19, so use their graded judgments from our previous PEEL assessment for comparison.

Figure 1: Pillar judgments for Cleveland Police, compared with forces in its MSG

Outstanding	⚙	0
	£	0
	⚖	0
Good	⚙	3
	£	3
	⚖	5
Requires improvement	⚙	2
	£	2
	⚖	0
Inadequate	⚙	1 (Cleveland)
	£	1 (Cleveland)
	⚖	1 (Cleveland)

HM Inspector's observations

I am extremely concerned about the performance of Cleveland Police in keeping people safe and reducing crime. In view of these findings, I have been in regular contact with the chief constable, because I do not underestimate how much improvement is needed.

Since our last inspection, there has been a significant deterioration in how the force prevents crime and anti-social behaviour. Prevention is not a priority for the force. There are now far fewer resources dedicated to neighbourhood policing and they are operating without a clear plan or direction.

The force is good at tackling serious and organised crime but needs to improve the way it investigates less serious crimes. These crimes are not always allocated to appropriately trained staff, nor investigated thoroughly enough or supervised effectively. The absence of a system to identify, action and track progress to arrest outstanding suspects concerns me.

I have serious concerns that the force is not adequately protecting vulnerable people. Disappointingly, the force has not made progress against areas we have previously identified as requiring improvement. Where it has tried to improve, through changing its processes, it has created risks in victims not being identified or responded to in a timely way.

Cleveland Police understands the cost of its services and its financial management is good. However, the limited extent to which the force understands the demands on its services, and how efficiently its resources are distributed, is worrying. This is having an impact on the force's ability to effectively plan for future demands.

The way that Cleveland Police treats the public and its workforce is inadequate. I am concerned at the lack of engagement and openness by the force. It is not giving the public or its own workforce sufficient opportunity to voice their needs or raise issues. It is not communicating well and encouraging feedback. It is not being transparent through inviting independent scrutiny or challenge. Some of its internal processes are perceived to be unfair, and it does not understand enough about the wellbeing of its workforce.

I am very concerned at the lack of ethical behaviour in the force – senior leaders (superintending and chief officer ranks, and senior police staff managers) should be acting as positive role models and many are not. This is having a profoundly negative effect on the organisation. While the force acts promptly on reports of corruption, it needs to proactively root out corruption and identify those people at risk of it, to try and prevent it from happening.

My overall assessment is that Cleveland Police's performance is inadequate and has declined considerably since our last inspection. The force has been placed into our national oversight process. We will monitor its progress.

Phil Gormley

HM Inspector of Constabulary

Effectiveness

Force in context

	Cleveland proportion	England and Wales proportion
Proportion of officers in a neighbourhood or response function* in post on 31 March 2019	38%	40%

* Figures for Cleveland Police relate to response officers only. The force moved all its neighbourhood officers into response in February 2019

Victim-based crime per 1,000 population

12 months ending 30 September 2018

	Cleveland rate	Most Similar Forces rate
Violence against the person	31	35
Sexual offences	3	3
Theft Offences / Robbery	48	42
Criminal damage and arson	16	14

Crime Outcomes

12 months ending 30 September 2018

	Cleveland proportion	England and Wales proportion
Proportion of crimes where action was taken	16%	13%
Proportion of crimes where suspect was identified	50%	46%
Proportion of crimes where victim did not support police action	33%	23%

Outcomes for crimes flagged as domestic abuse

12 months ending 31 March 2018

	Cleveland proportion	England and Wales proportion
Charge/summonsed	16%	16%
Evidential difficulties: suspect identified; victim does not support	70%	49%

How effectively does the force reduce crime and keep people safe?

Inadequate

Summary

The way Cleveland Police prevents crime, tackles anti-social behaviour and protects vulnerable people is poor. It needs to improve the way it investigates crime, but it is good at tackling serious and organised crime.

Crime prevention isn't a priority for the force and this is a cause of concern. The force isn't giving officers and staff the direction they need. It has limited resources assigned to neighbourhood teams and its future plans for policing neighbourhoods are uncertain. The force knows the main threats its communities face, but it doesn't have a good enough understanding of local concerns. Engagement with the public is poor and, across the force, problem solving is inconsistent. The force relies on its partners to prevent crime and anti-social behaviour. It needs to understand better the effectiveness of any prevention work that does happen.

The force needs to improve how it investigates crime. It doesn't have the right number of people in the right place to manage investigation demand. It needs to allocate crimes to the right teams for investigation and train its supervisors to oversee investigations properly. The quality of investigations isn't good enough, particularly telephone investigations and those completed by response officers who have limited available time.

The force needs to provide better support to victims and the wider community. We are concerned that the force is putting the public at risk by not being proactive enough at catching criminals. But it works well with public and private sector partners to manage offenders who have been arrested.

We have serious concerns that the force is leaving vulnerable victims at risk by not protecting them well enough. There are too many examples of the force:

- failing to identify vulnerable victims;
- providing a poor or significantly delayed response;
- failing to provide adequate safeguarding; and
- investigating some cases poorly.

The force's approach to vulnerability is unclear. Changes it has made to manage demand have created unnecessary risks and intentionally suppressed demand. It doesn't use its protective powers effectively to safeguard vulnerable victims. There are examples of it working well with its partners to assess, respond to and safeguard victims. But this isn't the case force-wide.

The force hasn't done enough to address the recommendations we made in our 2017 child protection inspection. It is leaving some children at risk of harm.

Cleveland Police understands the serious and organised crime threats across the force area. It has an effective strategy, a detailed strategic assessment and clear priorities. It works well with its partners to gather intelligence and respond to threats, including new and emerging threats, and manages organised crime groups (OCGs) effectively. It is good at deterring people at risk of entering organised crime and proactively works with vulnerable children to prevent this. The force disrupts, dismantles and investigates serious and organised crime well, but it could be better at understanding the effect of its activity on serious and organised crime.

The force understands the threat posed by firearms and responds well through a collaborative approach.

Preventing crime and tackling anti-social behaviour

Inadequate

Cleveland Police is inadequate in the way it prevents crime and tackles anti-social behaviour to keep the people of Cleveland safe. In this respect, the force has dropped two grades since our last inspection, which is a significant deterioration.

The force isn't prioritising crime prevention. There is a lack of strategic leadership and direction. It has limited resources allocated to neighbourhood teams and those resources aren't working consistently to force priorities. The future of neighbourhood policing is uncertain. Although other teams exist to prevent crime, they work separately to neighbourhood teams, lack clear direction and have limited capacity to solve problems.

The force understands the main threats facing its communities and has identified its priorities to address these threats. But it doesn't engage well with its communities, which means it doesn't fully understand local concerns and may not reflect these in its priorities. While some crime prevention and problem solving is happening, it is ad hoc and not well co-ordinated across the force. The force doesn't use a consistent approach to problem solving. Methods and systems that were previously in place are no longer consistently used. The force continues to work well with partners. There is a reliance on, but good use of, partner powers to prevent crime and anti-social behaviour. But the force isn't using evidence well enough to inform how it can prevent crime from occurring.

It is too early to assess the overall effect of removing neighbourhood officers. However, this is starting to show in the lack of access to police powers when needed to prevent crime in local communities.

The force isn't raising enough awareness in its communities to prevent crime. Individual teams send out messages, but there is no corporate approach to the force's communication. The force works well with children to prevent them from being drawn into crime.

Cause of concern

The force doesn't appropriately prioritise crime prevention. There is a lack of strategic direction, and the force doesn't allocate enough resources to prevention work. Staff who carry out prevention work lack an understanding of the priorities they should be tackling.

Recommendations

The force should take immediate steps to:

- provide strategic direction and co-ordination of all prevention activity;
- ensure there are the right resources, in the right place, to carry out structured problem-solving and prevention activity aligned to its priorities;
- ensure officers and staff working within neighbourhood teams understand the needs of local communities, their priorities, and the threats they face; and
- monitor the effectiveness of its crime prevention activity, evaluating and sharing effective practice both internally and with other organisations.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

Prioritising crime prevention

Cleveland Police doesn't prioritise crime prevention. It has a clear strategy, but this isn't implemented through its neighbourhood model and it has limited resources allocated to neighbourhood policing. The remaining neighbourhood teams lack the necessary direction and leadership from the force. The future for neighbourhood policing is uncertain.

The prevention strategy aligns with the Policing Vision for 2025 and the Modern Crime Prevention Strategy 2016. It communicates the priorities as being:

- tackling crime through crime prevention activities in the neighbourhood policing model;
- a reduction in repeat victimisation through crime prevention; and
- the development of prevention strategies and multi-agency prevention for sexual violence.

The force has kept its neighbourhood '3S' model. This model helps in identifying the different levels of neighbourhood team resources the force allocates to each local area to strengthen, support or sustain its communities. However, the model doesn't reflect the current force priorities, which means that the force has not sufficiently assessed where it needs to put its resources to prevent crime and solve problems. Its model is informed by data about volume crime and incidents, but it has not considered data about vulnerable people or aligned to priorities within its strategic assessment including repeat victims, missing children or drug offences. These are all areas where problem solving would assist the force in preventing crime and keeping people safe.

In February 2019, the force removed all police constables from its neighbourhood teams (77 officers in total) and placed them in response roles. This resulted in a neighbourhood policing model only resourced by police community support officers (PCSOs), neighbourhood sergeants and inspectors. However, the number of PCSOs is also reducing so that each ward will have just one PCSO dedicated to it (the savings from these posts will pay for additional resources elsewhere in the force). The specific role of the PCSOs is unclear. Most of those we spoke to don't have a good enough understanding of what is expected of them or how their role contributes to force priorities.

The force has a large community safety team that focuses on prevention activity, but most of the time it works in isolation, away from neighbourhood teams. It consists of a range of policing resources, including crime prevention officers, troubled families officers, hate crime investigators, community co-ordinators and mental health liaison officers. The team concentrates mainly on the jobs that have come in during the past 24 hours. However, its work lacks leadership and prioritisation and it isn't always clear how its activity aligns to the force's priorities.

The force has given officers and staff the skills, guidance and support they need to problem solve. It provided this specialist training in 2017, but it hasn't given them further training or continuing professional development to maintain these skills. Crime prevention officers have trained the workforce in problem solving because there were no plans to provide any more formal training.

The force has other resources to help prevent crime and anti-social behaviour, including:

- a cybercrime unit to raise awareness and prevent online crime;
- a rural crime officer who works with volunteers and other teams for specific operations;
- a team whose focus is to prevent children from being vulnerable, exploited, missing, and trafficked (VEMT); and
- people working with families and education to address behaviour when a child is abusive to their parent(s).

However, the force's VEMT team doesn't have the capacity to do the problem solving it is supposed to do. Also, the work with families and education to address abusive behaviour between children and their parents isn't a primary function of the police service.

Protecting the public from crime

Cleveland Police isn't adequately protecting the public from crime and anti-social behaviour. The force has analysed the main threats facing its communities and has identified the priorities for the whole force. However, it hasn't considered feedback from the public about their concerns in each local area. Neighbourhood teams aren't sufficiently addressing the force priorities or local concerns.

Local officers don't know enough about their communities and those who may pose a threat. Most PCSOs don't know about all the people who are wanted in their local area and are not aware of all the dangerous or priority offenders. They use a briefing system to understand what has happened in their area in the past 24 hours. Despite information being available, there is not sufficient understanding for them to prevent crime and anti-social behaviour from happening.

The force isn't raising enough awareness in its communities to prevent crime. Prevention messages on its website are hard to find and the force isn't updating the website because it intends to replace it with a 'single online home'. Individuals and teams are using Cleveland Connected (a messaging service) and social media to communicate with the public. There are good examples of officers and staff sending out messages about online crime, but there is no co-ordinated approach to this communication.

The force is improving how it prevents children being drawn into crime. There is evidence of this activity in the force's VEMT team. The force holds a bi-monthly diversionary meeting with other organisations working with children. The organisations use factors such as family history of criminality to identify children who may be more vulnerable to this. They consider these children to be at risk and have put extra support in place. As part of this, the force has a set programme of diversionary activities focused on specific geographical areas.

Across the force, there is no consistent approach to problem solving and, although there are examples of this happening, it isn't co-ordinated. Plans we viewed didn't include enough analysis of the problem, or enough supervision and evaluation. The force uses the SARA (scan, analyse, review, assess) problem-solving model, but this isn't being used consistently and in some cases isn't being used at all. The force has previously made good use of E-CINS, a web-based case-recording system, to record its problem-solving plans. However, it is no longer using this consistently. Some partners have also withdrawn from using this shared system.

Cleveland Police runs force-wide operations to prevent crime. However, these are generally the same operations the force runs every year or are operations run as part of a national initiative. Most tackle current problems rather than focusing on longer-term problem solving to prevent reoccurrence. The force doesn't use predictive techniques to inform crime prevention work.

The force continues to work well with partners to tackle crime and anti-social behaviour, and makes good use of partner powers. However, the removal of neighbourhood officers means that police powers aren't available when needed. The force shares relevant information with its partners and gives their analysts access

to its systems. There are some good examples of work with partners to prevent anti-social behaviour.

The force isn't using evidence to inform how it can prevent crime from occurring. It doesn't do enough evaluation of the prevention work and problem solving that takes place. Previously it communicated what works through flags placed on its electronic iMap (geographical mapping) system, but this is no longer well used. In 2017, we reported that the force had formed an evidence-based practice clinic with Teesside University. It intended this to provide evidence of what works specifically in Cleveland. The force has 45 officers and staff who have been trained and have completed research in evidence-based practice. We were disappointed to find that it hasn't made good use of this research or the skills that have been developed.

Investigating crime

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Requires improvement

Cleveland Police needs to improve the way it investigates crime. The force doesn't have the right number of people in the right place to manage its investigative demand. It allocates most crimes to the right teams. But it hasn't trained supervisors to the right standard to oversee the effectiveness of investigations.

The quality of investigations isn't good enough. This is particularly the case for crimes investigated over the phone and those investigated by response officers. Response officers don't have the time to make the necessary enquiries, they often miss the chance to collect evidence early and they don't make enquiries quickly enough. Most crimes are supervised, but not always given the necessary direction. The force has a plan in place to improve the quality of its investigations.

The force doesn't effectively support victims and the wider community. It doesn't see the importance of continuing with a prosecution when the victim doesn't support it. This may be putting victims and the wider community at unnecessary risk.

We are concerned that the force is putting the public at risk by its poor offender management. The force isn't proactive enough at catching criminals. It needs to have a clear process, with good leadership and senior officer oversight.

Cleveland Police works well with its public and private sector partners to manage offenders after arrest. It makes appropriate referrals for foreign national offenders. It manages and monitors the risks associated with suspects who are released under investigation (RUI). It fulfils its disclosure obligations and has effective arrangements in place to manage and ensure the quality of disclosure.

We have identified three areas for improvement, which we set out below. Although we are also concerned about the force's ability to proactively catch criminals, we have included this in our cause of concern under 'Protecting vulnerable people' later in this report.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

Investigation quality

Cleveland Police had a 17.6 percent increase in crime in the 12 months to March 2019 compared with the same period the previous year. The force is the third highest of all forces when this is applied to the level of population in Cleveland (per 1,000 population). This means that the force experiences more crimes within a smaller population, and many of these involve repeat victims.

There were 12 homicides in Cleveland in the 12 months to the end of March 2019, whereas the force usually investigates 1–3 homicides per year. The force's major investigations team (a collaboration with North Yorkshire Police) investigates these crimes, but the initial response remains with Cleveland officers. This is putting increasing pressure on already overstretched response officers.

The force doesn't have the right number of people in the right place for it to manage its investigative demand. Response officers can't progress investigations effectively because of other workloads, and the force's telephone investigations unit has been clearing a backlog quickly. The quality of investigations has suffered as a result. Most crimes are allocated to the right team, but some high-risk domestic abuse crimes are being investigated by officers in prisoner-handling teams who haven't been trained to investigate these crimes.

The force allocates crimes by crime category rather than the level of threat, harm and risk that is experienced by the victim. Delays can occur when allocating crimes between some teams, when it is unclear which team should take responsibility for an investigation. This mainly happens at weekends and causes unnecessary delays to the investigations and in supporting the victim. The force has developed new guidance for crime management and proportionate investigation to indicate which crimes will be investigated by which department. It had only recently introduced this at the time of our inspection.

Crimes are investigated by response officers, crime investigations departments and specialist crime teams, with some lower-level crimes being investigated over the phone. The workload of the force's crime investigations departments is low in comparison with other forces. While the force suggests that this is due to the increased complexity of investigations, it has not developed its reasoning to

understand this, therefore there it has no evidence to support this. This means that the force doesn't always have the right capacity and capability in the right places to carry out investigations.

Some of the force's investigation teams aren't aligned to demand to support continuing investigations. Crime investigation teams work a day shift (8.00am–6.00pm) and, although prisoner-handling teams work until 10.00pm, they don't accept work after 8.00pm. This means that, after these times, response officers deal with all prisoners and continuing investigations. The force is investing an additional £1m in its investigation teams, including those who investigate crimes relating to vulnerable victims. This will enable the force to recruit more investigators and provide additional staffing within its VEMT team.

The quality of investigation requires improvement. In our crime file review, we judged just over half of the force's investigations to be effective. This review took place six months before the inspection and, despite the feedback we provided, the force hadn't improved further by the time of our inspection. Most of the investigations by response officers that we reviewed – and all the telephone investigations – were ineffective. Investigations by specialist teams were mostly effective. The force has recently put a 'crime allocation and management rapid improvement plan' in place and is monitoring progress through its crime and justice learning and development group, chaired by the head of crime. However, the force has limited information available to help it improve the quality of its investigations.

When the force implemented its operating model in 2017, it didn't intend to have response officers investigating many crimes. Response officers don't have enough capacity to undertake investigations because responding to calls for service takes priority. The current shift pattern means that officers aren't at work for 12–15 days each month. This means that their investigations are taking too long to complete and officers often miss opportunities for the early collection of evidence. All the crimes we reviewed had input from a supervisor, but most didn't include an investigation plan to provide the necessary direction.

The force doesn't have enough people with the right training to investigate most crimes effectively. It has trained most frontline officers and investigators to the required level, but only trained 38 percent of supervisors, including those overseeing investigations by frontline officers. Only 23 percent of its child abuse investigators have the relevant accreditation. The force has moved some of its experienced investigators to work on significant enquiries within a historical investigations unit.

Generally, the force supports victims through its investigations and records any contact made, but it needs to have a better understanding of the information it gives them. During our crime file review, we found that 47 of the 60 crime files reviewed showed good victim care.

Catching criminals

Cleveland Police isn't proactive enough at catching criminals. There is no clear process, no force oversight and no one takes overall responsibility.

The force doesn't have a process to promptly circulate wanted people on the [Police National Computer](#) and doesn't manage this at either a local or a senior level. It reviews the overall number of outstanding suspects, but this data isn't always accurate and the force doesn't scrutinise it sufficiently. The force doesn't have any processes to assure itself that officers and staff are proactively pursuing outstanding suspects. At the force's daily 'pacesetter' meeting, chief inspectors review the details of some, but not all, high-risk domestic abuse offenders to circulate them as wanted. There are delays in outstanding suspects being handed over for other shifts to pursue. Also, neighbourhood sergeants are frustrated about the lack of available resources to execute warrants for wanted people.

The force works well with its partner organisations to catch criminals. There are immigration officers located within the force's custody team and the force makes appropriate referrals to check previous convictions for foreign national offenders. There is oversight of this process and appropriate controls are in place.

The force manages and monitors the risks associated with suspects who are released under investigation (RUI), and has increased its use of RUI. But it makes limited use of pre-charge [bail](#). There are clearly defined processes in place for both bail and RUI, and supervisors complete reviews at regular intervals. Bail suspect managers, who work for the force's private provider, monitor the use of RUI and breaches of pre-charge bail. This ensures that the force doesn't miss statutory limitation periods. Although the force has only provided limited training to officers, it has experts in place. However, the force can't assure itself that these processes consider the risks to victims and the community, and it doesn't routinely monitor RUI data for cases of domestic abuse.

The force is fulfilling its disclosure obligations and has effective arrangements in place to manage and ensure the quality of disclosure. It has given training to the workforce. However, most investigators don't have a good enough understanding of how to apply the disclosure rules to their investigations. Instead, evidence review officers (EROs) make sure that investigations comply with disclosure obligations. EROs work for the force's private provider and oversee the management of case files. The force's prosecution team manages performance monthly.

The force monitors its investigative outcomes through its performance meetings. They are only discussed when an exception is raised. In 2017, we gave the force a national recommendation highlighting that it needed to improve its use, understanding and monitoring of outcome 16. Although the force put a plan in place, this hasn't been successful. Senior leaders don't recognise the importance of progressing a prosecution when the victim doesn't support it. This means that the victim and wider community may be exposed to risk that the force could have reduced or prevented. Officers within the force's domestic abuse team have recently raised awareness of the use of outcome 16 with response officers through a presentation that examined six examples of successful evidence-led prosecutions, including the evidence used. We will continue to monitor progress in this area.

Protecting vulnerable people

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Inadequate

Cleveland Police isn't protecting vulnerable people well enough. We have serious concerns that the force is leaving vulnerable victims at risk. The force has high levels of repeat victimisation but isn't considering the cumulative effect. There are too many examples of the force:

- not identifying vulnerable victims;
- not providing any response to vulnerable victims, or providing a significantly delayed response;
- not fully assessing and safeguarding vulnerable victims including children; and/or
- not adequately investigating cases with low levels of vulnerability.

The force's approach to vulnerability is unclear. There is no vulnerability strategy or overall approach that the workforce understands. It analyses some patterns of offending against vulnerable victims but doesn't use this knowledge well. Training for some of the workforce in how to identify and assess vulnerability has helped understanding.

The force is making changes to try and manage its demand. But in doing so it is creating unnecessary risks in how it:

- deals with non-emergency calls;
- responds to vulnerable victims, particularly victims of domestic abuse;
- assesses victims of domestic abuse and associated children; and
- manages reports of missing children.

It has plans to improve its call handling, but these plans don't fully address all the problems.

The force doesn't make effective and consistent use of protective powers and measures to safeguard vulnerable victims. It isn't making disclosures under Clare's Law and Sarah's Law promptly, and it isn't making sufficient use of domestic abuse protection notices. This is despite the high number of repeat incidents and the increase in domestic abuse incidents overall.

The force works well with partners to assess, respond to and safeguard victims. There are mental health and domestic abuse practitioners in the force control room. The multi-agency approach in the north of the force to safeguard children is effective. But a similar approach in the south of the force hasn't yet started.

In 2017, we inspected Cleveland Police as part of our national child protection programme. In 2018, we followed this up with a post-inspection review. During this PEEL/IPA inspection, we reviewed all the recommendations relating to our previous child protection inspections of Cleveland Police. Disappointingly, the force hasn't made enough progress for any of these recommendations to be signed off.

As well as these outstanding recommendations, we found the following cause of concern, recommendations and areas for improvement in this inspection.

Cause of concern

Cleveland Police is failing to respond appropriately to vulnerable people, including children. It is missing opportunities to safeguard them and is exposing them to risk.

Recommendations

The force must take immediate action to ensure that:

- officers and staff can identify vulnerable people and repeat victims effectively;

- it promptly attends incidents involving vulnerable people, and any regrading of incidents is based on a structured and recorded risk assessment with supervisory oversight;

- it safeguards all victims of domestic abuse, through the effective completion of a structured risk assessment, adequately supervising any changes to the initial assessment;

- there is sufficient supervision of domestic abuse cases assessed as having a standard level of risk;

- the cumulative effect of numerous incidents involving the same victim or household is properly risk assessed, considered and responded to;

- referrals for ongoing safeguarding are made at the appropriate time;

- there are effective processes in place for catching criminals which are subject to supervision and scrutiny, and it uses the available legal powers to prevent re-offending; and

- it supplies people with the information they need and are entitled to under the provisions of Clare's Law and Sarah's Law.

Areas for improvement

- All children managed within VEMT should have a person dossier and a trigger plan in place with appropriate supervisory oversight.

These areas for improvement are still outstanding from our previous inspections:

- The force should further improve the way it works with partner organisations in relation to sharing information and safeguarding victims by continuing to work to establish a multi-agency safeguarding hub (for the south of the force area). (Vulnerability 2015)

- The force should ensure that the risks posed by registered sex offenders are managed effectively. (Vulnerability 2016)

- The force should take steps to understand the reasons why a high proportion of crimes related to domestic abuse fall into the category 'Evidential difficulties; victim does not support police action', and rectify this to ensure that it is pursuing justice on behalf of victims of domestic abuse. (Vulnerability 2016)

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

Understanding and identifying vulnerability

Cleveland Police's approach to vulnerability is unclear. There is no vulnerability strategy or whole-force approach that the workforce knows about. The force uses a variation of the College of Policing's vulnerability definition and has trained frontline officers to help improve their understanding of vulnerability. But the language consistently used by officers and staff at all levels within the force is about 'reducing demand'. There isn't enough focus on the victim.

The force has a limited understanding of the full breadth of vulnerability. It has individual strategies for domestic abuse and missing persons. The last time it produced its domestic abuse profile was in 2016 and it hasn't refreshed it since. However, it has done more detailed analysis to understand repeat victims of all types of crime, including victims of domestic abuse. In the 12 months to April 2019, the number of domestic abuse repeat victims increased by 21 percent compared with the previous 12 months. Nearly half of the domestic abuse incidents reported relate to repeat victims and the force has carried out work to understand this. It has also analysed the data on its missing children incidents, which make up most of its missing person reports. In the 12 months to April 2019, 228 children went missing a second or subsequent time, which resulted in the force responding 1,828 times to look for these children. However, the force doesn't sufficiently use the understanding that it has to inform how it responds to missing children incidents and it hasn't done a detailed analysis of other types of vulnerability.

The force has trained its workforce and provided guidance to help improve understanding of vulnerability. For frontline officers, this has included training in coercive and controlling behaviour, including stalking and harassment and cyberbullying. Officers value this training and the force has applied for funding so that it can extend it to the rest of the workforce. In 2018 the training was in honour-based abuse and in 2017 it focused on 'through the eyes of a child' and adverse childhood experiences. Awareness sessions about vulnerability, which force specialists were providing in 2017, have now stopped. The force provides the workforce with guidance on how to respond to people with mental ill health, learning difficulties and autism. It also gives the workforce guidance about recognising victims of modern-day slavery, including the action that should be taken to safeguard them and investigate these types of crimes.

However, the force isn't proactive enough in uncovering 'hidden' harm. Frontline officers don't have a good enough knowledge of the signs to look for, such as poor living conditions and social isolation. The force's VEMT team is also responsible for identifying hidden harm, but its workload means that it has limited capacity to do proactive work. The force is encouraging the public to report incidents involving people being the subject of forced labour through a 'Safe Car Wash' app (see 'Tackling serious and organised crime: Understanding threats' for further information).

When vulnerable victims contact the force, it doesn't identify or assess them well enough. Call handlers show good basic communication skills and empathy with callers, but the force hasn't trained them in identifying vulnerable people. Call handling systems automatically identify repeat callers through phone number and address records, but call handlers don't have access to all relevant force systems and don't consistently ask the right questions or complete a structured risk assessment.

We found examples of the control room diverting 101 (non-emergency) calls to enquiry desk answerphones as a way for the force to manage its demand. These calls then become the responsibility of enquiry desk staff. However, the force hasn't properly managed this change to its processes and hasn't considered the potential risk created. Some calls are being left overnight, and sometimes over weekends and bank holidays, without being responded to because staff aren't on duty. This means that some vulnerable victims aren't being identified and responded to quickly enough.

Health and social care partners help the force assess some vulnerable victims, which works well, but they aren't available all the time. A mental health practitioner works 12.00pm to 12.00am and a domestic abuse worker is available weekends only. They help the force by reviewing incidents to determine the level of response needed.

Responding to incidents

Cleveland Police can't respond to all incidents involving vulnerable victims promptly enough and leaves over a third of them waiting for a response. It downgrades many of these active incidents to help it meet its response time targets, but it doesn't base these decisions on any change in the victim's circumstances or on a reassessment of risk. For example: when an incident is reported and is assessed as requiring an officer to respond as a priority (within an hour), we found many examples of these incidents being inappropriately downgraded to a lesser priority resulting in a significantly longer wait for vulnerable victims. This means that the force is intentionally suppressing demand. Chief officers don't have a clear view of this because response data reported at force performance meetings is inaccurate: it incorrectly shows that the force had a 90 percent response rate to emergency incidents in April 2019, when its actual response rate was 64 percent. Despite us telling the force this in July 2018, it has continued to report inaccurate data. Its response rate to other incidents, or the level of incidents that are being re-graded, isn't reported at all.

The force can't respond to calls about missing persons in a timely way and it can't manage the volume of calls it receives. It doesn't have enough officers on duty when it receives these calls, which means the necessary enquiries can't be completed quickly enough. These enquiries then become the responsibility of the following shift, usually the next day.

Victims of domestic abuse often receive a delayed response, which puts them at risk. The force has a domestic abuse car to help respond to standard-risk domestic abuse victims through scheduled appointments, but some high-risk victims (who need an immediate or priority response) are included. The car only operates when there are enough officers on duty to resource it. The force also doesn't have enough specialist officers available to respond to victims of sexual offences.

The force isn't assessing and recording the risk to victims of domestic abuse at initial contact well enough. Response officers complete a structured risk assessment with the victim, but we found a third hadn't been completed. The force's telephone investigation unit completes risk assessments without seeing the victim or others in the household. While there is a national pilot project in progress to try this approach, Cleveland Police isn't part of this, so its own activities aren't taking place within an appropriately controlled environment. Also, the telephone unit is only completing 50 percent of the risk assessments required.

A secondary review is completed by supervisors, but these reviews are inadequate and don't consider cumulative risk to victims. The force has changed its process and as a result has introduced unnecessary risk in the way it assesses the level of safeguarding a victim receives. There are examples of frontline supervisors incorrectly downgrading the level of risk assessed by the response officer. The force expects supervisors to research wider information available on force systems for all victims assessed as standard risk. But supervisors often don't have the time to do thorough research, which means they are making poor decisions based on incomplete information. As a result, some victims don't receive the right level of safeguarding. This change in process has been made solely to manage demand, not the risk to the victim.

The force isn't safeguarding victims in a timely way because of delays in the referral process. Referrals for victims assessed as high and medium risk are sent to the force's protecting vulnerable people support hub for further review. We found 448 risk assessments that hadn't been progressed. The force told us that this queue had been triaged so that all high-risk cases were dealt with promptly but, in the small sample we reviewed, we immediately found some high-risk cases (the oldest of which was three months old). We referred these cases to the force for immediate action.

The force is putting at risk children who live in, or are associated with, domestic abuse households. It isn't always recording the details of these children, which means that it isn't identifying them as being vulnerable. Our 2017 national child protection inspection of Cleveland Police recommended that attending officers always record observations of a "child's behaviour and demeanour" in domestic abuse incidents so that better assessments can be made of the child's needs. The force has shown no improvement. Its secondary review process, based on wider information, doesn't always identify these children and the force has no way of assessing the cumulative risk to a child. The force only identifies a child to be vulnerable, and makes the appropriate referrals, if they are already recorded on force systems with a 'vulnerability marker'. However, there is no referral pathway for children who are vulnerable but don't have a marker already in place. This means that no strategy discussion or meeting will take place to make sure that these children are safe.

Cleveland Police doesn't take enough action to protect vulnerable victims. In too many cases, it isn't proactively pursuing domestic abuse offenders who are wanted. This is at a time when the force is experiencing an increase in the number of incidents of repeat victimisation. Officers have access to body-worn video cameras to help progress evidence-led prosecutions, but they aren't always using them. The force's overall arrest rate is 25 percent, a decrease of 9.9 percent compared with the previous year. This is still slightly lower than the England and Wales average of 28

percent for the period ending March 2019. The force's use of voluntary attendance is in line with the England and Wales rate of 8.4 percent.

The force works well with its partners to respond to victims who have mental health problems. It has a mental health street triage service – to provide advice and support for people experiencing mental health crisis – run by nurses. This means that people with mental health problems receive a better response, including getting appropriate care more quickly, and police officers are less likely to respond to incidents where they aren't required. It also reduces the number of instances where officers detain a person under section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983.

Supporting vulnerable victims

Cleveland Police has a clear approach to continuing safeguarding but doesn't implement it effectively. Neighbourhood teams aren't routinely involved in the continuing safeguarding of vulnerable people in their communities through activities such as providing crime prevention advice and reassurance visits. The force's crime prevention team does the target hardening required for victims of domestic abuse.

The force doesn't make effective and consistent use of its protective powers and measures to safeguard vulnerable victims. In 2017, we reported that the force's use of domestic abuse notices had more than halved. The force intended putting a dedicated officer in place to support the use of domestic abuse protection notices, but this didn't happen. Its use of protection notices and protection orders for domestic abuse offenders hasn't improved, despite an increase in reports of domestic abuse and repeat victims. We also found no evidence that the force is monitoring the orders for breaches. The force isn't always using pre-charge bail for cases of domestic abuse and instead releases some suspects under investigation. It doesn't oversee its data for RUI in cases of domestic abuse.

The force isn't giving people the information they need to protect themselves. It isn't making disclosures under Clare's Law promptly enough and we found a backlog of 58 Clare's Law applications, one of which had been outstanding for two and a half months. The delay in Sarah's Law disclosures is shorter. While the force makes good use of these schemes, there is an unknown level of risk within the backlogs and delays because people need the information to help keep them safe.

Cleveland Police works well with partners in the north of the force area to support longer-term safeguarding. It contributes to the effectiveness of the multi-agency children's hub, which has been in place since 2017 to provide early and effective intervention. The hub is well managed and has no backlogs. It takes all the referrals from the force and deals with them as a multi-agency team to address children's safeguarding. The force had intended to have a second multi-agency hub in the south of its area, with a 'go live' date of June 2019, but this has been delayed. This has been an area for improvement for the force since 2015. In the meantime, the force's protecting vulnerable people support hub sends referrals in this area directly to children's services and adult social care.

Operation Encompass had led to improvements in how the force notified schools of any children affected by domestic abuse. This scheme supports those children who are of school age by notifying the school if an incident has taken place the

previous day. However, the force hasn't allocated enough resources to manage the level of work: it should have two police staff, but only one is in post. Also, officers don't always record the details of children who are involved, or connected with, domestic abuse incidents.

The force's VEMT team co-ordinates a joint-agency approach to support vulnerable children. This is to minimise repeat episodes of missing children while also reducing potential harm. When a child goes missing three or more times within 90 days, children's care services hold a strategy meeting or risk management meeting. However, there is no assurance that these meetings are happening promptly. Officers spend a lot of time preparing for and attending these meetings and, if further crimes are identified, they are responsible for recording these crimes and on occasions progressing the investigations, which creates more work. The workload in the unit is high across all its functions of preventing, problem solving and investigating cases. The team doesn't record enough information and doesn't have enough resources or effective processes to adequately do the role it was set up to do.

All high-risk cases of domestic abuse are referred to a multi-agency risk assessment conference (MARAC), with a strategic meeting held every two weeks. The MARAC partner agencies screen these referrals and only take on the 'really high-risk' cases, based on an assessment of multi-agency information available. An independent chair now oversees this process.

The force seeks feedback from vulnerable victims. It surveys all victims monthly about the quality of service they receive. This includes domestic abuse victims who don't support police taking action. The force completes high-level analysis of victim satisfaction. It reports the results through its performance meetings. The office of the police and crime commissioner (OPCC) has formed a quarterly domestic abuse working group to scrutinise the force's approach to domestic abuse victims. This is made up of external representatives from the four local authorities, support agencies, voluntary organisations and the Crown Prosecution Service. The group reviews individual cases end to end to identify learning. Force representatives are present at the meeting so that the force will understand any improvements it has identified.

The force is managing registered sex offenders (RSOs) who may pose a risk to vulnerable people. However, the workload within the unit is at the high end of what is considered reasonable. There is an increasing demand for assessments and visits to be undertaken by this unit, alongside a steadily increasing number of sex offenders, but the force has no plan to address this. Officers manage their workload through prioritising high-risk visits, with most visits being unannounced. It is managing the workload it has by prioritising high-risk visits. There is a small backlog of risk assessments and visits to lower-risk offenders.

The force makes good use of technology to monitor the conditions given to dangerous and sexual offenders. It places software on the mobile devices of some RSOs (with their consent) to monitor their online activity. The software notifies the officer when the RSO makes specific searches online. The force makes good use of 'Buddi' tags – a tracking device that ensures offenders are complying with their conditions – and intends to enforce these by using sexual harm prevention orders. It makes good use

of these orders and monitors for breaches, although more recently there has been a decline in their use.

Neighbourhood teams don't have enough knowledge of dangerous offenders and sex offenders living in their local area. Occasionally, they are given enquiries to carry out relating to these offenders but they don't have an overall awareness. Previously, officers and PCSOs kept themselves informed by using the force's iMap system, but this no longer takes place as standard practice. Awareness briefings, which staff found useful, only happened in the north of the force. Officers have completed work with a local mental health facility to build knowledge and confidence of the staff dealing with RSOs. This included awareness of escorted and unescorted leave, and how to manage people who fail to return and potentially dangerous persons.

Tackling serious and organised crime

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Good

Cleveland Police understands the serious and organised crime threats across the force area. The force has aligned its strategy and governance for serious and organised crime to the national strategy. It has appropriate governance in place within the force and with partners. It has a thorough strategic assessment and clear priorities. It understands the gaps in its understanding through proactively seeking intelligence, which it does through various sources, including partners and local communities.

The force takes positive steps to understand newer threats such as modern-day slavery, child sexual exploitation and county lines. It proactively seeks intelligence about existing and new organised crime groups (OCGs). The force acts on the intelligence it receives and properly assesses new OCGs as soon as it identifies them. It maps and reviews them at regular intervals. There are plans in place to manage and disrupt organised crime.

Cleveland Police is good at deterring people at risk of being drawn into organised crime. It proactively works with children to prevent them from becoming involved in crime. This includes those who are at risk of being exploited for criminal purposes, such as county lines. The force publicises successful operations through social media. However, it could do more to communicate prevention messages to deter people from engaging in organised crime and protect them from being victims. This is one of the approaches in the force's serious and organised crime strategy.

The force disrupts, dismantles and investigates serious and organised crime well. It does this by drawing on its own specialist resources, in addition to other forces, agencies and partner organisations. The force is managing organised criminals through lifetime offender management. However, it doesn't understand the longer-term effect this is having on serious and organised crime. We saw signs that the removal of neighbourhood officers was starting to have a negative effect because they weren't available to carry out lower-level disruption activity.

> **Area for improvement**
>
> - The force needs to develop a better understanding of the effect of its activity on serious and organised crime across the four Ps, and make sure it learns from experience to maximise its disruptive effect.

During our pre-inspection in December 2018, we found that the management of serious and organised crime lacked leadership and direction. There was limited prevention activity and no accountability for those responsible for disrupting organised crime. Some good work was taking place, but this was as a result of individuals rather than force direction or a co-ordinated force approach. We gave our findings to the force five months ahead of the inspection because of the deterioration in this area. The force listened and made improvements ahead of the inspection taking place.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

Understanding threats

Cleveland Police understands the serious and organised crime threats across the force area. It has a thorough strategic assessment process to identify and assess the threats. This includes new threats such as child exploitation, modern-day slavery and cybercrime. The force uses MoRiLE to assess risk and identify priorities.

The force has aligned its strategy and governance for serious and organised crime to the national strategy and follows the 4P framework (pursue, prevent, protect, prepare). It manages this through a strategic board, which is informed by a local partnership board and a serious and organised crime local profile (SOCLP). The SOCLP guides partnership activity. It includes partner data and information and is updated bi-annually. Force and partnership analysts were completing the work to support this at the time of our inspection.

The force takes positive steps to understand newer threats such as modern-day slavery, child sexual exploitation and county lines, and continues to identify OCGs. Emerging threats are discussed at the force's tasking and co-ordinating meeting. The force recognises county lines activity as a threat, but has previously referred to it as 'child exploitation'. In January 2019, it held a county lines 'intensification week' with partners. It is starting to question why its child sexual exploitation crime levels are decreasing, while its intelligence submissions are increasing. It has support from partner organisations and other agencies in dealing with modern-day slavery through an anti-slavery network.

The force seeks intelligence to develop its understanding of the threat from serious and organised crime. It understands the gaps in its knowledge and co-ordinates activity to fill these gaps. It has communicated the intelligence it is seeking to both staff and partners, and it tasks and collects intelligence from a range of sources, including external partners. It exchanges intelligence with other forces, the regional organised crime unit and partner organisations.

The force acts on the intelligence it receives from a range of sources. A recent example is when intelligence from Crimestoppers resulted in the force identifying and mapping a new OCG. Investigators review suspicious activity reports that help to determine unusual financial activity. This then informs how the force can disrupt organised crime activity using partner powers. The Safe Car Wash app provides the force with local intelligence when a member of the public suspects modern-day slavery.

The force has 25 OCGs. It properly assesses new OCGs as soon as it identifies them. This is done immediately and before any operational activity takes place, unless urgent activity is required. The majority of these OCGs are reviewed and re-scored at regular intervals. Scanning and trigger processes are in place for OCGs assessed as lower risk. The force is archiving OCGs correctly.

The force doesn't identify urban street gangs, although it has started to look for county lines criminal networks. It does identify anti-social behaviour gangs and other people who would fall into the category of county lines, but it doesn't define them by this name. The force is doing work with partners to raise awareness of county lines but it could also do this through its school's liaison officers.

Serious and organised crime prevention

Cleveland Police is good at deterring people at risk of being drawn into organised crime. This is one of the approaches in the force's serious and organised crime strategy. It works with young children through youth engagement meetings and activities. It holds bi-monthly meetings with partner organisations and has a set programme of diversionary activity focused on specific areas.

The force proactively identifies those at risk of being drawn into crime and gang violence in order to safeguard them. For example, it has worked with partners and other agencies to protect children from being criminally exploited. These vulnerable children were being drawn into shoplifting by an organised gang, and the force co-ordinated a multi-agency approach to safeguard them. Long-term interventions were put in place to prevent them from becoming lifetime offenders.

The force doesn't use gang injunctions to tackle gang crime. Gang activity in Cleveland mainly focuses on anti-social behaviour and the force deals with this by using anti-social behaviour powers with partners.

The force is managing organised criminals through a lifetime offender management approach. It has introduced a new process, informed by the regional approach to lifetime offender management. This process is used for both prioritised individuals and other organised criminals.

The force has capable lead responsible officers to oversee OCGs. They are responsible for knowing what is happening with these groups and for disrupting their activity. The force monitors the activity of organised criminals while in prison. It works well with prisons, probation and the regional prison liaison unit to actively monitor and manage them. It manages their movements between prisons and prepares for their release.

Cleveland Police makes good use of serious crime prevention orders (SCPOs) to prevent organised criminals from offending while in custody or on release from prison. The force's integrated offender management team has three dedicated SCPO managers who manage and enforce ancillary orders.

The force publicises successful operations through social media. This is to reassure communities about what has happened and why. There are good examples of individual teams promoting awareness about modern-day slavery and cybercrime. The force has developed a booklet, which it has circulated to partners to raise awareness about organised crime. However, the force could do more to communicate prevention messages to deter people from engaging in organised crime and protect them from being victims. The force doesn't have a corporate communications strategy to manage its communication campaigns.

Disruption and investigation

A senior force leader is responsible for driving a whole-force approach to tackling serious and organised crime, and has taken steps towards holding staff to account through a new governance structure. The force has a strategic serious and organised crime delivery board, and an active serious and organised local partnership board. These meet regularly and have recently revised the terms of reference and increased membership. The force has a clear method for prioritising OCGs for investigation. It assigns capable local responsible officers to all active OCGs to manage them over their active lifespan. They have the support and advice they need from specialists in the force and within the region. The force regularly scrutinises activity and holds local responsible officers and senior investigating officers to account.

The force considers a broad range of tactics to disrupt and dismantle OCGs. There are 4P plans in place for each OCG. Local responsible officers are confident in using a range of tactics, including both covert and overt tactics. They have received training on the range of tactics available and which to consider for what purpose. The force uses financial investigations and asset recovery to dismantle and disrupt OCGs.

Cleveland Police disrupts, dismantles and investigates serious and organised crime well with other forces, agencies and partner organisations. The force's approach to serious and organised crime activity includes a regional and three-force approach under Operation Sentinel with Durham Constabulary and Northumbria Police. As well as the force's specialist teams, it draws on support from regional specialist units. It is also supported by British Transport Police, Harbour Police and Nuclear Policing teams. It makes good use of the Government Agency Intelligence Network to access partner intelligence and disruptive powers. It also uses an extended network of partners, including trading standards, local authorities and social services. However, we saw signs that the removal of neighbourhood officers was starting to have a negative effect because they weren't available to carry out lower-level disruption activity.

The force manages threats to life well by responding to dynamic intelligence – intelligence that is constantly being refreshed as new information comes in. There is 24/7 cover with decisions about intelligence being made by the receiving officer and

the necessary support identified. Threats to life are reviewed and allocated for immediate action.

The force is starting to identify county lines networks, but we can't yet assess how well it tackles or dismantles them. When children are identified, the force's VEMT team manages them and works with partners to put appropriate measures in place to divert them away from this activity and safeguard them.

The force has limited understanding of the long-term effect it is having on serious and organised crime. During 2018 and 2019, the force made an average of 2.2 disruptions per OCG. This is slightly lower than the England and Wales average. The force's analysis in preparing its local serious and organised crime profile is intended to show the impact of its activity. However, the force told us that this is proving difficult because of the complexity of collating the required information and the complex nature of organised criminality.

Armed policing

We have previously inspected how well forces were prepared to manage firearms attacks. This formed part of our 2016 and 2017 effectiveness inspections. Subsequent terrorist attacks in the UK and Europe have meant that the police service maintains a firm focus on armed capability in England and Wales.

It isn't just terrorist attacks that place operational demands on armed officers. The threat can include the activity of OCGs or armed street gangs and all other crime involving guns. The *Code of Practice on the Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons* makes forces responsible for implementing national standards of armed policing. The code stipulates that a chief officer be designated to oversee these standards. This requires the chief officer to set out the firearms threat in an armed policing strategic threat and risk assessment (APSTRA). The chief officer must also set out clear rationales for the number of armed officers (armed capacity) and the level to which they are trained (armed capability).

Understanding the threat and responding to it

Cleveland Police operates joint arrangements with Durham Constabulary to provide armed policing. This ensures that the standards of training, armed deployments and command of armed operations are the same in both forces.

The force has a good understanding of the potential harm facing the public. Its APSTRA conforms to the requirements of the code and the College of Policing guidance. The APSTRA is published annually and accompanied by a register of risks and other observations. The designated chief officer reviews the register frequently to maintain the right levels of armed capability and capacity.

All armed officers in England and Wales are trained to national standards. These standards relate to the role they perform. Most armed incidents in Cleveland are attended to by officers trained to an armed response vehicle (ARV) standard. However, incidents sometimes occur that require the skills and capabilities of more highly trained officers.

Some ARV officers expressed concerns that specialist officers aren't always available to attend incidents when these additional skills are needed. On these occasions, we were told that ARV officers sometimes resolve the incidents as an expedient method of reducing the danger and protecting the public. However, it is important that, for the safety of all concerned, the skills and capabilities of armed officers match the threats they face.

Working with others

It is important that effective joint working arrangements are in place between neighbouring forces. Armed criminals and terrorists have no respect for county boundaries. As a consequence, armed officers must be prepared to deploy flexibly in the knowledge that they can work seamlessly with officers in other forces. It is also important that any one force can call on support from surrounding forces in times of heightened threat.

The joint operational arrangements with Durham Constabulary mean that ARV officers can deploy quickly and efficiently in both force areas. This is undoubtedly a strength. However, we believe that extending collaborative arrangements to other forces in the north east would be of benefit. In particular, consideration should be given to developing a specialist capability with other forces in the region. This would provide greater assurance that officers with the right skills are on hand to manage the threats presented by the most dangerous criminals.

We also examined how well prepared forces are to respond to threats and risks. Armed officers in Cleveland are trained in tactics that take account of the types of recent terrorist attacks. Also, the force has an important role in designing training exercises with other organisations that simulate these types of attack. We found that these training exercises are reviewed carefully so that learning points are identified and improvements are made for the future.

In addition to debriefing training exercises, we also found that the force reviews the outcome of all firearms incidents that officers attend. This helps ensure that best practice or areas for improvement are identified. However, officers told us that some suggestions they have put forward – for example, how control room procedures could be improved – haven't been followed through to a logical conclusion.

Efficiency

Force in context

	Cleveland spend	England and Wales spend
Spend per head of population 2018/19 projection	£222	£192

Spend per head of population by category

2018/19 projection

	Cleveland spend	England and Wales spend
Visible frontline	£67	£65
Non-visible frontline	£73	£62
Frontline Support	£22	£17
Business support	£44	£41
Other	£16	£8

How efficiently does the force operate and how sustainable are its services?

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Inadequate

Summary

Cleveland Police has a poor understanding of its demand. It doesn't sufficiently prioritise between different types of demand and it shows a limited understanding of the factors that affect this. Its lack of understanding means that it isn't efficiently adapting the services it provides and, as a result, it can't provide them as promptly as it should be able to.

The force isn't making the best use of the resources it has. It has changed some processes to manage its functions better, but in doing so has created risks. It has considered more efficient ways of working, such as working with others, but it doesn't properly understand how effective its joint working is.

The force's financial management is good and it manages its budget tightly. However, it bases its plans on its poor understanding of demand. It also hasn't aligned its financial and workforce strategies, and there is no accurate plan to fill the skills or training gaps it has.

The force recognises that it needs to improve and has commenced a programme of change. However, the future operating model is uncertain, and the force doesn't sufficiently understand what the public of Cleveland expects.

The force has dropped two grades in the efficiency pillar since our last efficiency inspection in 2017, which is a significant deterioration.

Cause of concern

Cleveland Police doesn't adequately understand the demand it faces. A thorough understanding of demand is required to underpin all strategic planning. This failure means it doesn't have coherent workforce and financial plans to meet demand and deliver the necessary outcomes.

Recommendations

To address this cause of concern, the force should immediately:

- carry out a comprehensive assessment of current and potential future demand across all operational areas to inform the force's operating model. This should include latent demand, and the demand generated by internal processes;

- provide senior leaders with the relevant information, support and skills to inform their understanding of demand; and

- develop co-ordinated financial and workforce plans based on demand, which should be integrated into the force's strategic planning cycle.

Areas for improvement

These areas from improvement are still outstanding from our previous inspections:

- The force should undertake appropriate activities to fully understand its workforce's capabilities, in order to identify any gaps and put plans in place to address them. This will enable the force to be confident in its ability to be efficient in meeting current and likely future demand. (Efficiency 2017)

- The force should conduct a leadership skills audit that will allow it to understand leadership capacity and capability. (Efficiency 2017)

Meeting current demands and using resources

Inadequate

Cleveland Police doesn't understand its demand adequately to inform the services it provides. The understanding that it does have isn't sufficiently applied to its operating model and it doesn't always use the most accurate data and information. Senior leaders don't have a sufficient knowledge of the demand within their own areas, and the force doesn't give them enough information and support in this respect.

The force's understanding of the factors that affect demand is poor. It hasn't fully implemented its operating model and doesn't assess its processes well enough to make sure that they are efficient and effective. Through changing its processes, the force has created risks that it hasn't identified or managed, and it is suppressing demand. It doesn't adequately prioritise different types of demand or use its resources in the most efficient way, which means it isn't able to provide its services as quickly as it should be able to.

The force actively considers more efficient ways of working with partner organisations and private providers. However, it doesn't sufficiently understand the effectiveness of this joint working.

The force has a good understanding of some of its workforce training and accreditation needs, but not the skills and capabilities of the whole workforce. It doesn't have an accurate plan to fill the skills gaps it has. Its people strategy and its annual workforce plan aren't aligned to the financial plan. There isn't a good enough understanding of current or future demand to inform the workforce plan, and there is no costed training plan.

The force is making improvements in how it uses technology to fight crime and manage offenders.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

Assessing current demand

Cleveland Police doesn't properly understand demand in a way that enables it to effectively develop its services. Its appreciation of demand hasn't been refreshed for two to three years and is out of date. The force hasn't done enough to align its understanding of demand to the force priorities, particularly those relating to vulnerability and repeat victims.

The force has failed to fully resource its response model and has needed more officers than originally planned. This failure to properly resource the response function has resulted in an inability to respond to incidents in a timely manner, and also officers carrying higher than expected workloads. The force has recognised the problem but is still not properly using its own data to understand and resolve the situation.

The failure to understand demand undermines effective resource deployment. The force is experiencing high levels of sickness and is carrying a large number of vacancies, exacerbated by the lack of recruitment. The force has redeployed neighbourhood officers to support response teams, but this hasn't achieved the anticipated improvements. It has also had an adverse effect on the neighbourhood function.

The force insufficiently assesses emergent and latent demand. Its strategic risk assessment includes analysis of demand that is sometimes not well known because of low levels of reporting of, for example, child sexual exploitation and female genital mutilation. The force doesn't properly understand its internal demand or the increased demand created by its own processes. Consequently, inadequate provision has been made in its new operating model to accommodate critical elements such as multi-agency strategy meetings to address vulnerability.

Cleveland Police undertakes activities that are outside its main responsibilities. The control room continues to deal with reports of lost property and, more significantly, the force continues to provide services that are better provided by other organisations.

Understanding factors that influence demand

Cleveland Police doesn't fully understand the factors that affect demand. It has tried to respond to incoming demand in various ways, but this has often created problems elsewhere. These problems have arisen because it lacks an end-to-end understanding of its processes. Some changes it has made have either increased or suppressed demand elsewhere, or created a risk that hasn't been identified and managed. In addition, senior leaders don't understand the demand within their own areas of responsibility and the force doesn't give them enough data and support to enable sufficient understanding.

The force isn't addressing the inefficiencies in its processes to help it better manage its demand. It hasn't sufficiently aligned its operating model to its demand and it doesn't effectively prioritise incidents. The shift patterns for response and investigations teams don't correspond to the demand the force experiences, which increases bureaucracy, delays investigations and increases handovers. This also increases risk. During our inspection, we found examples of children being missing overnight and no one trying to locate them until the next morning.

The force is taking some action to limit how internal processes create more demand. But this is at a low level: it isn't reviewing inefficiencies overall. The force has completed a review of its standard operating procedures and has simplified some tasks. For example, it has changed its sudden death protocol to reduce the amount of time officers spend dealing with these incidents.

The force has some understanding of how efficient working practices can reduce demand. It has trained the change team to identify waste and duplication in its processes and is investing in digital ways of working. These include training all frontline officers to download body-worn video camera footage and footage from seized phones. It is also providing shop owners with a facility to upload digital evidence from CCTV, and members of the public can upload evidence from their mobile phones. But during the inspection this system had stopped working.

Working with others to meet demand

Cleveland Police works well with others to meet demand. However, it doesn't have a good enough understanding of how effective its joint working is. It doesn't have a specific person as the lead for its collaborative working who would have this oversight and provide the necessary strategic direction.

The force has many joint working arrangements with police and non-police partner organisations. It has formal contracts in place with several private providers for criminal justice, custody and its enabling services, but not all these functions are as effective as the force would like. For example, its control room processes aren't as efficient and effective as they could be, and it has been difficult for the force to make changes because of the conditions it agreed to when the contract was set up nine years ago. As a result, the force negotiated for its control room function to return to the force on 1 May 2019.

The force also works with other organisations to manage demand better. This includes having a mental health co-ordinator and a domestic abuse support worker in the control room.

Innovation and new opportunities

The force looks externally for some best practice and new ideas, such as the introduction of a MEDICAR by the special constabulary. This provides a special constable and paramedic who jointly patrol on Friday evenings to deal with police incidents where a victim also needs medical attention. The car reduces the need for a regular police officer or ambulance to attend. We found examples of how the force has taken new ways of working from other organisations and adapted them for its own purposes. It describes this process as 'borrowing with pride'. For example, it now uses an approach first developed by Cumbria Police, which helps to understand which roles are suitable for agile working.

There are ways in which the workforce can put forward ideas, including the force's online suggestion scheme called 'Let's innovate'. The success of this has been varied and senior leaders need to encourage the workforce to use it more. Staff can also put forward ideas when speaking directly to chief officers. The weekly email alert – the brief – is also used for this purpose.

Investment and benefits

The force's investment decisions are sound and reflect priority areas. It can demonstrate the value it has achieved, or will achieve, from investments. It has made some investment in police vehicles, providing new technology and better use of police buildings. However, the force should make sure that it has adequate processes in place to understand and track the full range of benefits it gets from the changes it makes.

Prioritising different types of demand

The way Cleveland Police prioritises different types of demand is poor. The force doesn't have a good enough understanding of the resources it needs to meet its current demand. For example, it doesn't sufficiently understand what resources it has or where to deploy them to meet demand. Chief officers don't have sufficient visibility of all force resources and the teams and posts that are in place, despite the force saying it needs extra resources in some areas.

The force prioritises some of its demand through its daily pacesetter meeting. This deals with the incidents that have occurred in the past 24 hours. It focuses on vulnerable victims including domestic abuse and missing persons. However, it doesn't review all its most urgent demand at this meeting. It relies on managers drawing attention to the most urgent tasks so that resources can be redirected. This doesn't always happen.

The force prioritises some of its demand in other ways, such as through its telephone investigations unit, its scheduled appointments and by diverting its 101 calls to front enquiry desks. However, the force isn't managing the risks created by doing this.

Assigning resources to demand and understanding their costs

Cleveland Police has a good understanding of the cost of its services and its financial management is good. The force has provided financial management training to managers and it holds them accountable for their respective budgets. It has a balanced overall budget for the next four years and has based its financial plans on realistic assumptions. The force has a clear approach to achieving savings and re-investing the money in the right areas. While finances are tight, the future savings requirement is minimal.

Workforce capabilities

Cleveland Police has a good understanding of the operational training and accreditation requirements of most of its frontline officers and staff. However, it needs a more detailed understanding of the skills and capabilities of its workforce. There is some understanding of the skills gaps it has, but it has undertaken little planning on how it will fill them. This lack of understanding means the force doesn't know the full range of skills it needs to meet its demand.

The force isn't sufficiently developing its workforce to be competent in their roles or to become future leaders. It has a learning and development strategy for 2019/20, which aligns with the National Police Chiefs' Council's Policing Vision 2025 that states:

> "By 2025 policing will be a profession with a more representative workforce that will align the right skills, powers and experience to meet challenging requirements."

The strategy sets out the force's intention for developing its workforce and introducing new ways of learning. However, there isn't an adequate plan to support the implementation of the strategy. In the absence of a full skills audit and a performance development review process, it has a limited understanding of what its workforce development requirements are. Its development of leadership and management skills is more positive because it has development opportunities that the workforce can choose to take up.

Following a period without recruitment, the force has too many positions currently vacant. It is now using recruitment and training to fill these positions. It advertises externally for posts to attract experienced officers and staff from other forces. Since our last inspection in 2017, it has recruited externally for a head of ethics and standards, and it has recruited other departmental leads and chief officers.

More efficient ways of working

Cleveland Police has introduced changes to help it deal with its demand more efficiently but, in doing so, it has made its processes less effective (to the extent of introducing risk to victims).

The force has started a new programme of change called 'Transforming Cleveland Police'. This strategy sets out how the force will transform Cleveland Police into an "outstanding and values-led organisation in which our staff have pride and our communities have confidence". It aims to transform its people and culture, service provision and digital services. The initial stage of this work is for departmental leads to determine what service they should provide and what design and capacity they need

to achieve this. However, we found that they don't fully understand the demand in their areas of responsibility, and the force hasn't supported them with enough data, information and skills to do so.

The force has placed too much reliance on HMICFRS and the force's auditors for providing assurance of its processes. It has no way of continually assessing and monitoring the quality of its processes. Managers don't understand whether their teams comply with force processes and submit quality information. This means that, when processes aren't working, this doesn't become apparent until it is too late. It also means that there isn't enough understanding of its processes to inform future plans. The force is taking steps to improve its control room but its plan doesn't sufficiently address all the issues we identified with its processes. During our inspection, the force halted some of its other plans for transforming the force to allow a further review to take place.

The force has basic arrangements in place for making sure that it achieves the benefits from its change programmes. But it hasn't sufficiently assessed whether it has achieved the improved results it expected. It is revising its process for assessing benefits as part of its new Transforming Cleveland Police programme of change.

The force doesn't always consider more efficient ways of working in the decisions it makes. Its immediate response to increased demand is usually to divert more resources into those areas. This means it is simply redistributing an already limited number of resources. It doesn't always consider that it could work differently or better through improved processes. When it has previously introduced different ways of working with online reporting of crimes for shop owners, we found that the system and CCTV upload had stopped working.

The force generally has a good record for making savings and efficiency gains. During the 2018/19 financial year, it set a balanced budget with the need to save a recurring £250,000. The non-pay savings came from procurement of insurance and mobile phones, and further savings were found in the contracted services from the private provider. The force also used zero-based budgeting to review all non-pay costs against what it thinks it needs. It achieved some pay savings through reductions in police officers and PCSO numbers, and civilianising some posts.

Using technology

The force is using technology to help improve the efficiency of its workforce and to fight crime. It has a clear three-year digital strategy for replacement and transformation, and is investing £8m in mobile technology. A robust process is in place for making sure that future IT investment provides clear results aligned to the police and crime plan, but it is too early to say whether the new ways of working are more efficient. The focus this year is to:

- improve mobile/agile working;
- introduce voice-to-text for officers to help with written work;
- provide data analysis software;
- provide screens within the communication centre;
- provide mobile tablets to reduce paperwork; and

- work towards joining the single online home by October 2019.

The force has assessed which roles are suitable for agile working, which provides a guide on how it can use mobile technology better. Officers are piloting the use of 4G laptops and mobile phones as part of the agile working and digital strategy. The force has also piloted an app for officers to use remotely that allows them to complete some forms electronically. There has been some delay in the mobile technology because of the information technology (IT) requirements within the force's new community safety hub (force headquarters).

The force is making good use of technology to manage offenders. It uses a tagging system for RSOs, so officers can review the offender by geographical location. It has started to make use of drones to prevent anti-social behaviour caused by off-road motorbikes.

Planning for the future

Inadequate

The force doesn't adequately assess the future demand for its services. It has no basis on which to do this given the position with its current operating model. The force's future model remains uncertain. Its strategic financial and workforce plans aren't based on a sufficient understanding of demand. It also doesn't understand what the public expects from its services.

The force needs to improve how it plans its future workforce needs. It hasn't completed a full review and assessment of future workforce requirements. Its workforce plans (including recruitment, training and development) don't take proper account of skills and capability gaps, the need to tackle inequalities and the lack of diversity through all workforce ranks and grades. It has restarted its recruitment to fill vacancies, but it will take time to get the capacity and capability it needs.

The force's financial management is good. It manages its budget tightly. It is making good use of reserves and has made solid assumptions when planning its finances. This includes factors such as the increase in employers' contributions to police officers' pensions and an increase in precept payments. However, its financial planning isn't based on an understanding of an interim or future operating model that aligns with a good understanding of demand, force priorities and future workforce requirements.

The force recognises that it needs to improve and it has begun a programme of change: Transforming Cleveland Police. However, its plans are uncertain, and they aren't ambitious or innovative. The force doesn't have enough capacity and capability to achieve the pace and scale of change required.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

Assessing future demand for services

The force doesn't adequately assess the future demand for its services and its future operating model remains uncertain. Its current model isn't managing demand efficiently or effectively, so the force doesn't have an efficient foundation on which to build a future model. It still has more to do in reviewing its service areas, and it isn't continuously monitoring the changes it makes to understand the effect they have in other areas of the force.

The force doesn't have the coherent view of future demand it needs to inform the necessary financial, workforce and operational planning. Plans that had been fundamental to how the force worked are no longer in use. Previously, the force's people strategy and the workforce plan were aligned: this is no longer the case.

Understanding public expectations

The force doesn't have an adequate understanding of what the public expects of its police service. It isn't engaging with the public to understand what their future expectations are or how they are changing. This means that the force's plans aren't informed by what the public wants.

The force is considering other channels to engage differently with the public. This includes online reporting of crimes. However, this move to use digital channels isn't included in the force's digital strategy.

Prioritising

The force manages its money well and has a balanced budget. This includes the movement of under- and over-spends, clear savings targets for which it holds managers accountable, and zero-based budgeting for non-pay costs. It bases its budget and long-term financial plans on sound assumptions, taking account of likely increases and pressures such as increased employer contributions to police pensions. The force took advantage of the precept increase. It is also able to access funds through changes to the contract it has with its strategic partner. It is using this money to fund additional posts. The force currently has healthy financial reserves.

However, the force hasn't comprehensively assessed its future workforce requirements, based on an understanding of changing demand. We previously asked the force to improve its efficiency by assessing its present and projected workforce skills. It hasn't yet completed this. Public expectations aren't clear in the force's planning and it doesn't always align its resources to its priorities. It doesn't sufficiently prioritise how it uses its resources and it doesn't properly understand:

- its demand;
- what resources it has where, and whether they are working to force priorities;
- the skills and capabilities of the workforce; or
- its future requirements.

All these factors should influence the force's future operating model.

Future workforce

The force needs to improve its workforce planning. It hasn't completed a full review and assessment of future workforce requirements. Its workforce plans (recruitment, training and development) don't take account of skills and capability gaps, the need to tackle inequalities and the lack of diversity throughout the different workforce ranks and grades.

The force has started recruiting again, but it will take time to achieve the capacity and capability it needs. It is currently 30 officers below what it needs to be able to operate efficiently. By the end of the year, it needs to have recruited an additional 100 officers because more officers will have left the force and retired. The force's plans aren't clear about what officer numbers are required. The figures in the workforce plan differ from those in its long-term financial plan.

The force is using a fast-track process to enable special constables and PCSOs to become police officers. This will help it achieve some of the additional police officers it needs. The force is reducing the number of PCSOs and plans to spend some of the savings on workforce modernisation, creating police staff roles where warranted powers aren't necessary. However, the force has temporarily suspended the PCSO fast-track process, which will slow down its original intention to recruit quickly.

Finance plans

The force is financially stable and has achieved the required savings. However, it needs to improve how its interim and future operating model informs its financial and workforce plans. It has allocated money to achieve some of its planned changes, such as its digital strategy for replacement and transformation. It is also making good use of reserves to create agile working, cloud services and public service network accreditation. It uses zero-based budgeting rather than incremental budgeting, based on no planned reduction in service provision. The force makes good assumptions when planning its finances but bases its plans on what it can afford now, rather than on an understanding of demand and what it needs for the future.

There is no requirement for the force to have a financial sustainability plan for 2019/20 because the budget is balanced. The savings it has made in previous years' savings have helped to get it to this position. It is in a good financial position, having made provision for the changes in the police pension employer contributions. This could have resulted in a £3m–£4m deficit, but the increase in grant and precept meant the force has been able to achieve a balanced budget.

Leadership and workforce development

The force has some understanding of its future leadership and workforce needs. It has considered its leadership and workforce skills at an organisational level, but not yet at an individual level. The force's leadership strategy outlines the future leadership capabilities it needs, and this has informed its leadership values and behaviours.

The force can't assess the workforce skills it has against the workforce skills it needs. It isn't yet able to map an individual's skills against the overall requirements in the leadership strategy to understand any gaps. It intends to use its performance development process to do this once implemented.

The force has insufficient information to undertake effective succession planning. It is filling its vacancies based on limited information about the specialist skills officers hold. It isn't informed by proper talent management or an appreciation of any wider skills or development required for a post. The learning and development plan includes succession planning for armed policing and for tactical skills, but not for the wider workforce based on need.

The force makes a broad range of training available, despite not knowing what its workforce needs are individually or collectively. It understands what mandatory training is required and provides this training. But in the absence of any understanding of individual or departmental training needs, it can't know if the training being provided is meeting the skills gap its workforce has. This results in a wide selection of training being made available, which officers can self-select, but the force has no way of knowing if this is meeting their needs or is being aimed at the right people.

The force doesn't use Police Now or the direct entry schemes to bring other skills and different experiences into the force. It has one fast-track officer and a cohort of transferees pending. It intends to bring in special constables and PCSOs through a fast-track process to become police constables. It has also held workshops to encourage people from minority communities to apply for jobs within the force.

Ambition to improve

The force recognises that it needs to improve as evident in its programme of change branded as 'Transforming Cleveland Police'. It isn't clear about what changes in demand it anticipates or how to sustain its services to meet these demands. It doesn't have ambitious and innovative plans. Its plans are uncertain, and it doesn't have enough capacity and capability to achieve the pace and scale of change required.

Legitimacy

Force in context

**Comparison of Cleveland
workforce ethnicity with local population**

as of 31 March 2019

	Cleveland proportion	Local population proportion
Black, Asian and minority ethnic as % of those with stated ethnicity	1.9%	5.5%
White as % of those with stated ethnicity	98.1%	94.5%
Not Stated as % of total	2.5%	

	Cleveland proportion	England and Wales proportion
Proportion of female officers in post as of 31st March 2019	26%	30%

Proportion of workforce without up-to-date security clearance

as of 1 April 2019

Cleveland proportion

1%

Stop and search by ethnicity

12 months ending 31 March 2018

Cleveland disproportionality

Stop and Search likelihood of BAME individuals compared to white individuals

2.0

Stop and Search likelihood of Black or Black British individuals compared to white individuals

3.9

Cleveland rate

England and Wales rate

Number of stops and searches per 1,000 population

12 months ending 31 March 2018

1.5

4.7

How legitimately does the force treat the public and its workforce?

○○○○ (one filled, three empty)

Inadequate

Summary

Cleveland Police is inadequate in the way it treats the public and its workforce.

The force doesn't treat the public fairly enough. It isn't giving local people the opportunity to voice their needs and concerns, and it doesn't encourage a culture that values engagement. It isn't being open in some of the decisions and actions it takes. The force experiences higher levels of complaint allegations from the public than most other forces. We found examples of unconscious bias and inappropriate language being used. The force is poor at using external scrutiny to seek the views of the public and consider what improvements it can make.

Cleveland Police isn't adequately maintaining an ethical workforce. Many senior leaders (superintending and chief officer ranks, and senior police staff managers) aren't acting as positive ethical role models. Their behaviour is having a profoundly negative impact on the force's ability to be effective and efficient in what it does. It concerns us that some of the information being presented to the chief constable isn't trustworthy. The force needs to improve how it tackles corruption within its workforce. While we recognise the improvements the force has made, there is still more to do.

Cleveland Police needs to improve how it treats its people. The force doesn't seek feedback on fair treatment in enough ways. It doesn't always listen to its workforce and it doesn't always tell them what action it takes in response to feedback. It has prioritised its wellbeing strategy, re-established its governance arrangements and extended its wellbeing services. But it hasn't communicated this well and the workforce isn't yet fully aware or seeing the benefits. The force doesn't manage the individual performance or development of its people effectively. It has limited ways of identifying potential talent within its workforce. Too many officers and staff don't perceive the promotion processes to be fair.

Treating the public fairly

●○○○

Inadequate

Cleveland Police doesn't treat the public fairly enough. It doesn't adequately understand or value the benefits of engaging with the community. And it doesn't place enough importance on procedural justice and treating people with fairness and respect.

The force doesn't encourage a culture that values engagement with the public. It doesn't use its communication channels effectively. This means it isn't giving local people the opportunity to voice their needs, concerns and preferences. It isn't open about the decisions and actions it takes. But it has successfully engaged young people and volunteers in policing.

The force doesn't treat its communities with enough respect. It experiences higher levels of complaints from the public than most other forces. It has been trying to improve this through raising the awareness of frontline staff about their professional behaviour. There is an inconsistent understanding of unconscious bias across the workforce. We found examples of unconscious bias and inappropriate language used between colleagues, and we are concerned that this will influence how staff treat members of the public.

Cleveland Police isn't good enough at monitoring the way it uses force. It therefore doesn't understand if its use is fair and appropriate. It doesn't monitor a comprehensive dataset effectively. It is poor at using external scrutiny to seek the views of the public and consider what improvements it can make. Without this understanding, it doesn't know where it needs to improve.

While the force has low numbers of stop and search encounters, it understands how the powers are used. But it hasn't sufficiently improved how it records its use of these powers.

Cleveland Police has required improvement in this area throughout all our PEEL inspections since 2015. It hasn't made adequate progress in this four-year period.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

Cause of concern

Cleveland Police doesn't adequately engage with local communities. This lack of engagement means that public expectations don't sufficiently influence force priorities and changes to the services it provides. The public also has a limited role in scrutinising the force and helping it to improve.

Recommendations

The force should immediately take steps to:

- improve its communication and engagement with the public of Cleveland. This should include informing them of changes to policing services, communicating the action it has taken to address force priorities, and the provision of community and personal safety advice;

- improve its understanding of local communities, including those who are less likely to complain or those who engage less with the police;

- understand what services its communities want and how the force's plans and its operating model reflect these expectations; and

- engage the public in the scrutiny of its data and processes, including the use of force and stop and search, to help it improve. This may be through an independent advisory group or other means. It should ensure that these people have the relevant training, and are provided with sufficient data and analysis for them to scrutinise and challenge in a constructive way.

Area for improvement

This area from improvement is still outstanding from our previous inspections:

- The force should continue with the improvements it has started to ensure that all stop and search records include sufficient reasonable grounds to justify the lawful use of the power, and that officers fully understand the grounds required to stop and search a person. (Legitimacy 2015)

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

Treating people fairly and respectfully

Cleveland Police doesn't value the benefits of engaging with communities, procedural justice and treating people with fairness and respect. It isn't being open in the decisions and actions it takes and it doesn't give members of the community the opportunity to voice their concerns. The force had previously communicated the importance of fairness and respect through its 'Everyone Matters' programme. However, this stopped in 2018 because there was insufficient leadership and accountability for it to become established practice.

Leaders aren't considering the importance of treating the public with respect when making force-level decisions. They don't consult the public about what they want from their police service or use this information to guide the force's priorities. While the force did talk to local councillors about changes in the service provided, it didn't inform its communities. This means that in some areas local communities are experiencing a reduced service without understanding why.

Cleveland Police doesn't foster a culture that values communication with the local community. It isn't trying to find out the needs, preferences and concerns of those communities that traditionally interact less often with, or have lower confidence in, the police. It has an engagement strategy that the workforce doesn't widely understand or apply. The workforce also doesn't use the various force communication channels effectively to engage with the public. Officers and staff rely on social media channels to broadcast messages, but don't use them to invite feedback. The force also doesn't use its website to engage with the public and it is neither maintaining nor developing the site – it is waiting to adopt a national approach for the single online home. However, the force is successfully developing its approach to youth engagement.

The Everyone Matters programme previously guided the force's approach to treating people with fairness and respect. This focused on 'serving our communities' and included themes such as engagement and addressing barriers to engagement. However, this has now stopped. The OPCC will be re-launching it, but with a focus on equality, diversity and inclusion rather than broader engagement with communities.

Force policies and procedures clearly explain the importance of fair decision making and respectful treatment, particularly during interactions with the public. Frontline officers and staff understand the importance of this. However, the force doesn't consistently demonstrate it in how it interacts with its communities, although it is starting to improve.

The force experiences higher levels of complaints than other forces. It had 525 complaint allegations in the 12 months to December 2018, which is significantly higher than other forces. This equates to 460 allegations per 1,000 officers in Cleveland, compared with the England and Wales average of 271. The main complaints are incivility, impoliteness and intolerance, lack of fairness and impartiality, oppressive conduct or harassment, and discriminatory behaviour. The force acknowledges this problem. Its directorate of standards and ethics has been communicating to the workforce about professional and ethical behaviour, and levels of complaints are starting to reduce.

The workforce doesn't have a consistent understanding of unconscious bias. While we found that frontline officers mostly understand it, this wasn't always the case for PCSOs and control room staff who are the first contact with the public. They haven't had the necessary training. We heard some examples of unconscious bias when dealing with calls. We also found members of the workforce using inappropriate language when speaking to colleagues. We are concerned that this will influence how staff treat members of the public. The examples we were told about show a lack of respect for diversity. Members of the workforce were keen to bring this to our attention during the inspection.

The force provides some role-specific communications skills training to officers and staff. The force's training in stop and search and personal safety includes how to interact with people in a professional way. However, call handlers and other staff in the force's control room haven't received training since their induction. The force plans to introduce short training sessions addressing continuing professional development. One of these sessions will focus on communication.

The force involves some local people in crime prevention, both through problem-solving activity and more formal volunteering. The force has increased its number of volunteers. It has a 'citizens in policing' programme through which it works with volunteers, special constables and police cadets.

Using force

Cleveland Police doesn't understand well enough whether its use of force is fair and appropriate. The force is recording data on use of force and complies with most of the national recording requirement. It has provided training and guidance to the workforce on how to use force fairly and appropriately. During 2018 and 2019, it hasn't effectively monitored its use of force. Force performance meetings don't receive this information often enough and the meetings that were dedicated to monitoring use of force information stopped in 2018. The force doesn't monitor other sources of information to help it improve, such as body-worn video camera and custody footage, Taser and firearm records, and complaints.

The force doesn't adequately use external scrutiny arrangements to seek the public's views and consider what improvements it can make. It should report use of force data and information to the OPCC's strategic independent advisory group (SIAG) on a six-monthly basis. However, in the seven months prior to inspection, the SIAG hadn't received any reports from the force. The only time the force has presented information to the SIAG was in October 2018, when it gave an initial presentation to explain what use of force is and what data it collects. The force has no other external scrutiny from people who might have less confidence and trust in the police, or by young people.

Using stop and search powers

Cleveland Police understands how it uses stop and search powers but hasn't sufficiently improved its recording of the grounds for searches.

The force has appointed a new lead for stop and search who has made some changes. They have introduced a two-day training course, which provides guidance to officers and staff on how to use stop and search fairly and with respect. This training is in line with the guidance provided by the College of Policing. The force circulates a monthly stop and search newsletter that includes lessons learned. It provides officers with examples of stop and searches using videos on the intranet site. The force has seen a decline in the use of stop and search and officers told us they don't have the time to carry it out. The force has had no complaints resulting from stop and search for two years.

We reviewed a representative sample of 337 stop and search records to assess the reasonableness of the recorded grounds. We found that 79 percent or those records contained reasonable grounds. Our assessment is based on the grounds recorded by the searching officer and not the grounds that existed at the time of the search.

Although the force has shown some improvement in its recording of reasonable grounds, it hasn't made enough progress. The force has been trying to improve since 2016. Supervisors review and quality check all stop and search forms and a dedicated sergeant completes a secondary review. The sergeant gives officers monthly feedback about good and poor examples of form completion.

The force analyses and scrutinises its data to understand how it uses its powers. It understands that black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) people are slightly more likely to be stopped and searched than white people. This is one of the lowest rates of disproportionality nationally. The force analyses ward-level data so that it can understand any differences. It knows whether an officer finds the item searched for and it also reports its positive outcome rate.

In our 2017 legitimacy report, we recommended that all forces should:

- monitor and analyse comprehensive stop and search data to understand reasons for disparities;
- take action on those; and
- publish the analysis and the action by July 2018.

We found that the force has complied with some aspects of this recommendation. The force monitors the find rate and breaks this down into search types. But this doesn't include separate identification of possession-only drug searches and supply-type drug searches. Nor does it break this down further by ethnicity. It also isn't clear that the force monitors enough data to identify the prevalence of possession-only drug searches or the extent to which these align with local or force-level priorities.

We reviewed the force's website and found no obvious mention of analysis it had carried out to understand and explain reasons for disparities, or any subsequent action taken.

There is no regular external scrutiny of the force's use of stop and search powers. Since 2017, the force has made attempts at having a youth scrutiny panel for stop and search. However, its success has been varied, which has meant that there has been no consistent approach. Just prior to our inspection, the force had re-formed this panel. There is no other external scrutiny of stop and search powers. The force has plans to include the scrutiny of BAME stop and search encounters through its district independent advisory groups, but this isn't yet in place.

The force doesn't scrutinise the use of body-worn video cameras.

The force doesn't communicate to the public what action it takes to change its policies and practice as a result of scrutiny and challenge.

Ethical and lawful workforce behaviour

Inadequate

Cleveland Police isn't adequately maintaining an ethical culture. Many senior leaders (superintending and chief officer ranks, and senior police staff managers) aren't acting as positive ethical role models. There are too many examples of these leaders:

- not taking responsibility;
- not acting with honesty, integrity and competence;
- opposing constructive challenge; and
- apportioning blame.

This behaviour is having a profoundly negative impact on the force's ability to be effective and efficient in what it does. It concerns us that the chief constable is unable to trust the information he receives from within the force. Some of the reported information is inaccurate and a misrepresentation of the force. The force has developed a new set of values and behaviours, but officers and staff aren't yet demonstrating them consistently.

The force needs to improve how it tackles corruption within its workforce. While we recognise the improvements it has made in this area, there is still more to do. The force isn't sufficiently managing the internal risk to identify those people who are most susceptible to corruption. There isn't enough capability within the force's counter-corruption unit (CCU) to monitor all force systems. The force recognises abuse of position for a sexual purpose as a serious corruption issue. But it needs to improve its links with organisations that support vulnerable people.

Cleveland Police has required improvement in this area throughout all our PEEL inspections since 2015. It hasn't made adequate progress in this four-year period and, although it put new arrangements in place, it then abandoned them.

Cause of concern

Many senior leaders (superintending and chief officer ranks, and senior police staff managers) aren't consistently demonstrating ethical behaviour. The inappropriate behaviour of these leaders within Cleveland Police is so profound that it is affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of the force.

Recommendations

The force should take immediate action to:

- embed the Code of Ethics principles and behaviours within the organisation;
- create a culture where officers and staff are honest and take responsibility for their work and action taken;
- hold the entire workforce to account for inappropriate behaviour and poor performance; and
- ensure there is a process for the workforce to discuss ethical dilemmas regularly and understand decisions made by the force about fairness that also influence policy and practice.

Areas for improvement

- The force should monitor its vetting decisions to identify disparities and disproportionality (e.g. black, Asian and minority ethnic groups), and act to reduce them where appropriate.
- The force should ensure it has full information technology (IT) monitoring to effectively protect the information contained within its systems.

These areas for improvement are still outstanding from our previous inspections:

- The force should improve the way corruption intelligence is assessed, graded and stored. (Legitimacy 2016)
- The force should review the capacity and capability of its counter-corruption unit, to ensure it can manage its work effectively. (Legitimacy 2016)

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

Maintaining an ethical culture

The force doesn't have a structured approach to ensure that officers and staff apply the Code of Ethics consistently. There is no clear lead for ethics in the force. It previously used the Everyone Matters programme to communicate ethical issues, but this has stopped and only pockets of work continued during 2018.

Many senior leaders aren't acting as ethical role models and aren't taking responsibility for areas within their control. We found examples where senior leaders knew things were happening that put vulnerable victims at risk but were not taking action. They have made changes to processes without considering the risk or the effect on victims. Force leaders blame others – including the force's private providers – for their own failings. Some of the comments we heard from the wider workforce include:

> "Directionless, rudderless and clueless."

> "We are being given no clear direction. No-one seems to have a clue what we are doing."

> "Senior leaders are basically missing."

It concerns us that the chief constable is unable to trust the information he receives. We tried to find evidence to support the statements senior leaders made during inspection, using the force's own documents, including its force management statement, performance reporting and force plans. Many of the statements made were incorrect. Not only were senior leaders unable to provide evidence to support some of the things they claimed were happening, but we found evidence to the contrary. This reported information is misrepresenting the force's position.

The force attempts to communicate and reinforce the behaviour it expects, but it does so in an ad hoc way. It has given presentations to frontline staff about the Code of Ethics and it (the code) is presented in some training sessions. The force has a new set of values and behaviours – which the workforce helped to develop – which align to the competency values framework. However, the workforce isn't consistently demonstrating these behaviours and the force isn't consistently holding individuals to account through performance management discussions.

Complaints from the public about officers' behaviour are starting to reduce in number. There are signs that the wider workforce, including frontline officers and staff, understand what is right and wrong. The force is starting to learn lessons from reviewing complaint and misconduct investigations, and is communicating these lessons through emails and its internal webpages. Officers and staff we spoke to told us they now have more confidence in the force's directorate for standards and ethics, and are prepared to report colleagues who act in inappropriate or corrupt ways.

The force has an established internal ethics committee, which considers ethical dilemmas raised by the workforce, but this hadn't met for nine months. Officers and staff are submitting issues to this meeting for consideration but these are still waiting to be discussed. The force is also sifting out some of the dilemmas, with no established criteria for doing so. It doesn't prioritise this forum as a way of addressing workforce concerns. The OPCC also has an ethics panel to provide an external view. However, we weren't able to review its effectiveness during our inspection.

The workforce can readily access force policies that have been subject to an equality impact assessment. The force doesn't assess policies against the Code of Ethics, but when a new policy is written the force circulates it to ethics committee members to ask if there are any concerns.

Cleveland Police complies with the national Vetting Code of Practice and [authorised professional practice](#). In our 2017 national report, we recommended that all members of the workforce should have received at least the lowest level of vetting by December 2018. The force has achieved this and has vetted all staff recruited prior to 2006. The force doesn't monitor vetting decisions to identify any differences in how people are treated, or consider mitigating actions. However, it has recently set up a process to collect the necessary data.

Tackling corruption

The force needs to improve how it tackles corruption within its workforce. While we recognise the improvements it has made so far, it still has more to do.

The force has a strategic threat assessment and control strategy. During our pre-inspection work, we found that its assessment of counter-corruption lacked detailed analysis of a wide range of data and information. The threats identified don't align to national corruption categories. The assessment includes some comparison between local and national threats – and brief analysis of worker type, role and length of service – but it doesn't refer to profiling corrupt employees, identifying locations within the force where corruption is more prevalent, or understanding external corruptors. The force is refreshing this assessment and addressing the issues identified.

The force isn't identifying well enough those people who are most at risk of corruption. It doesn't make good use of the information it holds to inform any assessment of risk. The people intelligence board is no longer in place to be able to identify the early warning signs, although the force is considering restarting these meetings. It has employed additional analysts to draw information from force data, and is considering devising a risk matrix to identify and assess those employees most at risk of corruption.

Members of the workforce and the public can report potential misconduct to the force via an anonymous email system and an anonymous reporting line. Most of the workforce have confidence in doing this. The force acts promptly on this intelligence. Of the 57 items of corruption intelligence we reviewed, 14 required further work. We also found examples of investigators restricting the parameters of the investigation and ignoring the possibility of other risks. Of these cases, the force should have referred six to the [Independent Office for Police Conduct](#) (IOPC) but it had only referred five. Together with the IOPC, the force has reviewed all previous referrals to make sure they were appropriate.

The force has enough people working within its CCU but needs to improve the capability of these investigators and managers. The CCU doesn't do any proactive monitoring, which means that the force can't intervene early to prevent corruption. The force has invested in monitoring software, but staff were trained so long ago that they are no longer confident in using it. The software also has some limitations because it can't monitor all the force's IT systems. The CCU doesn't proactively review conditions imposed on members of the workforce, such as refusals for secondary employment or inappropriate associations. This means that the force doesn't know whether people are breaching these conditions. Members of the

workforce record all gifts and hospitality, but some of the gifts accepted don't adhere to the force policy: for example, bottles of alcohol.

The force needs to improve its links with those organisations that support vulnerable people, to encourage them to report inappropriate behaviour by officers and staff. It initially contacted some organisations to provide information about what to do if they had concerns about officers or staff, but it didn't continue this approach. During our inspection, we found that this has started again. The force should develop a broader range of links with organisations such as sex worker support groups and alcohol support agencies.

Cleveland Police recognises abuse of position for a sexual purpose as serious corruption. This is included in the force's draft assessment. It recognises this as the main corruption threat facing the force. However, it hasn't fully completed our 2016 recommendation for all forces to implement a plan to achieve the capability and capacity required to seek intelligence on potential abuse of authority for a sexual purpose. This is because its proactive monitoring isn't yet in place and it only reactively investigates reports of abuse of authority. The force has raised the awareness of abuse of position through a range of communications including briefings and roadshows. The majority of the workforce have completed online training. The force has provided guidance to supervisors and managers, describing the warning signs to look for.

Treating the workforce fairly

Inadequate

Cleveland Police doesn't fully understand the concerns its people have about fairness at work. It doesn't consistently treat its people fairly. We are concerned that, when officers and staff are treated unfairly, this might affect how they treat members of the public.

The force has limited ways in which it seeks feedback about fair treatment. Most officers and staff are happy to voice their concerns but don't feel the force listens to them. The force isn't good enough at telling the workforce what action it has taken as a result of their feedback. There is no mechanism for workforce to challenge what the force does, which means that their voice isn't always heard at the right time.

Cleveland Police needs to improve its understanding of wellbeing to inform the way it cares for its people. It has prioritised its wellbeing strategy, re-established its governance arrangements and extended its wellbeing services. But it hasn't communicated this effectively and the workforce isn't yet fully aware or seeing the benefits. The force doesn't have a good enough understanding of the risks and threats to the wellbeing of its workforce. And it isn't always meeting its basic duty of care for its people.

The force doesn't manage the individual performance or development of its people effectively. It doesn't have anything in place to allow it to understand performance across the workforce. Supervisors don't effectively identify and manage poor performance. The force has limited ways of identifying potential talent within its workforce. Too many officers and staff don't perceive the promotion processes to be fair.

Cleveland Police has required improvement in this area throughout all our PEEL inspections since 2015. It hasn't made adequate progress in this four-year period and, although it put new arrangements in place, it then stopped them.

Cause of concern

Cleveland Police doesn't consistently treat its workforce with fairness and respect. It doesn't effectively communicate with or engage its workforce, its processes aren't perceived to be fair and it doesn't understand its workforce well enough to support them.

Recommendations

To address this cause of concern, the force should:

- communicate with the workforce, so they have a clear understanding of what is happening in the force;

- involve the workforce in decision making; listening to their feedback, acting on it, and communicating action taken;

- improve the timeliness of its grievance handling processes;

- understand the risks and threats to the wellbeing of its workforce and use this to inform the actions it takes;

- understand the performance of its workforce, support their development, and deal with poor performance fairly and consistently;

- fairly and consistently identify those with the potential to become senior leaders and support them to gain the skills for future leadership role; and

- ensure that promotion processes are transparent, fair and perceived as such by the workforce.

We set out our detailed findings below. These are the basis for our judgment of the force's performance in this area.

Improving fairness at work

Cleveland Police doesn't consistently understand the concerns its people have about fairness at work.

The workforce completed a survey in July 2018, which had a good response rate. However, the force's other engagement activities have been limited and officers and staff describe them as 'high-level communication'. This includes the work the force did to develop its behaviours and the launch of its new ideas portal called 'Let's innovate'. The launch of 'Let's innovate' coincided with the removal of 'Ask the Exec', which had

been the force's route for raising concerns or seeking answers. There has been an increase in the number of concerns raised about fair treatment through the force's anonymous email system. Most officers and staff are happy to voice their concerns, but there are now no formal routes to do so and the force doesn't always listen.

The force isn't good enough at communicating what action it takes in response to feedback and challenge about fairness at work. It has made several changes in response to feedback but hasn't communicated these well to the workforce. These include:

- updating its flexible working policy and practice, its pregnancy and maternity policy and its flexi-time policy; and

- improving its range of wellbeing services.

However, most people told us they didn't know what had happened as a result of their feedback.

Leaders don't use any of the formal meeting structures to seek the workforce's views on issues of fairness. None of the force meetings include representation from the staff networks. The staff equality forum is no longer in place, although the force told us it will be re-launched. The force intended to start an equality and diversity and inclusion meeting, but this hasn't happened. The OPCC has now taken responsibility for it and drafted a new equality, diversity and inclusion strategy.

The force has a clear, well-publicised and well-known grievance procedure. However, most of the workforce don't perceive this to be fair because of the time it takes the force to resolve the grievances. Our pre-inspection review found that the force has a good system for recording and managing grievances, but that it could improve how it deals with informal cases. In seven of the ten cases we reviewed, it took too long to resolve the grievances – some cases lasted over 12 months. We heard mixed views from staff and officers about their confidence in using the grievance process, and too many people perceive it negatively. People told us:

"It's seen as a way of getting what you want."

"A precursor to an employment tribunal or pay-out."

"It's used for money making."

The force is resolving more grievances informally. Supervisors are starting to do these themselves, supported by employee relations officers. This works well.

Some of the more recent redeployments within the force have gone well and haven't resulted in grievances. When the force moved neighbourhood officers into response officer roles, it communicated these changes effectively and officers felt listened to.

The force doesn't have effective arrangements for monitoring and scrutinising workforce information. It has an annual people report, which includes a range of data, but it isn't analysing this data frequently enough to identify issues of fairness. It doesn't frequently monitor disparities in recruitment, retention and promotion.

Supporting workforce wellbeing

In 2017, we reported that the force needed to put measures in place to understand and address the wellbeing concerns of the workforce. While the force has made progress in improving its wellbeing services for staff and officers, it doesn't sufficiently understand and monitor its wellbeing information. This means that it can't fully understand and act on the wellbeing needs of the workforce.

The force has recently launched a wellbeing strategy. This aligns to the Home Office policy paper, A common goal for police wellbeing 2021, and focuses on psychological, physical and social wellbeing. The force takes account of national guidance and good practice, and has gained the Blue Light Wellbeing Framework accreditation. It continues to work towards the Better Health at Work award. It has re-launched its wellbeing services under the heading 'Your wellbeing matters', but many officers and staff aren't aware of it. Leaders don't play a positive role in raising the awareness of wellbeing needs and provision.

The force doesn't fully understand the greatest threats to wellbeing. It doesn't sufficiently monitor its workforce data and information, and it has no wider evidence about wellbeing to identify the greatest threats and risks. The people and culture board oversees wellbeing but it doesn't receive enough information to make effective decisions.

Cleveland Police experiences high levels of sickness absence. In April 2019, the number of working days lost was 12.24 per officer and 9.95 per member of police staff. A high proportion of this sickness is stress-related. The force has changed its processes to improve the management of those people who are absent from work. Its employee relations officers started in September 2018 to help supervisors manage sickness absence. Since then, the force has started to see a reduction in police officer absence, although staff absence is still increasing.

Members of the workforce made the following comments about wellbeing:

"Sickness is still an issue and not getting any better."

"Sergeants are feeling the pressure – relentless."

"We feel like numbers on page since the last restructure."

"Officers are working rest days at the expense of their families and personal wellbeing and the force is in turmoil."

"Annual leave is a problem – it can be an issue getting leave approved."

"(The force is) rearranging officers' working patterns at short notice, with massive impact on their wellbeing and welfare for them and their families."

The force has invested in a people services team, which includes the force's occupational health service. However, it can't yet meet all its demand because it hasn't yet recruited all the staff required. Referrals to occupational health have to come through line managers. There is also no self-referral process for those people who don't wish to discuss their wellbeing with their line manager.

Cleveland Police doesn't consistently take early action to support its people. Supervisors consider wellbeing as part of their line management responsibilities but aren't consistently having conversations with their staff to help with early intervention.

They tend to rely on spotting the obvious signs that someone needs help, based on their own experience. The force has provided mental health awareness sessions to newly promoted supervisors and probationers, and it has mental health blue light champions available to support staff. However, it provides no other training or awareness sessions.

Senior leaders and managers are missing opportunities to consider the duty of care they have for their people. For example, a recent debrief session following a traumatic incident failed to give consideration to the wellbeing of the officers themselves. No-one asked if they were okay or considered referring them for counselling. The force has no specialised support available for those managing incidents involving trauma risk. However, the force has introduced preventative measures to improve wellbeing. A welfare officer goes through the daily incident list and, when necessary, contacts officers attending to ask if they need support.

The force doesn't effectively manage its use of temporary and acting positions. Although it has started to make improvements, this remains a problem because of the effect it has on wellbeing. The force doesn't give enough consideration to the potential financial effect when these people's salaries reduce after they have been temporarily promoted for years. It also doesn't adequately consider the effect that short-term acting positions can have on existing workloads.

Managing performance and development of officers and staff

Cleveland Police doesn't manage the individual performance or development of its people. It put its previous process on hold while it developed a new electronic system. Some of the workforce haven't had their capability or competence assessed for over four years. This means that the force can't easily identify poor performance or deal with it. The force had started to roll out its new system during our inspection.

In the absence of a performance management process, the force has no way of identifying talented members of its workforce who have the potential to become future leaders. Instead, it offers its people the opportunity to complete a development programme if they would like to become supervisors. There is only a small cohort of people on this programme because of limited interest.

Too many officers and staff don't consider the force's promotion processes to be fair. The force gives promotion candidates relevant information through briefings and presentations ahead of the process. But we heard the following comments about its recent sergeant-to-inspector promotion process:

"The recent promotion processes have been completely [messed] up. People have been told that they have been promoted and then told they haven't."

"The way HR [human resources] have told people that they are no longer being promoted is a disgrace. People are going back to a lot of temporary positions. Morale is low at the moment."

"HR don't seem to understand that moving people between departments undermines the relationships that people have built up with partners."

The force didn't communicate how many inspector vacancies were available when it ran its recent sergeant-to-inspector promotion process, because it didn't have this information. This meant that it was unable to promote all the successful candidates. Those it placed on a waiting list may have to start the process again if an inspector's post doesn't become available within 18 months. There is no independent or external involvement in the force's promotion process to ensure impartiality. It no longer uses the College of Policing's assessment centre to help with its promotion processes.

The force hasn't identified the potential barriers that prevent the workforce from applying for promotion. But it has identified barriers that prevent people applying to join the workforce. It has encouraged people from a range of communities to apply for jobs in the force by using social media and visiting universities, mosques, churches and temples. It received 1,500 expressions of interest in working for Cleveland Police. Over 100 of these people were invited to attend positive action workshops run by the force, providing information about becoming a police officer. Forty-four of these people applied to join the force.

Annex A – About the data

Data in this report is from a range of sources, including:

- Home Office;
- Office for National Statistics (ONS);
- our inspection fieldwork; and
- data we collected directly from all 43 police forces in England and Wales.

When we collected data directly from police forces, we took reasonable steps to agree the design of the data collection with forces and with other interested parties such as the Home Office. We gave forces several opportunities to quality assure and validate the data they gave us, to make sure it was accurate. For instance:

- We shared the submitted data with forces, so they could review their own and other forces' data. This allowed them to analyse where data was notably different from other forces or internally inconsistent.
- We asked all forces to check the final data used in the report and correct any errors.

We set out the source of this report's data below.

Methodology

Data in the report

British Transport Police was outside the scope of inspection. Any aggregated totals for England and Wales exclude British Transport Police data, so will differ from those published by the Home Office.

When other forces were unable to supply data, we mention this under the relevant sections below.

Most similar groups

We compare each force's crime rate with the average rate for forces in its most similar group (MSG). MSGs are groups of similar police forces, based on analysis of demographic, social and economic factors which relate to crime. We could not identify any forces similar to City of London Police. Every other force has its own group of up to seven other forces which it is most similar to.

An MSG's crime rate is the sum of the recorded crimes in all the group's forces divided by its total population. All of the most similar forces (including the force being compared) are included in calculating the MSG average.

[More information about MSGs can be found on our website](#).

Population

For all uses of population as a denominator in our calculations, unless otherwise noted, we use ONS mid-2018 population estimates.

Survey of police workforce

We surveyed the police workforce across England and Wales, to understand their views on workloads, redeployment and how suitable their assigned tasks were. This survey was a non-statistical, voluntary sample so the results may not be representative of the workforce population. The number of responses per force varied between 0 and 920. So we treated results with caution and didn't use them to assess individual force performance. Instead, we identified themes that we could explore further during fieldwork.

BMG survey of public attitudes towards policing (2018)

We commissioned BMG to survey public attitudes towards policing in 2018. Ipsos MORI conducted a similar version of the survey in 2015–2017.

The survey consisted of about 400 respondents for each of the 43 forces. Most surveys were completed online, by members of online research panels. However, a minority of the surveys (around 750) were conducted face-to-face. These face-to-face surveys were specifically targeted to groups that are traditionally under-represented on online panels. This aimed to make sure the survey respondents were as representative as possible of the total adult population of England and Wales. A small number of respondents were also surveyed online via postal invites to the survey.

Results were weighted by age, gender, ethnicity and indices of multiple deprivation to match population profiles. The sampling method used is not a statistical random sample and the sample size was small, which may be more problematic for larger force areas compared to small ones. So any results provided are only an indication of satisfaction rather than an absolute.

[The findings of this survey, and previous surveys, are available on our website](#).

Review of crime files

We reviewed police case files for these crime types:
- theft from person;
- rape (including attempts);
- stalking;
- harassment;
- common assault;
- grievous bodily harm (wounding); and
- actual bodily harm.

Our file review was designed to provide a broad overview of how well the police:

- identify vulnerability;
- conduct investigations; and
- treat victims.

We randomly selected files from crimes recorded between 1 May and 31 July 2018 and assessed them against several criteria. We reviewed 60 case files in each force, except for the Metropolitan Police Service where we reviewed 90.

For our file review, we only selected a small sample size of cases per force. So we didn't use results from as the only basis for assessing individual force performance, but alongside other evidence.

Force in context

999 calls

We collected this data directly from all 43 police forces in England and Wales.

Recorded crime and crime outcomes

We took this data from the July 2019 release of the Home Office police recorded crime and outcomes data tables.

Total police-recorded crime includes all crime (except fraud) recorded by all forces in England and Wales (except BTP). Home Office publications on the overall volumes and rates of recorded crime and outcomes include British Transport Police, which is outside the scope of this HMICFRS inspection. Therefore, England and Wales rates in this report will differ from those published by the Home Office.

Police-recorded crime data should be treated with care. Recent increases may be due to forces' renewed focus on accurate crime recording since our 2014 national crime data inspection.

Other notable points to consider when interpreting outcomes data are listed below.

- Crime outcome proportions show the percentage of crimes recorded in the 12 months ending 30 September 2018 that have been assigned each outcome. This means that each crime is tracked or linked to its outcome. So this data is subject to change, as more crimes are assigned outcomes over time.
- Under the new framework, 37 police forces in England and Wales provide outcomes data through the HODH every month. All other forces provide this data via a monthly manual return.
- Leicestershire, Staffordshire and West Yorkshire forces participated in the Ministry of Justice's out of court disposals pilot. As part of the pilot, they stopped issuing simple cautions or cannabis/khat warnings and restricted their use of penalty notices for disorder for adult offenders. These three forces continued to follow these procedures since the pilot ended in November 2015. Later, other forces also limited their use of some out of court disposals. So the outcomes data should be viewed with this in mind.

For a full commentary and explanation of outcome types please see the Home Office statistics, Crime outcomes in England and Wales: year ending March 2019.

Domestic abuse outcomes

In England and Wales, 29 police forces provide domestic abuse outcomes data through the Home Office data hub (HODH) every month. We collected this data directly from the remaining 14 forces.

Domestic abuse outcome proportions show the percentage of crimes recorded in the 12 months ending 31 March 2018 that have been assigned each outcome. This means that each crime is tracked or linked to its outcome. So this data is subject to change, as more crimes are assigned outcomes over time.

Workforce figures (including ethnicity and gender)

This data was obtained from the Home Office annual data return 502. The data is available from the Home Office's published police workforce England and Wales statistics or the police workforce open data tables. The Home Office may have updated these figures since we obtained them for this report.

The data gives the full-time equivalent workforce figures as at 31 March. The figures include section 38-designated investigation, detention or escort officers, but not section 39-designated detention or escort staff. They include officers on career breaks and other types of long-term absence but exclude those seconded to other forces.

Spend per head of population

We took this data from the HMICFRS value for money profiles.

These profiles are based on data collected by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, through the Police Objective Analysis. The spend over time figures are adjusted for inflation. The population figures are ONS mid-year estimates, with the 2018/19 value calculated by assessing the trend for the last five years. More details on this data can be found on our website.

Stop and search

We took this data from the Home Office publication, Police powers and procedures, England and Wales, year ending 31 March 2018. Stop and search totals exclude vehicle only searches and searches where the subject's ethnicity was not stated.

Vetting data (workforce without up-to-date security clearance)

We collected this data directly from all 43 police forces in England and Wales.