

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary



## HMIC Inspection Report

**Dorset Police**

**Major Crime**

**July 2008**



*Dorset Police – HMIC Inspection Report*

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## Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent of both the Home Office and the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/>.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005, and thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking more probing inspections of fewer topics. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that neighbourhood policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence is gathered, verified and then assessed against specific grading criteria (SGC) drawn from an agreed set of national (ACPO-developed) standards. However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

## HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09

HMIC's business plan (available at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/business-plan/>) reflects our continued focus on:

- protective services – including the management of public order, civil contingencies and critical incidents phase 3 of the programme in autumn 2008/spring 2009;
- counter-terrorism – including all elements of the national CONTEST strategy;
- strategic services – such as information management and professional standards; and
- the embedding of neighbourhood policing.

In addition, we are currently developing a scrutiny of strategic resource leverage, and are liaising with the Audit Commission on a methodology for the anticipated inspection of police authorities.

HMIC's priorities for the coming year are set in the context of the wide range of strategic challenges that face both the police service and HMIC, including the need to increase service delivery against a backdrop of reduced resources. With this in mind, the business plan for 2008/09 includes for the first time a 'value for money' plan that relates to the current Comprehensive Spending Review period (2008–11).

Our intention is to move to a default position where we do not routinely carry out all-force inspections, except in exceptional circumstances; we expect to use a greater degree of risk assessment to target activity on those issues and areas where the most severe vulnerabilities exist, where most improvement is required or where the greatest benefit to the service can be gained through the identification of best practice.

## Programmed Frameworks

During phase 2 of HMIC's inspection programme, we examined force responses to major crime, serious and organised crime and neighbourhood policing in each of the 44 forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

While this document includes the full graded report for the major crime inspection, the inspection relating to serious and organised crime is detailed in a separate thematic report.

## Major Crime

This framework covers the force effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room. There is only one statutory performance indicator at present, although other indicators shown in the report facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested give some context regarding the volume of such crimes, success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care. The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such crime. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer and specialist assets.

The grading system has changed this year to allow for a single ACPO threshold standard against which forces will be assessed as compliant, not compliant or exceeding compliance. It is recognised that collaborative arrangements can be used where appropriate. At a high level, the ACPO lead summarises the threshold standard as set out below:

- Intelligence – Compliance with the 2005 ACPO National Intelligence Model guidance on the shared understanding of and response to the risks and demands of the major crime threat, with effective intelligence and data sharing internally, with neighbouring forces and with key partners.
- Prevention – Effective proactive partnerships to prevent major crime in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; this includes precursor offending and options such as Osman warnings.
- Enforcement – Compliance with the 2006 ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* and guidance in the 2005 ACPO major incident room standardised administrative

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procedures, having sufficient resources to meet and manage the predicted demand and contingency to meet extraordinary demand from major crime investigation and review.

- Performance management and resilience – Efficiency through robust performance measures linking costs/resources, inputs and outputs to goals (ie the outcomes of reduction and prevention, detection and conviction work).

## Future Programmed Inspections

Following these serious and organised crime and major crime assessments, HMIC plans work in the following areas:

Inspection area	Dates
Neighbourhood policing	April 2008 – September 2008
Developing citizen focus	April 2008 – September 2008
Civil contingencies	September 2008 – May 2009
Public order	September 2008 – May 2009
Critical incidents	September 2008 – May 2009
Professional standards	June 2009 – December 2009
Information management	June 2009 – December 2009
Leadership	June 2009 – December 2009

## The Grading Process

HMIC has moved to a new grading system based on the national standards; forces will be deemed to meet the standard, exceed the standard or fail to meet the standard.

### Meeting the standard

HMIC uses the ACPO agreed standards as the starting point for its SGC. The standards against which forces are measured are communicated to all forces and police authorities some time before the inspection starts. The standards are set at a level that ensures that risk to the public is identified, managed and mitigated as far as is feasible; all forces should find the standards achievable.

### Exceeding the standard

Where a force can demonstrate capacity and capability that exceed the agreed national standards, it is expected that risk assessment and business cases justify the availability of 'additional' resources, and that they are deployed appropriately. For example, some forces require a higher level of capacity/capability to counter extraordinary threat levels or to discharge a regional or lead force remit. Without such a rationale, an over-investment would almost certainly represent poor value for money and thus attract criticism.

## **Failing to meet the standard**

This assessment is appropriate when a force cannot provide evidence that it meets a number of significant criteria that correlate with the ACPO national standards. Where evidence is provided to confirm that the particular issue has been properly risk assessed and the risk is being managed, then the report may not necessarily draw an adverse conclusion. The assessment may also give some credit in situations where a force has the ability to remedy any deficiencies promptly, in terms of time and investment levels needed.

## **Developing Practice**

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected (described as a 'strength') in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit more detailed examples of its good practice. HMIC has therefore, in some reports, selected suitable examples and included them in the report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces; each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required. HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

## Force Overview and Context

### Geographical description of force area

The Dorset Police area is located on the south coast with Hampshire to the east, Devon to the west and Wiltshire and Somerset to the north. This covers the Dorset County Council area and the unitary authority areas of Bournemouth and Poole. The whole area comprises nine local authorities, including six district councils. In total, this area comprises 159 wards.

Between its extreme points, the force area extends 50 miles from east to west and 40 miles north to south covering 1,024 square miles, approximately half of which is designated as Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty and Sites of Special Scientific Interest. The coastline is over 170 miles long, including 89 miles within Poole Harbour and the World Heritage Site known as the Jurassic Coast, which starts from Old Harry Rocks on the Purbeck coast and stretches 95 miles westward into East Devon. The police area is a combination of urban and rural areas, with the main urban areas being the south-east conurbation of Bournemouth, Poole and Christchurch, and Weymouth in the west.

The existing road and rail transport infrastructure provides good links to London and the South East. However, there are no motorways and only one trunk road, the east-west A31/A35. In 2002 the average daily traffic flow along the A31 at the Dorset and Hampshire border was 107,900 vehicles, compared with 34,030 across all other main routes in and out of the area. Mainline rail services for the area run between Weymouth and London Waterloo via the Poole/Bournemouth conurbation. Rail connections to the north of the county are provided by a limited service operated by Wessex Trains between Weymouth and Bristol, and Sherborne is served by a rail link between Exeter and Waterloo. The east-facing transport arrangements and the location of the south-east conurbation provide the force with an orientation to the east and a lack of congruity with the rest of the region, in particular with the Government Office of the South West.

There are three major ports in Dorset, serving both central Southern England and the South West. Bournemouth International Airport recorded a growth of 15% in 2006, establishing itself as one of the top ten fastest-growing airports in the country. It is estimated that by 2030, approximately 4 million passengers per annum could use the airport compared with the 917,000 for the year 2005/06. A £32 million airport refurbishment programme was approved in June 2007. In addition, Poole and Weymouth are both major seaports handling passenger and freight traffic to the Channel Islands and the Continent.

Tourism is a major industry in the county. The county attracts some 15.3 million night visitors or 18.7 million day tourists annually. Manufacturing employment makes up only 10% of the workforce, compared with 11% for the UK as a whole. The south-east conurbation comprises three different coastal towns, with Bournemouth attracting national attention as a conference centre for government and other high-profile customers as well as developing a 24-hour entertainment economy with 30,000 drinking places.

### Demographic profile of force area

Dorset Police serves a resident population of 710,084 (mid-year estimates for 2006), 300,000 of whom live within the Poole/Bournemouth conurbation. The population of Dorset has grown by 3.7% over the last ten years.

Dorset has a high proportion of people over retirement age (25.7%<sup>1</sup> compared with a national figure of 18.8%). There is a historical trend of people retiring to the South Coast

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<sup>1</sup> Dorset County Council, Females aged 60 years or over and males aged 65 years or over, mid-year 2006 population estimates, available from: <http://www.dorsetforyou.com/index.jsp?articleid=344105>

and, with the growing national elderly population, it is likely that the number of elderly people moving to Dorset may rise.

Dorset's ageing population is also partly offset by increases in migration. Among Government Office Regions, the South West had the largest net gain in internal migrants with 25,400<sup>2</sup> people moving into the region than moving away from it in 2005. This net gain was approximately 1.6 times higher than the net inflow to the South East region, which had the next largest gain of 15,500 people.

The birth rate for Dorset (9.8 births per 1,000 population) is below the national average of 12.5.<sup>3</sup> Even though the birth rate for all areas in the county is below the national figure, the number of people who move to the county offsets this and so the population is increasing. Dorset is one of the most popular places to live in England and Wales.

Since the 1991 census, the black and minority ethnic population for Dorset has more than doubled and now represents approximately 1.85% of the population. In the large, heavily populated urban area of the county, this figure is nearer 3%. However, the census data does not reflect the significant influx of students and tourists. This variation is illustrated by on-street assessments undertaken in October 2005 of members of black and minority ethnic communities within Bournemouth. As a result of these surveys, it was identified that the figure had increased to 9%.<sup>4</sup>

Dorset is perceived as a prosperous county; however, per capita the Gross Domestic Product reflects the regional picture in that it is below the national average. Dorset (excluding Bournemouth and Poole) is second only to Cornwall in terms of low pay. Dorset's tourist-related activities are known for their lower rates of pay and seasonality. Dorset has seven areas that fall within the 10% most deprived nationally and 29 areas that fall within the top 20%. Despite this, overall, house prices in Dorset are significantly above the English average. Houses in most parts of Dorset are less affordable than those in London and the South East, and in Christchurch they are the least affordable anywhere in the country with Bournemouth ranking fifth.<sup>5</sup>

There is a shortage of affordable housing in Dorset, with pressure on the housing stock increased by the demand for rented holiday accommodation and second homes. The number of dwellings will rise on average by 3,383 per year by 2026, but growth will be uneven throughout Dorset. Estimates of new housing by 2020 are between 33,995 and 36,140.<sup>6</sup>

## Strategic priorities

The force vision of 'A Safer Dorset For You' was developed following extensive consultation and became defined as 'One Team, One Vision: Committed to a safer Dorset for you'. To guide this endeavour, the force embraces the values of integrity, professionalism, fairness and respect. The vision and values drive and contextualise all activity for the organisation.

Dorset Police has two overarching strategic objectives:

- to make Dorset safer; and
- to make Dorset feel safer.

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<sup>2</sup> Office for National Statistics (ONS), *Population Trends* 129

<sup>3</sup> Dorset County Council, 2006 ONS statistics on births and deaths, available from: <http://www.dorsetforyou.com/index.jsp?articleid=343802>

<sup>4</sup> Dorset Police, cited in briefing paper for response to enquiry from the Commission for Racial Equality, 12 February 2007, available from: [http://www.dorset.police.uk/pdf/Agenda%20No.%2011%20\(i\)%20-%203%20CRE%20Letter%20-%20Appendix%20B%20-%20Briefing%20Paper.pdf](http://www.dorset.police.uk/pdf/Agenda%20No.%2011%20(i)%20-%203%20CRE%20Letter%20-%20Appendix%20B%20-%20Briefing%20Paper.pdf)

<sup>5</sup> S. Wilcox (2006) *The Geography of Affordable and Unaffordable Housing*, The Joseph Rowntree Foundation

<sup>6</sup> Dorset Fire and Rescue Service and Dorset Police (2007) *Towards a Safer Dorset 2020*

This will be achieved through operational priorities in 2008/09, which are:

- reducing serious violent crime;
- reducing the crime most affecting local communities;
- protecting vulnerable people;
- tackling serious and organised criminals;
- counter-terrorism and domestic extremism;
- reducing road casualties;
- bringing offenders to justice; and
- securing the trust and confidence of people in Dorset in their police force and the wider criminal justice system.

To improve Dorset Police's capability to deliver these objectives in 2008/09, the force will:

- further develop the National Intelligence Model (NIM) processes and structures;
- enhance protective services capability;
- prepare for the international sailing events off Portland up to and including the 2012 Olympic Games;
- improve the efficiency and effectiveness of crime and criminal justice processes;
- develop further collaboration with other forces and agencies to improve operational and organisational efficiency and effectiveness;
- develop and embed a people focus to secure trust and confidence in the force; and
- develop its workforce and make the best use of resources achieving significant improvements in efficiency and productivity.

Consistent with the vision are the expectations of customers and the community, which have been developed through innovative consultation.

### **Major achievements**

In 2007/08 overall crime reduced by 7% and the force achieved the longer-term public service agreement British Crime Survey volume crime target by reducing crime by 19.6% since the baseline year of 2003/04.

The force continues to focus on providing a service that meets the needs and expectations of the community and this is reinforced in its vision and priorities. The aspiration to create a deliberate customer experience through its people focus has contributed to the highest satisfaction of users for whole experience among most similar forces (MSFs) and also for national ratings in public confidence. This approach is consistent with the emphasis placed on policing neighbourhoods. The force was re-accredited by Investors in People in July 2007.

Dorset Police receives the second lowest amount of central funding per resident of all forces in England and Wales, which given its performance is a credit to how the force manages its limited resources. In comparison with the force's peers, Dorset spends a higher proportion of its budget on police officers, and has below average management costs, the second lowest cost of service provision and the lowest cost for supplies and services. The force achieved the highest rating for the front-line policing measure among MSFs.

### **Major challenges for the future**

Following the Home Secretary's decision not to merge police forces 'for the foreseeable future', there remained a need to move towards achieving the benefits identified in the original merger proposals. A fundamental review of the force was undertaken in 2007 to ensure that the force was fit for purpose to meet current, emerging and future threats. As a

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result of this review, a strategy to develop improvements to protective services has been formulated, called 'Dorset 2010'. (The relevance of 2010 is that the reorganisation of the force must be complete by the end of that year to enable it to meet both new and 'business as usual' demands while ensuring the safety and security of the sailing events up to and during the 2012 Olympic Games and policing any future party political conferences in Dorset.)

This programme of work puts the protective services requirement into the context of the overall policing demand in Dorset and the review has been extended to meet local needs and expectations as well as achieving national standards to ensure that Dorset is a force that continues to achieve a level of performance that places it within the top quartile of all forces. At the same time, collaborative opportunities are being developed with both police and non-police organisations focused on enhancing the force's protective services capability and achieving improvements in terms of the efficiency and effectiveness of service provision. Specific collaborations that are currently being progressed include South West police forces and police authorities, Hampshire Constabulary and the Dorset Fire and Rescue Service

The significant influx of visitors to tourist locations, language schools and the night-time economy in Bournemouth presents a population not recorded by census and thus reflects a variance where crimes are measured against incidence per head of resident population. This has funding implications and does not reflect true demand.

A significant problem for most police forces is alcohol-induced crime and disorder. In Dorset, for example, there are 30,000 drinking places in Bournemouth alone, and more 24-hour liquor licences than perhaps in any other county. Conversely, there are minimal places for alcohol treatment. Fundamental problems will require strategic and operational co-ordination between statutory partners in order to reduce and resolve problems. An example is reducing violent crime, where a range of partners must work together in problem solving.

The police enquiry centre (PEC), which manages call handling, faces the challenge of achieving during 2008/09 the target of answering 75% of non-emergency calls in 30 seconds. The percentage of PEC non-emergency abandoned calls also has a target of <5%.

In the coming years, the force will be called on to police a number of major events, including the 2012 international sailing event, which is already requiring significant preparatory work. The timely roll-out of Dorset 2010 will be paramount to enable full concentration on the 2012 Olympic Games and other significant events as well as maintaining and improving 'business as usual' services.

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## Force Summary of Judgements

This element of the inspection report details Dorset Police's effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room.

There is only one statutory performance indicator (SPI) at present, although other indicators shown below facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested below give some context around the volume of such crimes and success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care.

The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer (SIO) and specialist assets.

<b>Grade</b>	<b>Meets the standard</b>
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	2006	2007	Change	MSF** group mean
Life-threatening and gun crime per 1,000 population	0.217	0.170	-21.66%	0.249
Number of abductions per 10,000 population	0.000	0.000	0.00%	0.000
% of abduction crimes detected/convicted	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable
Number of attempted murders per 10,000 population	0.043	0.100	+132.56%	0.067
% of attempted murder crimes detected/convicted	100.00%	14.29%	-85.71pp*	55.87%
Number of blackmail offences per 10,000 population	0.613	0.071	-88.42%	0.122
% of blackmail crimes detected/convicted	9.30%	20.00%	+10.7pp*	38.52%
Number of kidnappings per 10,000 population	0.214	0.228	+6.54%	0.230
% of kidnapping crimes detected/convicted	40.00%	31.25%	-8.75pp*	56.97%
Number of manslaughter crimes per 10,000 population	0.014	0.057	+307.14%	0.022
% of manslaughter crimes detected/	100.00%	50.00%	-50pp*	Not applicable

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convicted				
Number of murders per 10,000 population	0.043	0.057	+32.56%	0.074
% of murder crimes detected/convicted	66.67%	100.00%	+33.33pp*	83.01%
Number of rapes per 10,000 population	2.023	2.665	+31.74%	2.009
% of rape crimes detected/convicted	24.65%	16.58%	-8.07pp*	20.25%

\*pp' is percentage points.

\*\* MSF group for Dorset is Essex, Gloucestershire, Norfolk, Suffolk, Surrey, Sussex and West Mercia.

From the SPI data contained in the table above it can be seen that the crime types of manslaughter and rape pose a threat to Dorset Police. The rates of offences for both categories are above the MSF group average and are among the higher rates in England and Wales. There have been significant increases in both offences in 2007 (particularly manslaughter).

The SPI data also indicates that major crime investigation in Dorset Police is less effective than that of the MSF group. Dorset Police is performing at a level below the MSF average for all crime types with the exception of murder, for which the force had a 100% sanction detection rate in 2007. It should also be noted that the majority of sanction detection rates for Dorset fell significantly in 2007.

The NPSAT published in September 2007 indicated that Dorset was facing either a low or medium demand with regard to homicide, rape and kidnapping offences and as such no NPSAT charts have been included in this report.

The force strategic assessment (FSA) reveals a clear understanding of the demand profile for major crime and the resources required to tackle these crimes.

The force has identified violent crime and protecting vulnerable people as its major crime priorities within the force control strategy. The force strategic intelligence requirement has a clear focus on the continuous search for information on prolific offenders, identification of vulnerable or hard-to-reach individuals and groups, and other information to prevent or enforce major crime offences.

Given the material available to the inspection team, the force shows that it is developing its approach to tackling major crime.

The force has placed suitable resources for interventions to maximise the return of harm reduction, to minimise risks to the public and to inhibit instances of major crime.

In making judgements, collaborative agreements with Hampshire Constabulary and forces within the South West region are recognised.

## Intelligence

**Summary – The force has sufficient dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands from major crime, supplying dynamic intelligence products that drive the energies of the force. The force has fully committed to its major crime investigations with the requisite staff, accommodation, equipment and funding.**

### Strengths

- The director of intelligence is an experienced detective superintendent (SIO) who has additional responsibilities for special branch (SB), covert policing arrangements, serious and organised crime investigation and authorities.
- The force intelligence bureau (FIB) has recently been restructured into a force intelligence unit (FIU). There are adequate dedicated analytical resources in the FIU.
- This structure is effective and serves the needs of the force. The principal analyst is the strategic lead and the line manager for the analytical and research team.
- The function of the FIU is directly linked to the control strategy objectives. However, within the unit, individual analysts are not dedicated to crime types, as the numbers of analysts make this impractical.
- Analysts and researchers are omni-competent, well trained – including in the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES) – and are able to provide wide-ranging analytical products.
- A wide range of internal and external data is used to inform the analytical products (through single points of contact (SPOCs) both within the FIU and partner agencies). The FIB does not have the ability to have free search across partner databases at level 2.
- Within the major crime investigation team (MCIT) there is one dedicated crime analyst who responds to the operational demand that is primarily homicide, stranger rapes, blackmail, kidnap and extortion.
- The MCIT analyst produces problem profiles, including homicide and rape, as well as threat assessments for major crime types to inform and prioritise police activity. The analyst also reviews all reported incidents of unexplained deaths, including those in care homes, prisons and military establishments, and those reported by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE).
- The force has two forensic researchers who identify links between crime series and develop analytical products that are either dealt with locally or referred to the regional intelligence unit (RIU).

### Work in progress

- While there is a dedicated analyst within the MCIT who is working to capacity at present, there are plans to provide resilience and support following the restructure through additional research capability. Analytical resource within the FIB will assist MCIT enquiries in times of need.

### **Areas for improvement**

- None identified

**Summary – The force seeks and shares intelligence about level 2 and level 3 major crime types through partnerships. This work is assessed to be effective. The force’s community impact assessments to evaluate risk following major crime are adequate.**

### **Strengths**

- Key Dorset Police staff attend a number of strategic and cross-region meetings where emerging crime themes are discussed. The Chief Constable is a member of the pan-Dorset public service forum which considers major crime themes.
- The force uses a wide range of open and closed sources both from within the organisation and through informal and formal arrangements with partners. Not all are subject to formalised information-sharing protocols. The force is in the process of bringing together the police, the UK Border Agency and HMRC into one site based in Poole that will enhance intelligence sharing and activity at levels 2 and 3.
- An SB analyst is in post who is jointly funded with the UK Border Agency.
- There are four prison intelligence officers who cover all prisons within Dorset.
- Sensitive information has been exchanged dynamically with other agencies and examples were provided to the inspection team.
- Community impact assessments are requested early in major crime cases and are completed by safer neighbourhood inspectors in conjunction with level 1 analysts.
- Problem profiles for homicides and rapes have been completed. The homicide problem profile (updated to December 2007) has identified three high-risk victim groups and there is a tactical plan for each.
- The force has concentrated on opportunities for situational prevention rather than targeting possible offenders, as numbers are low.
- An FIU has been established to manage and disseminate sensitive intelligence, including Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) and covert human intelligence source (CHIS) matters. The force is developing this to cover 24/7.

### **Work in progress**

- None identified

### **Areas for improvement**

- The force has identified the need for a 24-hour risk management unit in order to proactively manage the response to, and intelligence concerning, critical incidents and major crime. A business case has been submitted to the

information management board which is considering the proposals – which will require an increase in staffing – but no decisions have yet been made and no date set for implementation.

**Summary – The FSA has analysed the trends in relation to its major crime sufficiently. Consequently, the force control strategy is found to be similarly adequate. Problem profiles for homicide and rape are satisfactory with links to force and BCU level plans. There is sufficient evidence that the force understands the threat posed by other life-threatening issues.**

### **Strengths**

- The FSA is controlled and monitored by the quality and development department and is strongly driven by the Chief Constable. The FSA dated September 2007 addresses the main major crime types. Reviews of the FSA are carried out at the strategic crime board on a quarterly basis.
- Significant steps have been made by the force with its partners in order to complete joint strategic assessments that feed into the FSA.
- The FSA identifies threats and uses a threat assessment matrix to prioritise the most significant threats, risk and harm. It also makes useful inferences about each threat, which assists the decision-making and tasking processes. Kidnap, sex offences against children, and dangerous offenders are all considered within this threat assessment matrix.
- As a result of an identified gap for NIM compliance, the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) NIM team was invited to review Dorset's NIM processes. An improvement plan to address over 78 recommendations is now in place.
- There is limited reference to major crime within BCU plans and control strategies which, in the main, concentrate on volume crime activity. Emphasis on strands such as violent crime and protecting vulnerable people will concentrate local activities towards vulnerable groups and should reduce major crime. The HQ criminal investigation department (CID) has required all divisions to produce analysis, including geographical, temporal, behavioural and forensic factors as well as demographic analysis of victims and offenders.
- Baseline assessments consider precursor crimes or incidents for major crime, for example domestic violence offences as precursors to homicide. The NIM assessment regarding distraction burglary identifies the part played by organised cross-border criminals.
- The force MAPPA processes allow intelligence to be gathered internally and externally to help inform decision making.

### **Work in progress**

- None identified

### **Areas for improvement**

- The force is currently developing its existing neighbourhood profiles in order to better understand the vulnerabilities of geographic communities. However, this needs to be expanded to include those communities, either virtual or geographic, that cross safer neighbourhood team (SNT) areas. With the appointment of the strategic analytical roles within the FIB (FIU), vulnerable communities should be scoped at level 2.

**Summary – Trend analysis and problem profiles are occasionally shared with partners and routinely with BCUs. There is a full trigger plan for ‘hot briefing’ when either a significant change in the major crime threat or the nature of the analysis demands a fast-time response. Information-sharing protocols with key partners, such as the HSE, military establishments and prisons, exist. The force can demonstrate that it is on track to reach full management of police information (MoPI) compliance by 2010.**

### **Strengths**

- There is a general information-sharing protocol for the force that is mainly used at basic command unit (BCU) or crime and disorder reduction partnership (CDRP) level. Information is shared through the D-crime portal (a partnership IT system), which is highly effective but limited in scope.
- There are both formal and informal structures in place to share potential threats presented by major crime. There are numerous examples where surrounding forces and other law enforcement agencies have exchanged intelligence in fast time. The force has well-established daily management meetings and tasking processes that allow appropriate responses to significant changes in threat.
- There are formalised arrangements with partners, such as prisons, military establishments and the HSE. In addition, there is a regional death at work group that is attended by the police, the HSE, and health and local authorities who seek to identify trends and identify homicides.
- The head of the professional standards department (PSD) is also the chief information officer having specific responsibility through a chief inspector for MoPI compliance. Both report to the information management board. The force is on target to achieve MoPI compliance by April 2008 and is currently 80% compliant. There is an information-sharing group in place and MoPI features as a potential high-risk area on the force strategic risk register.
- There is evidence of use of the serious crime analysis system, kidnap and extortion database, injuries database, and NPIA Genesis database. The force uses the Metropolitan Police Service’s skills and diversity database to obtain interpreters. The force submits monthly returns against the National Crime Recording Standard by crime category.
- Information-sharing processes and arrangements with both statutory and business partners is good.
- The newly introduced FIU provides a 24/7 intelligence management capability for staff and partners.

### **Work in progress**

- None identified

### **Areas for improvement**

- None identified

**Summary – In respect of major crime, the force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities is developing, with evidence that the impact of organised crime group (OCG) activity is partially understood. As a result, future risks and threats across the force area are identified in a timely way.**

### **Strengths**

- The force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities has been completed in respect of level 1 activity under the Safer Neighbourhoods project.
- The force has created and resourced a prevention and public protection bureau. An additional superintendent's post was created and additional staff, including a detective chief inspector and detective inspector, were recruited.
- The superintendent has lead responsibility for crime reduction as a portfolio theme as well as leading the force's arrangements for public protection. As a result, issues of 'vulnerability' and 'dangerousness' are linked.
- Three inspectors have force-wide lead roles for domestic violence, public protection and drugs.
- The prevention and public protection bureau co-ordinates the multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA) processes which include MAPPA referrals for scheduled meetings. Each referral is considered and actioned by the appropriate agency/agencies depending on the agreed MAPPA level. Following MAPPA meetings, intelligence identifying risks and issues of offenders are fed into intelligence, monitoring and tasking and co-ordination group (TCG) processes.

### **Work in progress**

- A threat matrix is being used to prioritise targeting of identified OCGs. This process considers the impact of OCGs on specific groups within communities; however, further work is being carried out to fully profile and map communities and their vulnerability.
- The capability of the FIB/ FIU to environmentally scan is limited, however this capacity will be improved with the planned increase in the number of senior analysts.

### **Areas for improvement**

- While the FSA considers communities in respect of level 1 volume crime activity, work has yet to be completed to effectively map vulnerable locations and communities and how these may be affected by OCGs operating within the force area. The future risks and threats of major crime on vulnerable communities need to be better understood.

## RECOMMENDATION 1

**Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should develop its analytical processes to fully understand the impact of major crime upon its communities (and in particular vulnerable groups). In order to do this detailed community profiles should be developed which will inform future risk and threat assessments.**

**Summary – The force maintains a strategic risk register that is reviewed every three months by the risk management group, which oversees force risk. Each identified risk for major crime has a current and effective action plan, which is robustly and effectively monitored.**

### Strengths

- There is a clear risk management policy that is owned by the head of audit, performance and risk management, who reports to the assistant chief officer (the portfolio holder). The risk management policy is reviewed annually, and has clear aims, rationale, legislative and risk considerations as well as lines of responsibility.
- There is a risk management group which has clear and documented terms of reference. It oversees all strategic risks and has a wide-ranging membership, including the police authority. The police authority committee receives quarterly updates regarding the force's management of risk.
- There is a clear process for the identification, prioritisation and escalation of risk.
- The force uses a scaled probability matrix for the assessment of each risk. There is a scaled matrix for risk impact assessment that combines strategic, operational and emergency preparedness.
- The force strategic risk register contains 46 active risks (primarily business risks), each of which has a strategic risk owner at chief officer level and an action plan owner at tactical level. Action plans are reviewed and updated quarterly.
- Each department and BCU has its own risk register which contain operational risks. Risks are managed, reviewed and owned as per the force register. The most significant risks are considered for escalation to the force strategic risk register.
- It is evident from documents supplied by the force, and during group and individual interviews, that there is an informed decision-making process used to resource and mitigate the risk.
- The HQ CID risk register contains generic management and governance risks as well as operational risks. The operational risks include the force response to major crime and kidnap and extortion, as well as aspects of capability and capacity such as senior identification manager capability. Within this register it details existing control measures and additional controls to mitigate risk.

- The project Dorset 2010 has its own detailed risk register and where risks have been identified these have been addressed through sound structural arrangements, the allocation or redistribution of resource, and the development of policies and procedures in order to mitigate these risks.

### **Work in progress**

- None identified

### **Areas for improvement**

- While there some element of cost apportioned to the risks contained within the risk register, the force should consider an effective way to make sure that the costs associated with the risk are not outweighed by the costs involved in its mitigation.

**Summary – The force is creating ways of collaborating with some other forces in and outside its region to provide the same level of access and interrogation of intelligence systems. The force currently shares intelligence and data with the SOCA, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and the UK Border Agency and forces in the region. Its HOLMES systems are fully interoperable with other forces.**

### **Strengths**

- The force has a comprehensive IT management system that allows it to link and search records from 20 different Dorset Police systems, across level 1 and level 2 business areas. This system has been supplied to Hampshire and Avon and Somerset police forces.
- Within the FIB (FIU) there are staff dedicated to liaising with other law enforcement agencies. There is evidence of information and intelligence exchange between agencies on a regional, national and international basis.
- When the FIU is closed, the control room undertakes intelligence checks with other police forces and acts as the portal for IMPACT nominal index checks.
- It is evident from the FSA that the force does draw on intelligence from other law enforcement agencies.
- There are numerous operational examples where there has been effective joint working and intelligence sharing with agencies such as the SOCA, HMRC and the UK Border Agency.
- The force is using HOLMES IT version 11A (networked on Share-point) which is interoperable with other forces, and has MIRWEB and CASWEB functionality. Finance has been allocated in order to upgrade the system to version 12 when available. HOLMES is not interoperable with force IT systems and, as a result, records are manually copied onto the intelligence system or are subject of electronic intelligence submissions (5x5x5 intelligence grading system).
- All the data for the Olympics project has been entered onto the HOLMES system in order that it can be shared with other forces involved in the project, for

example the Metropolitan Police Service and Thames Valley Police.

- The force has a dedicated automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) intercept team. The local back-office facility hub is located on a non-police site and it can be interrogated by the control room and the FIU and is used as a reactive tool by the MCIT. Where HOLMES is used, there are templated actions that include ANPR. The MCIT investigators use pagers that indicate ANPR activation. (See Areas for improvement.)
- There is sound intelligence sharing with MAPPA partners.

### **Work in progress**

- None identified

### **Areas for improvement**

- While there is recognition that the force has shared its own systems with two of its four neighbouring forces, this has not been reciprocated and efforts should be made to secure mutual information-sharing arrangements.
- There is a need to exploit existing protocols between Dorset Police and CDRPs in order to gather and exchange information at level 2.

**Summary – The force has a case review policy that is generally applied, ensuring that current major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with ACPO guidance; the policy is effective and efficient.**

### **Strengths**

- The force has a major crime review policy that was introduced in June 2007. There are five types of review identified: self-inspection, progress review, detected review, thematic review and cold case review.
- Self-inspection is used for crimes not detected within seven days and uses a self-inspection pack that is completed by the SIO.
- Progress reviews are undertaken for undetected crimes still current after 28 days and are commissioned to the force crime review officer.
- In complex cases additional staff, including specialists such as HOLMES operators, will assist the crime review officer.
- A detected review takes place at the conclusion of the criminal justice processes and concentrates on good practice and learning.
- Thematic reviews are risk based and are conducted as a result of a problem or issue that would be detrimental to an investigation.
- All cold cases are risk assessed in February of each year and are scored to prioritise those requiring further investigation in the next planning year. Outside this process, any cold case with new information coming to light will be reviewed.

- Reviews are recorded on a confidential review template that is scanned onto HOLMES as appropriate.
- There is a dedicated review officer who is a former detective superintendent and accredited to professionalising the investigative process (PIP) level 3. Activity is focused on the formalised review of major crime and cold cases as well as reviews of potentially critical incidents and missing persons' cases.
- The review of serious and organised crime cases is less formalised and has just begun. MCIT supervisors have conducted such reviews – based on risk.

### **Work in progress**

- None identified

### **Areas for improvement**

- While Dorset Police does submit returns to the National Centre for Policing Excellence against the National Crime Recording Standard by crime category, these frequently fail to meet the 14-day deadline.

**Summary – The force tasking and co-ordination process operates satisfactorily to deliver suitable responses to manage major crime threats. Documentation examined reveals a sound understanding of historical, current and predicted demand.**

### **Strengths**

- The NPIA NIM team was invited by the force to review its tasking and co-ordination processes, and as a result has given advice for improvement. Recommendations include steps to ensure consistent corporate tasking and co-ordination policy and standards in order to comply with NIM minimum standards and guidelines.
- The force tasking and co-ordination processes at all levels (levels 1 and 2) are regular, efficient, robust and self-critical. Resources are appropriately tasked.
- There have been a variety of problem profiles produced, including drugs, murder and rape. This analysis shows an understanding of historical, current and predicted demand.
- Level 2 activity is considered and managed by the bi-weekly serious and organised crime TCG chaired by the head of the HQ CID. This meeting considers the use of MCIT resources to tackle both major crime and serious and organised crime. Representatives attend this meeting from all major crime and serious and organised crime disciplines as well as the SOCA and the RIU.
- The decisions made by the serious and organised crime TCG are referred to the force TCG where activity can be reviewed and explained. Decisions not to resource are documented. In such cases the proposed operation remains the responsibility of the FIB/FIU at level 2. A dedicated analyst and an FIB officer monitor and develop the operation/enquiry and re-submit requests for resources

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through tasking processes as appropriate.

### **Work in progress**

- Following the NPIA NIM review, 78 recommendations are being actioned.
- The force has introduced I-Task in order to improve its information management, briefing and actioning systems. It will deliver a standardised solution for the management of tasking and coordination, enable better recording of decision making and enhance daily and self-briefings.

### **Areas for improvement**

- None identified

**Summary – Due to inadequate bespoke major crime diversity training, the force’s awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations is limited.**

### **Strengths**

- Generic diversity training (in the form of a national computer-based package) has been undertaken by all officers and staff.
- The force has developed links with police officers in Italy, who provided advice, guidance and translation during a homicide investigation.
- Two Polish police officers assisted the force by providing an input to MCIT officers, thereby raising awareness of Polish cultural issues.
- The police authority oversees a scholarship programme that allows officers to undertake research about identified subjects in a country of their choice. A detective inspector has recently been selected to undertake research in Poland to look at the Polish culture. Previous successful scholars have completed research in Australia and the USA.
- A group of specialist officers attended a recent seminar designed to raise awareness and understanding of issues when working in Muslim communities.

### **Work in progress**

- The force is developing a human resources training plan specifically for major crime.

### **Areas for improvement**

- While diversity is included within some training courses, there is not a structured approach to providing awareness training of diverse community needs during major crime investigations. Few staff have received specific training.

## Prevention

**Summary – The force has an independent advisory group (IAG) and various other independent sources who are frequently used to maximise the contribution of partners in the management of major crime investigations.**

### Strengths

- The partnership and diversity development team (PDDT) owns the force partnership policy and drives action at a strategic level. At a BCU level there are sound working relationships with CDRPs and there is some evidence of joint tasking to prevent volume and signal crimes.
- Dorset Police has worked together with partners such as the UK Border Agency, HMRC, Operation Trident and the SOCA in order to tackle and disrupt major crime and serious and organised crime.
- There are good working relationships and sound working processes with drug and alcohol action teams and MAPPA partners, and within both areas of activity there is significant multi-agency preventative activity.
- There is a police partnership for Dorset (with charity status) that seeks opportunities to reduce crime.
- Members of the PDDT are working with other statutory partners in order to develop a Dorset-wide strategy for children and young persons, which includes 'safeguarding' responsibilities and Every Child Matters requirements.
- SNTs are working through a dedicated SPOC with the South West Counter Terrorist Intelligence Unit (SWCTIU) in order to develop a 'richer picture'. SB officers and the security service have given awareness training in this respect.
- Key individual networks and Partners and Communities Together partnerships have been established in all SNTs and their identified members can be consulted about crimes and incidents in their area.
- The FIU has a detailed database that contains information and contact details from a wide variety of sources, including communities, statutory and non-statutory partners, the business community and utilities. This information is used by SIOs within major crime and serious and organised crime enquiries.
- The force has established appropriate independent advisory networks at levels 1, 2 and 3. The IAG policy is owned by the PDDT and there is a dedicated part-time IAG co-ordinator. There is a centralised independent diversity advisory panel that is consulted regarding policies and recruitment.
- IAG feedback is considered and recorded within community impact assessments.
- There is a critical incident IAG that advises, guides and reviews significant issues and critical incidents. This IAG does not sit on gold groups but is consulted. It provides documented recommendations to SIOs. Members have had enhanced vetting.

- The chair of the critical incident IAG networks nationally with other IAGs in order to seek best practice. The deputy chief constable hosts an inter-IAG meeting allowing chairs of the IAGs to exchange information and improve ways of working.
- A team of volunteers scans national and local media, looking for police-related articles. It considers the positive or negative impact of these on local communities. Feedback is given so that the force can mitigate risks This allows the force to take immediate action to fill in any gaps or mitigate the damage to the reputation of the organisation.

### **Work in progress**

- None identified

### **Areas for improvement**

- There is a need for the IAGs to fully represent current and emerging communities within Dorset.
- The force should raise awareness of the availability of the critical incident IAG to ensure that there is consistent use across Dorset during major crime investigations.
- While community impact assessments are subject to review at daily management meetings, the force should ensure that every time a community impact assessment is completed, it should be forwarded to the most appropriate IAG for their information.

**Summary – Effective contingency plans are in place to minimise the impact of any escalation of a major crime incident. The inspection teams found that ‘golden hour’ principles were sufficiently understood by call management staff and first responders.**

### **Strengths**

- Business continuity and contingency feature within the force strategic risk register and include such issues as loss of IT, industrial action and Avian flu. Each action to mitigate risk is led by a chief officer and planning arrangements are being tested for adequacy.
- The force operates a gold, silver and bronze arrangement for the command of incidents. While there is no written procedure, there are adequate numbers of trained staff and appropriate out-of-hours on-call systems, both formal and informal, for the contact and deployment of these officers and other specialist staff, for example SIOs, firearms, public order and forensics.
- Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) authorities are the responsibility of a separate on-call superintendent.
- There is a tiered approach to crime scene management through crime scene investigators, crime scene managers and crime scene co-ordinators. There are

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adequate numbers of staff who are appropriately skilled and trained.

- Within the HQ crime department there are formal on-call arrangements for SIOs, crime scene investigators and family liaison officers. There are other less formal arrangements for all other specialisms and roles.
- A new policy is in place that comprehensively covers threat-to-life issues (through a matrix of questions) and is available in both paper and electronic formats to call handlers and controllers.
- Control room inspectors are trained to provide initial authority for the armed response vehicles to arm.
- While there are no drop-down menus on the command and control system, there is a standing operational procedure for kidnap, available on Share-point.
- There is a dedicated forensic trainer who has provided training to operational staff in scene preservation. There is a good level of understanding of golden hour issues.
- The force generally follows the guidelines on major incident room standardised administrative procedures (MIRSAP) and has recently undertaken a capability assessment for compliance.

### **Work in progress**

- In order to enhance capability and capacity at bronze level, from 1 January 2008 all inspectors will be trained as bronze incident commanders.
- When staffing allows, the scientific support department runs a forensic tasking unit, which provides advice and guidance to victims of crime and screens potential scenes for crime scene investigator attendance.
- There has been training of PEC and control room call handlers and controllers in carrying out primary risk assessment and it is proposed that the risk assessment form will include an 'aide memoire'.

### **Areas for improvement**

- Notwithstanding the positive comments above, there is a need for the force to ensure that PEC and control room call handlers and controllers are trained to give basic initial crime scene preservation advice to victims and witnesses.

**Summary – The threats from precursors to major crime offending are analysed adequately.**

### **Strengths**

- There is analysis of the current and future demand of major crime types and the precursors to these offences. The FIB analysts and researchers carry out key-word searches using I-Task to identify precursors.
- The force has a good understanding of the threats arising from risks which have

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been identified in the FSA, for example violence against the person, murder or serious assault, rape or serious sexual assault, and commercial robbery.

- Problem profiles for homicide, drugs and rape have been completed. These products show an understanding of historical, current and predicted demand.
- As a result of the homicide reduction strategy, the problem profile has been updated and identifies three high-risk victim groups (domestic violence victims, gay men and female sex workers) and there is a tactical plan for each.
- The force uses situational profiles in order to plan preventative activities.
- MAPPA information and intelligence-sharing arrangements with partners are good.
- The force takes a preventative approach to domestic violence using the domestic violence SPECSS (separation, pregnancy, escalation, cultural issues, stalking or sexual assault) and the Co-ordinated Action against Domestic Abuse (CAADA) risk models. It has Independent domestic violence advisers to work with high-risk victims identified through the multi-agency risk assessment conference process.
- Prison liaison officers gain intelligence regarding prisoners due to be released, which is assessed by the FIU to identify risk of re-offending.

### **Work in progress**

- Near-miss offences, such as attacks on vulnerable victims, will be identified through the proposed risk management unit. It will also provide a scanning function to ensure that critical incidents and areas of risk are identified and resourced appropriately.
- Divisions are establishing dedicated public protection units. These units provide support and investigation for domestic abuse, public protection (registered sex offenders and MAPPA offenders), child abuse, vulnerable adults and hate crime (supported by the central prevention and public protection bureau).

### **Areas for improvement**

- There is recognition that the force is reliant on the FSA and some scanning by FIU staff regarding precursor crimes. There is a need to develop a more dynamic process to identify signal and precursor crimes.

## **RECOMMENDATION 2**

**Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should develop a more dynamic process to identify signal and pre-cursor crimes.**

**Summary – The policy covering threat to life is fully accessible to staff and reasonably understood and implemented. Examples of joint, regional, cross-border and multi-agency operations are patchy.**

**Strengths**

- There are detailed reduction plans for each control strategy theme apart from firearms. While firearm-related crimes are closely monitored and feature in the FSA, the low volume does not warrant a reduction plan at this time.
- The force has recently appointed a detective superintendent as director of prevention and reduction and he reports directly to the detective chief superintendent.
- The level 2 TCG will routinely consider preventative and disruption activities. This is often reinforced by the appointment of a bronze commander (prevention) within an operational plan.
- There is a dedicated detective inspector working to the director of prevention and reduction. He chairs the force crime reduction group, has force-wide responsibility for crime prevention and drug misuse and seeks national best practice. He is involved in level 2 operational planning.
- The status and expertise of BCU crime reduction officers is being elevated in order that they should work as consultants offering specialist advice and guidance within operations at both levels 1 and 2.
- A wide variety of tactical interventions are used at all levels to prevent crime and to frustrate offenders, but disruption has not yet been defined and is it not a key performance indicator. Policy files are used to record decisions and rationale. Operational review processes specifically consider the benefits of disruption activity and ongoing risk.
- There is a new policy in place that comprehensively covers threat-to-life issues. It includes a menu of options and tactics, threat assessment guidance, a template letter and an actions/instructions form and is well understood across the force.
- It is accessible on the force Share-point IT system, is well understood and is applied in a dynamic fashion. Reference to gold command is mandatory, but the warnings will be issued at any level considered to be appropriate.
- The completed Osman paperwork is sent to the central authorities' bureau where they are checked for compliance and entered on the force intelligence system.
- Repeat victims and offenders can be picked up by searches on the force intelligence system, on HOLMES or by referral to the central authorities' bureau who place covert flags to assist the identification of repeats.
- The director of prevention and reduction has given force-wide training regarding managing risk and the implications of the Van Colle case.

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### **Work in progress**

- Talks are taking place between the regional heads of CID and the RIU in order to use the regional database to store Osman intelligence. Furthermore, arrangements are planned in order to facilitate cross-border activity using the RIU as the conduit for intelligence.

### **Areas for improvement**

- None identified

**Summary – The force has a witness protection capability that is supported by on-demand covert resources. The force operates a policy that is shared with and understood by staff. The force is collaborating with other forces and partners in this area.**

### **Strengths**

- The force has a good understanding of the need for and mechanisms by which witnesses can be protected.
- The witness protection capability is structured under the line management of the director of investigations who is the force co-ordinator. There are adequate dedicated trained resources that match demand.
- The force policy was recently reviewed; it is well understood by front-line operational officers and staff and is accessible via the force intranet. It provides clear guidelines and suggests actions. The home force completes risk assessments and then trigger plans are developed. Sensitive data is stored in a standalone database with limited information available to the control room inspectors.
- There are collaborative arrangements with surrounding forces.
- There is an equal division in the proportion of witnesses being protected within Dorset Police area on behalf of other police forces and those in the scheme residing out of the county. The force has in place sufficient mechanisms, covert and technical resources and working relationships with partners.

### **Work in progress**

- Dorset Police is working with Hampshire Constabulary on a collaborative arrangement for Hampshire to give provision of witness protection, level 2 surveillance and services within the proposed Hampshire confidential unit.

### **Areas for improvement**

- None identified

**Summary – The force has a limited system to monitor the impact of preventative and enforcement activity. There is evidence that the broad range of community policing assets are partially used to help understand levels of harm in the community.**

### **Strengths**

- The FSA identifies threats and uses a threat assessment matrix to prioritise the most significant threats, risk and harm. Kidnap, sex offences against children, and dangerous offenders are all considered within the threat assessment matrix and have appropriate actions.
- The force has a range of policies concerning repeat victimisation, hate crime and 'near repeats'. Near-repeat victims are identified by intelligence management units and SNTs are tasked to make visits and distribute crime prevention packs.
- SNTs use the neighbourhood profile templates in order to identify individuals, groups or communities who are at risk or are more vulnerable to crime. These are then 'accessed' in order to give enhanced services and to prevent crimes.
- The MCIT analyst produces problem profiles, including homicide and rape, as well as threat assessments for major crime types to inform and prioritise police activity.

### **Work in progress**

- Following the phase 1 inspection report on neighbourhood policing, a recommendation was made that the force develops community impact assessments that link to joint strategic assessments. It is anticipated that this development will help measure the impact of major crime events on the community and thus help deliver the force strategic aim of ensuring that communities are made to feel safe.

### **Areas for improvement**

- Although the force is completing the threat assessments for vulnerable victims and individuals, it needs to develop its understanding and intelligence regarding vulnerable communities and the harm on them as a result of major crime.
- The force is currently developing its existing neighbourhood profiles in order to better understand the vulnerabilities of geographic communities. However, this needs to be expanded to include those communities, either virtual or geographic, that cross SNT areas. With the appointment of the strategic analytical roles within the FIB (FIU), vulnerable communities should be scoped at level 2.

**Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force always considers relevant professional standards issues in the operational planning for major crime work. There is a developing security policy in use to ensure that staff are appropriately vetted commensurate with exposure.**

### **Strengths**

- A comprehensive security policy is in place to ensure that professional standards issues are considered in operational planning.

- The force demonstrates a robust approach to the security of intelligence (see Areas for improvement); all intelligence is held on a networked IT system that can link up to 20 other applications and has a tiered level of access.
- The inspection team examined the security arrangements developed for each operation including PSD integrity unit staff attending planning meetings and a security policy in the form of a contract being agreed and becoming part of the SIO's policy log.
- Members of staff involved in level 2 operations are required to sign confidentiality forms that are managed by the PSD. The force vetting officer has responsibility for the vetting of these staff.
- The PSD can be called to assist within an enquiry or members may invite themselves based on risk or intelligence. It will also conduct thematic reviews, for example use of RIPA legislation.
- The force undertakes anti-corruption initiatives, and details of operations have been shared with the inspection team.

### **Work in progress**

- Two areas have been identified as work in progress: vetting procedures and a review of the role of the operational security officer.

### **Areas for improvement**

- While the force has fully marketed the Crimestoppers integrity line, including on the front page of Share-point, it should seek best practice from other forces in order to further develop its IT-based reporting service in order to make sender details anonymous.
- Two additional areas for improvement have been identified but due to their sensitive nature are not disclosed in this report but have been shared with the force.

## **Enforcement**

**Summary – Governance arrangements for major crime investigations are wholly effective, with appropriate use made of IAGs and community membership of gold command support groups.**

### **Strengths**

- The assistant chief constable (ACC) has lead responsibility for major crime investigations, he has good oversight and understanding of the size and complexity of this critical area of business.
- The ACC chairs the strategic crime and criminal justice board. The force TCG is a rigorous process that is chaired by the ACC. Staff are held to account, actions

are monitored and there is a strong consideration for efficiency, risk and intelligence issues.

- Three members of the police authority have been suitably vetted and attend a level 2 TCG on a quarterly basis.
- The director of intelligence provides sanitised updates to a closed session of the police authority on matters such as OCG mapping and human trafficking.
- Gold groups are called where necessary. These involve partners, agencies, community members and other interested parties. The police authority is informed of events that require such a response but will not always attend the meeting.

### **Work in progress**

- Agreement has been reached to hold quarterly diarised meetings between the police authority members and the director of intelligence, which will raise awareness and understanding as well as providing opportunity for improved governance.

### **Areas for improvement**

- None identified

**Summary – The ACPO lead and the head of crime are not yet trained in the management of linked and series crime. These officers are supported by staff who have undergone adequate training and testing in critical incident command, community impact assessments and policing in partnership.**

### **Strengths**

- While the force has not been regularly tested in the management of series crime, it has the capability through relationships between crime managers, analytical support and management meetings to identify these cases. Historic evidence shows appropriate response to series crime where examples were shared with the inspection officers. Gold groups were established and arrangements tested by real-life events.
- There are adequate call-out procedures for specialist officers, and on each BCU there is a 24-hour nominated superintendent (silver) and 24/7 duty officer cover provided by a uniform inspector and chief inspectors. Furthermore, there is an on-call superintendent for PACE issues.
- The force has recently invested in a special events command centre that was tested during the 2007 Labour Party conference. The force has had responsibility for policing national party political conferences for a number of years and has gained significant expertise in major event planning and security operations which will be developed for the Olympic 2012 events.
- There has not been any appointment of an officer in overall charge as the opportunity has not arisen.

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- The force has good support from its IAG arrangements, especially the involvement of the critical incident IAG in major crime investigations. (See Areas for improvement.)
- The forensic intelligence unit looks for series and serial crimes through the study of DNA, shoeprint and fingerprint evidence. It then produces investigative packages that are allocated to officers for investigation and copies are forwarded to the RIU for information.

### **Work in progress**

- The planned introduction of the 24/7 risk management unit will identify critical incidents or potential critical incidents, and will co-ordinate an intelligence-led response. It will have access to force databases and, as a result, will have better capability to identify linked crimes.

### **Areas for improvement**

- The force does not have any superintendents trained in the management of series and serial crime (the ACC attended SCIMITAR training in 2002). While it is acknowledged that they are competent within that role, formal training should be provided.
- While community impact assessments are subject to review at daily management meetings, the force should ensure that every time a community impact assessment is completed, it should be forwarded to the most appropriate IAG for information.

**Summary – The force’s performance in the investigation of major crime is monitored through a regime that reviews each operation but does not review desired outcomes against cost, inputs and outputs.**

### **Strengths**

- Dorset Police has a dedicated review officer and a major crime review policy that was introduced in June 2007.
- Within 24 hours, every live major crime enquiry is reviewed by the SIO. This can be with the assistance of other peer SIOs. There is a formal policy and a rigorous process to review each live enquiry after 28 days. This review looks at lines of enquiry and staffing and scopes future actions. The findings of each review are fully documented within the policy file. Regular level 2 TCG meetings, at which staffing and resource considerations are addressed, complement this process.
- Other forces or agencies, when appropriate, complete major crime investigation reviews.
- Owing to the low volume of kidnaps and homicides, every one is debriefed and will be subject to review for organisational learning. In addition, Category A murders will be the subject of a bid for external review at the regional TCG.
- Periodic bids for additional resources and finance can be made to the head of the HQ CID either during or outside the TCG process. Management meetings

supplement this where SIOs report to superintendents concerning operational progress.

- Allocated budgets are monitored by SIOs assisted by a financial administrator who records and monitors spend against profile. The crime department has some administrative capability to monitor the low-level financial issues such as overtime, expenses, mileage and hotel accommodation.
- The force consistently seeks national good practice through attendance at training events, seminars and national working groups at all levels. Internally it seeks to identify learning through operational review and debriefs. Learning is quickly disseminated via updates in policy or procedures, through the good practice database and good practice forum.
- The force seeks feedback through critical review, for example external scrutiny of operations and inspection by the NPIA and outside agencies.
- Practitioner seminars, both within the force and regionally, are well attended by a wide selection of staff at all levels.
- Significant support is given to development of specialist staff, for example senior investigators are sent abroad for research and there is support to attend national courses and seminars.
- The quality and development department reviews every force policy annually.
- The Share-point system has an SIO folder that contains ACPO manuals of guidance and some best practice. Other areas of learning on Share-point include a dedicated area for specialist trained officers (STOs) and the casualty bureau.
- Individual officer skills are listed and managed through a skills matrix linked to the investigative policy (minimum standards of competence and training).
- Performance development reviews (PDRs) are graded and submitted to the learning and development unit for the allocation of appropriate courses. Each officer is allocated a mentor who discusses the individual's training and skills requirements.

### **Work in progress**

- The lead police authority member has an ambition to become more involved in performance issues generally, and finance rigour in particular. As a result, quarterly meetings are to be held where major crime investigations will be discussed.
- HMIC has previously recommended the development of multi-agency child abuse/vulnerable adult training. One of the expected outcomes is to ensure that lessons learnt from serious case reviews enter the learning cycle.

### **Areas for improvement**

- While there is focus on cost efficiencies within enquiries, there is no formalised true cost benefit assessment undertaken for each operation. Some very limited use is made of activity-based costing and activity analysis.

- While the force does carry out a post-operational review of major crime investigations, there is no evidence that the desired outcomes are measured against cost, inputs or outputs.
- The force needs to develop financial systems to monitor and understand the amount of resource that it is committing to each theme within enforcement, prevention, intelligence and communication, to enable it to balance the resourcing dedicated to each activity area.

### **RECOMMENDATION 3**

**Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should have a process for scoping, defining and reviewing both the activity and measurement of major crime investigations against agreed outcomes and costs.**

## **Performance management and resilience**

**Summary – The inspection teams found a sufficient investigative capability in-force to meet the predictable major crime investigation demands; however, collaborative agreements with the SOCA and forces in the South West region exist and are deployed as appropriate. These are considered adequate to counter normal and extraordinary levels of need. Force procedures to manage human resources provide partial protection for the investigative capability.**

### **Strengths**

- The MCIT has sufficient dedicated capacity and capability to match anticipated need. The MCIT structure and working patterns provide resilience and clear lines of leadership, reduce travelling time, cover weekend working and provide the force with efficient and consistent major crime investigation capability. Major incident room facilities exist at three sites and at HQ. These are well equipped and fit for purpose.
- There is a dedicated investigative training capability within the learning and development unit. The HQ CID has strong representation on the training user group and holds a separate training needs group.
- The force is undertaking PIP training for all major crime detectives. The force is working with the NPIA to implement a PIP improvement plan.
- Within the MCIT there are sufficient officers who are tier 2 interview trained and across the force there are in excess of 100 supervisors trained to tier 4.
- The force has in place systems, policies, processes and relationships to respond effectively to unexplained deaths in communities and institutions. There is in place a clear approach, supported by policy, to the investigation and oversight of sudden and unexplained deaths, which was clearly understood by first responders and their supervisors.

- The MCIT analyst reviews all reported incidents of unexplained deaths, including those in care homes, those reported by the HSE, prisons and military establishments, and unexplained drug-related deaths.
- Within the HQ CID command team there is a senior coroner's officer who, in addition to reporting to the coroner, reports to the director of investigations. Coroner's officers attend most sudden and unexplained deaths, thereby ensuring a consistent and quality- assured investigation.
- Each BCU has a dedicated public protection unit under the line management of the detective chief inspector. The public protection unit is responsible for the protection of vulnerable adults.
- There is appropriate capability and capacity within crime scene management and investigation. A comprehensive on-call system and collaborative agreements support these arrangements.
- There are cross-border and collaborative arrangements for the training of the force's officers and staff, for example surveillance. Within the public protection arena, the force undertakes training with other agencies for the management of registered sex offenders and dangerous offenders, and for child abuse investigations at all levels.
- The force has regional arrangements to call for mutual aid and has provided such aid to others.
- There are adequate resourcing arrangements within the high-tech crime unit and there are on-call facilities when required. The force also has collaborative arrangements across the region to share expensive specialist equipment.
- A member of the BCU criminal justice unit will be dedicated to MCIT court cases to provide administrative support, some file preparation and witness liaison. The nominated exhibits and disclosure officer or the case manager attached to the case completes file building.
- The force has adequate trained resources to respond to crimes in action such as kidnap or extortion. It has reciprocal arrangements with surrounding forces to provide assistance. The force has adopted the SOCA call-out template for kidnap response.
- There are sufficient resources to provide technical support, including intrusive deployments.
- Telephone analysts are subject to on-call out-of-hours arrangements.
- Officers at all levels receive critical incident training through the initial police learning and development programme (IPLDP) and core leadership development programme (CLDP).
- Front-line officers attend an investigative skills course, which is based on critical incident scenarios for domestic violence and hate crime. This includes golden hour responsibilities.

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- Inspectors receive a two-day bronze commanders' course that concentrates on cordons, staffing of incidents and scene management.
- There is a dedicated HOLMES team who come under the line management of the MCIT detective chief inspector. The HOLMES manager is experienced and involved in the development of HOLMES at regional and national levels. The force's HOLMES and casualty bureau capability have recently been tested and quality assured.

### **Work in progress**

- The force is undertaking significant PIP training for all HQ CID detectives.
- Dorset Police is working with Hampshire Constabulary on a collaborative arrangement for Hampshire to give added provision of witness protection, level 2 surveillance and services within the proposed Hampshire confidential unit.
- The force is looking to modernise posts within the MCIT, including HOLMES officers.

### **Areas for improvement**

- While there is an understanding within the HQ CID concerning the skills base of its staff, these records are maintained by individuals within various departments and are not centrally co-ordinated. As a result, the personnel manager is unaware of the spread of skills across the department which inhibits workforce planning.
- There should be a more formalised succession planning process to identify suitable individuals for future senior posts.

**Summary – Specialist and covert investigations are resourced through a robust infrastructure that is proven to be effective. Elements of surveillance and surveillance training are delivered through written and verbal collaborative agreements which are sound. The inspection found evidence of reactive use of these assets across a widening range of offences.**

### **Strengths**

- Following Dorset 2010 project recommendations, the structures – both management and operational – within the HQ CID have been modified in order to improve efficiency, decision making and operational effectiveness.
- There are adequate out-of-hours on-call systems, both formal and informal, for the contact and deployment of specialist staff. These arrangements are constantly tested in real-life events.
- The force has a dedicated, well-trained and suitably vetted surveillance team that is primarily used to target level 2 offenders.
- Training for surveillance operatives is completed in-force as Dorset is the South West region surveillance training centre, accredited by the NPIA.

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- HMIC examined the source handling function which appears to meet force needs.
- The force uses a wide range of undercover techniques.
- There is a dedicated economic crime unit that targets fraud, money laundering, general financial investigation and cheque and card theft. There are also financially trained officers and analysts within the FIB and the MCIT.

### Work in progress

- The Dorset 2010 project the force is committed to increase and enhance Level 2 capacity and capability through restructuring and the increase of resources in key areas. It relies upon additional resource being freed up from Level 1 as BCUs are merged and as a result this will take time to be fully realised, however, new policies, procedures and processes have been developed which will make efficient use of these resources when they are made available.
- Dorset is working with Hampshire Police on a collaborative arrangement for Hampshire to give added provision of witness protection, level 2 surveillance and services within the proposed Hampshire Confidential Unit.
- The force is part of the South-West Collaboration project which was successful in being awarded a £500,000 Home Office grant. This project has a completion date of 31<sup>st</sup> December 2008 and supports a range of initiatives including back office functions, firearms training, air support, ANPR and covert operations.

### Areas for improvement

- Current plans to implement covert Airwave radio should become high priority status. (It is recognised that radios have now been purchased.)
- There is a need to improve capability and capacity within the high-tech crime unit to work on interrogation of telephone handsets.

**Summary – The force has a full-time and dedicated case review team that is generally deployed when current and historical major crime cases are reviewed, in accordance with ACPO guidance. Case review work is effective and efficient.**

### Strengths

- Within the HQ CID there is a dedicated review officer who undertakes formalised scheduled reviews. The majority of work undertaken by the review officer is on current, rather than historic, unsolved cases.
- Unsolved homicide cases are re-examined and scoped for risk on an annual basis by the MCIT analyst and are then prioritised for a full review by the MCIT or the review officer. Four cases are reviewed each year.
- The ACC and the head of the HQ CID commission cold case reviews through the TCG process.

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- Staff within the roads policing unit review road deaths. The MCIT has assisted the roads policing unit with criminal investigations and the dedicated review officer has undertaken a review of a fail-to-stop road traffic collision. There is not a set timescale for re-examination of fatal road death collisions, as the force does not have undetected or 'driver not identified' cases outstanding.
- While Dorset Police has not required other forces to review Category A+ murders, the SOCA reviewed an unsolved homicide investigation.
- The force demonstrated compliance with MIRSAP.

### **Work in progress**

- None identified

### **Areas for improvement**

- None identified

## **Summary – The inspection found that the force was compliant with relevant ACPO standards of the *Murder Investigation Manual* and MIRSAP.**

### **Strengths**

- The ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* is widely available in paper format and on the force intranet.
- MIRSAP is widely understood and implemented across the major incident rooms. The force has demonstrated its flexible application of MIRSAP through the staffing of critical major incident room posts, for example the combination of statement reader and action allocator. There are sufficient trained staff within the MCIT.
- Policy files are completed for every major crime. Where HOLMES is used, policy files are recorded within it; otherwise a paper policy file is completed.
- Decisions not to pursue lines of enquiry and the rationale are fully documented within the policy files. Where the TCG process directs lines of enquiry, policy logs are updated and limited rationale is included within the TCG minutes.
- Sensitive decision making will be recorded on paper files and will be added to HOLMES at the close of an enquiry.

### **Work in progress**

- None identified

### **Areas for improvement**

- None identified

## **Recommendations**

### **Recommendation 1**

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should develop its analytical processes to fully understand the impact of major crime upon its communities (and in particular vulnerable groups). In order to do this detailed community profiles should be developed which will inform future risk and threat assessments.

### **Recommendation 2**

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should develop a more dynamic process to identify signal and pre-cursor crimes.

### **Recommendation 3**

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should have a process for scoping, defining and reviewing both the activity and measurement of major crime investigations against agreed outcomes and costs.

## Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

### A

ACC	assistant chief constable
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ANPR	automatic number plate recognition

### B

BCU	basic command unit
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### C

CDRP	crime and disorder reduction partnership
CHIS	covert human intelligence source
CID	criminal investigation department
CLDP	core leadership development programme
CSP	common security policy

### D

DAAT	drug and alcohol action team
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### E

ECU	economic crime unit
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### F

FIB	force intelligence bureau
FIU	force intelligence unit
FSA	force strategic assessment

### H

HMI	Her Majesty's Inspector
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HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
HMRC	Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs
HOLMES	Home Office Large Major Enquiry System
HSE	Health and Safety Executive

**I**

IAG	independent advisory group
IPLDP	initial police learning and development programme

**M**

MAPPA	multi-agency public protection arrangements
MCIT	major crime investigation team
MIRSAP	major incident room standardised administrative procedures
MoPI	management of police information
MSF	most similar force(s)

**N**

NIM	National Intelligence Model
NPIA	National Policing Improvement Agency
NPSAT	National Protective Services Analytical Tool

**O**

OCG	organised crime group
OpSy	operational security officer
Osman	Osman v UK (1999) 1 FLR 193, where the court established that in certain circumstances the state has a positive obligation to take preventive measures to protect an individual who is at risk from the criminal activities of others

**P**

PACE	Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
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PDDT	partnership and diversity development team
PDR	performance development review
PEC	police enquiry centre
PIP	professionalising the investigative process
POCA	Proceeds of Crime Act 2002
PSD	professional standards department

**R**

RIPA	Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
RIU	regional intelligence unit

**S**

SAR	suspicious activity report
SB	special branch
SC	security clearance
SGC	specific grading criteria
SIO	senior investigating officer
SNT	safer neighbourhood team
SOCA	Serious Organised Crime Agency
SPI	statutory performance indicator
SPOC	single point of contact

**T**

TCG	tasking and co-ordination group
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## Appendix 2: Developing Practice

<b>INSPECTION AREA:</b> Major crime
<b>TITLE:</b> Homicide reduction strategy
<p><b>PROBLEM:</b></p> <p>Within Dorset there are on average four murders per year. A major crime investigation team was established in 2003 and since that date, of the murders that have been committed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 40% are defined as ‘domestic’ murders;</li> <li>• 20% were murders of gay men; and</li> <li>• 20% were murders of sex workers.</li> </ul> <p>Every one of these murders has been detected, which in turn has enhanced public confidence in Dorset Police. The conviction and incarceration of the offenders has undoubtedly supported one of the primary aims of the force and made Dorset safer.</p> <p>However, the best way of achieving the other primary aim of the force, namely making the people of Dorset feel safer, is to prevent the murders from happening. (During the HMIC inspection carried out in spring 2006 it was identified that Dorset Police had no specific homicide reduction strategy.)</p> <p>There is no homicide reduction strategy template that is deemed appropriate for Dorset.</p>
<p><b>SOLUTION:</b></p> <p>A homicide reduction strategy has been developed that incorporates within it a number of actions that are linked to the force priorities. All the strands of the strategy are categorised into areas of intelligence, investigation, prevention and communication and are all linked to force priorities.</p> <p>Where appropriate, complementary strategies (domestic violence, kidnap, Osman warnings, etc) all have reference to homicide reduction.</p> <p>In addition, action plans are being developed in relation to the specific victim groups referred to above together with an incremental implementation plan.</p>
<p><b>OUTCOME:</b></p> <p>The force now has a proportionate homicide reduction strategy.</p>
<p><b>FORCE CONTACT:</b></p> <p>T/Detective Superintendent Neil Redstone, tel. 01202 223729</p>