



Promoting improvements
in policing to make
everyone safer

Royal Navy Police

An inspection of the leadership of the Royal Navy Police
in relation to its investigations

July 2016

© HMIC 2016

ISBN: 978-1-78655-157-3

www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic

Contents

Summary	3
1. Introduction	7
2. How effective is the overall strategic leadership and direction of the RNP, including the structures and mechanisms in support of these areas?	10
What we were looking for	10
Findings	10
3. How effective are the oversight, governance, monitoring and assessment arrangements within the RNP to ensure investigations are effective and kept free from improper interference?	24
What we were looking for	24
Findings	25
4. How well does the RNP use the National Intelligence Model in identifying strategic policing priorities that influence strategic planning and resourcing?	31
What we were looking for	31
Findings	32
5. Conclusions	35
How effective is the overall strategic leadership and direction of the RNP including the structures and mechanisms in support of these areas?	35
How effective are the oversight, governance, monitoring and assessment arrangements within the RNP to ensure investigations are effective and kept free from improper interference?	36
How well does the RNP use the National Intelligence Model in identifying strategic policing priorities that influence strategic planning and resourcing?	37
Annex A – Methodology	38
Annex B – List of case files reviewed	39
Annex C – Recommendations and Area for Improvement	40

Summary

Section 4 of the Armed Forces Act 2011 places a statutory duty on Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) to inspect and report to the Secretary of State (Defence) on the independence and effectiveness of investigations carried out by the Royal Navy Police (RNP). This is the first statutory inspection of the RNP by HMIC. The terms of reference for this inspection are as set out below.

- How effective is the overall strategic leadership and direction of the RNP, including the structures and mechanisms in support of these areas?
- How effective are the oversight and governance arrangements within the RNP to ensure investigations are free from improper interference?
- How well does the RNP monitor and assess the effectiveness of investigations? and
- How well does the RNP use the National Intelligence Model in identifying strategic policing priorities that influence strategic planning and resourcing?

This inspection took place in October and November 2015. We reviewed documents provided to us by the RNP and we conducted a series of interviews and focus groups with RNP personnel on board ships and at shore bases. We also examined twelve RNP case investigation files.

We found that the role of the RNP was comprehensively and consistently defined in various documents. RNP personnel to whom we spoke understood their role. The Provost Marshal (Navy) had circulated to RNP personnel comprehensive guidance on his expectations for the quality of investigations.

However, we found limitations in the command arrangements because the Provost Marshal (Navy) did not have control of the majority of RNP personnel. We found some evidence that supported concerns raised by RNP personnel in relation to a lack of clarity and understanding of their role across the wider Royal Navy; the Royal Navy needs to understand better the full extent of tasks RNP personnel undertake.

We found that the RNP had an 'in-house' training programme in which the identification and care of victims featured strongly, although we did not find any evidence of the RNP seeking to obtain feedback from victims on the quality of service provided. The range of training courses provided by the RNP was sufficient. However, the courses would benefit from accreditation.

We considered that succession planning was not always adequate and that for certain posts – where the investment in the postholders' training is considerable – extended tenure arrangements should apply.

There were well-established management structures and effective reporting mechanisms. RNP personnel and commanding officers elsewhere in the Royal Navy understood their responsibilities. The Provost Marshal (Navy) made good use of various internal and external governance mechanisms in order to provide him with assurance, but the RNP would benefit from the introduction of a structured process by which the independence and overall quality of its investigations are reviewed by other relevant professionals.

RNP meetings were well structured and complied with the National Intelligence Model Code of Practice. Personnel had a good understanding of the Model and they had ready access to policies and documents. The RNP's analytical products provided clear direction and guidance in relation to force priorities, but the force strategic assessment did not identify future demands adequately. The Strategic Tasking and Coordination Group identified priorities that influenced planning and resourcing in the short term but not the long term.

We conclude that the Provost Marshal (Navy) provided effective leadership and strategic direction of the RNP in relation to investigations but that action needs to be taken in order to improve matters concerning: the command arrangements; clarity and understanding of the RNP's role; the collection of victim feedback; the accreditation of training; and an extended tenure for a small number of posts.

We also conclude that, while there are effective oversight, governance, monitoring and assessment arrangements within the RNP to ensure investigations are effective and kept free from improper interference, the arrangements should be strengthened by making better use of the expertise that is available from other relevant professionals.

Finally, we conclude that, in order to inform better strategic planning and resourcing, the RNP should improve its use of the National Intelligence Model to identify strategic policing priorities that influence longer-term strategic planning and resourcing.

Recommendations and area for improvement

We have made six recommendations and we have identified one area for improvement:

Recommendation 1

By 31 December 2016, the Royal Navy should revise the command arrangements for the RNP in order to give the Provost Marshal (Navy) greater control over the deployment of RNP personnel.

Recommendation 2

By 31 December 2016, the Provost Marshal (Navy) should undertake a comprehensive survey of the tasks carried out by RNP personnel that are unrelated to the RNP's investigative and disciplinary role (the primary purpose). The survey should determine whether the performance of those tasks causes a reduction in the RNP's ability to meet its primary purpose. From this survey, the Provost Marshal (Navy) should, under the direction of the First Sea Lord, provide an assessment of the suitability of those tasks for RNP personnel.

Recommendation 3

By 30 September 2016, the Provost Marshal (Navy) should put in place a structured process to gather and act on feedback from victims in order to assess and improve the quality of victim care in investigations.

Recommendation 4

By 1 March 2017, the Provost Marshal (Navy) should, in conjunction with Provosts Marshal (Army and RAF), establish a mechanism whereby RNP investigators are accredited by the College of Policing under the Professionalising the Investigation Programme.

Recommendation 5

By 30 September 2016, the Provost Marshal (Navy) should identify the small number of posts for which an extended tenure arrangement is warranted. The Provost Marshal (Navy) should then negotiate the introduction of such an arrangement as soon as possible thereafter.

Recommendation 6

By 30 September 2016, the Provost Marshal (Navy) should make arrangements for the introduction of a structured process by which the independence and overall quality of RNP investigations is reviewed by other relevant professionals on a regular basis.

Area for improvement

The strategic assessment process is an area for improvement. The Provost Marshal (Navy) should improve the use of the strategic assessment process, in order to identify future demands more effectively. This will enable a more accurate assessment to be made of the RNP's capacity and capability to meet those demands.

1. Introduction

About HMIC

- 1.1. HMIC independently assesses police forces and policing activity from neighbourhood teams to serious crime and the fight against terrorism – in the public interest. In preparing our reports, we ask the questions which citizens would ask, and publish the answers in accessible form, using our expertise to interpret the evidence.
- 1.2. HMIC is independent of government and the police. HM Inspectors of Constabulary are appointed by the Crown – they are not employees of the police service or government.
- 1.3. HMIC decides on the depth, frequency and areas to inspect based on our judgments about what is in the public interest.
- 1.4. In making these judgments, we consider the risks to the public, the risks to the integrity of policing, service quality, public concerns, the operating environment, the burden of inspection and the potential benefits to society from the improvements that might arise from the inspection.
- 1.5. HMIC's annual inspection programme is subject to the approval of the Home Secretary in accordance with the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011.

About the Royal Navy Police

- 1.6. The Royal Navy Police, which we also refer to in this report as "the RNP" and "the force", is led by a Royal Navy officer of commander rank, who holds the title Provost Marshal (Navy), and is the chief officer of the RNP. He is responsible solely to the Admiralty Board of the Defence Council for the conduct and direction of all RNP investigations, which are to be conducted independently of the chain of command.
- 1.7. The RNP has 314 personnel including those of the Royal Marines Police Troop. RNP personnel are deployed to naval vessels and shore bases in the United Kingdom and across the world.¹
- 1.8. The RNP in the United Kingdom comprises: the RNP national headquarters; regional headquarters covering each of the north, west and eastern regions of the United Kingdom (each of which is led by a Naval Provost Marshal at

¹ Shore bases overseas include bases at British Overseas Territories such as Diego Garcia and Gibraltar.

lieutenant commander rank); and the Special Investigation Branch. In addition, the Provost Marshal (Navy) also has command of the separate Iraq Historic Allegations Team, which was established to investigate allegations by Iraqi civilians of abuse by UK armed forces personnel while in Iraq.²

Our commission

1.9. Section 4 of the Armed Forces Act 2011, which came into force on 4 June 2014, places a statutory duty on HMIC to inspect and report to the Secretary of State (Defence) on the independence and effectiveness of investigations carried out by each service police force: the Royal Navy Police; the Royal Military Police; and the Royal Air Force Police.

Terms of reference

1.10. This is the first statutory inspection of the RNP by HMIC. The terms of reference for this inspection are as follows:

- How effective is the overall strategic leadership and direction of the RNP, including the structures and mechanisms in support of these areas?
- How effective are the oversight and governance arrangements within the RNP to ensure investigations are free from improper interference?
- How well does the RNP monitor and assess the effectiveness of investigations? and
- How well does the RNP use the National Intelligence Model in identifying strategic policing priorities that influence strategic planning and resourcing?

1.11. In October 2010, HMIC inspected the Special Investigation Branch of the RNP. That inspection was conducted at the invitation of the Ministry of Defence. In this first statutory inspection of the RNP we have, where relevant, included commentary on the RNP's progress since the 2010 inspection.

² Further information on the Iraq Historic Allegations Team is available from: www.gov.uk/government/groups/iraq-historic-allegations-team-ihat. It was not within the scope of this inspection to conduct a comprehensive and detailed examination of all work undertaken by the Iraq Historic Allegations Team. Where relevant to other aspects of the inspection, we have included brief comments on the work of the Iraq Historic Allegations Team.

Methodology

- 1.12. This inspection took place in October and November 2015.
- 1.13. We reviewed documents provided to us by the RNP that described the force's role.
- 1.14. We visited shore bases at Portsmouth, Plymouth and Upavon and two naval vessels, which were docked at Portsmouth and Plymouth. We conducted a series of interviews and focus groups with RNP personnel. We also examined twelve RNP case investigation files.
- 1.15. A detailed description of the methodology for this inspection can be found at Annex A – Methodology – Methodology, and a list of the types of case files we reviewed can be found at Annex B – List of case files reviewed – List of case files reviewed.
- 1.16. HMIC is grateful to the personnel of the RNP who contributed to this inspection and to other Royal Navy personnel for their time and support during the inspection process.

The structure of this report

- 1.17. In order to provide a helpful report which is evidence-based, concise and easy to follow, we have laid out our findings and conclusions in a logical order:
 - chapter 2 provides our findings in relation to the effectiveness of the RNP's strategic leadership (the first question in our terms of reference);
 - chapter 3 provides our findings in relation to the effectiveness of the RNP's oversight and governance arrangements, including how well the RNP monitors and assesses investigations (the second and third questions in our terms of reference);
 - chapter 4 provides our findings in relation to how well the RNP uses the National Intelligence Model for strategic planning purposes (the fourth question in our terms of reference); and
 - chapter 5 provides our conclusions, in the form of our response to the questions posed in our terms of reference.
- 1.18. A list of the six recommendations we make in this report and a description of an area in which we consider that the RNP needs to improve can be found at Annex C – Recommendations and area for improvement – Recommendations and area for improvement.

2. How effective is the overall strategic leadership and direction of the RNP, including the structures and mechanisms in support of these areas?

What we were looking for

- 2.1. We consider that, in any police force, it is necessary for senior leaders to provide clarity of purpose and good direction to those they lead. If done well, this helps personnel to have a clear understanding of their role.
- 2.2. We also consider that senior leaders have a vital role to play in ensuring that, with the assistance of properly defined policies, personnel meet the expectations and standards that are placed upon them.
- 2.3. Therefore, in order to establish the effectiveness of the overall strategic leadership and direction of the RNP in relation to investigations, we looked for:
 - how the Royal Navy defines the role of the RNP, and how it ensures that the role is understood by personnel; and
 - how the Provost Marshal (Navy) ensures that the RNP conducts investigations that meet his expectations.

Findings

- 2.4. In summary, we found that the role of the RNP was comprehensively and consistently defined in various documents. RNP personnel to whom we spoke understood their role. The Provost Marshal (Navy) had circulated to RNP personnel comprehensive guidance on his expectations for the quality of investigations. However, we found limitations in the command arrangements in that the Provost Marshal (Navy) did not have control of the majority of RNP personnel. The full extent of tasks undertaken by RNP personnel needs to be better understood by the Royal Navy. Other findings in this part of the report relate to: collection of victim feedback; accreditation of investigators; and tenure arrangements.

How the Royal Navy defines the role of the RNP and how it ensures that the role is understood by personnel

- 2.5. We learned that, prior to the RNP's creation, the Royal Navy Regulating Branch was responsible for enforcing the Naval Discipline Act 1957. Its personnel were called "regulators".

- 2.6. In 2007, as a result of a change brought about by the Armed Forces Act 2006, the RNP was created. At the same time, the Royal Navy Regulating Branch was abolished and the RNP inherited the naval discipline role of the Royal Navy Regulating Branch as well as increased investigative responsibilities within its policing and investigations role.
- 2.7. The Armed Forces Act 2006 defines the role of the RNP concerning the investigation of military service offences.³
- 2.8. Through our document review we found that, in the years that followed the RNP's creation, the role of the RNP had been described by leaders in various documents at different times. Although the descriptions differed from document to document, there was consistency in their meaning and collectively they provided a comprehensive definition.

RNP principal task and primary duties (2011)

- 2.9. A document issued by the Provost Marshal in 2011 (which introduced the Royal Navy Police Code of Discipline) contained a description of a principal task for the RNP with four associated primary duties. We found that this description reflected the investigative role set out in the Armed Forces Act 2006 as well as the inherited naval discipline role:

"[the principal task is]...to enforce the law within the service community, and assist with the maintenance of service discipline. The primary duties of RNP are therefore to:

- (a) Uphold the Rule of Law.
- (b) Protect and assist the citizens within our communities.
- (c) Contribute towards the prevention and detection of crime.
- (d) Assist in the maintenance of a peaceful community free from crime and disorder."⁴

³ S116-118 Armed Forces Act 2006, available at: www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/52/part/5/chapter/1/crossheading/duty-of-service-policeman-following-investigation. Military service offences are those offences which can be committed by military personnel. They include: criminal conduct such as theft and assault; and non-criminal conduct such as being absent without leave, or contravening standing orders.

⁴ 20110907 – HQ PM(N) Policy Note 011-11-U, Royal Navy, 7 September 2011, paragraph 3

RNP mandate (2012)

- 2.10. A document issued in 2012 bore a description of a mandate, which we also found to reflect the investigative role set out in the Armed Forces Act 2006 and the inherited naval discipline role, as set out below.

"The RNP is mandated to:

Support operational effectiveness and delivery of military capability through provision of an investigative and policing service to the RN charged with the prevention, investigation and detection of crime and disciplinary offences, in order to contribute towards the maintenance of good order and military discipline."⁵

This mandate document also included 20 separate objectives. The objectives were broken down into three categories: legally mandated objectives; primary objectives; and secondary objectives. The objectives spanned a wide range of matters, from "...the maintenance of discipline and good order..." to "provide crime reduction advice..."

- 2.11. We found that, collectively, the 20 objectives were relevant to the RNP's policing, investigative and discipline roles.

RNP mission statement (2013)

- 2.12. A document, issued in 2013, contained a mission statement for the RNP. This also reflected the investigative role set out in the Armed Forces Act 2006 and the naval discipline role:

"to 'deliver effect' through the prevention, detection and investigation of crime and ill-discipline across the Naval Service and to support Front Line and Home Commands through non-policing functions."⁶

- 2.13. The document that contained this mission statement had been circulated to all RNP officers and warrant officers⁷ and we found that there was a good understanding of the mission statement among those we interviewed in the RNP.
- 2.14. At the time of the inspection, the Provost Marshal (Navy) was undertaking a review of the mission statement to ensure that it remained relevant to the future purposes of the Royal Navy and the RNP role within the Royal Navy.

⁵ *Royal Navy Police Mandate (Annex A to 20121106-RNP Mandate and Governance-PEG Paper-P)*, Royal Navy, 6 November 2012.

⁶ *20130607-RNP Direction and Guidance-R*, Provost Marshal (Navy), 7 June 2013 [RESTRICTED]

⁷ The warrant officer ranking includes Master-at-Arms and Regulating Petty Officer.

- 2.15. Once we had established how the Royal Navy, through the RNP, defined the role of the RNP and the duties of each member of RNP personnel, we turned our attention to how the Royal Navy ensured that the role was understood.
- 2.16. We found that a significant piece of work had been carried out in 2015. The Provost Marshal (Navy) had identified that the rate at which some ranks of RNP personnel were leaving the Royal Navy was higher than average. Because of this and other resourcing challenges the Provost Marshal (Navy), with support from the Naval Personnel Strategy Directorate, commissioned an ethos, culture and identity study across the RNP.

RNP ethos culture and identity study

- 2.17. This study, which was supported by an occupational psychologist from the Royal Navy's personnel strategy team, sought to gain a better understanding of the reasons why RNP personnel were leaving the Royal Navy.
- 2.18. The study involved a series of focus groups across all ranks of the RNP. At the time of our inspection, the study had not been finalised. However, we were told that a prominent early finding was that there were concerns among RNP personnel regarding a lack of clarity and understanding of their role across the wider Royal Navy.
- 2.19. This was also reflected in some of our interviews and focus groups where we were told that there was a culture – particularly at sea – where RNP personnel tended to be viewed as regulators rather than police officers. Consequently, they were often required to perform ancillary functions in addition to their policing role. We explored this in more detail.

Terms of reference for posts

- 2.20. We found that, for each post held by RNP personnel, there was a detailed written description of their duties – a form of job description – which the RNP called "terms of reference". For our document review, we were provided with 28 examples of these terms of reference, for posts across various parts of the RNP: national and regional headquarters posts; the Iraq Historic Allegations Team; the RNP Special Investigation Branch; and posts for RNP personnel on board naval vessels.
- 2.21. We found that all the terms of reference were written in a consistent format. Each contained a description of the postholder's duties, in the form of a primary purpose and a set of secondary purposes for each post. There was also information such as the postholder's level of authority and responsibility, and to whom he or she was accountable.

- 2.22. We looked closely at a subset of these terms of reference, in particular the posts held by RNP personnel working on board naval vessels and the posts on shore bases that were operational rather than administrative in nature.⁸
- 2.23. Among the subset we found that, generally, the primary purpose involved ensuring the maintenance of discipline and the investigation of criminal and disciplinary offences.⁹ The secondary purposes were usually relevant to the primary purpose. However, the secondary purposes were more wide-ranging. In one of the terms of reference we examined, they included mail supervision and administration of Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs routines.¹⁰
- 2.24. We were informed that there was sometimes insufficient policing and discipline work for RNP personnel posted to naval vessels. Interviewees told us that they were usually called upon to carry out these more wide-ranging secondary tasks, which they considered to be unconnected with their policing and discipline role. They informed us that this was commonplace and that such tasks for RNP personnel were also known within the Royal Navy as "executive duties". RNP personnel accepted that "warfighting" tasks, such as performing the role of flight deck officer, were important and formed part of their secondary purposes, however mail supervision and other non-police tasks were not.

Command arrangements

- 2.25. We understand that the Provost Marshal (Navy) has command of certain RNP shore-based personnel: headquarters Provost Marshal (Navy) staff; the RNP Special Investigation Branch; and the Iraq Historic Allegations Team. This represents the minority of RNP personnel. The majority of RNP personnel, who are posted elsewhere – to naval vessels and to other shore bases in the United Kingdom and across the world – are under the command of the relevant commanding officer.
- 2.26. We noted that this command arrangement differed from that in the two other service police forces (the Royal Military Police and the Royal Air Force Police), in which personnel were under the command of the relevant Provost Marshal.

⁸ The subset included the roles of: Leading Regulator; Regulating Petty Officer; Master at Arms; and Provost Marshal (Navy)

⁹ The 'maintenance of discipline' purpose featured less prominently or was absent from the terms of reference for certain investigative posts such as those held by the Iraq Historic Allegations Team and the Special Investigations Branch.

¹⁰ As set out in the terms of reference for the post of Regulating Petty Officer; secondary purposes 6e and 6j.

- 2.27. Because the majority of RNP personnel were not under the command of the Provost Marshal (Navy), we found that this seriously limited his ability to allocate and deploy RNP resources according to investigative and policing priorities.
- 2.28. An example reported to us was the Provost Marshal (Navy)'s inability to move RNP personnel from one area of Portsmouth to another at short notice without consent of the respective commanding officer. Provisions did exist to move RNP personnel at short notice for the purpose of providing temporary additional resources to investigations. However, this was only for use in exceptional circumstances (e.g. for matters that were deemed as being of the most serious nature and which attracted the highest profile).
- 2.29. We consider that, in order to address the limitations created by the RNP's command arrangements, the Royal Navy should revise those arrangements.

Recommendation 1

- By 31 December 2016, the Royal Navy should revise the command arrangements for the RNP in order to give the Provost Marshal (Navy) greater control over the deployment of RNP personnel.

Impact and suitability of tasks allocated to RNP personnel

- 2.30. We consider that, taken together, the principal task and primary duties, mandate, mission statement, and terms of reference for each post provided clarity for RNP personnel. However, when the secondary purposes and the command arrangements are taken into account, matters become less clear.
- 2.31. The full extent of tasks undertaken by RNP personnel as part of their secondary purposes (also known as executive duties), and the impact of those tasks on their ability to meet their primary purpose, need to be better understood by the Royal Navy.

Recommendation 2

- By 31 December 2016, the Provost Marshal (Navy) should undertake a comprehensive survey of the tasks carried out by RNP personnel that are unrelated to the RNP's investigative and disciplinary role (the primary purpose). The survey should determine whether the performance of those tasks causes a reduction in the RNP's ability to meet its primary purpose. From this survey, the Provost Marshal (Navy) should, under the direction of the First Sea Lord, provide an assessment of the suitability of those tasks for RNP personnel.

How the Provost Marshal (Navy) ensures that the RNP conducts investigations that meet his expectations

2.32. We consider that, in order to enable personnel to meet the expectations that are set for them, those expectations must be clearly defined and explained. Furthermore, those expectations must be embedded in – and implemented through – effective systems, working practices, monitoring and checking procedures. Consequently, for this aspect of our inspection, we assessed the RNP's approach in five areas: policies and guidance; training; skills and experience; supervision of investigations; and crime recording.

Policies and guidance

2.33. We found that the Royal Navy had adopted the *The Naval Service Core Values*, a set of six core values, which all Royal Navy personnel (including RNP personnel) were expected to observe.¹¹

2.34. In addition, the expectations of RNP personnel are enshrined in law through a statutory code of practice. Powers held by RNP personnel are similar to those held by civilian police officers, and the safeguards for the questioning and treatment of people by the RNP are similar to those for civilian police forces in England and Wales. The military powers and safeguards are published in *The Service Police Codes of Practice*.¹²

¹¹ See www.royalnavy.mod.uk/equality-and-diversity. The six Naval Service Core Values are commitment, courage, discipline, respect for others, integrity and loyalty.

¹² *The Service Police Codes of Practice*, Ministry of Defence, 19 March 2015, presented to Parliament pursuant to section 113(7) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

- 2.35. We found that, in addition to *The Service Police Codes of Practice*, the Provost Marshal (Navy) had, through an internal policy note promulgated in 2011, issued a *Royal Navy Police Code of Conduct*.¹³
- 2.36. We examined the *Royal Navy Police Code of Conduct* and found that it set out clear expectations across a range of areas such as:
- the exercise of police powers (where RNP personnel are enjoined to avoid "intolerance, prejudice, over enthusiasm and authoritarianism in the conduct of their duties");
 - confidentiality, honesty and integrity; and
 - fairness and impartiality to the service community and public (where RNP personnel are reminded that they have "a particular responsibility to act with fairness and impartiality in all their dealings").
- 2.37. We also examined various policies and procedures for investigations that the RNP supplied to us for our document review. These included a series of documents entitled "technical instructions", which had been issued by the Provost Marshal (Navy) over a number of years in connection with a range of investigative and other policing matters.¹⁴
- 2.38. We found that these documents provided comprehensive guidance on the standards required by the RNP for investigations, as well as procedures for how investigations should be undertaken. They included procedures that were derived from College of Policing standards,¹⁵ which had been adapted to take account of the military context.
- 2.39. Through our interviews with RNP personnel, we were satisfied that, in general, they understood the Royal Navy's and RNP's expectations of them and that they knew where to find the relevant policy and guidance documents when they needed to refer to them.

¹³ *Royal Navy Police Code of Conduct*, HQ PM(N) Policy Note 011-11.

¹⁴ The subject areas of the technical instructions included: command and organisation of the RNP, an investigative protocol for major incidents, a victims of crime code of practice, performance monitoring procedures, domestic abuse, domestic violence and so-called honour-based violence, streamlining of minor discipline offences, crime categories and divisions of investigative responsibilities, and guidance and templates for the completion of written reports.

¹⁵ The College of Policing defines and publishes guidance for Home Office police forces in a range of Authorised Professional Practice documents. See www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/

Recommendation 3

- By 30 September 2016, the Provost Marshal (Navy) should put in place a structured process to gather and act on feedback from victims in order to assess and improve the quality of victim care in investigations.

Training

- 2.40. The RNP recruitment policy was to recruit personnel only from within the Royal Navy or, in the case of the Royal Marines Police Troop, from within the Royal Marines. This meant that personnel joining the RNP had already undergone extensive training as sailors or marines and will have gained an understanding of how the RNP operates.
- 2.41. We found that there was a centralised database in use, which contained details of training for RNP personnel. This enabled managers to monitor overall training levels and it supported effective deployment decisions, so that personnel were only deployed to operations for which they were adequately trained. We also noted that the terms of reference for posts (see paragraph 2.20) often contained a section entitled "Competencies" which set out in detail the training requirements for postholders.
- 2.42. We found that the RNP had an 'in-house' training programme. Training was provided to personnel in accordance with their experience and the duties that they undertook.
- 2.43. The identification and care of victims featured strongly in the training programme, and was supported by presentations by Victim Support¹⁶ and external speakers. Personnel to whom we spoke had a clear understanding of the importance of their responsibilities to victims of crime and a good awareness of the armed forces code of practice regarding the services to be provided to victims of crime.¹⁷
- 2.44. However, we did not find any evidence of the RNP seeking to obtain feedback from victims on the quality of service provided by the RNP. Nor did the RNP use satisfaction surveys that would help to assess the effectiveness of investigations and the levels of victim care provided.

¹⁶ Victim Support is an independent charity supporting victims and witnesses of crime committed in England and Wales. It was set up almost 40 years ago and has grown to become the oldest and largest victims' organisation in the world.

¹⁷ *Joint Service Publication 839 Victims' Services*, Ministry of Defence, 11 November 2015. The Armed Forces Code of Practice for the Victims of Crime is contained in Annex A of that publication.

Work-based training and task book

- 2.45. Recruits to the RNP undertook an initial course. This was followed by a programme of development using a 'work-based training system', which was a series of training activities for completion in the workplace. RNP personnel were also required to complete a document called a "task book", in which they recorded evidence of competency in core skills such as arrest, crime scene management and stop and search. Trainees were expected to submit their task books to supervisors for endorsement.
- 2.46. The core skills covered by the task books were supplemented by a number of specialist training courses provided by the RNP. These covered areas such as volume crime, serious crime, management of investigations and crime scene investigation.
- 2.47. We noted that there were deadlines specified for completion of the task books and other elements of the Royal Military Police Advanced Apprenticeship Scheme in Policing (which the RNP adopted in 2010).¹⁸
- 2.48. We found that all RNP personnel received training about improper interference in investigations, the importance of which we discuss in the next chapter of our report (see paragraph 3.1). This training was provided in a number of areas relating to integrity and professionalism. We were informed that similar training is provided to senior naval officers outside of the RNP.
- 2.49. RNP personnel also undertook a 'pre-joining' training course before postings on board naval vessels. This course was designed to prepare them for a range of duties they undertook at sea, such as investigator, crime scene manager and custody officer. Interviewees told us that this course was invaluable to them.
- 2.50. In addition to the in-house programme, the RNP also used other course providers, such as Home Office police forces and the College of Policing, to provide specialised training. Examples here included training courses for senior investigating officers.

¹⁸ As stated in *BR3 Volume 1 Navy Personnel Management*, "[a]ll newly qualified LRegs will be assigned to a RNP Headquarters for a minimum period of 18 months for their first assignment to enable Task Book completion (which must be completed within 12 months)"; and "...the 3 remaining units of the Royal Military Police Advanced Apprenticeship Scheme in Policing (C & G Diploma in Policing) must be completed within 18 months". *BR3 Volume 1 Navy Personnel Management*, October 2015, Royal Navy, chapter 80A-3; available at: www.royalnavy.mod.uk/~media/royal%20navy%20responsive/documents/reference%20library/br%203/br3book/an80a.pdf

2.51. We considered the range of training courses provided by the RNP to be sufficient. However, we found that these courses were not accredited by the College of Policing. The College of Policing has a robust system for accreditation, the benefits of which are assurance to senior officers, the public and victims of crime that training – and therefore the competence of those that receive it – is of a high quality. In particular, the College of Policing's Professionalising Investigation Programme¹⁹ would be of value to the RNP.

Recommendation 4

- By 1 March 2017, the Provost Marshal (Navy) should, in conjunction with Provosts Marshal (Army and RAF), establish a mechanism whereby RNP investigators are accredited by the College of Policing under the Professionalising Investigation Programme.

Skills and experience

- 2.52. The RNP had a number of specialist posts that required investment, such as attendance on training courses, or an investment in time – where there was a need to build knowledge, experience and working relationships.
- 2.53. We were informed that the RNP applied a Royal Navy policy that all personnel should move roles every two to three years. This was explained to us as a way of keeping personnel "fresh" and providing continued professional development.
- 2.54. The application of this policy meant that, generally, RNP personnel moved roles within the RNP every two to three years. The movement of RNP personnel was overseen by career managers, who were not part of the RNP. We found that senior RNP personnel had only a limited input into decisions concerning the movement of personnel. Some RNP personnel we spoke to said that succession planning was not always adequate and that for certain posts – where the investment in the postholder's training is considerable – extended tenure arrangements should apply; under such arrangements, a limited number of RNP personnel would remain in post for periods beyond three years.
- 2.55. There is clearly a balance to be struck between developing the Royal Navy's workforce as a whole and preserving skills and experience in the RNP. We consider that such a balance is achievable.

¹⁹ See www.college.police.uk/What-we-do/Learning/Curriculum/Investigation/Pages/default.aspx

Recommendation 5

- By 30 September 2016, the Provost Marshal (Navy) should identify the small number of posts for which an extended tenure arrangement is warranted. The Provost Marshal (Navy) should then negotiate the introduction of such an arrangement as soon as possible thereafter.

Supervision and reviews of investigations

- 2.56. The majority of investigations undertaken by the RNP relate to disciplinary matters, and allegations of theft, violence and sexual assault. The investigations are usually carried out by RNP personnel at the rank of regulating petty officer or leading regulator. They are supervised by senior non-commissioned officers or warrant officers.
- 2.57. We examined a sample of twelve case files and the corresponding entries on the computerised investigation management system, which is used to record the progress of investigations. We found that the lines of enquiry and offences investigated were appropriate and consistent with the circumstances of the case. We found examples of good supervision and compliance with relevant policies.
- 2.58. During interviews and focus groups, we were told that supervisors sometimes asked investigators to undertake lines of enquiry which investigators felt to be unnecessary. In our case file review, we found a minor assault allegation where this appeared²⁰ to be the case. In this example, there were no aggravating or exacerbating factors. The victim had accepted the suspect's apology, acknowledged that the incident was unintentional and informed the investigator that he did not wish the matter to be investigated further. When the investigator reported these facts, the supervisor requested that further statements be taken.
- 2.59. We also found that, in all instances where an interview with a suspect had been tape-recorded, there was a requirement for a full written transcript to be prepared, regardless of the circumstances. An example provided to us involved a nine-page interview record of a disciplinary offence that had been fully admitted.
- 2.60. Investigators told us that transcript preparation was a time-consuming process which could be significantly reduced by the use of short descriptive notes²¹

²⁰ We did not speak directly with either the investigator or supervisor.

²¹ Short descriptive notes are brief accounts of comments made by suspects in investigative interviews, in particular: admissions of offences; disputed versions of events; denials; mitigation; and

where appropriate. Furthermore, we were informed that it was the responsibility of investigators to prepare the transcripts. We were informed after the inspection that this policy was being reviewed.

- 2.61. We consider that short descriptive notes should be used where appropriate and that, in the instances where a full transcript is required, it would be more cost-effective if the responsibility to prepare it fell to a typist.
- 2.62. We learned that RNP policy was that active investigations should be reviewed every 28 days. The purpose of the review was to "assess progress (or delay), re-evaluate the investigation and provide further direction to the Investigator and/or amend the investigative strategy".²² In the twelve cases we examined, all of which were in excess of 28 days old, we found that the 28-day reviews had taken place and that they were properly recorded by supervisors on the computerised investigation management system. Furthermore, interviewees added that reviews were routinely carried out in other investigations in accordance with the policy and that, in practice, supervisors looked at cases on a weekly basis (which RNP personnel referred to as "7-day reviews").
- 2.63. We were told that, in addition to the reviews carried out by supervisors, the RNP professional standards department also provided a crime review capability, as well as dealing with complaints made about RNP personnel and conducting technical evaluations (see paragraph 3.8). In one of our case reviews, we found that the professional standards department had reviewed the case and recommended new lines of enquiry.
- 2.64. In addition to the regular supervisory reviews and occasional professional standards department reviews, we learned of two occasions where the RNP had used other relevant professionals to conduct investigative reviews: officers from a Home Office police force had reviewed an investigation into a high-risk missing person; and a subject matter expert had reviewed investigations undertaken by the Iraq Historical Allegations Team as part of an ongoing review process.
- 2.65. We learned that the RNP holds a daily management meeting which is attended by representatives of all the United Kingdom-based units (in person or by telephone conferencing). This meeting reviews crimes and incidents of

aggravating factors. The use of such notes in straightforward and minor cases is common in civilian police forces in England and Wales. See: *The Prosecution Team Manual of Guidance for the preparation, processing and submission of prosecution files 2011 (incorporating National File Standard 2015)*, Association of Chief Police Officers and National Policing Improvement Agency, paragraph 1.13.1, available at <http://library.college.police.uk/docs/appref/MoG-final-2011-july.pdf>

²² *Provost Marshal (Navy) Technical Instruction No. 2*, Royal Navy, 13 August 2014, page 3, paragraph 10.

note in the preceding 24 hours, as well the progress of significant investigations and the availability of resources.

- 2.66. We attended two of these meetings and examined the minutes of previous meetings. We found that the meetings were well-structured and the process enabled effective scrutiny. At the meetings we attended, we saw actions being allocated to named individuals and a proper record kept, so as to ensure that personnel were held to account.
- 2.67. The monthly Tactical Tasking and Coordination Group meeting (see paragraph 4.10) also had a role in reviewing significant investigations.
- 2.68. We found that, as part of the RNP's performance monitoring regime, a monthly performance monitoring pack was supplied to all RNP senior officers. This included data relating to the numbers of investigations on naval vessels and at shore bases, the number of cases discontinued and cases over 100 days old.

Crime recording

- 2.69. The Service Police Crime Bureau,²³ which records crimes reported to the RNP, was inspected during the HMIC inspection of the Royal Military Police in 2015.²⁴ At that time, we concluded that there was insufficient oversight of the crime recording system and the post of crime registrar was needed to ensure compliance with crime recording rules, as in Home Office police forces.²⁵
- 2.70. We were informed during the RNP inspection that a role profile and job description (rather than terms of reference) for crime registrar had been completed and that an appointment would be made in the near future.
- 2.71. We found that, in common with the other service police forces, the RNP used templates that provide structured and effective processes for crime recording.

²³ The Service Police Crime Bureau is a joint unit supporting service police investigators, staffed by personnel from the service police forces (the Royal Navy Police, the Royal Military Police and Royal Air Force Police). The bureau records crimes on behalf of each of these forces.

²⁴ *An inspection of the leadership of the Royal Military Police in relation to its investigation*, HMIC, July 2015. Available at: www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/wp-content/uploads/an-inspection-of-the-leadership-of-the-rmp-in-relation-to-its-investigation.pdf

²⁵ *Op cit*, page 19.

3. How effective are the oversight, governance, monitoring and assessment arrangements within the RNP to ensure investigations are effective and kept free from improper interference?

What we were looking for

- 3.1. The RNP is responsible for policing service personnel and civilian members of staff who are subject to service law and discipline. RNP personnel operate in the United Kingdom and abroad and they report to both the Provost Marshal (Navy) and to the commanding officer of the base to which they are deployed.
- 3.2. This creates a special challenge for the RNP: in a military context, including when at war, the RNP needs to carry out investigations effectively and with a sufficient degree of independence to make sure that they are kept free from improper interference.
- 3.3. In this respect, safeguards have been provided in the Armed Forces Act 2006, which prohibits improper interference and places a duty on the Provost Marshal (Navy) to ensure that investigations are not interfered with.²⁶ The Armed Forces Act 2006 also places a duty on commanding officers of other naval units, who must notify the RNP if a Schedule 2 offence²⁷ has been committed, or if any other offence has been committed in prescribed circumstances.²⁸

²⁶ Section 115A(2) Armed Forces Act 2006 as amended: "The Provost Marshal of the force has a duty, owed to the Defence Council, to seek to ensure that all investigations carried out by the force are free from improper interference"; and section 115A(3) Armed Forces Act 2006 as amended: "Improper interference includes, in particular, any attempt by a person who is not a service policeman to direct an investigation which is being carried out by the force".

²⁷ Offences listed under Schedule 2 to the Armed Forces Act 2006 include murder, manslaughter, war crimes and other serious offences.

²⁸ Sections 113-114 of the Armed Forces Act 2006. The Armed Forces (Part 5 of the Armed Forces Act 2006) Regulations 2009 provide that only persons subject to service law may be considered to have committed an offence in prescribed circumstances; prescribed circumstances include where: a person subject to service law has been assaulted on at least two occasions by another person subject to service law; or serious injury has been inflicted on a person subject to service law by a person of superior rank or rate while the assailant was carrying out his duties. This description is not exhaustive.

- 3.4. We consider that, even with the legal safeguards in place, the RNP needs effective oversight and governance arrangements in order to ensure that investigations are free from improper interference, and that the effectiveness of investigations is monitored and assessed. Consequently, we looked for:
- how the Provost Marshal (Navy) uses management structures and reporting mechanisms to ensure that investigations are free from improper interference;
 - how well RNP personnel and commanding officers elsewhere in the Royal Navy understood their responsibilities; and
 - how the Provost Marshal (Navy) assures the Royal Navy and the public that the RNP is independent of the chain of command so that the Royal Navy and the public can have confidence in RNP investigations.

Findings

- 3.5. In summary, we found well-established management structures and effective reporting mechanisms. RNP personnel and commanding officers elsewhere understood their responsibilities. The Provost Marshal (Navy) made good use of various internal and external governance mechanisms in order to provide assurance, but the RNP would benefit from the introduction of a structured process by which the independence and overall quality of investigations is reviewed by other relevant professionals.

How the Provost Marshal (Navy) uses management structures and reporting mechanisms to ensure that investigations are free from improper interference

Reporting and accountability mechanisms

- 3.6. We found that the Provost Marshal (Navy) was accountable to the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Capability) for budgetary purposes. This accountability arrangement did not extend to investigations due to the Provost Marshal (Navy)'s independence from the chain of command in this regard.
- 3.7. We also found that the Provost Marshal (Navy) was granted direct access to the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (Capability) to raise any matters of concern or, if he considered it necessary, with the First Sea Lord in person. This arrangement provided the Provost Marshal (Navy) with direct access to the most senior member of the Royal Navy.

Technical evaluations

- 3.8. We were told that the professional standards unit undertook "technical evaluations" (a process similar to an inspection) of each RNP unit. These were normally undertaken biennially.

- 3.9. Prior to the technical evaluation, a self-assessment questionnaire was completed by the unit under evaluation. This was followed by an evaluation visit, after which a report was prepared and submitted to the Provost Marshal (Navy).
- 3.10. Technical evaluation reports contained an overview of the unit's performance and details of good practice or areas for improvement. If a technical evaluation revealed significant concerns, the unit would receive further attention, sometimes in the form of unannounced visits.
- 3.11. We examined a completed technical evaluation report.²⁹ We found that the technical evaluation followed a generic process based upon the self-assessment that had been submitted to the professional standards unit. The technical evaluation included areas such as: personal safety training; personal protective equipment; crime reduction; and terms of reference (see paragraph 2.20). The inspection team also reviewed a sample of investigation case files and held an open forum debate in relation to the executive duties (see paragraph 2.24) and police functions performed by RNP personnel.
- 3.12. We found that that the technical evaluation report contained a good overview of the general observations and a summary with an overall assessment. The report also identified specific areas of good practice and deficiencies, with supporting recommendations for improvement.

Performance monitoring report

- 3.13. We were informed that, in February 2012, the RNP introduced a monthly performance monitoring report in response to a recommendation from the HMIC inspection of the Special Investigations Branch in 2010.³⁰ This was also evident from one of the technical instructions (see paragraph 2.37) we examined, which contained significant detail on how performance would be monitored.³¹
- 3.14. We examined an example of the monthly performance monitoring report dated August 2015. It included information on: the distribution of RNP personnel across the naval fleet and shore bases; the number of discipline and criminal offences under investigation; the number of cases which had been referred by commanding officers; and the number of cases discontinued.

²⁹ *Royal Navy Police (RNP) Professional Standards Unit (PSU) Technical Evaluation (Techeval) Report – RNAS Culdrose, Royal Navy, 13 July 2015 (unpublished).*

³⁰ Recommendation 12. *Inspection of the Royal Navy Police Special Investigations Branch*, HMIC, October 2010, page 38. Available at: www.justiceinspectors.gov.uk/hmic/media/inspection-of-the-royal-navy-police-special-investigations-branch-20101114.pdf

³¹ *Provost Marshal (Navy) Technical Instruction Number 11 – Royal Navy Police Performance Monitoring*, Royal Navy, 9 September 2011.

Discontinuance reports

- 3.15. We were informed that, before any investigation is discontinued, a report is submitted to the relevant regional Naval Provost Marshal for the authorisation for discontinuance.

RNP personnel working at sea

- 3.16. RNP personnel who work at sea and at shore bases overseas are distant from United Kingdom-based RNP supervision and support. Because of this, they are required to report the details of investigations they undertake (and any other policing functions they perform) to shore-based senior RNP officers in the United Kingdom. Personnel with whom we spoke considered these reporting arrangements to be helpful in keeping investigations free from improper interference.

How well RNP personnel and commanding officers elsewhere in the Royal Navy understood their responsibilities

- 3.17. We found that RNP personnel at all ranks had a good understanding of their responsibilities, the concept of improper interference and the relevant legislation. RNP personnel we interviewed were able to describe in detail their powers and the obligations placed on the Provost Marshal (Navy) and on commanding officers of other units. We formed the view that investigators had a strong sense of independence. This was borne out in our review of case files.
- 3.18. Furthermore, the personnel with whom we spoke were unaware of any occasions where there had been improper interference in investigations, and they were clear about how to escalate matters should any such interference occur. They told us that when offences were referred to them to investigate by commanding officers they were given proper access to witnesses and evidence.
- 3.19. The senior RNP officers with whom we spoke believed that commanding officers across the Navy understood the legislation and the responsibilities placed on them.
- 3.20. When we spoke with commanding officers outside of the RNP they showed a good understanding of the legislation and their responsibilities, particularly their duty to notify the RNP of any Schedule 2 offences (see paragraph 3.3).

How the Provost Marshal (Navy) assures the Royal Navy and the public that the RNP is independent of the chain of command so that the Royal Navy and the public can have confidence in RNP investigations

Sexual offences

3.21. Commanding officers have the power to deal with certain offences, but must refer all sexual offences and other serious offences to the RNP to investigate.³² The Special Investigations Branch investigates serious or complex cases and those matters which, due to their nature, require a special investigation.

Tri-service investigations policy and protocol with police forces

- 3.22. We found that reciprocal arrangements had been made with the two other service police forces. This was for the referral and investigation of cases where a particularly high degree of independence was required, such as allegations against RNP personnel. For this, there was a *Tri-Service Investigations Policy*.³³
- 3.23. We were provided with a copy of the policy, which we examined. The policy's intent was clear: "...to ensure and increase confidence and transparency in the Service Police, and maintain high standards and good policing practice." We also found that it was explicit in describing the responsibility of the originating force to carry out urgent and essential tasks such as preserving evidence or securing a crime scene.

³² Certain duties of commanding officers are set out in sections 113-115 of the Armed Forces Act 2006. The offences they must (by law) refer are those specified in Schedule 2 to the Armed Forces Act 2006 and those which have been committed in 'prescribed circumstances' as defined in the Armed Forces (Part 5 of the Armed Forces Act 2006) Regulations 2009. Also, an internal Navy policy document issued in 2013 gives direction to commanding officers that all sexual offences must be reported to the RNP.

³³ *Tri-Service Investigations Policy*, jointly issued by the Provost Marshal (Navy), Provost Marshal (Army) and Provost Marshal (Royal Air Force), 21 May 2015.

- 3.24. We found that, in addition to the *Tri-Service Investigations Policy*, there was a protocol which had been agreed between the three service police forces, the Ministry of Defence Police and the Association of Chief Police Officers.³⁴ This allowed for the transfer of investigations from the RNP to Home Office police forces under a flexible approach based on consultation and agreement at a local level. In particular, the protocol allowed for the referral of any deaths on Ministry of Defence property to Home Office police forces to investigate.
- 3.25. We found that while the RNP had drawn on the expertise of other relevant professionals to review the quality of investigations, such as the reviews of the Iraq Historic Allegations Team's investigations (paragraph 2.64), we did not find any evidence of the RNP doing so to ensure the independence of its investigations. We consider that the RNP would benefit from a structured process by which the independence and overall quality of investigations is reviewed by other relevant professionals on a regular basis.

Recommendation 6

- By 30 September 2016, the Provost Marshal (Navy) should make arrangements for the introduction of a structured process by which the independence and overall quality of RNP investigations is reviewed by other relevant professionals on a regular basis.

Independent prosecution arrangements

- 3.26. The Service Prosecuting Authority, which was established by the Armed Forces Act 2006, exists to provide an independent prosecution service to the armed forces.
- 3.27. Because it is a separate part of the Ministry of Defence, the Service Prosecuting Authority was seen by RNP personnel as an important factor in assuring the Royal Navy and the public that RNP investigations are subject to an independent prosecution process.
- 3.28. In our interviews, RNP personnel described a positive working relationship with the Service Prosecuting Authority in terms of independent support and advice given during RNP investigations.

³⁴ *A Protocol between the Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland and the Ministry of Defence Police and the Service Police*, 7 April 2014. The Association of Chief Police Officers was superseded in April 2015 by the National Police Chiefs' Council.

- 3.29. The Service Prosecuting Authority is signatory to a protocol³⁵ that has been agreed between the Director of Service Prosecutions, the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Ministry of Defence. This protocol deals with the issue of 'concurrent jurisdiction' (where an allegation against a person subject to service law could be heard by a military or a civil court). We found a good level of knowledge of the protocol among senior RNP officers we spoke to.
- 3.30. We found that the Service Prosecuting Authority provided feedback to the RNP in certain cases, particularly those where shortcomings in investigations had been identified. In these cases, the Provost Marshal (Navy) often commissioned the RNP Professional Standards Department to undertake reviews of the investigations.

Independent oversight by other bodies

- 3.31. In addition to the independent inspection that is provided by HMIC, certain aspects of the RNP's operations are subject to independent oversight by a range of bodies including the Service Complaints Commissioner, the Office of the Surveillance Commissioner and the Interception of Communications Commissioner's Office.

³⁵ *Protocol on the exercise of criminal jurisdiction in England and Wales BETWEEN The Director of Service Prosecutions and The Director of Public Prosecutions and The Ministry of Defence, 2011*

4. How well does the RNP use the National Intelligence Model in identifying strategic policing priorities that influence strategic planning and resourcing?

What we were looking for

- 4.1. The National Intelligence Model ("the Model") is a business process used by Home Office police forces (and other law enforcement bodies) to provide focus to operational policing and to make sure resources are used to best effect. The Model is set out in a Code of Practice.³⁶
- 4.2. At a strategic level, the Model is used to assess current and emerging crime threats. This assessment is used to help prioritise policing activity and allocate resources.
- 4.3. The Model is underpinned by a set of minimum standards, namely that the organisation:
 - has governance and command structures;
 - can demonstrate knowledge management;
 - gathers information and makes use of intelligence; and
 - has a tasking and co-ordination process.
- 4.4. To assess how well the RNP uses the Model to identify strategic policing priorities and allocate resources, we considered:
 - how well the Model is understood and is supported by relevant and accurate documents that describe threats (i.e. tactical and strategic assessments), and how accessible policies, procedures and training are across the RNP;
 - whether the RNP has a formal meeting structure that meets the requirements set out in the Code of Practice; and
 - how well the RNP produces, assesses and uses intelligence and other information to identify strategic priorities and influence strategic planning and resourcing.

³⁶ *Code of Practice: National Intelligence Model*, Home Office, National Centre for Policing Excellence and Centrex, 2005, paragraph 3.1.1, page 6. Available at: <http://library.college.police.uk/docs/npia/NIM-Code-of-Practice.pdf>.

Findings

- 4.5. In summary, we found that RNP meetings were well structured and complied with the Code of Practice. Personnel had a good understanding of the Model and they had ready access to policies and documents. The RNP's analytical products provided clear direction and guidance in relation to force priorities, but the force strategic assessment did not identify future demands adequately. The Strategic Tasking and Coordination Group identified priorities that influenced planning and resourcing in the short term but not the long term.

How well the Model is understood, with relevant and accurate documents that describe threats, and how accessible policies, procedures and training are across the RNP

- 4.6. We found that all relevant personnel in the RNP were provided with training about the Model. The training included an explanation of how to apply the Model in their day-to-day work. We also found that information relating to the Model was easily accessible. RNP personnel to whom we spoke had a good understanding of the Model's principles and their individual responsibilities under it.
- 4.7. We examined three tactical and strategic assessments. We found that they were detailed and informative.

Whether the RNP has a formal meeting structure that meets the requirements set out in the Code of Practice

- 4.8. We found that the RNP's arrangements for regular meetings to discuss intelligence-related matters (generally known among organisations that have adopted the Model as 'co-ordination group meetings') complied with the requirements of the Model.
- 4.9. We observed one of the RNP's daily management meetings. This meeting was attended by representatives from each of the RNP units, either in person or by telephone conference. The meeting reviewed incidents and offences during the previous 24 hours, allocated actions to named individuals, reviewed actions from previous meetings and allocated resources to deal with incidents.
- 4.10. We also observed an RNP-wide Tactical Tasking and Coordination Group meeting. This monthly meeting was chaired by the Deputy Provost Marshal (Navy) and was attended in person by senior RNP personnel from each of the regions. We also observed the Eastern Region Tactical Tasking and Coordination Group meeting. This was chaired by the RNP officer in charge of that region. We were supplied with agendas and supporting documents such as tactical assessments.

- 4.11. We considered that the Tactical Tasking and Coordinating Group meetings we observed were effective. They covered a wide range of issues including a review of outstanding actions, high risk issues, progress against the RNP control strategy (see paragraph 4.13), progress of serious investigations and resource allocation. We examined the minutes of previous meetings and found similar topics had been covered in those. We found a consistent approach was taken to meetings, including a review of all outstanding actions and updates provided by named individuals.
- 4.12. The Provost Marshal (Navy) chaired the force Strategic Tasking and Coordination Group meeting, which was attended in person by senior RNP officers. We observed this meeting (which we discuss at paragraph 4.15). We found it to be well structured, with formal direction provided by the Provost Marshal (Navy) and effective updates provided by plan owners against their respective responsibilities under the RNP control strategy.

How well the RNP produces, assesses and uses intelligence and other information to identify strategic priorities and influence strategic planning and resourcing

- 4.13. We found that the RNP had set out its requirements for the collection of intelligence. These featured in a comprehensive document (called an "intelligence requirement") which was compiled on a six-monthly basis by the force intelligence bureau. The intelligence requirement focused on the priority areas within the RNP's "control strategy" (another component of the Model). We also found that the RNP produced intelligence collection plans in relation to short term or new policing priorities.
- 4.14. We found that RNP personnel had a good understanding of the intelligence requirement, intelligence collection plans and how to collect and submit the required intelligence.
- 4.15. The RNP provided us with a copy of its *Strategic Assessment*,³⁷ which is produced annually. This document was used by the Provost Marshal (Navy) and the Strategic Tasking and Coordination Group to decide the strategic policing priorities for the year ahead.
- 4.16. We examined the strategic assessment for the period January 2014 to December 2014 (which was published in March 2015). We found that it contained an analysis of threat, which determined the RNP's strategic priorities for 2015 as:
- domestic abuse;
 - digital crime;

³⁷ *Strategic Assessment 2014*, Royal Navy Police, 16 March 2015 (unpublished).

- fraud;
 - sex related crime;
 - misuse of drugs;
 - organised crime groups;
 - firearms and explosives;
 - violence; and
 - tackling alcohol consumption and its effects on the commission of crime.
- 4.17. We found that these priorities were used as the basis for the control strategy which described how each priority would be addressed by the RNP in different thematic ways: prevention; intelligence; enforcement; and reassurance activity.
- 4.18. The annual strategic assessment provided an appropriate means to address the current and emerging issues in the short term (i.e. 12 months ahead). However, it did not adequately identify demands and threats further ahead.
- 4.19. The ability to have a clear understanding of the future demands the RNP may face is important in order for it to determine what capacity and capability it needs to meet the challenges that those future demands will bring.

Area for improvement

- The strategic assessment process is an area for improvement. The Provost Marshal (Navy) should improve the use of the strategic assessment process, in order to identify future demands more effectively. This will enable a more accurate assessment to be made of the RNP's capacity and capability to meet those demands.

5. Conclusions

Our terms of reference required us to address certain questions, which we set out below.

How effective is the overall strategic leadership and direction of the RNP including the structures and mechanisms in support of these areas?

- 5.1. The evidence for this aspect of the inspection showed that the RNP was well led overall. We found a clear mandate from the Provost Marshal (Navy), with strong leadership and clear priorities. There was a committed and professional workforce which had a clear understanding of its role. In the various documents we reviewed, we found the roles and responsibilities of the RNP were clearly set out and comprehensive guidance on the Provost Marshal (Navy)'s expectations for the quality of investigations. Certain documents provided evidence of a good emphasis on victim care in the RNP, which was also reflected in some of the training activities. Against this evidence of good strategic leadership, our inspection also revealed opportunities to strengthen it further.
- 5.2. The command arrangements need revision; they are too restrictive. This prompted our first recommendation.
- 5.3. The understanding of the role of the RNP by the wider Royal Navy was consistently raised with us as the area of most concern to RNP personnel during the inspection; we were pleased to see that this was being addressed through the ethos, culture and identity study commissioned by Provost Marshal (Navy). Nevertheless, our findings prompted us to make our second recommendation: an assessment of the suitability of the tasks carried out by RNP personnel. In other areas, we were prompted to make three further recommendations, concerning the introduction of: a process to gather feedback from victims; accreditation of investigators by the College of Policing; and a tenure policy for certain posts.
- 5.4. On balance, we conclude that the Provost Marshal (Navy) provided effective leadership and strategic direction of the RNP in relation to investigations but that action needs to be taken in order to improve matters in the five areas we outlined in paragraphs 5.2 and 5.3. Furthermore, we consider that such action would help to improve the effectiveness of investigations and help to keep them free from improper interference.

How effective are the oversight, governance, monitoring and assessment arrangements within the RNP to ensure investigations are effective and kept free from improper interference?

- 5.5. The evidence for this aspect of the inspection fell into two broad areas: the arrangements to ensure that investigations were effective in general; and specifically the arrangements to ensure that investigations were kept free from improper interference.
- 5.6. In the first area, the inspection revealed evidence of good oversight, governance, monitoring and assessment arrangements, such as the reviews of investigations by senior officers at set times and the requirement for authorisation by a senior RNP officer before the closure of investigations. These arrangements were strong and they provided assurance to the Provost Marshal (Navy).
- 5.7. In the second area, the inspection revealed evidence of good arrangements to ensure that investigations were kept free from improper interference, such as the direct access to the First Sea Lord enjoyed by the Provost Marshal (Navy). This and the various other measures we found, such as the requirements for commanding officers to refer certain cases to the RNP, provided good assurance to the Provost Marshal (Navy).
- 5.8. We considered that, in order to strengthen this already good assurance, the RNP should make better use of the expertise that is available from other relevant professionals and introduce processes by which the independence and quality of investigations can be independently assessed. This prompted our sixth recommendation.
- 5.9. Therefore we conclude that, while there are effective oversight, governance, monitoring and assessment arrangements within the RNP to ensure investigations are effective and kept free from improper interference, the arrangements should be strengthened in the manner we describe in paragraph 5.8. We also conclude that, taken together, completion of all the recommendations we make in this report would help to improve the effectiveness of investigations and help to keep them free from improper interference.

How well does the RNP use the National Intelligence Model in identifying strategic policing priorities that influence strategic planning and resourcing?

- 5.10. The evidence for this aspect of the inspection identified a clear commitment to the National Intelligence Model from the RNP's leadership. RNP meetings under the National Intelligence Model process were well structured. They identified in an effective way the emerging issues and threats faced by the RNP in the short term.
- 5.11. The RNP analytical products we reviewed provided personnel with clear direction and guidance in relation to force priorities. However, when we looked at the RNP's ability to assess and predict future issues that may affect the force, the evidence was less reassuring. The force strategic assessment did not adequately identify demands, threats in the longer term. This is an area for improvement.
- 5.12. Therefore, we conclude that, in order to better inform strategic planning and resourcing, the RNP should improve its use of the National Intelligence Model in identifying strategic policing priorities that influence longer term strategic planning and resourcing.

Annex A – Methodology

The inspection was carried out in three stages.

Initial visit

During the first stage in October 2015, HMIC made a one-day visit to RNP headquarters, Portsmouth to gain an understanding of the way in which the RNP is structured and how it operates.

Document review

The second stage consisted of a review of over 1,000 pages of documents provided by the force that described the structure, leadership and operational procedures of the RNP.

Field inspection visits

The field inspection took place in November 2015. This included visits to shore bases at Portsmouth, Plymouth and Upavon and two naval vessels, which were docked at Portsmouth and Plymouth.

We interviewed the Provost Marshal (Navy), three deputy Provosts Marshal, and commanding officers from the Royal Marines Police Troop and the Special Investigations Branch. We held focus groups with junior RNP personnel and also with other Royal Navy personnel.

We obtained from the RNP a list of case files, from which we selected twelve at random, for examination to see how strategic leadership and direction affected day-to-day practice. We also visited the Service Police Crime Bureau. This bureau, which is staffed by personnel from the three armed service police forces, covers a wide range of responsibilities such as crime recording, support to service police investigations and dealing with enquiries from other law enforcement agencies.

We examined the arrangements for the training and skill development of RNP personnel and we visited the RNP training college (Defence School of Policing and Guarding) where we spoke with personnel.

Annex B – List of case files reviewed

1. Theft
2. Burglary and theft
3. Burglary with intent to steal
4. Possession of a class A drug with intent to supply
5. Assault
6. Assault
7. Assault
8. Assault
9. Voyeurism
10. Sexual assault
11. Sexual assault
12. Rape

Annex C – Recommendations and area for improvement

Recommendation 1

By 31 December 2016, the Royal Navy should revise the command arrangements for the RNP in order to give the Provost Marshal (Navy) greater control over the deployment of RNP personnel.

Recommendation 2

By 31 December 2016, the Provost Marshal (Navy) should undertake a comprehensive survey of the tasks carried out by RNP personnel that are unrelated to the RNP's investigative and disciplinary role (the primary purpose). The survey should determine whether the performance of those tasks causes a reduction in the RNP's ability to meet its primary purpose. From this survey, the Provost Marshal (Navy) should, under the direction of the First Sea Lord, provide an assessment of the suitability of those tasks for RNP personnel.

Recommendation 3

By 30 September 2016, the Provost Marshal (Navy) should put in place a structured process to gather and act on feedback from victims in order to assess and improve the quality of victim care in investigations.

Recommendation 4

By 1 March 2017, the Provost Marshal (Navy) should, in conjunction with Provosts Marshal (Army and RAF), establish a mechanism whereby RNP investigators are accredited by the College of Policing under the Professionalising the Investigation Programme.

Recommendation 5

By 30 September 2016, the Provost Marshal (Navy) should identify the small number of posts for which an extended tenure arrangement is warranted. The Provost Marshal (Navy) should then negotiate the introduction of such an arrangement as soon as possible thereafter.

Recommendation 6

By 30 September 2016, the Provost Marshal (Navy) should make arrangements for the introduction of a structured process by which the independence and overall quality of RNP investigations is reviewed by other relevant professionals on a regular basis.

Area for improvement

- The strategic assessment process is an area for improvement. The Provost Marshal (Navy) should improve the use of the strategic assessment process, in order to identify future demands more effectively. This will enable a more accurate assessment to be made of the RNP's capacity and capability to meet those demands.